

DRAFT

[For Internal Expert/Peer Review]

**The First State of the Carbon Cycle Report
(SOCCR): The North American Carbon Budget
and Implications for the Global Carbon Cycle**



U.S. Climate Change Science Program

Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.2

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[Note: The organization of this publication is subject to change]

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PREFACE

1
2
3 A primary objective of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) is to provide the best
4 possible scientific information to support public discussion, as well as government and private sector
5 decision-making, on key climate-related issues. To help meet this objective, the CCSP has identified an
6 initial set of 21 synthesis and assessment products that address its highest priority research, observation,
7 and decision-support needs.

8 This CCSP Report, which is one of the 21 products, provides a synthesis and integration of the
9 current knowledge of the North American carbon budget and its context within the global carbon cycle. In
10 a format useful to decision makers, it (1) summarizes our knowledge of carbon cycle properties and
11 changes relevant to the contributions of and impacts¹ upon the United States and the rest of the world, and
12 (2) provide scientific information for U.S. decision support focused on key issues for carbon management
13 and policy. Consequently, this Report promises to be of significant value to decision-makers, and to the
14 expert scientific and stakeholder communities. For example, we expect this Report to be a major
15 contributor to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (due to
16 be published in 2007).

17 This Report—Synthesis and Assessment Product (SAP) 2.2—addresses carbon emissions; natural
18 reservoirs and sequestration; rates of transfer; the consequences of changes in carbon cycling on land and
19 the ocean; effects of purposeful carbon management; effects of agriculture, forestry, and natural resource
20 management on the carbon cycle; and the socio-economic drivers and consequences of changes in the
21 carbon cycle. It covers North America’s land, atmosphere, inland waters, and adjacent oceans, where
22 “North America” is defined as Canada, the United States of America, and Mexico. The Report includes an
23 analysis of North America’s carbon budget that documents the state of knowledge and quantifies the best
24 estimates (i.e., consensus, accepted, official) and uncertainties. This analysis provides a baseline against
25 which future results from the North American Carbon Program (NACP) can be compared. SAP 2.2 will
26 be coordinated with other CCSP synthesis and assessment products as appropriate, especially SAP 2.1
27 (*Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations and Review of Integrated*
28 *Scenario Development and Application*) and SAP 3.1 (*Climate Models: An Assessment of Strengths and*
29 *Limitations for User Applications*).

¹The term “impacts” as used in this Report refers to specific effects of changes in the carbon cycle, such as acidification of the ocean, the effect of increased CO₂ on plant growth and survival, and changes in concentrations of carbon in the atmosphere. The term is not used as a shortened version of “climate impacts,” as was adopted for the *Strategic Plan for the U.S. Climate Change Science Program*.

1 The focus of this Report follows the Prospectus developed by the Climate Change Science Program
2 and posted on its website at www.climatescience.gov. More specifically, SAP 2.2 attempts to:

- 3 • Quantify current information on sources and sinks and associated uncertainties related to the buildup
4 of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and methane (CH₄) in the atmosphere. For example, it provides the best
5 available estimates of the contribution of carbon dioxide emissions from combustion of fossil fuels in
6 North America to changes in global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide for recent decades.
7 Discussion of future changes in fossil fuel emissions are limited to existing scenarios because
8 scenarios are the central element of the work being done under SAP 2.1.
- 9 • Discuss and assess current accepted projections of the future of the North American carbon budget,
10 including uncertainties in projected fossil fuel emissions and the impact of policy and technology
11 scenarios on those emissions.
- 12 • Provide current estimates, with the associated uncertainties, of the fractions of global and North
13 American fossil-fuel carbon emissions being taken up by North America's ecosystems and adjacent
14 oceans.
- 15 • Provide current, best available answers to specific questions about the North American carbon budget
16 relevant to carbon management policy options. The key questions were identified through early and
17 continuing dialogue with SAP 2.2 stakeholders. The answers include explicit characterization of
18 uncertainties.
- 19 • Identify where NACP-supported research will reduce current uncertainties in the North American
20 carbon budget and where future enhancements of NACP research can best be applied to further
21 reduce critical uncertainties.
- 22 • Describe and characterize the carbon cycle as an integrated interactive system, using innovative
23 graphics to depict the carbon cycle in ways that are easily understandable.

24
25 The audience for SAP 2.2 includes scientists, decisionmakers in the public sector (Federal, State,
26 and local governments), the private sector (carbon-related industry, including energy, transportation,
27 agriculture, and forestry sectors; and climate policy and carbon management interest groups), the
28 international community, and the general public. This broad audience is indicative of the diversity of
29 stakeholder groups interested in knowledge of carbon cycling in North America and of how such
30 knowledge might be used to influence or make decisions. Not all the scientific information needs of this
31 broad audience can be met in this first synthesis and assessment product, but the scientific information
32 provided herein is designed to be understandable by all. The primary users of SAP 2.2 are likely to be

1 officials involved in formulating climate policy, individuals responsible for managing carbon in the
2 environment, and scientists involved in assessing and/or advancing the frontier of knowledge.

3 It is envisioned that SAP 2.2 will be used (1) as a state-of-the-art assessment of our knowledge of
4 carbon cycle properties and changes relevant to the contributions of and carbon-specific impacts upon the
5 United States in the context of the rest of the world; (2) as a contribution to relevant national and
6 international assessments; (3) to provide the scientific basis for decision support that will guide
7 management and policy decisions that affect carbon fluxes, emissions, and sequestration; (4) as a means
8 of informing policymakers and the public concerning the general state of our knowledge of the global
9 carbon cycle with respect to the contributions of and impacts on the United States; and (5) as a statement
10 of the carbon cycle science information needs of important stakeholder groups. For example, well-
11 quantified regional and continental-scale carbon source and sink estimates, error terms, and associated
12 uncertainties will be available for use in U.S. climate policy formulation and by resource managers
13 interested in quantifying carbon emissions reductions or carbon uptake and storage. This Report is also
14 intended for senior managers and members of the general public who desire to improve their overall
15 understanding of the U.S. role in Earth's carbon budget and to gain perspective on what is and is not
16 known.

17 The questions addressed by this Report include:

- 18 • What is the carbon cycle and why should we care?
- 19 • How do North American carbon sources and sinks relate to the global carbon cycle?
- 20 • What are the primary carbon sources and sinks in North America, and how are they changing
21 and why?
- 22 • What are the direct, non-climatic effects of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide or other changes in
23 the carbon cycle on the land and oceans of North America?
- 24 • What are the options and measures implemented in North America that could significantly affect the
25 North American and global carbon cycles (e.g., North American sinks and global atmospheric
26 concentrations of carbon dioxide)?
- 27 • How can we improve the application of scientific information to decision support for carbon
28 management and climate decision making?

29
30 These questions provide the basis for the five chapters in Part I of this Synthesis and Assessment
31 Report. Part II of the Report focuses on the human-system components of the North American carbon
32 cycle, and discusses the carbon "sources and sinks" aspects of (a) energy extraction and conversion,

1 (b) the transportation sector, (c) industry and waste management, and (d) the buildings sector. Part III
2 provides information about land and water systems, including human settlements, and their roles in the
3 carbon cycle.

4

5 ***[NOTE TO REVIEWERS: The following items will also be included in the PREFACE, but***
6 ***have not yet been developed.]***

- 7 • Structure and organization of this report; How to read this report
8 • Definition of basic terms, acronyms, units, etc.
9 • Treatment of carbon vs CO₂ vs CO₂ equivalents
10 • Treatment of CH₄
11 • Treatment of greenhouse gases
12 • Conventions for sources and sinks (i.e., positive and negative numbers)

1 **U.S. Climate Change Science Program**
2 **Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.2**
3 **The First State of the Carbon Cycle Report (SOCCR):**
4 **North American Carbon Budget**
5 **and Implications for the Global Carbon Cycle**

6
7 ***Executive Summary***

8
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10
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16
17
18 The Earth's carbon budget is in imbalance. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution in the 18th
19 century, but most dramatically since World War II, the human use of coal, petroleum, and natural gas has
20 transferred large amounts of carbon from geological reservoirs to the atmosphere, primarily as the
21 combustion product carbon dioxide (CO₂). Clearing of forests and plowing of grasslands for agriculture
22 has also transferred carbon from plants and soils to the atmosphere as CO₂. The combined rate of transfer
23 is far larger than can be balanced by the biological and geological processes which naturally remove CO₂
24 from the atmosphere and store the carbon in various terrestrial and marine reservoirs as part of the earth's
25 carbon cycle. The result is a "piling up" of CO₂ in the atmosphere, and a dramatic increase in
26 atmospheric CO₂ concentration. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has increased by 31%
27 since 1750, and the present concentration is now higher than at any time in the past 420,000 years and
28 perhaps the past 20 million years. Because CO₂ is an important greenhouse gas, this imbalance and
29 buildup in the atmosphere has consequences for climate and climate change.

30 North America is a major contributor to this imbalance. Among all countries, the United States,
31 Canada, and Mexico ranked, respectively, as the first, eighth, and eleventh largest emitters of CO₂ from
32 fossil fuels in 2002. Combined, these three countries contributed almost a third (32%) of the world's

1 entire fossil fuel emissions in 2002 and more than quarter (27%) in 2003. North America is
2 incontrovertibly a major source of atmospheric CO₂.

3 North America may also be an important sink. Many lines of scientific evidence point to the
4 vegetation and soils of the Northern Hemisphere as a net sink for atmospheric carbon, removing CO₂
5 from the atmosphere and to some degree mitigating fossil-fuel sources. The contribution of North
6 America to that sink is, however, highly uncertain. The mechanisms that might be responsible for a North
7 American sink, including forest regrowth and sequestration in agricultural soils, are reasonably well
8 known. However, their relative contributions, their magnitudes, and their future fates are highly
9 uncertain.

10 Understanding the North American carbon budget, both sources and sinks, is critical to the U.S.
11 Climate Change Science Program goal of providing the best possible scientific information to support
12 public discussion, as well as government and private sector decision making, on key climate-related
13 issues. In response, this Report provides a synthesis, integration and assessment of the current knowledge
14 of the North American carbon budget and its context within the global carbon cycle. The Report is
15 organized as a response to questions about the North American carbon budget relevant to carbon
16 management policy options and a broad range of stakeholder groups interested in knowledge of carbon
17 cycling in North America and of how such knowledge might be used to influence or make decisions. The
18 questions were identified through early and continuing dialogue with these stakeholder groups, including
19 scientists, decision makers in the public sector (Federal, State, and local governments), the private sector
20 (carbon-related industry, including energy, transportation, agriculture, and forestry sectors; and climate
21 policy and carbon management interest groups), the international community, and the general public.

22 The questions and the answers provided by this Report are summarized below.
23

24 **What is the carbon cycle and why should we care?**

25 The carbon cycle is the combination of many different physical, chemical and biological processes
26 that transfer carbon between storage pools or reservoirs in the atmosphere, plants, soils, freshwater
27 systems, ocean and geological sediments. We are familiar with the cycling of water in precipitation,
28 runoff, stream flow, and evaporation. Water delivered from the atmosphere in rain and snow evaporates
29 from land, freshwater rivers and lakes, and the ocean, and condenses in the atmosphere to form clouds.
30 These clouds generate rain or snow, and the cycle begins anew. Similarly, carbon cycles through the
31 atmosphere, land and water, and over long periods of time, through the earth's rocky crust itself.

32 Hundreds of millions of years ago, and over millions of years, this carbon cycle was responsible for
33 the formation of coal, petroleum, and natural gas, the fossil fuels that are the primary source of energy for
34 our modern, post-industrial societies. Today, the cycling of carbon among atmosphere, land, freshwater

1 and marine reservoirs over periods of years and decades determines the balance of the carbon budget
2 observed at any particular time: how much carbon is stored in a reservoir, how much is coming in, how
3 much is going out, and how fast the carbon pool is changing. Currently the global carbon budget is in
4 imbalance, with carbon building up in the atmosphere as carbon dioxide, and human use of coal,
5 petroleum and natural gas to fuel economies is responsible.

6 If vast quantities of water had been trapped underground for millions of years and then, in recent
7 decades, released to trigger unprecedented rates of evaporation and thus significant changes in cloud
8 formation and precipitation patterns, there might be concerns about possible imbalances in the water
9 cycle. This has not happened for water, but it has happened for carbon. The 19th and especially 20th
10 centuries saw a dramatic rise in the combustion of “fossil fuels,” releasing into the atmosphere over
11 *decades* quantities of carbon that had been stored in the earth system over thousands of *millennia*. During
12 this same time, forests that had once absorbed very large quantities of carbon dioxide were being
13 converted to agricultural cropland with carbon released to the atmosphere during clearing.

14 It is not surprising, then, that concentrations of carbon dioxide and other carbon compounds in the
15 earth’s atmosphere, such as methane, are increasing. This facts, together with patterns of human activity
16 that are likely to continue trends in fossil fuel use and deforestation, raise concerns about imbalances in
17 the carbon cycle and their implications.

18 Climate change is an obvious concern. Atmospheric carbon dioxide is the largest single forcing agent
19 of climate change. However, the consequences of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide extend beyond
20 climate change alone. It is increasingly evident that elevated atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations
21 are responsible for increased acidification of the surface ocean, with potentially dire future consequences
22 for corals and other marine organisms that build their skeletons and shells from calcium carbonate.
23 Ocean acidification is a powerful reason in addition to that of climate change to care about the carbon
24 cycle and the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

25 Invariably, any options or actions to prevent, minimize, or forestall future climate change, or to avoid
26 damage to marine ecosystems from ocean acidification, will require management of the carbon cycle and
27 concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. That management involves both reducing sources of
28 atmospheric carbon dioxide like the combustion of fossil fuels, or enhancing sinks such as uptake and
29 storage or sequestration in vegetation and soils. In either case, formulation of options by decision makers
30 and successful management of the earth’s carbon budget requires solid scientific understanding of the
31 carbon cycle.

32

1 **How do North American carbon sources and sinks relate to the global carbon** 2 **cycle?**

3 North America is responsible for approximately 27% of the carbon dioxide emissions produced
4 globally by fossil fuel combustion. The United States accounts for 86% of the North American total and
5 approximately one quarter of the global total. In recent years, extraction of fossil fuels and their
6 conversion into energy delivery forms (solid, liquid, gas, and electric) in North America released on the
7 order of 2800 million metric tons (Mt) of CO₂ per year to the atmosphere, approximately 10% of total
8 global emissions in 2003. Electricity generation is responsible for most (90-95%) of North America's
9 energy extraction and conversion emissions. The transportation sector of North America released 2151
10 Mt CO₂ into the atmosphere in 2003, 40% of the total carbon emissions from worldwide transportation
11 activity and about 9% of total global CO₂ emissions. The buildings sector in North America is
12 responsible for the annual emission of 2712 Mt CO₂ or 9% of global fossil fuel emissions. U.S. buildings
13 alone are responsible for more CO₂ emissions than total CO₂ emissions of any country in the world,
14 except China. Most—approximately 64%—of the emissions from the building sector of North America
15 are associated with the production of electricity used in buildings. Emissions from the North American
16 building sector, excluding electricity, were about 4% of global total CO₂ emissions in 2003. In 2002,
17 North American industry (excluding fossil fuel mining and processing) was responsible for the release of
18 826 Mt CO₂ into the atmosphere, or 16% of the 5200 Mt CO₂ emissions from global industry.

19 The carbon budget of North America is dominated by the fossil fuel emissions source; however, the
20 vegetation and soils of North America and the surrounding coastal oceans are also a substantial net sink.
21 Approximately 30% of North American fossil fuel emissions are offset by a smaller sink of 2170 Mt CO₂
22 per year. Most (60%) of that sink is caused by relatively young, growing forests in the United States and
23 Canada which have re-colonized land formerly cleared of forests for agricultural use in past centuries.
24 The *global* terrestrial sink is quite uncertain, estimated as somewhere in the range of 2200 to 8433 Mt
25 CO₂ per year during the 1990s, with the actual sink likely near 4000 Mt CO₂ per year. Thus, North
26 America is probably responsible for at least half of the global terrestrial sink, but could account for as
27 little as a quarter to nearly all of it.

28 Both as a source and a sink, North America is a major, even dominant component of the global
29 carbon cycle. And it is clear that the North American carbon budget of the next few decades will
30 continue to be dominated by the large sources from fossil fuel emissions as the trends responsible for
31 current emissions continue into at least the near future. Consequently, the global carbon cycle will
32 continue to be dominated by a large fossil fuel source from North America. The future trajectory of
33 carbon sinks in North America, and their contribution to the global terrestrial sink is less certain, in part
34 because the important contribution of regrowing forests is likely to decline as the forests mature, and in

1 part because the response of forests and other ecosystems to future climate change and increases in
2 atmospheric CO₂ concentrations is uncertain.

3 Because North America's carbon budget is such a substantial part of the global carbon budget,
4 options and measures taken to manage the North American carbon budget will have important global
5 consequences. North America has many opportunities for decreasing emissions, including changes to the
6 energy system, increasing energy efficiency, investments in forest planting and agricultural soil
7 management, biomass energy, and geological sequestration. Implementation of policies to deploy these
8 technologies and practices is best achieved by national governments with international cooperation. This
9 provides maximum coverage of CO₂ emissions and carbon sinks. It also allows better allocation of
10 resources for technology research and development.

11 **What are the primary carbon sources and sinks in North America, and how are** 12 **they changing and why?**

13 ***The Sources***

14
15 The primary source of carbon in North America is the release of CO₂ during the combustion of fossil
16 fuels. The North American fossil fuel source is three times larger than the net sink of land and water
17 systems and dominates the net carbon balance of the continent. Fossil fuel carbon emissions in the
18 United States, Canada and Mexico totaled 1856 Mt C (6805 Mt CO₂) in 2003 and have increased at an
19 average rate of approximately 1% per year for the last 30 years. The United States was responsible for
20 85% of North America's fossil fuel emissions in 2003, Canada for 9% and Mexico 6%.

21
22 U.S. emissions dominate North American emissions and continue to grow at close to the North
23 American average rate of ~1.0% per year, but U.S. per capita emissions have been roughly constant for
24 the past 30 years, while the carbon intensity of the U.S. economy has decreased at a rate of ~2% per year.
25 U.S. emissions grew at 1% per year even though per capita emissions were roughly constant simply
26 because of population growth at an average rate of 1%. The constancy of U.S. per capita values masks
27 faster than 1% growth in some sectors (e.g., transportation) that was balanced by slower growth in others
28 (e.g., increased manufacturing energy efficiency). Also, a large part of the decline in the carbon intensity
29 of the U.S. economy was caused by the comparatively rapid growth of the service sector (3.6% per year),
30 which now dominates the economy (roughly three-fourths of GDP) and has carbon emissions per dollar
31 of economic activity only 15% that of manufacturing. This implies that emissions growth is essentially
32 decoupled from economic growth. Also, because the service sector is likely to continue to grow more
33 rapidly than other sectors of the economy, we expect that carbon emissions will continue to grow more
34 slowly than GDP.

1 Electricity generation is the single largest contributor to the North American fossil-fuel source,
2 accounting for approximately 40% of the total North American fossil fuel source. Again, U.S. emissions
3 dominate. In 2003, electricity generation in the United States alone released 2409 Mt CO₂ to the
4 atmosphere, 35% of total North American fossil fuel emissions for that year.

5 The transportation sector of North America released 2120 Mt CO₂ into the atmosphere in 2003,
6 31% of total North American emissions. Most (87%) of that source is from the United States.
7 Transportation energy use in North America and the associated CO₂ emissions have grown substantially
8 and relatively steadily over the past forty years. Growth has been most rapid in Mexico, the country most
9 dependent upon road transport. Carbon emissions from the transportation sector are determined by the
10 levels of passenger and freight activity, the shares of transport modes, the energy intensity of passenger
11 and freight movements, and the carbon intensity of transportation fuels. The growth of passenger and
12 freight activity are driven by population, per capita income, and economic output. Chiefly as a result of
13 economic growth, energy use by North American transportation is expected to increase by 46% from
14 2003 to 2025.

15 More than half of electricity produced in North America (67% in the United States) is consumed in
16 buildings, making that single use the third largest carbon source in North America (25% of the total). The
17 trend in the buildings sector over the last decade has been towards growth, with emissions from energy
18 use in buildings in the United States and Canada (including the use of natural gas, wood, and other fuels
19 as well as electricity) increasing 30% since 1990, corresponding to an annual growth rate of 2.1%. In the
20 United States, the major drivers of energy consumption growth in the buildings sector are growth in
21 commercial floor space and increase in the size of the average home. Carbon emissions from buildings
22 will grow with energy consumption, which in turn will increase with population and income.
23 Furthermore, the shift from large extended- to nuclear-family and single-occupant households means an
24 increase in the number of households per unit population—each with its own heating and cooling systems
25 and electrical appliances. Certain electrical appliances (such as space cooling/conditioning equipment)
26 once considered a luxury are now becoming commonplace. Technology- and market-driven
27 improvements in efficiency are expected to continue for most equipment, but this will probably not be
28 sufficient to adequately curtail emissions growth in the buildings sector without government intervention.

29 Emissions from North American industry (not including fossil fuel mining and processing or
30 electricity generation) are a relatively small (12%) and declining component of North America's fossil
31 fuel source. Industrial CO₂ emissions from North America decreased nearly 11% between 1990 and
32 2002, while energy consumption in the United States and Canada increased 8% to 10% during that period.
33 In both countries, a shift in production toward less energy-intensive industries and dissemination of more
34 energy efficient equipment kept the rate of energy demand growth lower than industrial GDP growth.

1 **The Sinks**

2 Approximately 30% of North American fossil fuel emissions are offset by a natural sink of 592 Mt C
3 per year caused by a variety of factors, including forest regrowth, fire suppression, and agricultural soil
4 conservation. The sink currently absorbs 506 Mt C per year in the United States and 134 Mt C per year in
5 Canada. Mexican ecosystems create a net source of 48 Mt C per year, mostly as a consequence of
6 ongoing deforestation. The coastal ocean surrounding North America is also a small net source of carbon
7 to the atmosphere (19 Mt C per year)

8 The primary carbon sink in North America is that of growing forests in the United States and Canada
9 that have re-colonized land formerly cleared of forests for agricultural use in past centuries. Forest
10 regrowth transfers carbon from the atmosphere, and it accumulates primarily in aboveground vegetation,
11 with about a third accumulating as dead organic carbon in the soil. The suppression of forest fires also
12 increases net carbon storage in forest biomass. The forest sink is by far the largest single component of
13 the net North American sink, currently responsible for approximately 358 Mt C per year, or 60% of the
14 total. As the recovering forests mature, however, net carbon uptake and the size of the sink decline; the
15 estimated forest sink in Canada declined by nearly a third between 1990 and 2003.

16 Woody encroachment, the invasion of woody plants into grasslands or of trees into shrublands, is a
17 potentially large, but highly uncertain carbon sink. It is caused by a combination of fire suppression and
18 grazing. Fire inside the United States has been reduced by more than 95% from the pre-settlement level of
19 approximately 80 million hectares burned per year, and this favors shrubs and trees in competition with
20 grasses. The resulting sink has been estimated at 120 Mt C per year (20% of the North American sink),
21 but the uncertainty around this estimate is greater than 100%. Woody encroachment might actually
22 represent a small source of atmospheric carbon, or the sink might be twice the current estimate.

23 Wood products and wetlands are sinks of comparable size, 67 and 70 Mt C per year, respectively, or
24 about 12% each of the total North American sink. Wood products create a carbon sink because they
25 accumulate both in use (e.g., furniture, house frames, etc.) and in landfills. The wetland sink is primarily
26 a consequence of peat accumulation in Canada's extensive frozen and unfrozen wetlands and of
27 sedimentation and the accompanying carbon sequestration in mineral soils of Canadian and U.S.
28 wetlands. Drainage of peatlands in the United States has created a net source of 5 Mt C per year, and the
29 very large reservoir of carbon in North American wetlands (the single largest carbon pool of any North
30 American ecosystem) is vulnerable to release to the atmosphere in response to climate change and
31 drainage for development, shifting this moderate sink to a potentially large source.

32 Agricultural lands in North America are currently nearly neutral with respect to carbon. Although
33 mineral soils are estimated to be sequestering currently 6–15 Mt C per year, cultivation of organic soils
34 releases 5–10 Mt C per year. The net is an approximate carbon balance for agricultural soils in Canada

1 and a small sink 6 Mt C year or even source (1.5 Mt C per year) in the United States. The carbon balance
2 of agricultural lands is determined by two processes: management and changes in the environment. The
3 effects of management (e.g., cultivation, conservation tillage) are reasonably well known and have been
4 responsible for historic losses of carbon in Canada and the United States (and current losses in Mexico),
5 albeit with some increased sequestration in recent years. The effects of climate are uncertain.

6 Conversion of agricultural and wildlands to cities and other human settlements affect carbon sinks
7 mainly by replacing biological ecosystems with built land cover. Growth of urban and suburban trees in
8 North America are a part of the forest sink discussed above, but the rates of carbon sequestration in the
9 vegetation and soils of settlements are uncertain and probably relatively small, certainly in comparison to
10 fossil fuel emissions these areas. Thus, settlements in North America are almost certainly a source of
11 atmospheric carbon, and the density and development patterns of human settlements are drivers of fossil
12 fuel emissions, especially in the important residential and transportation sectors.

14 **What are the direct, non-climatic effects of increasing atmospheric CO₂ or other** 15 **changes in the carbon cycle on the land and oceans of North America?**

16 The consequences of a carbon cycle imbalance and the buildup of CO₂ in the atmosphere CO₂ extend
17 beyond climate change alone. Ocean acidification and “CO₂ fertilization” of land plants are foremost
18 among these direct, non-climatic effects.

19 The increasing concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere has already made the world’s oceans more
20 acid. This acidification negatively impacts corals and other marine organisms that build their skeletons
21 and shells from calcium carbonate. Future changes could dramatically alter the composition of ocean
22 ecosystems of North America and elsewhere.

23 Rates of photosynthesis of many plant species often increase in response to elevated concentrations of
24 carbon dioxide, thus potentially increasing plant growth and even agricultural crop yields in the future.
25 There is, however, considerable uncertainty about whether such “CO₂ fertilization” will continue into the
26 future with prolonged exposure to elevated carbon dioxide and whether the fertilization of photosynthesis
27 will translate into increased plant growth or net uptake and storage by terrestrial ecosystem. Recent
28 studies include many examples in which experimental treatment with elevated CO₂ leads to consistent
29 increases in plant growth, but others in which elevated CO₂ has little effect on plant growth, leads to an
30 initial stimulation but limited long-term effects, or increases carbon losses as well as gains. Moreover, it
31 is unclear how plants and ecosystem might respond simultaneously to both “CO₂ fertilization” and
32 climate change. While there is some experimental evidence that plants may use less water when exposed
33 to elevated CO₂, it seems likely that extended deep drought or other unfavorable climatic conditions could
34 mitigate the positive effects of elevated CO₂ on plant growth. It is thus far from clear that elevated

1 concentrations of atmospheric CO₂ have led to terrestrial carbon sequestration or will do so at the
2 continental scale in the future.

3 The carbon cycle also intersects with a number of critical earth system processes, including the
4 cycling of both water and nitrogen. Virtually any change in the carbon cycle of the land and ocean of
5 North America as part of purposeful carbon management will consequently affect these other processes
6 and cycles. For example, an increase in organic carbon in soils is likely to increase both the availability
7 of nitrogen for plant growth and enhance the water holding capacity of the soil. However, very little is
8 known about the complex web of interactions between carbon and other systems at continental scales, and
9 the direct, non-climatic effects of carbon cycle change or management on the interwoven systems of
10 North America is essentially unknown.

11
12 **What are the options and measures implemented in North American that could**
13 **significantly affect the North American and global carbon cycles (e.g., North**
14 **American sinks and global atmospheric CO₂ concentrations)?**

15 Addressing imbalances in the North American and global carbon cycles requires options and
16 measures focused on reducing carbon emissions. Options and measures focused on enhancing carbon
17 sinks in soils and biomass can contribute as well, but their potential is far from sufficient to deal with the
18 magnitude of current imbalances.

19 Options for reducing carbon emissions include:

- 20 • Reducing emissions from the transportation sector through efficiency improvement, higher prices for
21 carbon-based fuels, liquid fuels derived from biomass, and in the longer run (after 2025) hydrogen
22 energy;
- 23 • Reducing the carbon emission impact of buildings through efficiency improvements and energy-
24 saving passive design measures;
- 25 • Reducing emissions from the industrial sector through efficiency improvement, fuel-switching, and
26 innovative process designs; and
- 27 • Reducing emissions from energy extraction and conversion through efficiency improvement, fuel-
28 switching, and reduced demands due to increased end use efficiency.

29
30 In many cases, significant progress with such options would require a combination of technology
31 research and development, policy interventions, and information and education programs

32 Opinions differ about the relative mitigation impact of cost-effective emission reduction vs. carbon
33 sequestration at modest cost increases per metric ton of CO₂ emitted. Some economic analyses suggest
34 that the potential mitigation is greater at relatively low prices for agricultural soil carbon sequestration

1 than from fossil fuel use reduction. In addition, analyses suggest that carbon emission cap and trading
2 policies could reduce carbon emissions significantly without a major net economic cost by providing
3 incentives to use the least-cost combination of mitigation/sequestration alternatives.

4 Many options and measures that reduce emissions and increase sequestration have significant co-
5 benefits in terms of economic efficiency and environmental management. At the same time, actions
6 focused on one greenhouse gas or one mitigation pathway can have unintended consequences. For
7 instance, carbon sequestration strategies such as reduced tillage can increase emissions of CH₄ or N₂O.

8 Options and measures can be implemented in a variety of ways at a variety of scales, not only at
9 international or national levels. For example, a number of municipalities, state governments, and private
10 firms in North America have made commitments to voluntary GHG emission reductions. For cities, one
11 focus has been the Cities for Climate Protection program of International Governments for Local
12 Sustainability (formerly ICLEI). For states, the Regional Greenhouse Gas (Cap and Trade) Initiative is
13 nearing implementation. For industry, one focus has been membership in the Pew Center.

14 15 **How can we improve the application of scientific information to decision support** 16 **for carbon management and climate decision making?**

17 Effective carbon management requires that relevant, appropriate science be communicated to the
18 wide variety of people whose decisions affect carbon cycling. Because the field is relatively new and the
19 demand for policy-relevant information has been limited, carbon cycle science has rarely been organized
20 or conducted to inform carbon management. To generate information that can systematically inform
21 carbon management decisions, scientists and decision makers need to clarify what information would be
22 most relevant in specific sectors and arenas for carbon management, adjust research priorities as
23 necessary, and develop mechanisms that enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the information being
24 generated.

25 In the United States, the Federal carbon science enterprise does not yet have many mechanisms to
26 assess emerging demands for carbon information across scales and sectors. Federally funded carbon
27 science has focused predominantly on basic research to reduce uncertainties about the carbon cycle.
28 Initiatives are now underway to promote coordinated, interdisciplinary research that is strategically
29 prioritized to address societal needs. The need for this type of research is increasing. Public concern,
30 voluntary action and governmental efforts to regulate carbon emissions have heightened demand for basic
31 data on the carbon cycle, models that link natural and social systems, and physical, economic and political
32 analysis of specific carbon management options. There appears to be substantial demand for information
33 in the energy, transportation, agriculture, forestry and industrial sectors, at scales ranging from local to
34 global.

1 To ensure that carbon science is as useful as possible for decision making, carbon scientists and
2 carbon managers need to create new forums and institutions for communication and coordination.
3 Research suggests that in order to make a significant contribution to management, scientific and technical
4 information intended for decision making must be perceived not only as credible (worth believing), but
5 also as salient (relevant to decision making on high priority issues) and legitimate (conducted in a way
6 that they believe is fair, unbiased and respectful of divergent views and interests). To generate
7 information that meets these tests, carbon stakeholders and scientists need to collaborate to develop
8 research questions, design research strategies, and review, interpret and disseminate results. Transparency
9 and balanced participation are important for guarding against politicization and enhancing usability.

10 To make carbon cycle science more useful to decision makers in the United States and elsewhere in
11 North America, we suggest that leaders in the carbon science community take the following steps:

- 12 • Identify specific categories of decision makers for whom carbon cycle science is likely to be salient,
13 focusing on policy makers and private sector managers in carbon-intensive sectors (energy, transport,
14 manufacturing, agriculture and forestry);
- 15 • Identify and evaluate existing information about carbon impacts of decisions and actions in these
16 arenas, and assess the need and demand for additional information. In some cases, demand may need
17 to be nurtured and fostered through a two-way interactive process;
- 18 • Encourage scientists and research programs to experiment with both incremental and major
19 departures from existing practice with the goal of making carbon cycle science more salient, credible,
20 and legitimate to carbon managers;
- 21 • Involve not just physical or biological disciplines in scientific efforts to produce useable science, but
22 also social scientists, economists, and communication experts; and
- 23 • Consider initiating participatory pilot research projects and identifying existing “boundary
24 organizations” (or establishing new ones) to bridge carbon management and carbon science.

1

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1 **Chapter 1. What is the Carbon Cycle and Why Do We Care?**
2 ***An Introduction to the Purpose, Scope, and Structure of the State of***
3 ***the Carbon Cycle Report (SOCCR)***

4
5 **Lead Authors: SOCCR Coordinating Team**

6
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12
13 **WHY A REPORT ON THE CARBON CYCLE?**

14 The concept of a *carbon budget* or *carbon cycle* is unfamiliar to many decision makers and other
15 citizens. We are familiar with a *water cycle*, where precipitation falls on the earth to supply water bodies
16 and evaporation returns water vapor to the earth's clouds, which then renew the cycle through
17 precipitation. Similarly, carbon—a fundamental requirement for life on earth—cycles through exchanges
18 between (a) carbon-based life on and near the earth's surface, (b) carbon in the earth's atmosphere, and
19 (c) water in the ocean. Stated in oversimplified terms, plants consume carbon dioxide from the
20 atmosphere through photosynthesis and create sugars and other carbohydrates, which animals and humans
21 use for food and shelter to sustain life. Emissions from plants, other natural systems, and human activities
22 return carbon to the atmosphere, which renews the cycle (Fig. 1-1).

23
24 **Figure 1-1. The global carbon cycle.** Reservoirs (in black) are gigatons [1 Gt = one billion (1×10^9)
25 metric tons] of carbon, and exchanges between reservoirs (in purple) are Gt carbon per year. *Illustration*
26 *courtesy NASA Earth Science Enterprise.*

27
28 All of the components of this cycle—the atmosphere, the terrestrial vegetation, soils, freshwater lakes
29 and rivers, the ocean, and geological sediments—are reservoirs of carbon. As carbon cycles through the
30 system, it is exchanged between reservoirs, transferred from one to the next. The carbon *budget* is an
31 accounting of the balance of exchanges of carbon among the reservoirs: how much carbon is stored in a
32 reservoir at a particular time, how much is coming in from other reservoirs, and how much is going out.
33 When the inputs to a reservoir (the sources) exceed the outputs (the sinks), the amount of carbon in the
34 reservoir increases. The myriad physical, chemical, and biological processes that transfer carbon among

1 reservoirs, and transform carbon among its various molecular forms during that transfer, are responsible
2 for the cycling of carbon through reservoirs. That cycling determines the balance of the carbon budget
3 observed at any particular time. Examining the carbon budget not only reveals whether the budget is in
4 balance or imbalance, but also provides insight into causes of any imbalance and steps that might be taken
5 to manage that imbalance. Currently, the global carbon budget is in imbalance; and human use of coal,
6 petroleum, and natural gas to fuel economies is responsible.

7 If vast quantities of water had been trapped underground for millennia and then, in recent centuries,
8 released to trigger unprecedented rates of evaporation—and thus significant changes in cloud formation
9 and precipitation patterns—there might be concerns about possible imbalances in the water cycle.

10 Although this has not happened for water, it has happened for carbon. Over the millennia, vast quantities
11 of carbon were stored in residues from dead plant and animal life that sank into the earth and became
12 fossilized. With the expansion of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th and 20th centuries, human societies
13 found that these fossils had great value as energy sources for economic growth; and the 20th century saw a
14 dramatic rise in the combustion of these “fossil fuels” (e.g., coal, petroleum, and natural gas), releasing
15 into the atmosphere over *decades* quantities of carbon that had been stored in the earth system over
16 *millenia*. During this same time, forests that had once absorbed very large quantities of carbon dioxide
17 each year shrank in their extent.

18 It is not surprising, then, that measurements of carbon dioxide and other carbon compounds in the
19 earth’s atmosphere, such as methane, have shown steady increases in concentrations. This fact, together
20 with patterns of human activity that continue trends in fossil fuel use and deforestation, raises concerns
21 about imbalances in the carbon cycle and their implications.

22

23 **The Carbon Cycle and Climate Change**

24 Most of the carbon in the earth’s atmosphere is in the form of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and methane
25 (CH₄). Both carbon dioxide and methane are important “greenhouse gases.” Along with water vapor, and
26 other “radiatively active” gases in the atmosphere, they absorb heat radiated from the earth’s surface, heat
27 that would otherwise be lost into space. As a result, these gases help warm the earth’s atmosphere. Rising
28 concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases can alter the earth’s radiant
29 energy balance. The earth’s energy budget determines the global circulation of heat and water through the
30 atmosphere and the patterns of temperature and precipitation we experience as weather and climate. Thus,
31 the human disturbance of the earth’s global carbon cycle during the Industrial era and the resulting
32 imbalance in the earth’s carbon budget and buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have
33 consequences for climate and climate change. According to the Strategic Plan of the U.S. Climate Change
34 Science Program, carbon dioxide is the largest single forcing agent of climate change (CCSP, 2003).

1 In addition to the relationship between climate change and atmospheric carbon dioxide as a
2 greenhouse gas, research is beginning to reveal the feedbacks between a changing carbon cycle and
3 changing climate and what that implies for future climate change. Simulations with climate models that
4 include an interactive global carbon cycle indicate a positive feedback between climate change and
5 atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. The research is in its early stages, and the magnitude of the
6 feedback varies considerably among models; but in all cases, future atmospheric carbon dioxide
7 concentrations are higher and temperature increases are larger in the coupled climate-carbon cycle
8 simulations than in simulations without the coupling and feedback between climate change and changes
9 in the carbon cycle (Friedlingstein *et al.*, 2006).

10 Invariably, any options or actions to prevent, minimize, or forestall future climate change will require
11 management of the carbon cycle and concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. That
12 management involves both reducing sources of atmospheric carbon dioxide such as the combustion of
13 fossil fuels and enhancing sinks such as uptake and storage or sequestration in vegetation and soils. In
14 either case, the formulation of options by decision makers and successful management of the earth's
15 carbon budget requires solid scientific understanding of the carbon cycle and the "ability to account for all
16 carbon stocks, fluxes, and changes and to distinguish the effects of human actions from those of natural
17 system variability" (CCSP, 2003). In short, because people care about the potential consequences of
18 global climate change, they also necessarily care about the carbon cycle and the atmospheric imbalance in
19 the carbon budget.

21 **Other Implications of an Imbalance in the Carbon Budget**

22 We do not yet have a full understanding of the consequences of this imbalance, but we do know that
23 they extend beyond climate change alone. Experimental studies, for example, tell us that, for many plant
24 species, rates of photosynthesis often increase in response to elevated concentrations of carbon dioxide,
25 thus potentially increasing plant growth and even agricultural crop yields in the future. There is, however,
26 considerable uncertainty about whether such "CO₂ fertilization" will continue into the future with
27 prolonged exposure to elevated carbon dioxide; and, of course, its potential beneficial effects on plants
28 presume climatic conditions that are also favorable to plant and crop growth.

29 It is also increasingly evident that atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations are responsible for
30 increased acidification of the surface ocean, with potentially dire future consequences for corals and other
31 marine organisms that build their skeletons and shells from calcium carbonate. Ocean acidification is a
32 powerful reason, in addition to climate change, to care about the carbon cycle and the accumulation of
33 carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

1 It is clear that we need to appreciate the importance of the earth's carbon cycle, its implications for
2 our well-being in North America, and the challenge of clarifying what we know vs what we do not know
3 about the carbon cycle. The reason is that any sustained imbalance in the earth's carbon cycle could be
4 serious business indeed for North America, as it could be for any other part of the world.

6 **Why the Carbon Budget of North America?**

7 The continent of North America has been identified as both a significant source and a significant sink
8 of atmospheric carbon dioxide (Wofsy and Harriss, 2002). More than a quarter (27%) of global carbon
9 emissions from the combination of fossil fuel and cement manufacturing are attributable to North
10 America (United States, Canada, and Mexico) (Marland *et al.*, 2003). North American plants remove
11 carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and store it as carbon in plant biomass and soil organic matter,
12 mitigating to some degree the anthropogenic sources. The magnitude of the "North American sink" has
13 been estimated at anywhere from less than 100 Mt C yr⁻¹ to slightly more than 2000 Mt C y⁻¹ (Turner *et al.*,
14 1995; Fan *et al.*, 1998), with a value near 350 to 750 Mt C yr⁻¹ perhaps most likely (Houghton *et al.*,
15 1999; Goodale *et al.*, 2002; Gurney *et al.*, 2002). The North American sink is thus a substantial fraction,
16 perhaps on the order of 30–60%, of the global terrestrial sink estimated to be in the range of 600 to 2300
17 Mt C yr⁻¹ and primarily in the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere (IPCC, 2001). The global terrestrial
18 sink is responsible for about a quarter to a half of the carbon added to the atmosphere by human actions
19 that was transferred to oceans and land by carbon cycle processes and thus did not contribute to the
20 accumulation and increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Global atmospheric carbon
21 concentrations would be substantially higher than they are without the partially mitigating influence of the
22 sink in North America.

23 Some mechanisms that might be responsible for the North American terrestrial sink are reasonably
24 well known. These mechanisms include, but are not limited to, the re-growth of forests following
25 abandonment of agriculture, changes in fire and other disturbance regimes, historical climate change, and
26 fertilization of ecosystem production by nitrogen deposition and elevated atmospheric carbon dioxide
27 (Dilling *et al.*, 2003). Recent studies have indicated that some of these processes are likely more
28 important than others for the current North American carbon sink, but significant uncertainties remain
29 (Caspersen *et al.*, 2000; Schimel *et al.*, 2000; Houghton 2002). The future of the current North American
30 terrestrial sink is highly uncertain, and it depends on which mechanisms are the dominant drivers.

31 Estimates of coastal carbon cycling and input of carbon from the land are equally uncertain (JGOFS,
32 2001). Coastal processes are also difficult to parameterize in global carbon cycle models, which are often
33 used to derive best-guess estimates for regional carbon budgets (JGOFS, 2001). It is very important to

1 quantify carbon fluxes in coastal margins of the area adjacent to the North American continent, lest
2 regional budgets of carbon on land be mis-attributed.

3 Whether as source or sink, North America is a major player in the global carbon cycle. The scientific
4 understanding of the global carbon cycle required for successful carbon management strategies and by
5 decision makers searching for options to stabilize or mitigate concentrations of greenhouse gases in the
6 atmosphere (CCSP, 2003) requires an understanding of the North American carbon budget.

7

8 **CARBON CYCLE SCIENCE IN SUPPORT OF CARBON MANAGEMENT DECISIONS**

9 Beyond understanding the science of the North American carbon budget and its drivers, increasing
10 attention is now being given to deliberate management strategies for carbon (DOE 1997, Hoffert *et al.*,
11 2002; Dilling *et al.*, 2003). Carbon management is now being considered at a variety of scales in North
12 America. There are tremendous opportunities for carbon cycle science to improve decision-making in this
13 arena. In seeking ways to more effectively use scientific information in decision-making, we must pay
14 particular attention to the importance of developing constructive scientist–stakeholder interactions.

15 Many decisions in government, business, and everyday life are connected with the carbon cycle. They
16 can relate to *driving forces* behind changes in the carbon cycle (such as consumption of fossil fuels) and
17 strategies for managing them and/or *impacts* of changes in the carbon cycle (such as climate change or
18 ocean acidification) and responses to reduce their severity. Carbon cycle science can help to inform these
19 decisions by providing timely and reliable information about facts, processes, relationships, and levels of
20 confidence, although such support is more likely to be effective if the science is connected with
21 communication structures that are considered by both scientists and users to be legitimate and credible.

22 Perhaps the most widely studied examples of scientist–stakeholder communication and dialogue have
23 occurred through various types of scientific assessments. For example, Cash and Clark (2001) and Cash *et*
24 *al.* (2003) found that the most effective¹ scientific assessments generally shared three interdependent
25 characteristics, which they termed credibility, saliency, and legitimacy. Credibility is obviously essential
26 if a scientific assessment is to be viewed as technically authoritative. The credibility of an assessment
27 depends on the scientific scope and rigor of the process and on the scientific stature of its participants
28 (Parson, 2003).

¹ The effectiveness of scientific syntheses and assessments is evaluated using a variety of criteria, including effects on policies, management options, research agendas, and attitudes of key constituencies (Cash and Clark, 2001; Parson 2003). These are not the only possible effectiveness criteria, but they provide an appropriate emphasis on the effectiveness of scientifically credible information that can be easily communicated to stakeholders and that they find useful for policy and management.

1 Saliency, according to Cash and Clark, is the extent to which an assessment is perceived as relevant
2 and useful to stakeholders. Ensuring saliency requires early and ongoing dialogue with stakeholders to
3 make sure that the questions posed within the scientific community are also important to the stakeholder
4 community, and to educate the stakeholder community about the importance of scientific issues that they
5 might otherwise overlook.

6 Cash and Clark (2001) defined legitimacy as the “perceived fairness of the assessment process.” The
7 legitimacy of a scientific assessment requires not only the contributions of scientific experts who
8 represent a range of technical viewpoints, but also the substantive involvement of stakeholder
9 representatives to ensure that the assessment is perceived as fair by their constituencies.

10 A common conclusion in analyses of scientific assessments is that the initial design and context are
11 critically important (Cash and Clark, 2001; Farrell *et al.*, 2001; Parson 2003). The community and
12 institutional mandate for an assessment have a strong influence on the eventual success of the process.
13 The initial “framing” of the issues and questions to be addressed affects many decisions about the
14 organization of the assessment, communication among participants, prioritization of goals, and ultimate
15 effectiveness (Farrell *et al.*, 2001). The framing process requires great care because it may predetermine
16 not only *who* gets to pose the questions, but also *how* the questions are posed.

17 How the assessment is delivered is as important as how it is defined. A potential pitfall in scientific
18 assessment is to focus solely on producing a written report of findings, without understanding the
19 importance of ongoing communication and social interaction that are critical for effective outcomes (Cash
20 and Clark, 2001). Our proposed approach pays considerable attention to the ongoing process required to
21 produce the SAP 2.2, with the explicit goal of ensuring that the SAP 2.2 is not only scientifically credible
22 but also easily accessible, credible, and relevant to decision makers and other stakeholders. Transparency
23 of the process will be a high priority through all stages.

24 Analysis of previous scientific assessments has emphasized that credibility, saliency, and legitimacy
25 are inter-connected. As Parson (2003) put it, “Assessments that command little attention or respect by
26 virtue of the collective stature of their participants; that draw no clear scientific judgments or conclusions
27 about present knowledge except that more research is needed; that present no cogent new ways to
28 understand the issue; and whose reports are both useless to scientists and inaccessible to lay persons, can
29 expect to have no influence on policy, however high the quality of their work on other dimensions.”

30 The U.S. climate and carbon research community, and a diverse range of stakeholders, recognize the
31 need for an integrated synthesis and assessment focused on North America to (a) summarize what is
32 known and what is known to be unknown, documenting the maturity as well as the uncertainty of this
33 knowledge; (b) convey this information among scientists and to the larger community; and (c) ensure that
34 our studies are addressing the questions of concern to society and decision-making communities.


1 As the most comprehensive treatment to date of carbon cycle facts, directions, and issues for North
2 America, incorporating stakeholder interactions throughout, this report, the *First State of the Carbon*
3 *Cycle Report (SOCCR)*, focused on *The North American Carbon Budget and Implications for the Global*
4 *Carbon Cycle* is intended as a step in that direction.

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2

3 **Figure 1-1. The global carbon cycle.** Reservoirs (in black) are gigatons [1 Gt = one billion (1×10^9) metric tons] of
 4 carbon, and exchanges between reservoirs (in purple) are Gt carbon per year. *Illustration courtesy NASA Earth*
 5 *Science Enterprise.*

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Chapter 2. The Carbon Cycle of North America in a Global Context

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KEY FINDINGS

- Human activity over the last two centuries, including combustion of fossil fuel and clearing of forests, has led to a dramatic increase in the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Global atmospheric CO₂ concentrations have risen by 31% since 1850, and they are now higher than they have been for 420,000 years.
- North America is responsible for approximately 27% of the emissions produced globally by fossil-fuel combustion, with the United States accounting for 86% of the North American total.
- While emissions (a carbon source) dominate the carbon budget of North America, these emissions are partially offset by a smaller carbon sink (uptake of carbon). The sink is approximately 30% of the North American emissions, 9% of global emissions, and approximately 50% of the global terrestrial sink inferred from global budget analyses and atmospheric inversions. This sink is most likely caused by relatively young, growing forests which have re-colonized land formerly cleared of forests for agricultural use in past centuries.
- Global carbon dioxide emissions have increased for the last 30 years. In comparison, North American carbon dioxide emissions have increased at an average rate of approximately 1% per year for the last 30 years.
- While the future trajectory of carbon sinks in North America is uncertain (substantial climate change could convert current sinks into sources), it is clear that the carbon cycle of the next few decades will be dominated by the large sources from fossil-fuel emissions.
- Because North American carbon emissions are at least a quarter of global emissions, a reduction in North American emissions would have global consequences. North America has many opportunities for decreasing emissions, including changes to the energy system, increasing energy efficiency, investments in forest planting and agricultural soil management, biomass energy, and geological sequestration.

1 THE GLOBAL CYCLE

2 The modern global carbon cycle is a collection of many different kinds of processes, with diverse
3 drivers and dynamics, that transfer carbon among major pools in rocks, fossil fuels, the atmosphere, the
4 oceans, and plants and soils on land (Sabine *et al.*, 2004b) (Fig. 2-1). During the last two centuries,
5 human actions, especially the combustion of fossil fuel and the clearing of forests, have altered the global
6 carbon cycle in important ways. Specifically, these actions have led to a rapid, dramatic increase in the
7 concentration of carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the atmosphere (Fig. 2-2), changing the radiation balance of the
8 Earth (Hansen *et al.*, 2005), and most likely warming the planet (Mitchell *et al.*, 2001). The cause of the
9 recent increase in atmospheric CO₂ is confirmed beyond a reasonable doubt (Prentice, 2001). This does
10 not imply, however, that the other components of the carbon cycle have remained unchanged during this
11 period. The background or unmanaged parts of the carbon cycle have, in fact, changed dramatically over
12 the past two centuries. The consequence of these changes is that only about 48% ± 5% of the carbon
13 dioxide emitted to the atmosphere from fossil-fuel combustion and forest clearing has remained there
14 (Sabine *et al.*, 2004b). In essence, human actions have received a large subsidy from the unmanaged parts
15 of the carbon cycle. This subsidy has sequestered, or hidden from the atmosphere, approximately 240 ±
16 40 Gt of carbon. [Throughout this chapter, we will present the pools and fluxes in the carbon cycle in Gt
17 C (1 Gt = 1 billion tons or 1 × 10¹⁵ g). The mass of CO₂ is greater than the mass of carbon by the ratio of
18 their molecular weights, 44/12 or 3.67 times; 1 km³ of coal contains approximately 1 Gt C.]

19

20 **Figure 2-1. Schematic representation of the components of the carbon cycle.**

21

22 **Figure 2-2. Atmospheric CO₂ concentration from 1850 to 2005.** The data prior to 1957 are from the
23 Siple ice core (Friedli *et al.*, 1986). The data since 1957 are from continuous atmospheric sampling at the
24 Mauna Loa Observatory (Hawaii) (Keeling *et al.*, 1976; Thoning *et al.*, 1989).

25

26 The recent subsidy or sequestration of carbon by the unmanaged parts of the carbon cycle makes
27 them critical for an accurate understanding of climate change. Future increases in carbon uptake in the
28 unmanaged parts of the cycle could moderate the risks from climate change, while decreases or transitions
29 from uptake to release could amplify the risks, perhaps dramatically.

30 In addition to its role in the climate, the carbon cycle intersects with a number of critical earth system
31 processes. Because plant growth is essentially the removal of carbon dioxide from the air through
32 photosynthesis, agriculture and forestry contribute important fluxes. Wildfire is a major release of carbon
33 from plants and soils to the atmosphere (Sabine *et al.*, 2004b). The increasing concentration of CO₂ in the

1 atmosphere has already made the world's oceans more acid (Caldeira and Wickett, 2003). Future changes
2 could dramatically alter the composition of ocean ecosystems (Orr *et al.*, 2005).

4 **The Background or Unmanaged Global Carbon Cycle**

5 The modern background or unmanaged carbon cycle includes the processes that occur in the absence
6 of human actions. These processes are, however, currently so altered by human influences on the carbon
7 cycle that it is not appropriate to label them natural. This background or unmanaged part of the carbon
8 cycle is dominated by two pairs of gigantic fluxes with annual uptake and release that are close to
9 balanced (Sabine *et al.*, 2004b) (Fig. 2-1). The first of these comprises the terrestrial carbon cycle: plant
10 growth on land annually fixes about 100–200 Gt of atmospheric carbon, approximately 20 times the
11 annual emission from fossil-fuel combustion, into carbohydrates. Respiration by land plants, animals, and
12 microorganisms, which provides the energy for growth, activity, and reproduction, returns a slightly
13 smaller amount to the atmosphere, with the difference burned in wildfires or stored as plant biomass or
14 soil organic carbon. The second comprises the ocean carbon cycle: about 92 ± 5 Gt of atmospheric carbon
15 dissolves annually in the oceans, and about 90 Gt moves from the oceans to the atmosphere. The rest
16 remains in the ocean as a mix of dissolved CO_2 , bicarbonate (HCO_3^-), carbonate ($\text{CO}_3^{=}$), and organic
17 matter.

18 Before the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon uptake and release through these two pairs
19 of large fluxes were almost balanced, with carbon uptake on land of approximately 0.45 ± 0.1 Gt C yr⁻¹
20 transferred to the oceans and released from the oceans to the atmosphere. As a consequence, the level of
21 carbon dioxide in the atmosphere varied by less than 25 ppm in the 10,000 years prior to 1850 (Joos and
22 Prentice, 2004). But atmospheric CO_2 was not always so stable. During the preceding 420,000 years,
23 atmospheric CO_2 was 180–200 ppm during ice ages and approximately 275 ppm during interglacials
24 (Petit *et al.*, 1999). The lower ice-age concentrations in the atmosphere most likely reflect a transfer of
25 carbon from the atmosphere to the oceans, possibly driven by changes in ocean circulation and sea-ice
26 cover (Keeling and Stephens, 2001; Sigman and Boyle, 2000). Enhanced biological activity in the oceans,
27 stimulated by increased delivery of iron-rich terrestrial dust, may have also contributed to this increased
28 uptake (Martin, 1990).

29 In the distant past, the global carbon cycle was out of balance in a different way. Fossil fuels are the
30 product of plant growth, especially in the period 354 to 290 million years ago, the Carboniferous. During
31 this period, luxuriant plant growth and geological activity combined to bury a small fraction of each
32 year's growth. Over millions of years, this gradual burial led to the accumulation of vast stocks of fossil
33 fuel. The total accumulation of fossil fuels is uncertain, but probably in the range of 6000 ± 3000 Gt. It
34 also led to a near doubling of atmospheric oxygen (Falkowski *et al.*, 2005).

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Anthropogenic Perturbations

Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, or about 1850, there has been a massive release of carbon from fossil-fuel combustion and deforestation. Cumulative carbon emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, natural gas flaring, and cement manufacture from 1850 through 2004 are just over 300 ± 30 Gt (Marland and Rotty, 1984; Andres *et al.*, 1999). Land use change during this period, mostly from the clearing of forests, added another 160 ± 160 Gt (DeFries *et al.*, 1999; Houghton, 1999). The rate of fossil-fuel consumption in any recent year would have required, for its production, more than 400 times the current global primary production (total plant growth) of the land and oceans combined (Dukes, 2003). This has led to a rapid increase in the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere since 1850, with atmospheric CO₂ rising by 31% (i.e., from 287 ppm to 377 ppm).

Together, the three major countries of North America (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) accounted, in 2003, for carbon emissions from fossil-fuel combustion of approximately 1.83 ± 0.2 Gt C, or about 27% of the global total. The United States, the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide, was responsible for 86% of the North American total. Per capita emissions in 2003 were 5.4 ± 0.5 metric ton in the United States, 5.0 ± 0.55 metric ton in Canada, and 0.9 ± 0.1 metric ton in Mexico. Per capita emissions in the United States were nearly 5 times the world average, 2.5 times the per capita emissions for Western Europe, and more than 8 times the average for Asia and Oceania. The carbon intensity of the United States' economy, at 0.15 metric ton of emitted carbon per \$1000 (in 1995 dollars) of GDP (measured as PPP or Purchasing Power Parity), in 2003 was close to the world's average of 0.14 tC/\$1000 [DOE EIA (U.S. Department of Energy, 2005)]. Canada's carbon intensity is somewhat higher at 0.19 tC/\$1000, and Mexico's is somewhat lower at 0.12 tC/\$1000. Rich countries with substantially lower carbon intensity include Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Rich countries with higher carbon intensity include Australia and New Zealand [DOE EIA (U.S. Department of Energy, 2005)].

The world's largest countries, China and India, have total carbon emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and the flaring of natural gas that are substantially lower than those in the United States. The 2003 total for China was 61% of that in the United States, and the total for India was 18% that of the United States. Per capita emissions for China and India in 2003 were 14% and 5%, respectively, of the U.S. rate. Carbon intensity in both China and India is high. In 2003, carbon intensity in China was 4.6 times greater than that in the United States. The carbon intensity in India was 3.4 times that in the United States [DOE EIA (U.S. Department of Energy, 2005)].

Carbon emissions from North America have grown by about 1.0% per year for the last 30 years, substantially slower than the growth in GDP (Fig. 2-3). Slower growth in emissions than GDP

1 characterizes many of the world's richest countries, including Canada and the United States. Since 1980,
2 emissions growth has been only slightly slower than GDP growth in Mexico, a pattern typical of rapidly
3 industrializing countries (Fig. 2-3). More rapid growth in GDP than in emissions can result from
4 decreasing both the energy intensity of the economy (through, for example, more efficient manufacturing
5 and increasing the role of the service sector) and the carbon intensity of the energy system (through, for
6 example, replacing coal with natural gas in power plants or replacing fossil power plants with wind power
7 plants) (Sathaye, 2004). It is not clear whether, in the absence of policy, historical trends in the energy
8 intensity of GDP and the carbon intensity of the energy system will continue.

9
10 **Figure 2-3. GDP in 2000 U.S. dollars vs fossil-fuel carbon emissions (Mt C yr⁻¹).** Data from EIA
11 (2005). Each arrow shows the sequence from 1980 to 2003 for a country. Note that carbon emissions per
12 unit GDP decelerate as a country gains wealth. The lines in the figure show the slopes associated with the
13 different ratios of GDP and emissions growth (the y-intercept of the dotted and dashed lines are not
14 informative and were chosen only to keep from obscuring the arrows).

15 16 **ASSESSING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CARBON BUDGETS**

17 Changes in the carbon content of the oceans and plants and soils on land can be evaluated with at
18 least five different approaches—flux measurements, inventories, inverse estimates based on atmospheric
19 CO₂, process models, and calculation as a residual. The first method, direct measurement of carbon flux,
20 is well developed for measurements over the spatial scale of up to 1 km², using the eddy flux technique
21 (Wofsy *et al.*, 1993; Baldocchi and Valentini, 2004). Although eddy flux measurements are now collected
22 at more than 100 networked sites, spatial scaling presents formidable challenges. To date, estimates of
23 continental-scale fluxes based on eddy flux must be regarded as preliminary.

24 Inventories, based on measuring trees on land (Birdsey and Heath, 1995) or carbon in water samples
25 (Takahashi *et al.*, 2002; Sabine *et al.*, 2004a), can provide useful constraints on changes in the size of
26 carbon pools, though their utility for quantifying short-term changes is limited. Inventories were the
27 foundation of the recent conclusion that 118 Gt of anthropogenic carbon has entered the oceans (Sabine *et*
28 *al.*, 2004a) and that forests in the midlatitudes of the Northern Hemisphere sequestered 0.6 to
29 0.7 Gt C yr⁻¹ in the 1990s (Goodale *et al.*, 2002). Changes in the atmospheric inventory of O₂ (Keeling
30 *et al.*, 1996) and ¹³C in CO₂ (Siegenthaler and Oeschger, 1987) provide a basis for partitioning CO₂ flux
31 into land and ocean components.

32 Process models and inverse estimates based on atmospheric CO₂ (or CO₂ in combination with ¹³C or
33 O₂) also provide useful constraints on carbon stocks and fluxes. Process models build from understanding
34 the underlying principles of atmosphere/ocean or atmosphere/ecosystem carbon exchange to make

1 estimates over scales of space and time that are relevant to the global carbon cycle. For the oceans,
2 calibration against observations with passive tracers (Matsumoto *et al.*, 2004) (^{14}C and
3 chlorofluorocarbons) tends to nudge a wide range of models toward similar results. Sophisticated models
4 with detailed treatment of the ocean circulation, chemistry, and biology all reach about the same estimate
5 for the current ocean carbon sink, 1.5 to 1.8 Gt C yr⁻¹ (Greenblatt and Sarmiento, 2004). Models of the
6 land carbon cycle take a variety of approaches. They differ substantially in the data used as constraints, in
7 the processes simulated, and in the level of detail (Cramer *et al.*, 1999; Cramer *et al.*, 2001). Models that
8 take advantage of satellite data have the potential for comprehensive coverage at high spatial resolution
9 (Running *et al.*, 2004), but only over the time domain with available satellite data. Flux components
10 related to human activities, for example deforestation, have been modeled based on historical land use
11 (Houghton, 1999). At present, model estimates are uncertain enough that they are often used most
12 effectively in concert with other kinds of estimates (e.g., Peylin *et al.*, 2005).

13 Inverse estimates based on atmospheric gases (CO_2 , ^{13}C in CO_2 , or O_2) infer surface fluxes based on
14 the spatial pattern of atmospheric concentration, coupled with information on atmospheric transport
15 (Newsam and Enting, 1988). The atmospheric concentration of CO_2 is now measured with high precision
16 at approximately 100 sites worldwide (Masarie and Tans, 1995). The ^{13}C in CO_2 and O_2 are measured at
17 far fewer sites. The basic approach is a linear Bayesian inversion (Tarantola, 1987; Enting, 2002), with
18 many variations in the time scale of the analysis, the number of regions used, and the transport model.
19 Inversions have more power to resolve year-to-year differences than mean fluxes (Rodenbeck *et al.*, 2003;
20 Baker *et al.*, 2006). Limitations in the accuracy of atmospheric inversions come from the limited density
21 of concentration measurements, especially in the tropics, uncertainty in the transport, and errors in the
22 inversion process (Baker *et al.*, 2006). Recent studies that use a number of sets of CO_2 monitoring stations
23 (Rodenbeck *et al.*, 2003), models (Gurney *et al.*, 2003; Law *et al.*, 2003; Gurney *et al.*, 2004; Baker *et al.*,
24 2006), temporal scales, and spatial regions (Pacala *et al.*, 2001), highlight the sources of the uncertainties
25 and appropriate steps for managing them.

26 A final approach to assessing large-scale CO_2 fluxes is solving as a residual. At the global scale, the
27 net flux to or from the land is often calculated as the residual left after accounting for fossil emissions,
28 atmospheric increase, and ocean uptake (Siegenthaler and Oeschger, 1987). Increasingly, the need to treat
29 the land as a residual is receding, as the other methods improve. Still, the existence of constraints at the
30 level of the overall budget injects an important connection with reality.

31

32 **RECENT DYNAMICS OF THE UNMANAGED CARBON CYCLE**

33 Of the approximately 460 ± 100 Gt carbon added to the atmosphere by human actions since 1850,
34 only about 180 ± 5 Gt remain. The “missing carbon” was stored, at least temporarily, in the oceans and in

1 ecosystems on land. Based on a recent ocean inventory, 118 ± 19 Gt of the missing carbon is now in the
2 oceans (Sabine *et al.*, 2004a). This leaves about 100 Gt that must be stored on land. Identifying the
3 processes responsible for the uptake on land, their spatial distribution, and their likely future trajectory
4 has been one of the major goals of carbon cycle science over the last decade.

5 Much of the recent research on the global carbon cycle has focused on annual fluxes and their spatial
6 and temporal variation. The temporal and spatial patterns of carbon flux provide a pathway to
7 understanding the underlying mechanisms. Based on several different approaches, carbon uptake by the
8 oceans averaged 1.7 ± 0.3 Gt C yr⁻¹ for the period from 1992–1996 (Gloor *et al.*, 2003; Mearns and
9 McNeil, 2003; Matsumoto *et al.*, 2004; Takahashi *et al.*, 2002; Gurney *et al.*, 2003). The total
10 anthropogenic flux is this amount, plus 0.45 Gt yr⁻¹ of preindustrial outgassing, for a total of 2.2 ± 0.4 Gt
11 yr⁻¹. This rate represents an integral over large areas that are gaining carbon and the tropics, which are
12 losing carbon (Fig. 2-4). Interannual variability in the ocean sink for CO₂, though substantial (Greenblatt
13 and Sarmiento, 2004), is much smaller than interannual variability on the land (Baker *et al.*, 2006).

14
15 **Figure 2-4. The spatial distribution of ocean CO₂ exchange from 1992–1996 for several regions and**
16 **measurement approaches.** Tak99 and Tak02 are from (Takahashi *et al.*, 2002) $\Delta p\text{CO}_2$ estimates, T3L1
17 and T3L2 are from (Gurney *et al.*, 2003; Gurney *et al.*, 2004), Fwd is from predictive ocean models, JI is
18 from the ocean atmosphere ocean inversions of (Jacobson *et al.*, 2006). The far right column is the sum of
19 the individual ocean basins toward the left [from (Jacobson *et al.*, 2006)].

20
21 On land in the 1990s, carbon releases from land-use change were more than balanced by ecosystem
22 uptake, leading to a net sink on land (without accounting for fossil-fuel emissions) of approximately
23 1.1 Gt C yr⁻¹ (Schimel *et al.*, 2001; Sabine *et al.*, 2004b). The dominant sources of recent interannual
24 variation in the net land flux were El Niño and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 (Bousquet *et al.*,
25 2000; Rodenbeck *et al.*, 2003; Baker *et al.*, 2006), with most of the year-to-year variation in the tropics
26 (Fig. 2-5). Fire likely plays a large role in this variability (van der Werf *et al.*, 2004).

27
28 **Figure 2-5. The 13-model mean CO₂ flux interannual variability (Gt C yr⁻¹) for several continents**
29 **(solid lines) and ocean basins (dashed lines); (a) North Pacific and North America, (b) Atlantic north**
30 **of 15°N and Eurasia, (c) Australasia and Tropical Pacific, (d) Africa, and (e) South America (note the**
31 **different scales for Africa and South America) (from Baker *et al.*, 2006).**

32
33 On a time scale of thousands of years, the ocean will be the sink for approximately 80% of the carbon
34 released to the atmosphere by human activities (Joos and Prentice, 2004). The rate of CO₂ uptake by the
35 oceans is, however, limited. CO₂ enters the oceans by dissolving in seawater. The rate of this process is

1 determined by the concentration difference between the atmosphere and the surface waters and by an air-
2 sea exchange coefficient related to wave action, wind, and turbulence (Le Quéré and Metzl, 2004).
3 Because the surface waters represent a small volume with limited capacity to store CO₂, the major control
4 on ocean uptake is at the level of moving carbon from the surface to intermediate and deep waters.
5 Important contributions to this transport come from the large scale circulation of the oceans, especially
6 the sinking of cold water in the Southern Ocean and, to a lesser extent, the North Atlantic.

7 On land, numerous processes contribute to carbon storage and carbon loss. Some of these are directly
8 influenced through human actions (e.g., the planting of forests, conversion to no-till agriculture, or the
9 burying of organic wastes in landfills). The human imprint on others is indirect. This category includes
10 ecosystem responses to climate change (e.g., warming and changes in precipitation), changes in the
11 composition of the atmosphere (e.g., increased CO₂ and increased tropospheric ozone), and delayed
12 consequences of past actions (e.g., regrowth of forests after earlier harvesting). Early analyses of the
13 global carbon budget (e.g., Bacastow and Keeling, 1973) typically assigned all of the net flux on land to a
14 single mechanism, especially fertilization of plant growth by increased atmospheric CO₂. Recent evidence
15 emphasizes the diversity of mechanisms.

17 **The Carbon Cycle of North America**

18 By most estimates, the land area of North America is currently a sink for carbon, in the absence of
19 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion. This conclusion for the continental scale is based mainly on the
20 results of atmospheric inversions. Several studies address the carbon balance of particular ecosystem
21 types [e.g., forests (Goodale *et al.*, 2002; Chen *et al.*, 2003; Kurz and Apps, 1999)]. Pacala and colleagues
22 (Pacala *et al.*, 2001) used a combination of atmospheric and land-based techniques to estimate that the 48
23 contiguous U.S. states are currently a carbon sink of 0.3 to 0.6 Gt C yr⁻¹. Based on inversions using 13
24 atmospheric transport models, North America was a carbon sink of 0.97 Gt C yr⁻¹ from 1991–2000
25 (Baker *et al.*, 2006). Over the area of North America, this amounts to an annual carbon sink of 39.6 g C
26 m⁻² yr⁻¹, similar to the sink inferred for all northern lands (North America, Europe, Boreal Asia, and
27 Temperate Asia) of 32.5 g C m⁻² yr⁻¹ (Baker *et al.*, 2006).

28 Recent carbon storage in North America probably results from a number of different processes. Chen
29 *et al.* (Chen *et al.*, 2003) argue that Canadian forests are a small sink because processes tending to
30 increase tree growth, including elevated atmospheric CO₂ and deposition of biologically available
31 nitrogen, are more than compensating effects of recent disturbances. Kurz and Apps (Kurz and Apps,
32 1999) reach the opposite conclusion, that recent disturbances make Canadian forests a net carbon source.
33 In the United States, forest regrowth is outpacing recent harvesting and disturbance (Birdsey and Heath,

1 1995). Some of this is a consequence of a profound historical shift in the location of United States
2 agriculture.

3 Much of the Eastern United States was cleared for agriculture in the 18th century, only to be
4 abandoned as agriculture moved to the Great Plains, the Southwest, and the West in the 19th and 20th
5 centuries (Ramankutty and Foley, 1999). As a consequence, large areas once cleared for agriculture are
6 currently regrowing forests (Caspersen *et al.*, 2000). Increasing carbon in previously harvested forests has
7 several drivers beyond the shift in agriculture, including changes in harvesting and management practices
8 (Harmon *et al.*, 1996; Goodale *et al.*, 2002) and fire suppression (Calkin *et al.*, 2005; Mouillot and Field,
9 2005). The processes sequestering carbon have been partially offset by processes that release stored
10 carbon, including unusually high wildfire years [United States—(Mouillot and Field, 2005)], insect
11 outbreaks [Canada—(Kurz and Apps, 1999)] , and storm damage [Europe—(Janssens *et al.*, 2003)]. The
12 heat wave and drought in Europe in the summer of 2003 led to a large loss of carbon, driven largely by
13 decreased plant growth (Ciais *et al.*, 2005).

14 Several other processes probably contribute to recent carbon sinks in the United States (Table 2-1),
15 though they are difficult to quantify with confidence. These include the thickening of vegetation in
16 woodland and shrubland areas, the burial of organic matter in lakes and reservoirs (Stallard, 1998),
17 increases in the soil carbon in managed grassland and agricultural soils (Asner *et al.*, 2003), and storage
18 of carbon in durable products (e.g. houses and furniture) and waste in landfills (Pacala *et al.*, 2001).

19
20 **Table 2-1. Sinks of carbon for 1980--90 in the coterminous United States (Gt C yr⁻¹).**

21
22 Some of the recent carbon storage in North America may be a consequence of increased atmospheric
23 CO₂ (Schimel *et al.*, 2000; Melillo *et al.*, 2003), nitrogen deposition (Holland *et al.*, 1997), or climate
24 changes that have increased the length of the frost-free season in many locations (Myneni *et al.*, 1997;
25 Hicke *et al.*, 2002). The evidence in support of the first two mechanisms comes from empirical and
26 modeling studies. It is clear that plant growth in many terrestrial ecosystems is limited by either
27 atmospheric CO₂ or biologically available nitrogen (Melillo *et al.*, 2003). It is much less clear, however,
28 that increased availability of either resource has led to carbon sequestration. Recent studies include many
29 examples in which experimental treatment with elevated CO₂ leads to consistent increases in plant growth
30 (e.g., Norby *et al.*, 2005), but others in which elevated CO₂ has little effect on plant growth (Shaw *et al.*,
31 2002), leads to an initial stimulation but limited long-term effects (Oren *et al.*, 2001), or increases carbon
32 losses as well as gains (Hungate, 1997; Schlesinger and Lichter, 2001). Evidence on the role of changes in
33 the length of the growing season comes from field-based, satellite, and modeling studies (Myneni *et al.*,

1 1997; Nemani *et al.*, 2003). Recent evidence indicates that negative effects of dry summers can offset
2 much or all of the effects of earlier springs (Angert *et al.*, 2005).

3 To the extent that current carbon sink in North America reflects the regrowth of previously harvested
4 forest, it is a one-time phenomenon and not a permanent feature of the carbon cycle. Similarly, a sink
5 from effective fire suppression in the second half of the 20th century may have already saturated or even
6 reversed, as large accumulations of highly flammable fuels amplify the challenge of current and future
7 fire management. Sinks from CO₂ fertilization (Hungate *et al.*, 2003), increased nitrogen deposition, and
8 altered management of agricultural lands (Smith, 2004) could continue for some time, but they too will
9 eventually saturate (Gruber *et al.*, 2004).

10 Very little of the current carbon sink in North America is a consequence of deliberate action to
11 sequester carbon. Some is a collateral benefit of steps to improve land management, for increasing soil
12 fertility, improving wildlife habitat, etc. Much of the current sink is unintentional, a consequence of
13 historical changes in technologies and preferences in agriculture, transportation, and urban design.

14 15 **CARBON CYCLE OF THE FUTURE**

16 The future trajectory of carbon sinks in North America is very uncertain. Several trends will play a
17 role in determining the sign and magnitude of future changes. One important controller is the magnitude
18 of future climate changes. If the climate warms significantly, much of the United States could experience
19 a decrease in plant growth and an increase in the risk of wildfire (Bachelet *et al.*, 2003), especially if the
20 warming is not associated with substantial increases in precipitation. Exactly this pattern—substantial
21 warming with little or no change in precipitation—characterizes North America in many of the newer
22 climate simulations (Rousteenoja *et al.*, 2003). If North American ecosystems are sensitive to elevated
23 CO₂, nitrogen deposition, or warming, plant growth could increase (Schimel *et al.*, 2000). The empirical
24 literature on CO₂ and nitrogen deposition is mixed, with some reports of substantial growth enhancement
25 (Norby *et al.*, 2005) and others reporting small or modest effects (Oren *et al.*, 2001; Shaw *et al.*, 2002;
26 Heath *et al.*, 2005).

27 Overall, the carbon budget of North America is dominated by carbon releases from the combustion of
28 fossil fuels. Currently, as much as 50% of this may be offset by carbon uptake in plants and soils (Baker
29 *et al.*, 2006). Most of this uptake appears to be a rebound, as natural and managed ecosystems recover
30 from past disturbances. Little evidence supports the idea that these ecosystem sinks will increase in the
31 future. Substantial climate change could convert current sinks into sources (Gruber *et al.*, 2004).

32 In the future, trends in the North American energy economy may intersect with trends in the natural
33 carbon cycle. A large-scale investment in afforestation could offset substantial future emissions (Graham,
34 2003). Costs of this kind of effort would, however, include the loss of the new forested area from its

1 previous uses, including grazing or agriculture, plus the energy costs of managing the new forests, plus
2 any increases in emissions of non-CO₂ greenhouse gases from the new forests. Large-scale investments in
3 biomass energy would have similar costs but would result in offsetting emissions from fossil-fuel
4 combustion, rather than sequestration (Giampietro *et al.*, 1997). The relative costs and benefits of
5 investments in afforestation and biomass energy will require careful analysis (Kirschbaum, 2003).
6 Investments in other energy technologies, including wind and solar, will require some land area, but the
7 impacts on the natural carbon cycle are unlikely to be significant or widespread (Hoffert *et al.*, 2002;
8 Pacala and Socolow, 2004).

9 Like the present, the carbon cycle of North America during the next several decades will be
10 dominated by fossil emissions. Geological sequestration may become an increasingly important
11 component of the budget sheet. Still, progress in controlling the net release to the atmosphere must be
12 centered on the production and consumption of energy rather than the processes of the unmanaged carbon
13 cycle. North America has many opportunities to decrease emissions (Hoffert *et al.*, 2002; Caldeira *et al.*,
14 2004; Pacala and Socolow, 2004). Many of these are in the area of increasing the efficiency of energy
15 generation, the transportation system, building stocks, and manufacturing technologies. Others are in the
16 area of replacing carbon-emitting energy technologies with nonemitting technologies, including solar,
17 wind, biomass, and nuclear. Still others are in the area of sequestration, including both geological and
18 biological components. Finally, there are many opportunities in conservation, in directing the economy
19 and personal preferences away from carbon-intensive activities. Capitalizing on the opportunities in all
20 four of these areas will require dedicated research, financial support, creativity, and an interested public
21 (Raupach *et al.*, 2004). Nothing about the status of the unmanaged carbon cycle provides a justification
22 for decreasing the commitment to progress in all of these areas.

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Table 1. Sinks of carbon for 1980–90 in the coterminous United States (in Gt C yr⁻¹).

Category	Low	High	Land area 1980–90 (10 ⁶ ha)	Houghton <i>et al.</i> (8)	Birdsey and Heath (12)
Forest trees	0.11	0.15	247–247	0.06 ^a	0.11
Other forest organic matter	0.03	0.15	247–247	– 0.01	0.18
Cropland soils	0.00	0.04	185–183	0.14	—
Nonforest, non-cropland (woody encroachment)	0.12 ^b	0.13 ^b	334–336 ^c	0.12	—
Wood products	0.03	0.07	—	0.03	0.03
Reservoirs, alluvium, colluvium	0.01	0.04	—	—	—
Exports minus imports of food, wood	0.04	0.09	—	—	—
Fixed in the United States but exported by rivers	0.03	0.04	—	—	—
“Apparent” ^d U.S. sink without woody encroachment	0.25	0.58	766	0.15–0.23 ^e	0.31
“Apparent” ^d U.S. sink including woody encroachment	0.37	0.71	766	0.15–0.35 ^e	—
Sink ^f	0.03	0.58	766	0.15–0.35 ^e	0.31

^a Assumes that the 0.05 Gt C yr⁻¹ estimated in (8) to be accumulating in western pine woodlands as a result of the suppression is assigned to forest instead of row 4.

^b These numbers are not bounds, but rather the only two existing estimates.

^c Total area for all lands other than forest and croplands. Possible woody encroachment because of fire suppression on up to about two-thirds of this land (10,16).

^d By “apparent” sink, we mean the net flux from the atmosphere to the land that would be estimated in an inversion. It includes all terms in the table.

^e Lower bound reflects uncertainty in the estimates for the effects of fire suppression.


^f Excludes sinks caused by the export/import imbalance for food and wood products and river exports because these create corresponding sources outside the United States.

Source: Pacala *et al.* (2001)

3
4


1
2

Figure 2-1. Schematic representation of the components of the carbon cycle.




3


1 **Fig. 2-2. Atmospheric CO₂ concentration from 1850 to 2005.** The data prior to 1957 are from the Siple ice core
 2 (Friedli *et al.*, 1986). The data since 1957 are from continuous atmospheric sampling at the Mauna Loa Observatory
 3 (Hawaii) (Keeling *et al.*, 1976; Thoning *et al.*, 1989).
 4
 5




1
 2 **Figure 2-3. GDP in 2000 U.S. dollars vs fossil-fuel carbon emissions (Mt C yr⁻¹).** Data from EIA (2005).
 3 Each arrow shows the sequence from 1980 to 2003 for a country. Note that carbon emissions per unit GDP
 4 decelerate as a country gains wealth. The lines in the figure show the slopes associated with the different ratios
 5 of GDP and emissions growth (the y-intercepts of the dotted and dashed lines are not informative and were
 6 chosen only to keep from obscuring the arrows).



1 **Figure 2-4. The spatial distribution of ocean CO₂ exchange from 1992–1996, for several regions and**
 2 **measurement approaches.** Tak99 and Tak02 are from (Takahashi *et al.*, 2002) $\Delta p\text{CO}_2$ estimates, T3L1 and T3L2
 3 are from (Gurney *et al.*, 2003; Gurney *et al.*, 2004), Fwd is from predictive ocean models, JI is from the ocean
 4 atmosphere ocean inversions of (Jacobson *et al.*, 2006). The far right column is the sum of the individual ocean
 5 basins toward the left [from (Jacobson *et al.*, 2006)].
 6



1 **Figure 2-5. The 13-model mean CO₂ flux interannual variability (Gt C yr⁻¹) for several continents (solid**
 2 **lines) and ocean basins (dashed lines) (a) North Pacific and North America, (b) Atlantic north of 15°N and**
 3 **Eurasia, (c) Australasia and Tropical Pacific, (d) Africa, and (e) South America (note the different scales for Africa**
 4 **and South America) [from (Baker *et al.*, 2006)].**



5

Chapter 3. The North American Carbon Budget Past and Present

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KEY FINDINGS

- Fossil fuel carbon emissions in the United States, Canada, and Mexico totaled 1856 Mt C yr⁻¹ in 2003. This represents 27% of global fossil fuel emissions.
- Approximately 30% of North American fossil fuel emissions are offset by a natural sink of 592 Mt C yr⁻¹ caused by a variety of factors, including forest regrowth, fire suppression, and agricultural soil conservation.
- North American carbon dioxide emissions have increased at an average rate of approximately 1% per year for the last 30 years.
- The growth in emissions accompanies the historical growth in the industrial economy and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of North America. However, at least in the United States and Canada the rate of emissions growth is less than the growth in GDP, reflecting a decrease in the carbon intensity of these economies.
- Historically the plants and soils of the United States and Canada were sources for atmospheric CO₂, primarily as a consequence of the expansion of croplands into forests and grasslands. In recent

1 decades the terrestrial carbon balance of these regions have shifted from source to sink as forests
2 recover from agricultural abandonment, fire suppression and reduced logging and, as a result, are
3 accumulating carbon. In Mexico, emissions of carbon continue to increase from net deforestation.

- 4 • Fossil fuel emissions from North America are expected to continue to grow, but will also continue to
5 grow more slowly than GDP.
 - 6 • The future of the North American carbon sink is highly uncertain. The contribution of recovering
7 forests to this sink is likely to decline as these forests mature, but we do not know how much of the
8 sink is due to fertilization of the ecosystems by nitrogen in air pollution and by increasing CO₂
9 concentrations in the atmosphere, nor do we understand the impact of tropospheric ozone or how the
10 sink will change as the climate changes.
 - 11 • The magnitude of the North American sink offers the possibility that significant mitigation of fossil fuel
12 emissions could be accomplished by managing forests, rangelands, and croplands to increase the
13 carbon stored in them. However, the range of uncertainty in these estimates is at least as large as the
14 estimated values themselves.
 - 15 • Current trends towards lower carbon intensity of U.S. and Canadian economies increase the
16 likelihood that a portfolio of carbon management technologies will be able to reduce the 1% annual
17 growth in fossil fuel emissions. This same portfolio might be insufficient if carbon emissions were to
18 begin rising at the approximately 3% growth rate of GDP.
-

22 INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY

23 Fossil Fuel

24 Fossil fuel carbon emissions in the United States, Canada, and Mexico totaled 1856 Mt C yr⁻¹ in 2003
25 and have increased at an average rate of approximately 1% per year for the last 30 years (United States =
26 1582, Canada = 164, Mexico = 110 Mt C yr⁻¹, see Fig. 3-1). This represents 27% of global emissions,
27 from a continent with 16.5% of the global land area, 7.4% of the global population, and 25.0% of global
28 GDP (EIA, 2005).

30 **Figure 3-1. Historical carbon emissions from fossil fuel in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.**

31 Data from EIA (2005).

32
33 The United States is the world's largest emitter in absolute terms, with approximately one-quarter of
34 the global total. Its per capita emissions of 5.4 t C yr⁻¹ are among the largest in the world, but the carbon
35 intensity of its economy (emissions per unit GDP) at 0.15 metric ton of emitted carbon per dollar of GDP
36 is close to the world's average of 0.14 t C/\$ (EIA, 2005). Total U.S. emissions continue to grow at close

1 to the North American average rate of ~1.0% per year, but U.S. per capita emissions have been roughly
2 constant for the past 30 years, while the carbon intensity of the U.S. economy has decreased at a rate of
3 ~2% per year (see Figs. 3-1 to 3-3).

4 Absolute emissions grew at 1% per year even though per capita emissions were roughly constant
5 simply because of population growth at an average rate of 1%. The constancy of U.S. per capita values
6 masks faster than 1% growth in some sectors (e.g., transportation) that was balanced by slower growth in
7 others (e.g., increased manufacturing energy efficiency) (Fig. 3-3). Also, a large part of the decline in the
8 carbon intensity of the U.S. economy was caused by the comparatively rapid growth of the service sector
9 (3.6% per year), which now dominates the economy (roughly three-fourths of GDP) and has carbon
10 emissions per dollar of economic activity only 15% that of manufacturing (Figs. 3-3b to 3-3c). This
11 implies that emissions growth is essentially decoupled from economic growth. Also, because the service
12 sector is likely to continue to grow more rapidly than other sectors of the economy, we expect that carbon
13 emissions will continue to grow more slowly than GDP. This is important because it speaks to the issue of
14 our technological readiness to achieve an emissions target. For example, a portfolio of technologies able
15 to reduce the 1% annual growth in emissions to 0%, might be insufficient if carbon emissions were to
16 begin rising at the ~3% growth rate of GDP (Pacala and Socolow, 2004).

17 18 **Carbon Sinks (see Table 3-1 for citations and data)**

19 Approximately 30% of North American fossil fuel emissions are offset by a natural sink of 592 Mt C
20 yr⁻¹ caused by a variety of factors, including forest regrowth, fire suppression, and agricultural soil
21 conservation. The sink currently absorbs 506 Mt C yr⁻¹ in the United States and 134 Mt C yr⁻¹ in Canada.
22 Mexican ecosystems create a net source of 48 Mt C yr⁻¹. Rivers and international trade also export a net
23 of 161 Mt C yr⁻¹ that was captured from the atmosphere by the continent's ecosystems, and so North
24 America absorbs 753 Mt C yr⁻¹ of atmospheric CO₂ (753 = 592 + 161). Because most of these net exports
25 will return to the atmosphere elsewhere within 1 year (i.e., carbon in exported grain will be eaten,
26 metabolized, and exhaled as CO₂), the net North American sink is rightly thought of as 592 Mt C yr⁻¹
27 even though the continent absorbs a net of 753 Mt C yr⁻¹. Moreover, coastal waters are small net emitters
28 to the atmosphere at the continental scale (19 Mt C yr⁻¹) (see Chapter 15). However, much of the CO₂
29 absorbed from or emitted to the air by coastal waters is part of the natural carbon cycle of the oceans, and
30 so coastal sea-air exchanges should also be excluded from the continental carbon sink.

31 As reported in Chapter 2, all of the world's continents collectively absorbed a net of approximately
32 1500 Mt C yr⁻¹ of atmospheric CO₂ during the 1990s. However, because this value includes the losses of
33 1000–2000 Mt C yr⁻¹ caused by tropical deforestation (Archard *et al.*, 2002; DeFries *et al.*, 2002;
34 Houghton, 2003b), carbon sinks during the 1990s actually totaled 2500–3500 Mt C yr⁻¹. North America's

1 net absorption of more than 700 Mt C yr⁻¹ thus represents 20–30% of the global total on 16.5% of the
2 global land area. Similarly, the United States was responsible for 17–24% of the global total despite
3 having only 6.5% of the land area (Table 3-1). The reason for the disproportionate importance of U.S.
4 sinks is probably the unique land use history of the country (summary in Appendix 3A). During European
5 settlement, large amounts of carbon were released from the harvest of virgin forests and the plowing of
6 virgin soils to create agricultural lands. The abandonment of many of the formerly agricultural lands in
7 the east and the regrowth of forest is a unique event globally and is responsible for about one-half of the
8 U.S. sink (Houghton *et al.*, 2000). Most of the U.S. sink thus represents a one-time recapture of some of
9 the carbon that was released to the atmosphere during settlement. In contrast, Mexican ecosystems, like
10 those of many tropical nations, are still a net carbon source because of ongoing deforestation (Masera *et*
11 *al.*, 1997).

12
13 **Table 3-1. Annual net carbon emissions (source = positive) or uptake (land sink = negative) of**
14 **carbon in millions of tons.**

15
16 The magnitude of the North American sink documented in Table 3-1 offers the possibility that
17 significant carbon mitigation could be accomplished by managing forests, rangelands, and croplands to
18 increase the carbon stored in them. However, the range of uncertainty in these estimates is at least as large
19 as the value reported in Table 3-1. The largest contributors to the uncertainty in the U.S. sink are the
20 amount of carbon stored on rangelands because of the encroachment of woody vegetation and the lack of
21 comprehensive and continuous inventory of Alaskan lands. A carbon inventory of these lands would do
22 more to constrain the size of the U.S. sink than would any other measurement program of similar cost.
23 Also we still lack comprehensive U.S. inventories of carbon in soils, woody debris, wetlands, rivers, and
24 reservoirs. Finally, we lack estimates of any kind for four significant components of the carbon budget in
25 Canada and six in Mexico (see Table 3-1).

26 The cause and future of the North American carbon sink is also highly uncertain. Although we can
27 document the accumulation of carbon in ecosystems and wood products, we do not know how much of
28 the sink is due to fertilization of the ecosystems by the nitrogen in air pollution and by the added CO₂ in
29 the atmosphere, we do not fully understand the impact of tropospheric ozone, nor do we understand
30 precisely how the sink will change as the climate changes. Research is mixed about the importance of
31 nitrogen and CO₂ fertilization (Casperson *et al.*, 2000; Oren *et al.*, 2001; Hungate *et al.*, 2003; Luo 2006;
32 Körner *et al.*, 2005). If these factors are weak, then, all else equal, we expect the North American sink to
33 decline over time as ecosystems complete their recovery from past exploitation (Hurt *et al.*, 2002).
34 However, if these factors are strong, then the sink could grow in the future. Similarly, global warming is

1 expected to lengthen the growing season in most parts of North America, which should increase the sink.
2 But warming is also expected to increase the rate of decomposition of dead organic matter, which should
3 decrease the sink. The relative strength of these two factors is still difficult to predict. Experimental
4 manipulations of climate, atmospheric CO₂, tropospheric ozone, and nitrogen, at the largest possible
5 scale, will be required to reduce uncertainty about the future of the carbon sink.

7 NORTH AMERICAN FOSSIL FUEL EMISSIONS

8 Fossil fuel emissions currently dominate the net carbon balance in the United States, Canada, and
9 Mexico (Fig. 3-1, Table 3-1). Fossil emissions are more than three times larger than the net carbon sink in
10 the United States, marginally larger than the net sink in Canada, and twice as large as the net deforestation
11 source in Mexico. Each of the three countries has always been a net source of carbon dioxide emissions to
12 the atmosphere for the past three centuries (Houghton *et al.*, 1999, 2000; Houghton and Hackler, 2000;
13 Hurtt *et al.*, 2002).

14 Carbon dioxide emissions continue to grow in North America at close to their 30-year average of
15 1.0% per year. Figure 3-2 shows the growth of GDP and CO₂ emissions in more than 100 countries from
16 1980 (tail of each arrow) until 2003 (arrow head). The vertical distance between the solid diagonal line
17 and the average position of an arrow is inversely related to the country's relative carbon intensity. Note
18 that the United States is no outlier in this respect. Also, the slope of an arrow shows the rate of emissions
19 growth relative to the rate of economic growth—the flatter the slope, the faster the country's carbon
20 intensity is decreasing. Thus, countries vertically close to the line have higher carbon intensities than
21 countries far from the line. Note that the United States has a flatter slope than many countries including
22 Japan, but that several other industrialized countries actually have growing GDP and declining emissions
23 (the circled arrows).

24
25 **Figure 3-2. GDP in 2000 U.S. dollars vs fossil fuel carbon emissions (Mt C yr⁻¹).** Data from EIA
26 (2005). Each arrow shows the sequence from 1980 to 2003 for a country. Note that carbon emissions per
27 unit GDP decelerate as a country gains wealth. The lines in the figure show the slopes associated with the
28 different ratios of GDP and emissions growth (the y-intercepts of the dotted and dashed lines are not
29 important; we moved the lines representing different ratios of GDP and emissions growth to higher y-
30 intercepts so as not to obscure the data summarized by the arrows).

31
32 Historical decreases in U.S. carbon intensity began early in the 20th century and continue despite the
33 approximate stabilization of per capita emissions (Fig. 3-3a). Why has the U.S. carbon intensity declined?
34 This question is the subject of the extensive literature on the so-called structural decomposition of the

1 energy system and on the relationship between GDP and environment (i.e., Environmental Kuznets
2 Curves; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994). See for example Greening *et al.* (1997,
3 1998), Casler and Rose (1998), Golove and Schipper (1998), Rothman (1998), Suri and Chapman (1998),
4 Greening *et al.* (1999), Ang and Zhang (2000), Greening *et al.* (2001), Davis *et al.* (2002), Kahn (2003),
5 Greening (2004), Lindmark (2004), Aldy (2005), and Lenzen *et al.* (2006).

6 Possible causes of the decline in U.S. carbon intensity include structural changes in the economy,
7 technological improvements in energy efficiency, behavioral changes by consumers and producers, the
8 growth of renewable and nuclear energy, and the displacement of oil consumption by gas, or coal by oil
9 and gas (if we produce the same amount of energy from coal, oil, and gas, then the emissions from oil are
10 only 80% of those from coal, and from gas only 75% of those from oil) (Casler and Rose, 1998; Ang and
11 Zhang, 2000). The last two items on this list are not dominant causes because we observe that both
12 primary energy consumption and carbon emissions grew at close to 1% per year over the past 30 years
13 (EIA, 2005). At least in the United States, there has been no significant decarbonization of the energy
14 system during this period. However, all of the other items on the list play a significant role. The economy
15 has grown at an annual rate of 2.8% over the last three decades because of 3.6% growth in the service
16 sector; manufacturing grew at only 1.5% per year (Fig. 3-3b). Because the service sector has a much
17 lower carbon intensity than manufacturing (a factor of 6.5 in 2002; compare Figs. 3-3b and 3-3c), this
18 faster growth of services reduces the country's carbon intensity. If all of the growth in the service sector
19 had been in manufacturing from 1971 to 2001, then the emissions would have grown at 2% per year
20 instead of 1%. So, structural change is at least one-half of the answer. However, note that emissions from
21 manufacturing are approximately constant despite 1.5% economic growth, while those of services grew at
22 2.1% despite 3.6% economic growth (Figs. 3-3b and 3-3c). The decrease in the carbon intensity within
23 these sectors is caused both by within-sector structural shifts (i.e., from heavy to light manufacturing) and
24 by technological improvements (See Part II of this report). Emissions from the residential sector are
25 growing at roughly the same rate as the population (Fig. 3-3c; 30-year average of 1.0% per year), while
26 emissions from transportation are growing faster than the population but slower than GDP (Fig. 3-3c;
27 30-year average of 1.4% per year). The difference between the 3% growth rate of GDP and the 1.6%
28 growth in emissions from transportation is not primarily due to technological improvement because
29 carbon emissions per mile traveled have been level or increasing over the period (Chapter 7).

30
31 **Figure 3-3. (a) The historical relationship between U.S. per capita GDP and U.S. carbon intensity**
32 **(green symbols, kg CO₂ emitted per 1995 dollar of GDP) and per capita carbon emissions (red**
33 **symbols, kg CO₂ per person).** Each symbol shows a different year, and each of the two time series
34 progresses roughly chronologically from left (early) to right (late) and ends in 2002. *Source:* Maddison

1 (2003), Marland *et al.* (2005). Thus, the red square farthest to the right shows U.S. per capita CO₂
2 emissions in 2002. The square second farthest to the right shows per capita emissions in 2001. The third
3 farthest to the right shows 2000 and so on. Note that per capita emissions have been roughly constant over
4 the last 30 years (squares corresponding to per capita GDP greater than approximately \$16,000). (b)
5 Historical U.S. GDP divided among the manufacturing, services and agricultural sectors. *Source*: Mitchell
6 (1998) and WRI (2005). (c) Historical U.S. carbon emissions divided among the residential, services,
7 manufacturing, and transportation sectors. *Source*: EIA (2005).

9 NORTH AMERICAN CARBON SINK

10 Appendix 3A contains an overview of the historical development of the sinks in U.S. and Canadian
11 ecosystems and the source from ongoing deforestation in Mexico. The remainder of this chapter focuses
12 on current values. To estimate non-fossil sources and sinks, we rely exclusively on inventory methods in
13 which the total amount of carbon in a pool (i.e., living forest trees plus forest soils) is measured on two
14 occasions. The difference between the two measurements shows if the pool is gaining (sink) or losing
15 (source) carbon. Carbon inventories are straightforward in principle, but of uneven quality in practice. For
16 example, we know the carbon in living trees in the United States relatively accurately because the U.S.
17 Forest Service Forest Inventory program measures trees systematically in more than 200,000 locations.
18 However, we must extrapolate from a few measurements of forest soils with models because there is no
19 national inventory of carbon in forest soils. We report uncertainties using six categories: ***** = 95%
20 certain that the actual value is within 10% of the estimate reported, **** = 95% certain that the estimate
21 is within 25%, *** = 95% certain that the estimate is within 50%, ** = 95% certain that the estimate is
22 within 100%, * = uncertainty > 100%.

23 In addition to inventory methods, it is also possible to estimate carbon sources and sinks by
24 measuring carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For example, if air exits the border of a continent with more
25 CO₂ than it contained when it entered, then there must be a net source of CO₂ somewhere inside the
26 continent. We do not include estimates obtained in this way because they are still highly uncertain at
27 continental scales. Pacala *et al.* (2001) found that atmosphere- and inventory-based methods gave
28 consistent estimates of U.S. ecosystem sources and sinks but that the range of uncertainty from the former
29 was considerably larger than the range from the latter. For example, by far the largest published estimate
30 for the North American carbon sink was produced by an analysis of atmospheric data by Fan *et al.* (1998)
31 (1700 Mt C yr⁻¹). The appropriate inventory-based estimate to compare this to is our
32 -753 Mt C yr⁻¹ of net absorption (atmospheric estimates include net horizontal exports by rivers and
33 trade), and this number is well within the wide uncertainty limits in Fan *et al.* (1998). The allure of
34 estimates from atmospheric data is that they do not risk missing critical uninventoried carbon pools. But,
35 in practice, they are still far less accurate at continental scales than a careful inventory (Pacala *et al.*,

1 2000). Using today's technology, it should be possible to complete a comprehensive inventory of the sink
2 at national scales, with the same accuracy as the U.S. forest inventory currently achieves for above-
3 ground carbon in forests (25%, Smith and Heath, 2005). Moreover, this inventory would provide
4 disaggregated information about the sink's causes and geographic distribution. In contrast, estimates from
5 atmospheric methods rely on the accuracy of atmospheric models, and estimates obtained from different
6 models vary by 100% or more at the scale of the United States, Canada, or Mexico (Gurney *et al.*, 2004).

7 The current emissions of carbon by the United States, Canada, Mexico, and North America are listed
8 in Table 3-1, and the much larger current stocks of ecosystem carbon are listed in Table 3-2 (note the
9 change of units from millions of tons of carbon per year in Table 3-1 to billions of tons of carbon in
10 Table 3-2). **In Table 3-1, a negative number indicates a carbon sink, and a positive number**
11 **indicates a carbon source.**

12
13 **Table 3-2. Carbon stocks in North America in billions of tons.**
14

15 **Forests**

16 Based on U.S. Forest Service inventories, forest ecosystem carbon stocks in the United States,
17 excluding soil carbon, have increased since 1953. The rate of increase has recently slowed because of
18 increasing harvest and declining growth in some areas with maturing forests. The current average annual
19 increase in carbon in trees is 146 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Smith and Heath, 2005) plus 23 Mt C yr⁻¹ from urban and
20 suburban trees (Chapter 14). The total estimate of the carbon sink in forested ecosystems is -259 Mt C yr⁻¹
21 and includes a sink of 90 Mt C yr⁻¹ from the accumulation of nonliving carbon in the soil (-90-146-23 =
22 -259) (Pacala *et al.*, 2001; Goodale *et al.*, 2002). Although the magnitude of the forest soil sink has
23 always been uncertain, it is now possible to measure the total above-and below-ground sink in a few
24 square kilometers by monitoring the atmospheric carbon dioxide that flows into and out of the site over
25 the course of a year. Note that these spatially intensive methods appropriate for monitoring the sink over a
26 few square kilometers are unrelated to the spatially extensive methods described above, which attempt to
27 constrain the sink at continental scales. As described in Appendix 3B, these studies now confirm the
28 estimates of inventories and show that most of the forest sink is above ground.

29 According to Canada's Greenhouse Gas Inventory (Environment Canada, 2005), managed forests in
30 Canada (comprising 53% of the total forest area) sequestered 101 Mt C aboveground in 1990. Since then,
31 carbon sequestration has decreased gradually to 69 Mt C in 2003, as managed forests have recovered
32 from past disturbances (Kurz and Apps, 1999). In addition, Goodale *et al.* (2002) estimate the sink of
33 nonliving carbon belowground to be -30 Mt C yr⁻¹ for the period 1990-1994.

1 The two studies of Mexican forests (Masera *et al.*, 1997 and Cairns *et al.*, 2000) both report
2 substantial losses of forest carbon, primarily because of deforestation in the tropical south. However, both
3 of these studies rely on calculations of carbon loss from remote imagery, rather than direct measurements,
4 and both report results for a period that ended more than 10 years ago.

6 **Wood Products**

7 Wood products create a carbon sink because they accumulate both in use (e.g., furniture, house
8 frames, etc.) and in landfills. The wood products sink is estimated at -57 Mt C yr^{-1} in the United States
9 (Skog and Nicholson, 1998) and -10 Mt C yr^{-1} in Canada (Goodale *et al.*, 2002). We know of no
10 estimates for Mexico.

12 **Woody Encroachment**

13 Woody encroachment is the invasion of woody plants into grasslands or the invasion of trees into
14 shrublands. It is caused by a combination of fire suppression and grazing. Fire inside the United States
15 has been reduced by more than 95% from the pre-settlement level of approximately 80 million hectares
16 burned per year, and this favors shrubs and trees in competition with grasses (Houghton *et al.*, 2000).
17 Field studies show that woody encroachment both increases the amount of living plant carbon and
18 decreases the amount of dead carbon in the soil (Guo and Gifford, 2002; Jackson *et al.*, 2002). Although
19 the gains and losses are of similar magnitude (Jackson *et al.*, 2002), the losses occur within approximately
20 a decade after the woody plants invade (Guo and Gifford, 2002), while the gains occur over a period of up
21 to a century or more. Thus, the net source or sink depends on the distribution of times since woody plants
22 invaded, and this is not known. Estimates for the size of the current U.S. woody encroachment sink
23 (Kulshreshtha *et al.*, 2000; Houghton and Hackler, 1999; and Hurtt *et al.*, 2002) all rely on methods that
24 do not account for the initial rapid loss of carbon from soil when grasslands were converted to shrublands
25 or forest. The estimate of $-120 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$ in Table 3-1 is from Kulshreshtha *et al.* (2000) but is similar to
26 the estimates from the other two studies (-120 and $-130 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$). No estimates are currently available
27 for Canada or Mexico. Note the error estimate of more than 100% in Table 3-1. A comprehensive set of
28 measurements of woody encroachment would reduce the error in the national and continental carbon
29 budgets more than any other inventory.

31 **Agricultural Lands**

32 Soils in croplands and grazing lands have been historically depleted of carbon by humans and their
33 animals, especially if the land was converted from forest to non-forest use. Harvest or consumption by
34 animals reduces the input of organic matter to the soil, while tillage and manure inputs increase the rate of

1 decomposition. Changes in cropland management, such as the adoption of no-till agriculture (see Chapter
2 10), have reversed the losses of carbon on some croplands, but the losses continue on the remaining lands.
3 The net is an approximate carbon balance for agricultural soils in Canada and 1.5 to -6 Mt C yr^{-1} in the
4 United States.

6 **Wetlands**

7 Peatlands are wetlands that have accumulated deep soil carbon deposits over thousands of years
8 because decomposition in them is less than plant productivity. Thus, wetlands form the largest carbon
9 pool of any North American ecosystem (Table 3-2). If drained for development, this soil carbon pool is
10 rapidly lost. Canada's extensive frozen and unfrozen wetlands create a net sink of between -19 and
11 -20 Mt C yr^{-1} (see Chapters 12 and 13), but drainage of U.S. peatlands have created a net source of
12 5 Mt C yr^{-1} . The very large pool of peat in northern wetlands is vulnerable to climate change and could
13 add more than 100 ppm to the atmosphere ($1 \text{ ppm} \approx 2.1 \text{ Gt C}$) during this century if released because of
14 global warming (see the model result in Cox *et al.*, 2000 for an example).

15 The carbon sink due to sedimentation in wetlands is between 0 and -21 Mt C yr^{-1} in Canada and
16 between 0 and $-112 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$ in the United States (see Chapter 13). Another important priority for
17 research is to better constrain carbon sequestration due to sedimentation in wetlands, lakes, reservoirs,
18 and rivers.

19 The focus on this report is on carbon fluxes without a consideration of the radiative forcing of
20 different greenhouse gases [i.e., global warming potential (GWP)]. However, wetlands are naturally an
21 important source of methane (CH_4). The GWP of a gas depends on its instantaneous radiative forcing and
22 its lifetime in the atmosphere, with methane having GWPs of 1.9 and 16.9 $\text{CO}_2\text{-C}$ equivalents on 500-year
23 and 20-year time frames, respectively (Ramaswamy *et al.*, 2001). Methane emissions effectively cancel
24 out the positive benefits of any carbon storage as peat in Canada and make U.S. wetlands a source of
25 warming on a decadal time scale (Chapter 9). Moreover, if wetlands become warmer and remain wet with
26 future climate change, they have the potential to emit large amounts of methane. This is probably the
27 single most important consideration, and unknown, in the role of wetlands and future climate change.

29 **Rivers and Reservoirs**

30 Organic sediments accumulate in reservoirs, alluvium, and colluvium and represent a carbon sink.
31 Pacala *et al.* (2001) extended an analysis of reservoir sedimentation (Stallard, 1998) to an inventory of the
32 68,000 reservoirs in the United States and also estimated net carbon burial in alluvium and colluvium.
33 Table 3-1 includes the midpoint of their estimated range of 10 to 40 Mt C yr^{-1} in the coterminous United

1 States. This analysis has also recently been repeated and produced an estimate of 17 Mt C yr⁻¹
2 (E. Sundquist, personal communication). We know of no similar analysis for Canada or Mexico.

4 **Exports Minus Imports of Wood and Agricultural Products**

5 The United States imports 14 Mt C yr⁻¹ more wood products than it exports and exports 30–50 Mt C
6 yr⁻¹ more agricultural products than it imports (Pacala *et al.*, 2001). The large imbalance in agricultural
7 products is primarily because of exported grains and oil seeds. Canada and Mexico are net wood
8 exporters, with Canada at –74 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Environment Canada, 2005) and Mexico at –1 Mt C yr⁻¹
9 (Masera *et al.*, 1997). We know of no analysis of the Canadian or Mexican export-import balance for
10 agricultural products.

12 **River Export**

13 Rivers in the coterminous United States were estimated to export 30–40 Mt C yr⁻¹ to the oceans in the
14 form of dissolved and particulate organic carbon and inorganic carbon derived from the atmosphere
15 (Pacala *et al.*, 2001). An additional 12–20 Mt C yr⁻¹ of inorganic carbon is also exported by rivers but is
16 derived from carbonate minerals. We know of no corresponding estimates for Alaska, Canada, or Mexico.

18 **Coastal Waters**

19 Chapter 15 summarizes the complexity and large uncertainty of the sea-air flux of CO₂ in North
20 American coastal waters. It is important to understand that the source in Mexican coastal waters is not
21 caused by humans and would have been present in preindustrial times. It is simply the result of the purely
22 physical upwelling of carbon-rich deep waters and is a natural part of the oceanic carbon cycle. It is not
23 yet known how much of the absorption of carbon by U.S. and Canadian coastal waters is natural and how
24 much is caused by nutrient additions to the coastal zone by humans. Accordingly, it is essentially
25 impossible to currently assess the potential or costs for carbon management in coastal waters of North
26 America.

28 **CONCLUDING SUMMARY**

29 U.S. fossil fuel consumption currently emits 1582 Mt C yr⁻¹ to the atmosphere. This is partially
30 balanced by a flow of 506 Mt C yr⁻¹ from the atmosphere to land caused by net ecosystem sinks in the
31 United States. Canadian fossil consumption transfers 164 Mt C yr⁻¹ to the atmosphere, but net ecological
32 sinks capture 134 Mt C yr⁻¹. Mexican fossil emissions of 110 Mt C yr⁻¹ are supplemented by a net
33 ecosystem source of 48 Mt C yr⁻¹ from tropical deforestation.

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1 **Table 3-1. Annual net emissions (source = positive) or uptake (land sink = negative)**
 2 **of carbon in millions of tons**

Source (positive) or Sink (negative)	United States	Canada	Mexico	North America
Fossil source (positive)				
Fossil fuel ***** ^a (oil, gas, coal)	1582 (681, 328, 573)	164 (75, 48, 40)	110 (71, 29, 11)	1857 (828, 405, 624)
Nonfossil carbon sink (negative) or source (positive)				
Forest***	-259 ^b	-99 ^c	+52 ^d	-283
Wood products****	-57 ^e	-10 ^f	ND	-67
Woody encroachment *	-120 ^g	ND	ND	-120
Agricultural soils**	-4 ^h	-0 ^h	-0 ^h	-4
Wetlands*	-41 ⁱ	-25 ⁱ	4 ⁱ	-70
Rivers and reservoirs**	-25 ^j	ND	ND	-25
Total carbon sink ***	-506	-134	48	-592
Net horizontal exports (negative) or imports (positive)				
Wood products****	14 ^e	-74 ^c	-1 ^d	-61
Agriculture products***	-65 ^k	ND	ND	-65
Rivers to ocean**	-35 ^k	ND	ND	-35
Total net absorption** (Sink plus exports)	-592	-208	47	-753
Net absorption (negative) or emission (positive) by coastal waters ****	ND	ND	ND	19 ^l

3 Uncertainty:

4 ***** (95% confidence within 10%)

5 **** (95% confidence within 25%)

6 *** (95% confidence within 50%)

7 ** (95% confidence within 100%)

8 * (95% confidence bounds >100%)

9 ND = No data available

10 ^ahttp://www.eia.doe.gov/env/inlenv.htm

11 ^bSmith and Heath (2005) for above ground carbon, but including 23 Mt C/yr⁻¹ for U.S. urban and suburban forests from
 12 Chapter 14, and Pacala *et al.* (2001) for below ground carbon.

13 ^cEnvironment Canada (2005)

14 ^dMasera *et al.* (1997)

15 ^eSkog *et al.* (2004), Skog and Nicholson (1998)

16 ^fGoodale *et al.* (2002)

17 ^gKulshreshtha *et al.* (2000), Hurtt *et al.* (2002), Houghton and Hackler (1999).

18 ^hChapter 10

19 ⁱChapter 13

20 ^jStallard, 1998; Pacala *et al.* (2001)

21 ^kPacala *et al.* (2001)

22 ^lChapter 15

1

Table 3-2. Carbon stocks in North America in billions of tons

	United States	Canada	Mexico	North America
Forest	53 ^a	85 ^a	9 ^d	147
Cropland	14 ^b	4 ^b	1 ^b	19
Pasture	33 ^b	12 ^b	10 ^b	55
Wetlands	42 ^c	152 ^c	2 ^c	196
Total	142	253	22	417

2

^aGoodale *et al.* (2002)

3

^bChapter 10


4

^cChapter 13

5


^dMasera *et al.* (1997)

1




2 Fig. 3-1. Historical carbon emissions from fossil fuel in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Data from
3 EIA (2005).

1




2 **Fig. 3-2. GDP in 2000 U.S. dollars vs fossil fuel carbon emissions (Mt C/yr^{-1}).** Data from EIA (2005). Each
 3 arrow shows the sequence from 1980 to 2003 for a country. Note that carbon emissions per unit GDP decelerate as a
 4 country gains wealth. The lines in the figure show the slopes associated with the different ratios of GDP and
 5 emissions growth (the y-intercepts of the dotted and dashed lines are not important; we moved the lines representing
 6 different ratios of GDP and emissions growth to higher y-intercepts so as not to obscure the data summarized by the
 7 arrows).


1



(a)



(b)



(c)

2 **Fig. 3-3. (a) The historical relationship between U.S. per capita GDP and U.S. carbon intensity (green**
 3 **symbols, kg CO₂ emitted per 1995 dollar of GDP) and per capita carbon emissions (red symbols, kg CO₂ per**
 4 **person). Each symbol shows a different year, and each of the two time series progresses roughly chronologically**
 5 **from left (early) to right (late) and ends in 2002. Source: Maddison (2003), Marland *et al.* (2005). Thus, the red**
 6 **square farthest to the right shows U.S. per capita CO₂ emissions in 2002. The square second farthest to the right**
 7 **shows per capita emissions in 2001. The third farthest to the right shows 2000, and so on. Note that per capita**
 8 **emissions have been roughly constant over the last 30 years (squares corresponding to per capita GDP greater than**

1 approximately \$16,000). (b) Historical U.S. GDP divided among the manufacturing, services, and agricultural
2 sectors. *Source*: Mitchell (1998), WRI (2005). (c) Historical U.S. carbon emissions divided among the residential,
3 services, manufacturing, and transportation sectors. *Source*: EIA (2005).

Appendix 3A

Historical Overview of the Development of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican Ecosystem Sources and Sinks for Atmospheric Carbon

Although the lands of the New World were inhabited before the arrival of Europeans, the changes since arrival have been enormous, especially during the last two centuries. Peak U.S. emissions from land-use change occurred late in the 19th century, and the last few decades have experienced a carbon sink (Houghton *et al.*, 1999; Hurtt *et al.*, 2002). In Canada, peak emissions occurred nearly a century later than in the United States, and current data show that land-use change causes a net carbon sink (Environment Canada, 2005). In Mexico, the emissions of carbon continue to increase from net deforestation. All three countries may be in different stages of the same development pattern (see Fig. 3-2).

The largest changes in land use and the largest emissions of carbon came from the expansion of croplands. In addition to the carbon lost from trees, soils lose 25–30% of their initial carbon content (to a depth of 1 m) when cultivated. In the United States, croplands increased from about 0.25 million ha in 1700 to 236 million ha in 1990 (Houghton *et al.*, 1999; Houghton and Hackler, 2000). The most rapid expansion (and the largest emissions) occurred between 1800 and 1900, and since 1920 there has been little net change in cropland area (Fig. 3-2). Pastures expanded nearly as much, from 0.01 million to 231 million ha, most of the increase taking place between 1850 and 1950. As most pastures were derived from grasslands, the associated changes in carbon stocks were modest.

The total area of forests and woodlands in the United States declined as a result of agricultural expansion by 160 million ha (38%), but this net change obscures the dynamics of forest loss and recovery, especially in the eastern part of the United States. After 1920, forest areas increased by 14 million ha nationwide as farmlands continued to be abandoned in the northeast, southeast, and north central regions. Nevertheless, another 4 million ha of forest were lost in other regions, and the net recovery of 10 million ha offset only 6% of the net loss (Houghton and Hackler, 2000).

Between 1938 and 2002, the total area of forest land in the conterminous United States decreased slightly, by 3 million ha (Smith *et al.*, 2004). This small change is the net result of much larger shifts among land-use classes (Birdsey and Lewis, 2003). Gains of forest land, primarily from cropland and pasture, were about 50 million ha for this period. Losses of forest land to cropland, pasture, and developed use were about 53 million ha for the same period. Gains of forest land were primarily in the

1 Eastern United States, whereas losses to cropland and pasture were predominantly in the South, and
2 losses to developed use were spread around all regions of the United States.

3 In the United States, harvest of industrial wood (timber) generally followed the periods of major
4 agricultural clearing in each region. In the last few decades, total volume harvested increased until a
5 recent leveling took place (Smith *et al.*, 2004). The volume harvested in the Pacific Coast and Rocky
6 Mountain regions has declined sharply, whereas harvest in the South increased and in the North, stayed
7 level. Fuel wood harvest peaked between 1860 and 1880, after which fossil fuels became the dominant
8 type of fuel (Houghton and Hackler, 2000).

9 The arrival of Europeans reduced the area annually burned, but a federal program of fire protection
10 was not established until early in the 20th century. Fire exclusion had begun earlier in California and in
11 parts of the central, mountain, and Pacific regions. However, neither the extent nor the timing of early fire
12 exclusion is well known. After about 1920, the Cooperative Fire Protection Program gradually reduced
13 the areas annually burned by wildfires (Houghton *et al.*, 1999, 2000). The reduction in wildfires led to an
14 increase in carbon storage in forests. How long this “recovery” will last is unclear. There is some
15 evidence that fires are becoming more widespread, again, especially in Canada and the western United
16 States. Fire exclusion and suppression are also thought to have led to woody encroachment, especially in
17 the southwestern and western United States. The extent and rate of this process is poorly documented,
18 however, and estimates of a carbon sink are very uncertain. Gains in carbon aboveground may be offset
19 by losses belowground in some systems, and the spread of exotic annual grasses into semiarid deserts and
20 shrublands may be converting the recent sink to a source (Bradley *et al.*, in preparation).

21 The consequence of this land-use history is that U.S. forests, at present, are recovering from
22 agricultural abandonment, fire suppression, and reduced logging (in some regions), and, as a result, are
23 accumulating carbon (Birdsey and Heath, 1995; Houghton *et al.*, 1999; Caspersen *et al.*, 2000; Pacala
24 *et al.*, 2001). The magnitude of the sink is uncertain, and whether any of it has been enhanced by
25 environmental change (CO₂ fertilization, nitrogen deposition, and changes in climate) is unclear.
26 Understanding the mechanisms responsible for the current sink is important for predicting its future
27 behavior (Hurt *et al.*, 2002).

28 In the mid-1980s, Mexico lost approximately 668,000 ha of closed forests annually, about 75% of
29 them tropical forests (Masera *et al.*, 1997). Most deforestation was for pastures. Another 136,000 ha of
30 forest suffered major perturbations, and the net flux of carbon from deforestation, logging, fires,
31 degradation, and the establishment of plantations was 52.3 Mt C yr⁻¹, about 40% of the country’s
32 estimated annual emissions of carbon. A later study found the deforestation rate for tropical Mexico to be
33 about 12% higher (1.9% per year) (Cairns *et al.*, 2000).

Appendix 3B

Eddy-Covariance Measurements Now Confirm Estimates of Carbon Sinks from Forest Inventories

Long-term, tower-based, eddy-covariance measurements (e.g., Wofsy *et al.*, 1993) represent an independent approach to measuring ecosystem-atmosphere CO₂ exchange. The method describes fluxes over areas of approximately 1 km² (Horst and Weil, 1994), measures hour-by-hour ecosystem carbon fluxes, and can be integrated over time scales of years. A network of more than 200 sites now exists globally (Baldocchi *et al.*, 2001); more than 50 of these are in North America. None of these sites existed in 1990, so these represent a relatively new source of information about the terrestrial carbon cycle. An increasing number of these measurement sites include concurrent carbon inventory measurements.

Where eddy-covariance and inventory measurements are concurrent, the rates of accumulation or loss of biomass are often consistent to within several tens of g C m⁻² yr⁻¹ for a one-year sample. Published intercomparisons in North America exist for western coniferous forests (Law *et al.*, 2001), agricultural sites (Verma *et al.*, 2005), and eastern deciduous forests (Barford *et al.*, 2001; Cook *et al.*, 2004; Curtis *et al.*, 2002; Ehmann *et al.*, 2002; Gough *et al.*, in review). Multiyear studies at two sites (Barford *et al.*, 2001; Gough *et al.*, in review) show that 5- to 10-year averages converge toward better agreement. Table 3B-1 from Barford *et al.* (2001) shows the results of nearly a decade of concurrent measurements in an eastern deciduous forest.

This concurrence between eddy-covariance flux measurements and ecosystem carbon inventories is relevant because it provides independent validation of the inventory measurements used to estimate long-term trends in carbon stocks. The eddy-covariance data are also valuable because the assembly of global eddy-covariance data provides independent support for net storage of carbon by many terrestrial ecosystems and the substantial year-to-year variability in this net sink. The existence of the eddy-covariance data also makes the sites suitable for co-locating mechanistic studies of inter-annual, and shorter, time-scale processes governing the terrestrial carbon cycle. Chronosequences show trends consistent with inventory assessments of forest growth, and comparisons across space and plant functional types are beginning to show broad consistency. These results show a consistency across a mixture of observational methods with complementary characteristics, which should facilitate the development of an increasingly complete understanding of continental carbon dynamics (Canadell *et al.*, 2000).

1
2
3

Table 3B-1. Carbon budget for Harvard Forest from forest inventory and eddy-covariance flux measurements, 1993–2001. *Source:* Barford *et al.* (2001), Table 1. Numbers in parentheses give the ranges of the 95% confidence intervals.

Component	Change in carbon stock or flux (g C m ⁻² yr ⁻¹)	Totals
Change in live biomass		
A. Aboveground		
1. Growth	1.4 (±0.2)	
2. Mortality	-0.6 (±0.6)	
B. Belowground (estimated)		
1. Growth	0.3	
2. Mortality	-0.1	
Subtotal		1.0 (±0.2)
Change in dead wood		
A. Mortality		
1. Aboveground	0.6 (±0.6)	
2. Belowground	0.1	
B. Respiration	-0.3 (±0.3)	
Subtotal		0.4 (±0.3)
Change in soil carbon (net)		0.2 (±0.1)
Sum of carbon budget figures		1.6 (±0.4)
Sum of eddy-covariance flux measurements		2.0 (±0.4)

4

Chapter 4. What Are the Options and Measures That Could Significantly Affect the Carbon Cycle?

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KEY FINDINGS

- Options to reduce energy-related CO₂ emissions include improved efficiency, fuel switching (among fossil fuels and non-carbon fuels), and CO₂ capture and storage.
- Most energy use, and hence energy-related CO₂ emissions, involves equipment or facilities with a relatively long life—5 to 50 years. Many options for reducing these CO₂ emissions are most cost-effective, and sometimes only feasible, in new equipment or facilities. This means that cost-effective reduction of energy-related CO₂ emissions may best be achieved as existing equipment and facilities are replaced. It also means that technological change will have a significant impact on the cost because emission reductions will be implemented over a long time.
- Options to increase carbon sinks include forest growth and agricultural soil sequestration. The amount of carbon that can be captured by these options is significant, but small relative to the excess carbon in the atmosphere. These options can be implemented in the short-term, but the amount of carbon sequestered typically is low initially then rising for a number of years before tapering off again as the total potential is achieved. There is also a significant risk that the carbon sequestered may be released again by natural phenomena or human activities.
- A number of policy options can help reduce carbon emissions and increase carbon sinks. The effectiveness of a policy depends on the technical feasibility and cost-effectiveness of the portfolio of measures it seeks to promote, on its suitability given the institutional context, and on its interaction with policies implemented to achieve other objectives.
- Policies to reduce atmospheric CO₂ concentrations cost effectively in the short- and long-term would: (1) encourage adoption of cost-effective emission reduction and sink enhancement measures through an emissions trading program or an emissions fee; (2) stimulate development of technologies that lower the cost of emissions reduction, geological storage and sink enhancement; (3) adopt

1 appropriate regulations to complement the emissions trading program or emission fee for sources or
2 actions subject to market imperfections, such as energy efficiency measures and co-generation; (4)
3 Revise existing policies with other objectives that lead to higher CO₂ or CH₄ emissions so that the
4 objectives, if still relevant, are achieved with lower emissions.

- 5 • Implementation of such policies is best achieved by national governments with international
6 cooperation. This provides maximum coverage of CO₂ emissions and carbon sinks and so enables
7 implementation of the most cost-effective options. It also allows better allocation of resources for
8 technology research and development. National policies may need to be coordinated with
9 state/provincial governments, or state/provincial governments may implement coordinated policies
10 without the national government.
-

14 INTRODUCTION

15 This chapter provides an overview of measures that can reduce CO₂ and CH₄ emissions and those that
16 can enhance carbon sinks, and it attempts to compare them. Finally, it discusses policies to encourage
17 implementation of source reduction and sink enhancement measures.

19 SOURCE REDUCTION OPTIONS

20 Combustion of fossil fuels is the main source of CO₂ emissions, although some CO₂ is also released
21 in non-combustion and natural processes. Most energy use, and hence energy-related CO₂ emissions,
22 involves equipment or facilities with a relatively long life—5 to 50 years. Many options for reducing
23 these CO₂ emissions are most cost-effective, and sometimes only feasible, in new equipment or facilities.

24 To stabilize the atmospheric concentration of CO₂ “would require global anthropogenic CO₂
25 emissions to drop below 1990 levels . . . and to steadily decrease thereafter” (IPCC, 2001a).¹ That entails
26 a transition to an energy system where electricity and hydrogen become the major energy carriers. They
27 are produced by non-fossil sources or from fossil fuels with capture and geological storage of the CO₂
28 generated. The transition to such an energy system, while meeting growing energy needs, will take at
29 least several decades. Thus, shorter term (2015–2025) and longer term (post-2050) options are
30 differentiated.

31 Options to reduce energy-related CO₂ emissions can be grouped into a few categories:

- 32 • efficiency improvement,

¹The later the date at which global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions drop below 1990 levels, the higher the level at which the CO₂ concentration is stabilized.

- 1 • fuel switching to fossil fuels with lower carbon content per unit of energy produced and to non-
- 2 carbon fuels, and
- 3 • switching to electricity and hydrogen produced from fossil fuels in processes with CO₂ capture and
- 4 geological storage.

6 Efficiency Improvement

7 Energy is used to provide services such as heat, light, and motive power. Any measure that delivers
8 the desired service with less energy is an efficiency improvement.² Efficiency improvements reduce CO₂
9 emissions whenever they reduce the use of fossil fuels directly or indirectly.³ Energy use can be reduced
10 by improving the efficiency of individual devices (such as refrigerators, industrial boilers, and motors), by
11 improving the efficiency of systems (using the correct motor size for the task), and by using energy that is
12 not currently utilized, such as waste heat.⁴ Opportunities for efficiency improvements are available in all
13 sectors.

14 It is useful to distinguish two levels of energy efficiency improvement: (1) the amount consistent with
15 efficient utilization of resources (the economic definition) and (2) the maximum attainable (the
16 engineering definition). Energy efficiency improvement thus covers a broad range, from measures that
17 provide a cost saving to measures that are too expensive to warrant implementation. Market imperfections
18 inhibit adoption of some cost-effective efficiency improvements (NCEP, 2005).⁵

19 Energy efficiency improvements tend to occur gradually, but steadily, across the economy in response
20 to technological developments, replacement of equipment and buildings, changes in energy prices, and
21 other factors.⁶ In the short term, the potential improvement depends largely on greater deployment and
22 use of available efficient equipment and technology. In the long term, it depends largely on technological
23 developments.

²In the transportation sector, for example, energy efficiency can be increased by improving the fuel performance of vehicles, shifting to less emissions-intensive modes of transport, and adopting measures that reduce transportation demand, such as telecommuting and designing communities so that people live closer to shopping and places of work.

³Increasing the fuel economy of vehicles or the efficiency of coal-fired generating units reduces fossil fuel use directly. Increasing the efficiency of refrigerators reduces electricity use and hence the fossil fuel used to generate electricity.

⁴For example, 40 to 70% of the energy in the fuel used to generate electricity is wasted. Cogeneration or combined heat and power systems generate electricity and produce steam or hot water. Cogeneration requires a nearby customer for the steam or heat.

⁵Examples include limited foresight, externalities, capital market barriers, and principal/agent split incentive problems.

⁶The rate of efficiency improvement varies widely across different types of equipment such as lighting, refrigerators, electric motors, and motor vehicles.

1 Fuel Switching

2 Energy-related CO₂ emissions are primarily due to combustion of fossil fuels. Thus, CO₂ emissions
3 can be reduced by switching to a less carbon-intensive fossil fuel or to a non-carbon fuel.

4 The CO₂ emissions per unit of energy for fossil fuels (carbon intensity) differ significantly, with coal
5 being the highest, oil and related petroleum products about 25% lower, and natural gas over 40% lower
6 than coal. Oil and/or natural gas can be substituted for coal in all energy uses, mainly electricity
7 generation. However, natural gas is not available everywhere in North America and is much less abundant
8 than coal, limiting the large-scale long-term replacement of coal with natural gas. Technically, natural gas
9 can replace oil in all energy uses but to substitute for gasoline and diesel fuel, by far the largest uses of
10 oil, would require conversion of millions of vehicles and development of a refueling infrastructure.

11 Non-carbon fuels include

- 12 • biomass and fuels, such as ethanol, produced from biomass; and
- 13 • electricity and hydrogen produced from carbon-free sources.

14
15 Biomass can be used directly as a fuel in some situations. Pulp and paper plants and sawmills, for
16 example, use wood waste and sawdust as fuel. Ethanol, currently produced mainly from corn, is blended
17 with gasoline. The CO₂ emission reduction achieved depends on whether the biomass used is replaced, on
18 the fossil-fuel energy used to produce the fuel, and the carbon content of the fuel displaced.

19 Carbon-free energy sources include hydro,⁷ wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, and nuclear fission.
20 Sometimes they are used to provide energy services directly, such as solar water heating and wind mills
21 for pumping water. But they are mainly used to generate electricity, about 35% of the electricity in North
22 America. Currently, generating electricity using any of the carbon free energy sources is usually more
23 costly than using fossil fuels.

24 Most of the fuel switching options are currently available, and so are viable short-term options in
25 many situations.

26

27 Electricity and Hydrogen from Fossil Fuels with CO₂ Capture and Geological 28 Storage

29 About 65% of the electricity in North America is generated from fossil fuels, mainly coal but with a
30 rising share for natural gas (EIA, 2003). The CO₂ emissions from fossil-fired generating units can be
31 captured and injected into a suitable geological formation for long-term storage.

⁷Reservoirs for hydroelectric generation produce CO₂ and methane emissions, so such sources are not totally carbon free.

1 Hydrogen (H₂) is an energy carrier that emits no CO₂ when burned, but may give rise to CO₂
2 emissions when it is produced (National Academies, 2004). Currently, most hydrogen is produced from
3 fossil fuels in a process that generates CO₂. The CO₂ from this process can be captured and stored in
4 geological formations. Alternatively, hydrogen can be produced from water molecules using electricity, in
5 which case the CO₂ emissions depend on how the electricity is generated. Hydrogen could substitute for
6 natural gas in most energy uses and be used by fuel cell vehicles.

7 Carbon dioxide can be captured from the emissions of large sources, such as power plants, and
8 pumped into geologic formations for long-term storage, thus permitting continued use of fossil fuels
9 while avoiding CO₂ emissions to the atmosphere.⁸ Many variations on this basic theme have been
10 proposed; for example, pre-combustion vs post-combustion capture, production of hydrogen from fossil
11 fuels, and the use of different chemical approaches and potential storage reservoirs. While most of the
12 basic technology exists, much work remains to safely and cost effectively integrate CO₂ capture and
13 storage into our energy system, so this is mainly a long-term option (IPCC, 2005).

14 15 **Industrial Processes**

16 The processes used to make cement, lime, and ammonia release CO₂. Because the quantity of CO₂
17 released is determined by chemical reactions, the process emissions are determined by the output. But, the
18 CO₂ could be captured and stored in geological formations. CO₂ also is released when iron ore and coke
19 are heated in a blast furnace to produce molten iron, but alternative steel-making technologies with lower
20 CO₂ emissions are commercially available. Consumption of the carbon anodes during aluminum smelting
21 leads to CO₂ emissions, but good management practices can reduce the emissions. Raw natural gas
22 contains CO₂ that is removed at gas processing plants and could be captured and stored in geological
23 formations.

24 25 **Methane Emissions**

26 Methane is produced as organic matter decomposes in low-oxygen conditions and is emitted by
27 landfills, wastewater treatment plants, and livestock manure. In many cases, the methane can be collected
28 and used as an energy source. Methane emissions also occur during production of coal, oil, and natural
29 gas. Such emissions usually can be flared (though this generates CO₂) or collected for use as an energy
30 source. Ruminant animals produce CH₄ while digesting their food. Emissions by ruminant farm animals
31 can be reduced by measures that improve animal productivity. All of these emission reductions are
32 currently available.

⁸Since combustion of biomass releases carbon previously removed from the atmosphere, capture and storage of these emissions results in negative emissions.

1

2 TERRESTRIAL SEQUESTRATION OPTIONS

3 Trees and other plants sequester carbon as biological growth captures carbon from the atmosphere
4 and sequesters it in the plant cells (IPCC, 2000b). Currently, very large volumes of carbon are sequestered
5 in the plant cells of the earth's forests. Increasing the stock of forest through afforestation, reforestation,
6 or forest management draws carbon from the atmosphere and increases the carbon sequestered in the
7 forest and the soil of the forested area. Sequestered carbon is released by fire, insects, disease, decay,
8 wood harvesting, conversion of land from its natural state, and disturbance of the soil.

9 Agricultural practices can increase the carbon sequestered by the soil. Some crops build soil organic
10 matter, which is largely carbon, better than others. Some research shows that crop-fallow systems result in
11 lower soil carbon content than continuous cropping systems. No-till and low-till cultivation builds soil
12 organic matter.

13 Conversion of agricultural land to forestry can increase carbon sequestration in soil and tree biomass,
14 but the rate of sequestration depends on the soil type. Conversion of agricultural land to other uses can
15 result in positive or negative net carbon emissions depending upon the land use.

16 Although forest growth and soil sequestration cannot capture all of the excess carbon in the
17 atmosphere, they do have the potential to capture a significant portion.⁹ These options can be
18 implemented in the short-term, but the amount of carbon sequestered typically is low initially then rising
19 for a number of years before tapering off again as the total potential is achieved.

20

21 INTEGRATED COMPARISON OF OPTIONS

22 As is clear from the previous sections, there are thousands of options to reduce emissions of or to
23 sequester CO₂. To help them decide which options to implement, policy makers need to know which are
24 the most cost-effective—have the lowest cost per metric ton of CO₂ reduced or sequestered.

25 This involves an integrated comparison of options, which can be surprisingly complex in practice. It
26 is most useful and accurate for short-term options where the cost and performance of the option can be
27 forecast with a high degree of confidence. The performance of many options is interrelated; for example,
28 the emission reductions that can be achieved by blending ethanol in gasoline depend on other measures as
29 well, such as telecommuting, to reduce travel demand the success of modal shift initiatives, and the
30 efficiency of motor vehicles. The prices of fossil fuels affect the cost-effectiveness of many options.

⁹The IPCC (2001b) estimated that biological growth including soils has the potential of capturing up to 20% of the globe's releases of excess atmospheric carbon over the next 50 years (Chapter 4). Nabuurs *et al.* (2000) estimate potential annual forest sequestration in the United States at 6% to 11% of 1990 emissions and 125% to 185% of 1990 emissions for Canada. For the two countries together, the figure is 17% to 27%.

1 Changes to the age structure of the population, increases in per capita incomes, and other factors can
2 affect the potential for some options as well. Finally, the policy selected to implement an option,
3 incentives vs a regulation for example, can affect its potential.

4 The emission reduction potential and cost-effectiveness of options also vary by location. Energy
5 sources and sequestration options differ by location; for example, natural gas may not be available, the
6 wind and solar regime vary, hydro potential may be small or large, land suitable for
7 afforestation/reforestation is limited, the agricultural crops may or may not be well suited to low-till
8 cropping. Climate, lifestyles, and consumption patterns also affect the potential of many options; for
9 example, more potential for heating options in a cold climate, more for air conditioning options in a hot
10 climate. The mix of single-family and multi-residential buildings affects the potential for options focused
11 on those building types, and the scope for public transit options tends to increase with city size.
12 Institutional factors affect the potential of many options as well; for example, the prevalence of rented
13 housing affects the potential to implement residential emission reduction measures, the authority to
14 specify minimum efficiency standards for vehicles, appliances, and equipment may rest with the
15 state/provincial government or the national government, and the ownership and regulatory structure for
16 gas and electric utilities can affect their willingness to offer energy efficiency programs.

17
18 **TEXT BOX on “Emission Reduction Supply Curve” goes near here.**
19

20 The estimated cost and emission reduction potential for the principal short-term CO₂ emission
21 reduction and sequestration options are summarized in Table 4.1. All estimates are standardized to a
22 common unit of measurement—2004 U.S. dollars per metric ton of carbon.¹⁰
23

24 **Table 4-1. Standardized cost estimates [annualized cost in 2004 constant U.S. dollars per metric ton**
25 **of carbon (t C)]**
26

27 Most options have a range of costs. The range is due to four factors. First, the cost per unit of
28 emissions reduced varies by location even for a very simple measure. For example, the emission
29 reduction achieved by installing a more efficient light bulb depends on the hours of use and the generation
30 mix that supplies the electricity. Second, the cost and performance of any option in the future is uncertain.
31 Different assumptions about future costs and performance contribute to the range. Third, most mitigation
32 and sequestration options are subject to diminishing returns, that is, cost rises at an increasing rate with
33 greater use, as in the power generation, agriculture, and forestry cost estimates. So the estimated scale of

¹⁰A metric ton (sometimes written as “tonne”) is 1000 kg, which is 2205 lb or 1.1025 tons.

1 adoption contributes to range. Finally, some categories include multiple options, notably those for the
2 U.S. economy as a whole, each with its own marginal cost. For example, the “All Industry” category is an
3 aggregation of seven subcategories discussed in Chapter 8. The result again is a range of cost estimates.

4 The cost estimates in Table 4-1 are the direct costs of the options. A few options, such as the first
5 estimate for power generation in Table 4-1, have a negative annualized cost. This implies that the option
6 mitigation is likely to yield cost savings for reasons such as improved combustion efficiency. Some
7 options have ancillary benefits (e.g., reductions in ordinary pollutants, reduced dependence on imported
8 oil, expansion of wildlife habitat associated with afforestation) that reduce their cost from a societal
9 perspective. Indirect (multiplier, general equilibrium, macroeconomic) effects in the economy tend to
10 increase the direct costs (as when the increased cost of energy use raises the price of products that use
11 energy or energy-intensive inputs). Examples of these complicating effects are presented in individual
12 chapters, along with some estimates of their effects on costs.

13 As indicated in several segments of Table 4.1, costs are sensitive to the policy instrument used to
14 implement the option. In general, the less restrictive the policy, the lower the cost. That is why the cost
15 estimates for the Feebate are lower than the cost estimate for the CAFÉ standard. In a similar vein, costs
16 are lowered by expanding the number of participants in a permit trading arrangement, especially those
17 with a prevalence of low-cost options, such as developing countries. That is why the global trading costs
18 are lower than the Annex I (industrialized countries only) case for the U.S. economy.

19 The task of choosing the “best” combination of options may seem daunting given the numerous
20 options and the associated cost ranges. This combination will depend on several factors including the
21 emission target, the emitters covered, the compliance period, and the ancillary benefits of the options. The
22 best combination will change over time as cheap options become more costly with additional
23 installations, and technological change lowers the costs of more expensive options. It is unlikely that
24 policy-makers can identify the least-cost combination of options to achieve a given emission target. They
25 can adopt policies, such as permit trading, that cover a large number of emitters and allow them to choose
26 the lowest cost reduction options.

27

28 **POLICY OPTIONS**

29 **Overview**

30 Stabilizing the carbon cycle will require very substantial reductions and increased sequestration of
31 CO₂ emissions. Policies will need to stimulate implementation of a portfolio of options to reduce
32 emissions and increase sequestration in the short-term, taking into account constraints on and implications
33 of the mitigation strategies. Policies will also need to encourage research and development of
34 technologies that can reduce emissions even further in the long term.

1 No single technology or approach can achieve a sufficiently large CO₂ emission reduction or
2 sequestration to stabilize the carbon cycle (Hoffert *et al.*, 1998, 2002). A portfolio of options will need to
3 be implemented, including greater efficiency in the production and use of energy; expanded use of
4 renewable energy technologies; technologies for removing carbon from fossil fuels and sequestering it in
5 geological formations; various changes in forestry, agricultural, and land use practices; and possibly other
6 approaches, some of which are currently very controversial, such as nuclear power and certain types of
7 “geoengineering.”

8 Because CO₂ has a long atmospheric residence time,¹¹ immediate action to reduce emissions and
9 increase sequestration allows its atmospheric concentration to be stabilized at a lower level.¹² Policy
10 instruments to promote cost-effective implementation of a portfolio of options covering virtually all
11 emissions sources and sequestration options are available for the short term. Such policy instruments are
12 discussed below.

14 **General Considerations**

15 Policies to encourage reduction and sequestration of CO₂ emissions could include information
16 programs, voluntary programs, conventional regulation, emissions trading, and emissions taxes
17 (Tietenberg, 2000). Information and voluntary programs are generally not environmentally effective¹³
18 (OECD, 2003b).

19 Reducing emissions will require the use of policy instruments such as regulations, emissions trading,
20 and emissions taxes. Regulations can require designated sources to keep their emissions below a specified
21 limit, either a quantity per unit of output or an absolute amount per day or year. Regulations can also
22 stipulate minimum levels of energy efficiency of appliances, buildings, equipment, and vehicles.

23 An emissions trading program establishes a cap on the annual emissions of a set of sources.
24 Allowances equal to the cap are issued and can be traded. Each source must monitor its actual emissions
25 and remit allowances equal to its actual emissions to the regulator. An emissions trading system creates
26 an incentive for sources with low-cost options to reduce their emissions and sell their excess allowances.
27 Sources with high-cost options find it less expensive to buy allowances at the market price than to reduce
28 their own emissions enough to achieve compliance.

¹¹CO₂ has an atmospheric lifetime of 5 to 200 years. A single lifetime can not be defined for CO₂ because of different rates of uptake by different removal processes. (IPCC, 2001a, Table 1, p. 38)

¹²IPCC, 2001a, p. 187.

¹³Information and voluntary programs may have some impact on behavior through an appeal to patriotism or an environmental ethic; publishing information that may reveal negative actions, as in a pollutant registry; and providing public recognition, as in green labeling or DOE’s Energy Star Program (Tietenberg and Wheeler, 2001).

1 An emissions tax requires designated sources to pay a specified levy for each unit of its actual
2 emissions. In a manner analogous to emissions trading, emitters will mitigate emissions up to the point
3 where mitigation costs are lower than the tax, but once mitigation costs exceed the tax they will opt to pay
4 it.

5 The choice of policy instrument needs to consider institutional and socioeconomic constraints that
6 affect its implementation, such the ability of sources to monitor their actual emissions, the constitutional
7 authority of national and/or provincial/state governments to impose emissions taxes, regulate emissions
8 and/or regulate efficiency standards. It is also important to consider potential conflicts between carbon
9 reduction policies and policies with other objectives, such as keeping energy costs to consumers as low as
10 possible.

11 Practically every policy (except cost-saving conservation and other “no regrets” options), no matter
12 what instrument is used to implement it, has a cost in terms of utilization of resources and ensuing price
13 increases that leads to reductions in output, income, and employment, or in more technical measures of
14 economic well-being (e.g., “welfare measures” such as “compensating variation”). The total cost is
15 usually higher than the direct cost due to interactions with other segments of the economy (“general
16 equilibrium” effects) and with existing policies. Regardless of where the compliance obligation is
17 imposed, the cost ultimately is borne by the general public as consumers, shareholders, employees,
18 taxpayers, and recipients of government services.¹⁴ The cost can have competitiveness impacts if some
19 emitters in other jurisdictions are not subject to similar policies. But the societal benefits, such as
20 improved public health and reduced environmental damage, may exceed the cost of implementing the
21 policy.

22 To achieve a given emission reduction target, regulations that require each affected source to meet a
23 specified emissions limit or implement specified controls are almost always more costly than emissions
24 trading or emissions taxes because they require each affected source to meet the regulation regardless of
25 cost rather than allowing emission reductions to be implemented where the cost is lowest (Bohm and
26 Russell, 1986).¹⁵ The cost saving available through trading or an emissions tax generally increases with
27 the diversity of sources and share of total emissions covered by the policy.¹⁶ A policy that raises revenue

¹⁴The source with the compliance obligation passes on the cost through some combination of higher prices for its products, negotiating lower prices with suppliers, layoffs, and/or lower wages for employees, and lower profits that lead to lower tax payments and lower share prices. Other firms that buy the products or supply the inputs make similar adjustments. Governments raise taxes or reduce services to compensate for the loss of tax revenue. Ultimately all of the costs are borne by the general public.

¹⁵As well, regulation is generally inferior to emissions trading or taxes in inducing technological change.

¹⁶These policies encourage implementation of the lowest cost emission reductions available to the affected sources. They establish a price (the emissions tax or the market price for an allowance) for a unit of emissions and then allow affected sources to respond to the price signal. In principle, these two instruments are equivalent in terms of achievement of the efficient allocation of resources, but they may differ in terms of equity because of how the emission permits are initially distributed and whether a tax or subsidy is used. It is easier to coordinate emissions trading programs than emissions taxes across jurisdictions.

1 (an emissions tax or auctioned allowances) has a lower macroeconomic cost than a policy that does not, if
2 the revenue is used to reduce existing distortionary taxes such as sales or income taxes (see, e.g., Parry
3 *et al.*, 1999).

4 5 **Source Reduction Policies**

6 Historically CO₂ emissions have not been regulated directly. Some energy-related CO₂ emissions
7 have been regulated indirectly through energy policies, such as promotion of renewable energy, and
8 efficiency standards and ratings for equipment, vehicles, and some buildings. Methane emissions from oil
9 and gas production, underground coal mines, and landfills have been regulated, usually for safety reasons.

10 Policies with other objectives can have a significant impact on CO₂ emissions. Policies to encourage
11 production or use of fossil fuels, such as favorable tax treatment for fossil fuel production, increase CO₂
12 emissions. Similarly, urban plans and infrastructure that facilitate automobile use rather than public transit
13 increase CO₂ emissions. In contrast, a tax on vehicle fuels reduces CO₂ emissions.

14 CO₂ emissions are well suited to emissions trading and emissions taxes. These policies allow
15 considerable flexibility in the location and, to a lesser extent, the timing of the emission reductions. The
16 environmental impacts of CO₂ depend on its atmospheric concentration, which is not sensitive to the
17 location or timing of the emissions. Apart from ground-level safety concerns, the same is true of CH₄
18 emissions. In addition, the large number and diverse nature of the CO₂ and CH₄ sources means that use of
19 such policies can yield significant cost savings.

20 Despite the advantages of emissions trading and taxes, there are situations where regulations setting
21 maximum emissions on individual sources or efficiency standards for appliances and equipment are
22 preferred. Such regulations may be desirable where monitoring actual emissions is costly or where firms
23 or individuals do not respond well to price signals due to lack of information or other barriers. Energy
24 efficiency standards for appliances, buildings, equipment and vehicles tend to fall into this category
25 (OECD, 2003a).¹⁷ In some cases, such as refrigerators, standards have been used successfully to drive
26 technology development.

27 28 **Sequestration Policies**

29 Currently there are few, if any, policies whose primary purpose is to increase carbon uptake by forests
30 or agricultural soils. But policies designed to achieve other objectives, such as afforestation of marginal
31 lands, green payments, conservation compliance, Conservation Reserve Program, and CSP increase
32 carbon uptake. Policies that affect crop choice (support payments, crop insurance, disaster relief) and

¹⁷The efficiency of standards sometimes can be improved by allowing manufacturers that exceed the standard to earn credits that can be sold to manufacturers that do not meet the standard.

1 farmland preservation (conservation easements, use value taxation, agricultural zoning) may increase or
2 reduce the carbon stock of agricultural soils. And policies that encourage higher agricultural output
3 (support payments) can reduce the carbon stored by agricultural soils.

4 Policies to increase carbon uptake by forests and agricultural soils could take the form of

- 5 • Regulations, such as requirements to reforest areas that have been logged, implement specified forest
6 management practices, and establish land conservation reserves;
- 7 • Incentive-based policies, such as subsidies for adoption of specified forest management or
8 agricultural practices, or issuance of tradable credits for increases in specified carbon stocks. The
9 tradable credits can be sold to sources subject to a CO₂ emissions trading program or offset
10 requirement.¹⁸ Since the carbon is easily released from these sinks, for example by a forest fire or
11 tilling the soil, ensuring the permanence of the carbon sequestered is a major challenge for such
12 policies. (Feng *et al.*, 2003);
- 13 • Voluntary actions, such as “best practices” that enhance carbon sequestration in soils and forests
14 while realizing other benefits (e.g., managing forests for both timber and carbon storage),
15 establishment of plantation forests for carbon sequestration, and increased production of wood
16 products (Sedjo, 2001; Sedjo and Swallow, 2002).

17
18 The carbon cycle impacts of such programs would not be large, compared with emission levels; and
19 in nearly every case they face serious challenges in verifying and monitoring the net carbon uptake,
20 especially over relatively long periods (e.g., Marland *et al.*, 2001).

21 22 **Research and Development Policy**

23 Policies to stimulate research and development of lower emissions technologies for the long term are
24 also needed. Policies to reduce CO₂ emissions influence the rate and direction of technological change
25 (OECD, 2003a). By stimulating additional technological change, such policies can reduce the cost of
26 meeting a given reduction target (Goulder, 2004). Such induced technological change justifies earlier and
27 more stringent emission reduction targets.

28 Two types of policies are needed to achieve a given cumulative CO₂ reduction or concentration target
29 at least cost. Policies to reduce emissions and increase sequestration help are needed to create a market for
30 less emission-intensive technologies. But direct support for research and development is also important;
31 the combination of “research push” and “market pull” policies is more effective than either strategy on its

¹⁸Projects to increase forest sequestration are envisaged in the Kyoto Protocol through Articles 3.3 and 3.4 and through the use of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Also, forests could create carbon offset credits that could be exchanged in tradable carbon systems. Some offset credits might be viewed as temporary. However, there are many circumstances where temporary credits would be valuable additions to a carbon reduction portfolio.

1 own (Goulder, 2004). Policies should encourage research and development for all promising technologies
2 because there is considerable ambiguity about which ones will ultimately prove most useful, socially
3 acceptable, and cost-effective.¹⁹
4

5 **CONCLUSIONS**

6 Policies to reduce projected CO₂ and CH₄ concentrations in the atmosphere must recognize the
7 following:

- 8 • Emissions are produced by millions of diverse sources, most of which (e.g., power plants, factories,
9 building heating and cooling systems, and large appliances) have lifetimes of 5 to 50 years, and so
10 can adjust only slowly at reasonable cost;
- 11 • Potential uptake by agricultural soils and forests is significant but small relative to emissions and can
12 be reversed easily;
- 13 • Technological change will have a significant impact on the cost because emission reductions will be
14 implemented over a long time, and new technologies should lower the cost of future reductions; and
- 15 • Many policies implemented to achieve other objectives by different national, state/provincial, and
16 municipal jurisdictions increase or reduce CO₂/CH₄ emissions.

17
18 The effectiveness of the policies is determined by the technical feasibility and cost-effectiveness of
19 the portfolio of measures they seek to promote, their interaction with other policies that have unintended
20 impacts on CO₂ emissions, and by their suitability given the institutional and socioeconomic context
21 (Raupach *et al.*, 2004). This means that the effectiveness of the portfolio can be limited by factors such as

- 22 • The institutional and timing aspects of technology transfer. The patenting system for instance does
23 not allow all countries and sectors to get the best available technology.
- 24 • Demographic and social dynamics. Factors such as land tenure, population growth, and migration
25 may pose an obstacle to reforestation strategies.
- 26 • Institutional settings. The effectiveness of taxes, subsidies, and regulations to induce the deployment
27 of certain technology may be limited by factors such as corruption or existence of vested interests.
- 28 • Environmental considerations. The portfolio of measures may incur environmental costs such as
29 waste disposal or biodiversity reduction.

30
31 Under a wide range of assumptions, cost-effective policies to reduce atmospheric CO₂ and CH₄
32 concentrations cost-effectively in the short and long term would

¹⁹In other words, research and development is required for a portfolio of technologies. Because technologies have global markets, international cooperation to stimulate the research and development is appropriate.

- 1 • Encourage adoption of cost-effective emission reduction and sink enhancement measures. An
2 emissions trading program or emission fee that covers as many sources and sinks as possible,
3 combined with regulations where appropriate, could achieve this. National policies can improve cost-
4 effectiveness by providing broader coverage of sources and sinks while reducing adverse
5 competitiveness effects. Use of revenue from auctioned allowances and emissions taxes to reduce
6 existing distortionary taxes can reduce the economic cost of emission reduction policies.
- 7 • Stimulate development of technologies that lower the cost of emissions reduction, geological storage,
8 and sink enhancement. Policies that encourage research, development, and dissemination of a
9 portfolio of technologies combined with policies to reduce emissions and enhance sinks to create a
10 “market pull” tend to be more effective than either type of policy alone.
- 11 • Adopt appropriate regulations to complement the emissions trading program or emission fee for
12 sources or actions subject to market imperfections, such as energy-efficiency measures and co-
13 generation. In some situations, credit trading can improve the efficiency of efficiency regulations.
- 14 • Revise existing policies at the national, state/provincial, and local level with other objectives that lead
15 to higher CO₂ or CH₄ emissions so that the objectives, if still relevant, are achieved with lower
16 emissions.

17
18 Implementation of such policies is best achieved by national governments with international
19 cooperation. This provides maximum coverage of CO₂ and CH₄ emissions and carbon sinks. It also allows
20 better allocation of resources for technology research and development. However, constitutional
21 jurisdiction over emissions sources or carbon sinks may reside with state/provincial governments. In that
22 case national policies may need to be coordinated with state/provincial governments, or state/provincial
23 governments may implement coordinated policies without the national government.

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
1 **[START OF TEXT BOX]**

2 **Emission Reduction Supply Curve**

3 A tool commonly used to compare emission reduction and sequestration options is an emission
 4 reduction supply curve, such as that shown in the figure. It compiles the emission reduction and
 5 sequestration options available for a given jurisdiction at a given time. If the analysis is for a future date, a
 6 detailed scenario of future conditions is needed. The estimated emission reduction potential of each
 7 option is based on local circumstances at the specified time, taking into account the interaction among
 8 options. The options are combined into a curve starting with the most cost-effective and ending with the
 9 least cost-effective. For each option, the curve shows the cost per metric ton of CO₂ reduced on the
 10 vertical axis and the potential emission reduction, tons of CO₂ per year, on the horizontal axis. The curve
 11 can be used to identify the lowest cost options to meet a given emission reduction target, the associated
 12 marginal cost (the cost per metric ton of the last measure included), and total cost (the area under the
 13 curve).

14 An emission reduction supply curve is an excellent tool for assessing alternative emission reduction
 15 targets. The best options and cost are easy to identify. The effect on the cost of dropping some options is
 16 easy to calculate. And the cost impact of having to implement additional measures due to
 17 underperformance by some measures is simple to estimate. The drawbacks are that constructing the curve
 18 is a complex analytical process and that the curve is out of date almost immediately because fuel prices
 19 and the cost or performance of some options change.

20



21 **Hypothetical emission reduction supply curve.**

22 The curve shows the estimated unit cost (\$/t CO₂e) and annual emission reduction (t CO₂e) for emission
 23 reduction and sequestration options for a given region and date arranged in order of increasing unit cost.

1 When constructed for a future date, such as 2010 or 2020, the precision suggested by the curve is
2 misleading because the future will differ from the assumed scenario. A useful approach in such cases is to
3 group options into cost ranges, such as less than \$5 per metric ton of CO₂, \$5 to \$15 per metric ton of
4 CO₂, etc., ignoring some interaction effects and the impacts of the policy used to implement the option.
5 This still identifies the most cost-effective options. Comparing the emissions reduction target with the
6 emission reduction potential of the options in each group indicates the most economic strategy.

7
8 **[END OF TEXT BOX]**

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2

Table 4.1. Standardized cost estimates [annualized cost in 2004 constant U.S. dollars per metric ton of carbon (t C)]

Option/applicable date(s)	Annualized cost (in \$2004 U.S.)	Potential range (Mt C yr ⁻¹) or % reduction	Source
Power generation	-\$206 to 1067/t C	N.A.	DOE/EIA (2000)
Transportation/2010 (U.S. permit trading)	\$76/t C	N.A.	DOE/EIA (2003)
Transportation/2025 (U.S. permit trading)	\$214/t C	90	DOE/EIA (2003)
Transportation/2017 (CAFÉ standard)	\$74/t C	43	US CBO (2003)
Transportation/2030 (Feebate)	\$44/t C	74	Greene <i>et al.</i> (2005)
Afforestation/2010–2110	\$54 to 109/t C	41 to 247	Lewandrowski (2004),
Forest management/2010–2110	\$4 to 109/t C	8 to 94	Stavins and Richards (2005),
Biofuels/2010–2110	\$109 to 181/t C	123 to 169	EPA (2005)
Agricultural soil carbon sequestration/2010–2110	\$4 to 109/t C	19 to 49	EPA (2005)
All industry			
Reduction of fugitives	\$92 to 180/t C	3%	Hertzog (1999);
Energy efficiency	\$0 to 180/t C	12% to 20%	Martin <i>et al.</i> (2001);
Process change	\$92 to 180/t C	20%	Jaccard <i>et al.</i> (2002,
Fuel substitution	\$0 to 92/t C	10%	2003a, 2003b);
CO ₂ capture and storage	\$180 to 367/t C	30%	Worrel <i>et al.</i> (2004); DOE (2006)
Waste management			
Reduction of fugitives	\$0 to 180/t C	90%	Hertzog (1999),
CO ₂ capture and storage	>\$367/t C	30%	Jaccard <i>et al.</i> (2002)
Entire U.S. economy			
No trading	\$102 to 548/t C	Marginal cost	EMF (2000)
Annex I trading	\$19 to 299/t C	Marginal cost	EMF (2000)
Global trading	\$7 to 164/t C	Marginal cost	EMF (2000)

3

1 **Chapter 5. How Can We Improve the Application of Scientific**
 2 **Information to Decision Support Related to Carbon Management and**
 3 **Climate Decision-Making?**

4
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6
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16
 17
 18 **KEY FINDINGS**

- 19 • Information is lacking on emerging needs and demands for carbon cycle related data and analyses
 20 across scales and sectors. In fact, carbon management is a relatively new concept for most decision-
 21 makers and members of the public.
- 22 • Improving the usefulness of carbon science in North America will require more explicit commitments
 23 to generate decision-relevant information.
- 24 • Research on the production of policy-relevant scientific information suggests a number of options,
 25 from co-production of knowledge to uses of modeling tools in decision support structures and certain
 26 uses of “boundary organizations.”
- 27 • A number of initiatives to improve understandings of decision support needs and options related to
 28 the carbon cycle are under way, some as a part of the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP).
- 29 • Further participatory pilot experiments should be considered to enhance interactions between climate
 30 change scientists and parties involved in carbon management activities and decisions.

31
 32
 33 **INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF "USABLE" CARBON SCIENCE**

34 Humans have been inadvertently altering the Earth's carbon cycle since at least the dawn of
 35 agriculture, and more rapidly since the industrial revolution. Recent climate science has shown that these
 36 influences are large enough to cause significant climate change (IPCC, 2001). In response, environmental

1 advocates, business executives, and policy-makers have increasingly recognized the need for deliberate
2 management of the carbon cycle. Effective carbon management would seem to require that relevant,
3 appropriate science be communicated to the wide variety of people whose decisions affect carbon cycling.
4 Yet, thus far, carbon cycle science has rarely been organized or conducted in ways that directly support
5 decision making on managing carbon emissions, sequestration, and impacts. There are two main reasons:
6 (1) carbon cycle science has been conducted primarily as basic science¹ and (2) non-scientists have only
7 recently begun to demand carbon cycle information for decision making. As a result, the emerging efforts
8 to consciously manage carbon occur in the virtual absence of information and insights on whether these
9 efforts are appropriate, sufficient, or implemented effectively relative to the needs to reduce carbon
10 emissions and atmospheric concentrations (Dilling *et al.*, 2003). To make carbon cycle science more
11 relevant to public and private decision makers, scientists and decision makers will need to clarify what
12 information is most needed in specific sectors and arenas for carbon management, adjust research
13 priorities as necessary, and develop mechanisms that enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the
14 information being generated—in short, they will need to collaborate to make carbon cycle science and
15 analysis more “usable” (Mitchell *et al.*, forthcoming; Cash *et al.*, 2003). Such a component of more
16 “applied” or “solutions-oriented” research could be combined with a basic science portfolio to make
17 carbon science more directly relevant to decision making.

18

19 **TAKING STOCK: WHERE ARE WE NOW IN PROVIDING DECISION SUPPORT TO** 20 **IMPROVE CAPACITIES FOR CARBON MANAGEMENT?**

21 The first question to address then is what might we consider “decision support?” There are many
22 different uses of the term. We adopt the definition of decision support included in the U.S. Climate
23 Change Science Program (CCSP) Strategic Plan: “Decision support resources refers to the set of analyses
24 and assessments, interdisciplinary research, analytical methods, model and data product development,
25 communication, and operational services that provide timely and useful information to address questions
26 confronting policymakers, resource managers and other stakeholders” (U.S. Climate Change Science
27 Program, 2003).

28 Who are the potential stakeholders for information related to the carbon cycle and options and
29 measures? Most people constantly if unconsciously make decisions that affect the carbon cycle, through
30 their use of energy, transportation, living spaces, and natural resources. Increasing attention to climate
31 change has led some policy makers, businesses, advocacy groups and consumers in these sectors to begin

¹ Carbon cycle research has been applied to agricultural soil management for a number of years; however, the focus has been on improving agricultural productivity, not limiting carbon concentrations in the atmosphere.

1 making more conscious choices to limit carbon emissions.² Whether driven by normative commitments to
2 averting climate change, by political pressures or requirements to reduce carbon emissions, or by
3 economic opportunities and consumer pressures, actors in these sectors are beginning to seek out
4 information that can help them achieve their specific carbon-related goals, including those that relate to or
5 affect the carbon cycle and the climate.³ Even in countries and economic sectors where no consensus
6 exists on the need to manage carbon, some entities have begun to experiment with carbon-limiting
7 practices and investments in anticipation of a carbon-constrained future.

8 As part of the process of designing and producing this report, we engaged individuals from a wide
9 range of sectors and activities, including forestry, agriculture, utilities, fuel companies, carbon brokers,
10 transportation, non-profits, and local and federal governments. Although we did not conduct new research
11 on the needs of these stakeholders for information and decision support capabilities, a preliminary review
12 of their interests and activities suggests that there are many stakeholders potentially interested in carbon-
13 related information (see Text Box 1).

15 **CURRENT APPROACHES AND TRENDS**

16 As we enter an era of deliberate carbon management, decision makers from the local to the national
17 level are increasingly open to or actively seeking carbon science information as a direct input to policy
18 and investment decisions (Apps *et al.*, 2003). The government of Canada, having ratified the Kyoto
19 protocol, has been exploring emission reduction opportunities and offsets and has delineated needs for
20 applied research (Government of Canada, 2005). A few prominent stakeholders in the U.S. are actively
21 using carbon science to move forward with voluntary emissions offset programs such as the Chicago
22 Climate Exchange, which brokers, among other mechanisms, agricultural carbon credits in partnership
23 with the Iowa Farm Bureau.⁴ Cities and states, including large regional partnerships on the east and west
24 coasts, are beginning to show interest in managing emissions and carbon-related science (Text Box 1). In
25 addition to these select visible, active stakeholders for carbon-related information, there may be many
26 other potential stakeholders in the U.S. across sectors and scales (Text Box 1). Whether or not interest in
27 carbon information emerges broadly in these constituencies may well depend on whether and how
28 mandatory policies involving carbon management evolve, and what incentives might be put in place. In
29 Europe, for example, mandatory carbon emissions policies have resulted in intense interest in carbon
30 science from interested stakeholders who are directly affected by such policies (Schröter *et al.*, 2005).

² For examples, see Text Box 1

³ For example, carbon science was presented at recent meetings of the West Coast Governors' Global Warming Initiative and the Climate Action Registry [<http://www.climateregistry.org/EVENTS/PastConferences/>;
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/events/2005_conference/presentations/]

⁴ www.iowafarmbureau.com/special/carbon/default.aspx

1 In the U.S., the federal carbon science enterprise does not have many mechanisms to assess emerging
2 demands for carbon information across scales and sectors. Thus far, federally-funded carbon science has
3 focused predominantly on basic research in order to elucidate some of the fundamental uncertainties in
4 the global carbon cycle and local and regional processes affecting the exchange of carbon (Dilling, in
5 review). Most of the effort at the U.S. federal level is organized under the Climate Change Science
6 Program (CCSP). Almost two-thirds of this effort is managed by the National Aeronautics and Space
7 Administration and the National Science Foundation, whose missions are explicitly focused on basic
8 research, not decision support per se (U.S. Climate Change Science Program, 2006; Dilling, in review).
9 There are research efforts at a relatively lower level of investment at the Department of Energy and the
10 U.S. Department of Agriculture under the CCSP⁵ as well as significant technology efforts under the
11 Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP), a sister program to the CCSP focused on technology
12 development. Increasing linkages between these programs may enhance the ability of CCSP carbon-
13 related research to serve decision support needs.

14 Until perhaps the past decade, carbon management as a concept was not widely recognized—even
15 now, most members of the public do not know the term “carbon sequestration” or understand its potential
16 implications (Shackley *et al.*, 2005; Curry *et al.*, 2004). In more recent years, however, the carbon cycle
17 science community has increasingly recognized that it may have more direct relevance to issues of policy
18 and decision making, calling for “coordinated rigorous, interdisciplinary research that is strategically
19 prioritized to address societal needs” (Sarmiento and Wofsy, 1999). The North American Carbon
20 Program’s (NACP) “Implementation Plan” lists decision support as one of four organizing questions
21 (Denning *et al.*, 2005).

22 As stated in that same plan, however, little is known in the scientific community about the likely users
23 of decision support information that might emerge from a program such as the NACP. Indeed, the
24 National Academy of Sciences’ review of the CCSP stated that “as the decision support elements of the
25 program are implemented, the CCSP will need to do a better job of identifying stakeholders and the types
26 of decisions they need to make” (National Research Council, 2004). Moreover, they state that “managing
27 risks and opportunities requires stakeholder support on a range of scales and across multiple sectors,
28 which in turn implies an understanding of the decision context for stakeholders” (National Research
29 Council, 2004).

30 There are two programs within the CCSP framework that may inform this question of how to link
31 carbon science to user needs more explicitly in the coming years. NASA has an Applications program

⁵ For example, The Consortium for Agricultural Soil Mitigation of Greenhouse Gases (CASMGs) was recently funded by the USDA to provide information and technology necessary to develop, analyze and implement carbon sequestration strategies.

1 that seeks to find uses for its data and modeling products using a “benchmarking systems” approach, and
2 USDA and DOE have invested significant resources in science that might inform future carbon
3 sequestration efforts and carbon accounting in agriculture and forests. Conducted as separate efforts, the
4 programs have not yet been integrated into a broader framework aimed at making carbon cycle science
5 more useful to decision makers within the CCSP carbon research agenda, but certainly may contribute to
6 such a strategy if developed.

7 Improving the usefulness of carbon science in North America will require more explicit commitments
8 by scientific research funding agencies, scientists, policy makers and private sector managers to generate
9 decision-relevant carbon cycle information. The participatory methods and boundary spanning institutions
10 identified in the next section may be helpful both in refining research agendas and accelerating the
11 application of research results to carbon management and societal decision making.

12 13 **OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE APPLICABILITY OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION** 14 **TO CARBON MANAGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING**

15 Studies that have examined the creation and use of knowledge for decision making have found that
16 information must be perceived not only as *credible* (worth believing), but also as *salient* (relevant to
17 decision making on high priority issues) and *legitimate* (conducted in a way that decision makers believe
18 is fair, unbiased and respectful of divergent views and interests) (Mitchell *et al.*, forthcoming; Cash *et al.*,
19 2003). Even the most technically and intellectually rigorous science may fail to influence decision makers
20 if it does not address the decisions they face, or if it is conducted in a way that they perceive as biased or
21 unresponsive to their concerns.

22 Research on the production of policy-relevant scientific information suggests strategies to maintain
23 the integrity of the research endeavor while increasing its policy relevance. Although communicating
24 results more effectively is important, generating science that is more applicable to decision making may
25 require modifying the way scientific information is produced. Carbon cycle scientists and carbon decision
26 makers will need to develop methods for interaction that work best in their specific application. At their
27 core, all of these strategies promote scientist-stakeholder interaction in the development of research
28 questions, selection of research methods, and review, interpretation and dissemination of results (Adler *et*
29 *al.*, 1999; Ehrmann and Stinson, 1999; National Research Council, 1999; National Research Council,
30 2005; Farrell and Jaeger, 2005; Mitchell *et al.*, forthcoming). Such processes work best when they
31 enhance the research and its utility while preserving the credibility of both scientists and stakeholders.
32 Transparency and participation are important for guarding against politicization and enhancing usability.

- 1 Examples of joint scientist-stakeholder development of policy relevant scientific information include:
- 2 • *Co-production of research knowledge (e.g., Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments)*: In nine
- 3 regional partnerships across the U.S., university researchers partner with local operational agencies
- 4 and others that might incorporate climate information in decision making. New research is developed
- 5 in consultation with all partners in an ongoing, iterative process (Lemos and Morehouse, 2005).
- 6 • *Institutional experimentation and adaptive behavior (e.g., adaptive management)*: Adaptive
- 7 management is a powerful concept that acknowledges the inherent uncertainty of responses of natural
- 8 systems to human management, and seeks to periodically assess the outcomes of management
- 9 decisions and adjust policy decisions and new actions accordingly, a form of deliberate “learning by
- 10 doing” (c.f. Holling 1978). Adaptive management principles have been applied for resources with
- 11 multiple interests at stake, such as management of large river systems as well as forests in the Pacific
- 12 Northwest (Holling 1995; Pulwarty and Redmond, 1997; Mitchell *et al.*, 2004; Lemos and
- 13 Morehouse, 2005).
- 14 • *Assessments as policy component (e.g., recovering the stratospheric ozone layer)*: Assessments that
- 15 were credible, salient and legitimate played a significant role in the successful implementation of the
- 16 Montreal Protocol which phased out the use of ozone-depleting substances. The presence of a highly
- 17 credible scientific and technical assessment process with diverse participation from academics and
- 18 industry scientists is credited as a key factor in the Protocol’s success (Parson, 2003).
- 19 • *Mediated modeling*: Shared tools can facilitate scientist-user interactions, help diverse groups orient
- 20 around a problem and illuminate common assumptions as well as differences. Mediated modeling
- 21 involves a guided process in which participants from a wide variety of perspectives jointly construct a
- 22 computer model that can be used in solving complex environmental problems, or envisioning a shared
- 23 future. The process has been successfully used for watershed management, endangered species
- 24 management and a host of other difficult environmental issues (Van den Belt, 2004).
- 25 • *Carbon modeling tools as decision support*: As carbon management within the United States is
- 26 increasingly considered at the national level, some federal agencies have begun to develop decision
- 27 support tools to help estimate carbon sequestration in various ecosystems and under various land use
- 28 scenarios. These pilot-phase tools are available online and feature a customizable user interface (see
- 29 examples such as the NASA Ames CQUEST, Carbon Query and Evaluation Support Tools,
- 30 <http://geo.arc.nasa.gov/website/cquestwebsite/>; the U.S. Forest Service COLE, Carbon Online
- 31 Estimator, <http://ncasi.uml.edu/COLE/>; and Colorado State COMET-VR, CarbOn Management
- 32 Evaluation Tool, <http://www.cometvr.colostate.edu/>).
- 33

1 Over time, well-structured scientist-stakeholder interaction can bring substantial benefits to both
2 scientists and decision makers (Moser, 2005). Scientists learn to identify research questions that are both
3 scientifically interesting and relevant to decisions, and to frame their answers in ways that audiences are
4 more likely to find compelling. Non-scientists learn more about what questions science can and cannot
5 answer. They also clarify the boundary between empirical questions that scientists can answer (e.g., the
6 sequestration potential of a particular technology) and issues that require political resolution (e.g., the
7 appropriate allocation of carbon reduction targets across firms). Institutional arrangements can convert ad
8 hoc successes in scientist-stakeholder interaction into systematic and ongoing networks of scientists,
9 stakeholders, and managers. Such “co-production of knowledge,” can enhance both the scientific basis of
10 policy and management and the research agenda for applied science (Lemos and Morehouse, 2005;
11 Gibbons *et al.*, 1994; Patt *et al.*, 2005a).

12 Such interactive approaches to research also have limitations, risks, and costs. Scientists may be
13 reluctant to involve non-scientists who "should" be interested in a given issue, but who can add little
14 scientific value to the research, and whose involvement consumes considerable time and effort. Involving
15 private sector firms may require scientists accustomed to working in an open informational environment
16 to navigate in a world in which much information is proprietary. Scientists may also choose not to pursue
17 applied, participatory research if they do not see it producing the "cutting edge" (and career enhancing)
18 science most valued by other scientists (Lemos and Morehouse, 2005).

19 On the stakeholder side, some may lack the financial resources, expertise, time, and other capacities
20 needed for meaningful participation. Some will distrust scientists in general and government-sponsored
21 science in particular due to cultural, institutional, historical, or other factors. Some may reject
22 participation in open and public processes in which they must interact with those with whom they
23 disagree politically or compete economically. In some cases, stakeholders will try to manipulate research
24 questions and findings to serve their political or economic interests. Perhaps most importantly,
25 stakeholders often show little interest in diverting their time (or that of their employees) from other
26 activities to what they perceive as the slow and too-often fruitless pursuit of scientific knowledge (Patt
27 *et al.*, 2005b).

28 Where direct stakeholder participation proves too difficult, costly, unmanageable, or unproductive,
29 scientists and research managers need other methods to identify the needs of potential users. Science on
30 the one hand and policy, management, and decision-making on the other exist to a large extent as quite
31 separate social and professional realms, with quite different traditions, norms, codes of behavior, and
32 reward systems. The boundaries that exist between them serve many useful functions but may also inhibit
33 the transfer of useful knowledge across those boundaries. According to Guston (2001), a boundary
34 organization is an institution that “straddles the shifting divide” between politics and science. Boundary

1 organizations are accountable to both sides of the boundary and involve professionals from each, as well
2 as those serving in a mediating role. Such “boundary spanning” individuals and organizations can often
3 facilitate the uptake of science by translating scientific findings so that stakeholders find them more user-
4 friendly and by stimulating adjustments in research agendas and approach. Boundary organizations can
5 exist at a variety of scales and for a wide variety of purposes. Cooperative agricultural extension services
6 and NGOs that successfully convert large-scale scientific understandings of weather, aquifers, or
7 pesticides into locally-tuned guidance to farmers are classic examples of boundary organizations (Cash,
8 2001). The International Research Institute for Climate Prediction focuses on seasonal-to-interannual
9 scale climate research and modeling so that their research results are useful to farmers, fishermen, and
10 public health officials (e.g., Agrawala *et al.*, 2001). The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
11 Advice (SBSTA) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change serves also as a
12 boundary organization at an international level. The SBSTA serves as a link between information and
13 assessments provided by expert sources (such as the IPCC) and the Conference of the Parties (COP),
14 which focuses on setting policy.⁶ The University of California Berkeley Digital Library Project Calflora
15 project has sought to ensure that an extensive database on plants is designed and implemented in ways
16 that support environmental planning (Van House *et al.*, 2003).

17 And of course, there are other significant challenges to the use of knowledge, even when created
18 through self-conscious efforts like those just delineated. People fail to integrate new research and
19 information in their decisions for many reasons. Besides obstacles already mentioned, people often are
20 not motivated to use information that implies or supports policies they dislike; that conflicts with pre-
21 existing preferences, interests, or beliefs; or that conflicts with cognitive, organizational, sociological, or
22 cultural norms (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky, 1984; Lahsen, 1998; Yaniv, 2004; Lahsen, forthcoming).
23 These tendencies are important components of a healthy democratic process. Developing processes to
24 make carbon science more useful to decision makers will not guarantee that it gets used but it will make it
25 possible and more likely that it will.

26

27 **RESEARCH NEEDS TO ENHANCE DECISION SUPPORT FOR CARBON** 28 **MANAGEMENT**

29 There is likely to be substantial and growing demand for detailed analysis of carbon management
30 issues and options across major economic sectors, nations and levels of government in North America.
31 This is especially likely in jurisdictions that place policy constraints on carbon budgets, such as within the
32 states comprising the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or the State of California. Although some new

⁶ <http://unfccc.int/2860.php>

1 efforts are underway in parts of agencies, carbon cycle science, at least in the U.S., could be organized
2 and carried out in ways that better meet this potential demand in a more systematic fashion. As noted by
3 the National Research Council (2004), effective implementation of the goals of the program, as a part of
4 the Climate Change Science Program, “requires focused research to develop decision support resources
5 and methods.” While such recommendations were stated for the whole of the program, they are pertinent
6 to carbon-related science as one of the major components.

7 The process of creating information to support decision making should be significantly different from
8 the process of creating “basic” or “fundamental” scientific knowledge. The primary driver for such “use-
9 inspired” research is societal need, not scientific curiosity alone (Stokes, 1997). To improve the
10 application of scientific information to support carbon and climate-related decisions, scientists and non-
11 scientist carbon managers need to improve their joint understanding of the top priority questions facing
12 carbon-related decision making. They also need to collaborate more effectively in undertaking research
13 and interpreting results in order to answer those questions. The scale of information provided and its
14 specificity to regional or local concerns are often important considerations for the salience of information
15 (Cash and Moser, 2000).

16 As a first step, a formal process could be developed “for gathering requirements and understanding
17 the problems for which research can inform decision makers outside the scientific community,” including
18 the formation of a decision support working group (Denning *et al.*, 2005). To move forward on creating
19 an effective decision component of the CCSP program, the NRC recommends organizing a variety of
20 deliberative activities, such as workshops, focus groups, working panels, and citizen advisory groups,
21 with the goals being to: “1) expand the range of decision support options being developed by the
22 program; 2) to match decision support approaches to the decisions, decision makers, and user needs; and
23 3) to capitalize on the practical knowledge of practitioners, managers and laypersons” (National Research
24 Council, 2004). The current status of decision support activities across the CCSP will be assessed by
25 several other SAP processes, complementary to this one, specifically SAP 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 (organized
26 under the heading of “Explore the uses and identify the limits of evolving knowledge to manage risks and
27 opportunities related to climate variability and change”).
28

29 **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

30 The carbon cycle is influenced through deliberate and inadvertent decisions on the part of diverse and
31 spatially dispersed actors, located in many different sectors and at different scales. Scientific information
32 and analysis can lead to better-informed decision making across many sectors and levels of action, if
33 decision makers recognize that information and analysis as relevant and legitimate. To make carbon cycle

1 science more useful to decision makers, we suggest the following steps, to be initiated by leaders in the
2 scientific and program level carbon science community:

- 3 • Identify specific categories of decision makers for whom carbon cycle science is likely to be salient,
4 focusing on policy makers and private sector managers in carbon-intensive sectors (energy, transport,
5 manufacturing, agriculture and forestry)
- 6 • Identify and evaluate existing information about carbon impacts of decisions and actions in these
7 arenas, and assess the need and demand for additional information. In some cases, demand may need
8 to be nurtured and fostered through a two-way interactive process.
- 9 • Encourage scientists and research programs to experiment with both incremental and major
10 departures from existing practice with the goal of making carbon cycle science more salient, credible,
11 and legitimate to carbon managers.
- 12 • Involve not just physical or biological disciplines in scientific efforts to produce useable science, but
13 also social scientists and communication experts.
- 14 • Consider initiating participatory pilot research projects and identifying existing boundary
15 organizations (or establishing new ones) to bridge carbon management and carbon science.

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1 **[BEGIN TEXT BOX]**

2
3 **Sectors Expressing Interest and/or Participating in the SAP 2.2 Process.** This list of sectors is not an
4 exhaustive list nor is it based on a rigorous assessment, it is meant to demonstrate the wide variety of
5 potential stakeholders with an interest in carbon-related information.

6 **Agriculture:** Tillage and other farming practices significantly influence carbon storage in agricultural
7 soils. Managing these practices presents opportunities both to slow carbon loss and to restore carbon in
8 soils. Farmers have demonstrated significant interest in carbon management as ways to stimulate rural
9 economic activity. Since much of the agricultural land in the United States is privately owned, both
10 economic forces and governmental policies will be critical factors in the participation of this sector in
11 carbon management. (Chapter 10).

12 **Forestry:** Forests accumulate carbon in above-ground biomass as well as soils. The carbon impact of
13 planting, conserving, and managing forests has been an area of intense interest in international
14 negotiations on climate change (IPCC, 2000). Whether seeking to take advantage of international carbon
15 credits, to offset other emissions, or to simply identify environmental co-benefits of forest actions taken
16 for other reasons, governments, corporations, land-owners, and non-profits might need more information
17 on and insight into the carbon implications of forestry decisions ranging from species selection to
18 silviculture, harvesting methods and the uses of harvested wood. (Chapter 11).

19 **Utilities and Industries:** In the US, over 85% of energy produced comes from fossil fuels with
20 relatively high carbon intensity. The capital investment and fuel source decisions of utilities and energy-
21 intensive industries thus have major carbon impacts. A small but growing number of companies have
22 made public commitments to reducing carbon emissions, developed business models that demonstrate
23 sensitivity to climate change, and begun exploring carbon capture and storage opportunities. For example,
24 Cinergy, a large Midwestern utility, has experimented with carbon offset programs in partnership with
25 The Nature Conservancy. (Chapter 6 and 8).

26 **Transportation:** Transportation accounts for approximately 37% of carbon emissions in the U.S., and
27 about 22% worldwide. In transportation, governmental infrastructure investments, automobile
28 manufacturers' decisions about materials, technologies and fuels, and individual choices on auto
29 purchases, travel modes and distances all have significant impacts on carbon emissions. (Chapter 7)

30 **Government:** In the US, national policies currently rely primarily on voluntary measures and
31 incentive structures (U.S. Department of State, 2004; Richards, 2004). Canada, having ratified the Kyoto
32 Protocol, has direct and relatively immediate needs for information that can help it meet its binding
33 targets as cost-effectively as possible (Government of Canada, 2005). The Mexican government appears
34 to be particularly interested in locally-relevant research on natural and anthropogenic influences on the

1 carbon cycle, likely impacts across various regions, and the costs, benefits, and viability of various
2 management options (Martinez and Fernandez-Bremauntz, 2004). Below the national level, more and
3 more states and local governments are taking steps, including setting mandatory policies, to reduce carbon
4 emissions, and may need new carbon cycle science scaled to the state and local level to manage
5 effectively [for example, nine New England and mid-Atlantic states have formed a regional partnership,
6 also observed by Eastern Canadian provinces, to reduce carbon emissions through a cap and trade
7 program combined with a market-based emissions trading system (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative—
8 RGGI—www.rggi.org] (see Chapters 4 and 14).

9 ***Non-Profits and Non-Governmental Organizations:*** Many environmental and business-oriented
10 organizations have an interest in carbon management decision making. Such organizations rely on science
11 to support their positions and to undercut the arguments of opposing advocates. There has been
12 substantial criticism of “advocacy science” in the science-for-policy literature, and new strategies will
13 need to be developed to promote constructive use of carbon cycle science by advocates (Ehrmann and
14 Stinson, 1999; Adler *et al.*, 2001).

15

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PART II OVERVIEW

Energy, Industry, and Waste Management Activities: An Introduction to CO₂ Emissions from Fossil Fuels

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THE CONTEXT

Fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) are used primarily for their concentration of chemical energy, energy that is released as heat when the fuel is burned. Fossil fuels are composed primarily of compounds of hydrogen and carbon. When the fuels are burned, the hydrogen and carbon oxidize to water and CO₂, and heat is released. If the water and CO₂ are released to the atmosphere, the water will soon fall out as rain or snow. The CO₂, however, will increase the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere and join the active cycling of carbon that takes place among the atmosphere, biosphere, and hydrosphere. Since humans began taking advantage of fossil-fuel resources for energy, we have been releasing to the atmosphere, over a very short period of time, carbon that was stored deep in the Earth over millions of years. We have been introducing a large perturbation to the active cycling of carbon.

Estimates of fossil-fuel use globally show that there have been significant emissions of CO₂ dating back at least to 1750, and from North America back at least to 1785. However, this human perturbation of the active carbon cycle is largely a recent process, with the magnitude of the perturbation continuing to grow as population grows and demand for energy grows. Looking back from the end of 2005, fully half of the CO₂ released from fossil-fuel burning globally has occurred since 1980 (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Cumulative global emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel combustion and cement manufacture from 1751 to 2002.

1 Some CO₂ is also released to the atmosphere during the manufacture of cement. Limestone (CaCO₃)
2 is heated to release CO₂ and produce the calcium oxide (CaO) used to manufacture cement. In North
3 America, cement manufacturing now releases less than 1% of the CO₂ released by fossil-fuel combustion.
4 However, cement manufacturing is the largest anthropogenic (of human origin) source of CO₂ after fossil-
5 fuel use and the clearing and oxidation of forests and soils (see Part III of this report). The CO₂ emissions
6 from cement manufacture are often included in the accounting of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions from
7 fossil fuels.

8 Part II of this report addresses the magnitude and pattern of CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel
9 consumption and cement manufacturing in North America, and discusses some scenarios for emissions in
10 the future. This introductory section addresses some general issues associated with CO₂ emissions and the
11 annual and cumulative magnitude of total emissions. It looks at the temporal and spatial distribution of
12 emissions and some other data likely to be of interest. The following four chapters delve into the sectoral
13 details of emissions so that we can understand the forces that have driven the growth in emissions to date
14 and the possibilities for the magnitude and pattern of emissions in the future. These chapters reveal that
15 38.4% of CO₂ emissions from North America come from enterprises whose primary business is to
16 provide electricity and heat and another 30.8% come from the transport of passengers and freight. This
17 introduction focuses on the total emissions from the use of fossil fuels, and the subsequent chapters
18 provide insight into how these fuels are used and the economic and human processes motivating their use.
19

20 **Estimating CO₂ Emissions**

21 If we have estimates of the consumption of fossil fuels, it is relatively straightforward to estimate the
22 amount of CO₂ released to the atmosphere when they are consumed. Because CO₂ is the equilibrium
23 product of oxidizing the carbon in fossil fuels, we need to know only the amount of fuel used and its
24 carbon content. For greater accuracy, we adjust this estimate to take into consideration the amount of
25 carbon that is left as ash or soot and is not actually oxidized. We also consider the fraction of fossil fuels
26 that is used for products such as highway asphalt, lubricants, waxes, solvents, and plastics and thus may
27 not soon be converted to CO₂. Some of these long-lived carbon-containing products will release the
28 carbon they contain to the atmosphere as CO₂ during use or during processing of the materials as waste.
29 Other products will hold the carbon in use or in landfills for decades or longer. One of the differences
30 among the various estimates of CO₂ emissions is the ways they deal with the carbon in these carbon-
31 containing products.

32 Fossil-fuel consumption is often measured in mass or volume units and, in these terms, the carbon
33 content of fossil fuels is quite variable. However, when we measure the amount of fuel consumed in terms
34 of its energy content, we find that for each of the primary fuel types (coal, petroleum, and natural gas)

1 there is a strong correlation between the energy content and the carbon content. The rate of CO₂ emitted
2 per unit of useful energy released depends on the ratio of hydrogen to carbon and on the details of the
3 organic compounds in the fuels; but, roughly speaking, the numerical conversion from energy released to
4 carbon released as CO₂ is about 25 kg C per billion J for coal, 20 kg C per billion J for petroleum, and 15
5 kg C per billion J for natural gas. Figure 2 shows details of the correlation between energy content and
6 carbon content for more than 1000 coal samples. Detailed analysis of the data suggests that hard coal
7 contains 25.16 kg C per billion J of coal (measured on a net heating value basis¹), with a standard error of
8 the mean at 2.09%. The value is slightly higher for lignite and brown coals (26.23 kg C per billion J
9 $\pm 2.33\%$, also shown in Figure 1). Similar correlations exist for all fuels, and Table 1 shows some of the
10 coefficients reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for estimating CO₂
11 emissions from measures of fossil-fuel use. The differences between the values in Table 1 and those in
12 Figure 1 are small, but they begin to explain how different data compilations can end up with different
13 estimates of CO₂ emissions.

14
15 **Figure 2. The carbon content of coal varies with the heat content, shown here as the net heating**
16 **value.** To make them easier to distinguish, data for lignites and brown coals are shown on the left axis, and
17 data for hard coals are offset by 20% and shown on the right axis. Heating value is plotted in the units at
18 which it was originally reported, Btu/lb, where 1 Btu/lb = 2324 J/kg (from Marland *et al.*, 1995).

19
20 **Table 1. A sample of the coefficients used for estimating CO₂ emissions from the amount of fuel**
21 **burned** (from IPCC, 1996).

22
23 Data on fossil-fuel production, trade, consumption, and so on are generally collected at the level of
24 some political entity, such as a country, and over some time interval, typically a year. Estimates of
25 national annual fuel consumption can be based on estimates of fuel production and trade, estimates of
26 actual final consumption, data for fuel sales or some other activity that is clearly related to fuel use, or on
27 estimates and models of the activities that consume fuel (such as vehicle miles driven). In the discussion
28 that follows, some estimates of national annual CO₂ emissions are based on “apparent consumption”
29 (defined as production + imports – exports \pm changes in stocks), while others are based on more direct

¹“Net heating value” is the heat release measured when fuel is burned at constant pressure so that the water is released as water vapor. This is distinguished from the “gross heating value,” which is the heat release measured when the fuel is burned at constant volume so that the water is released as liquid water. The difference is essentially the heat of vaporization of the water and is related to the hydrogen content of the fuel.

1 estimates of fuel consumption. All of the emissions estimates in this chapter are in terms of the mass of
2 carbon released.²

3 The uncertainty in estimates of CO₂ emissions will thus depend on the variability in the chemistry of
4 the fuels, the quality of the data, or models of fuel consumption, and on uncertainties in the amount of
5 carbon that is used for non-fuel purposes (such as asphalt and plastics) or is otherwise not burned. For
6 countries like the United States—with good data on fuel production, trade, and consumption—the
7 uncertainty in national emissions of CO₂ is probably on the order of ±5% or less. In fact, the U.S.
8 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (2005) suggests its estimates of CO₂ emissions from energy use
9 in the United States are accurate, at the 95% confidence level, within –1 to +6 %; and Environment
10 Canada (2005) suggests its estimates for Canada are within –4 to 0 %. The Mexican National Report
11 (Mexico, 2001) does not provide estimates of uncertainty, but our analyses using the Mexican data
12 suggest that uncertainty is larger than for the United States and Canada. Emissions estimates for these
13 same three countries as reported by the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) and the
14 International Energy Agency (IEA) (see the following section) will have larger uncertainty because these
15 groups are making estimates for all countries. Because they work with data from all countries, they are
16 inclined to use global average values for things like the emissions coefficients, whereas agencies within
17 the individual countries use values that are more specific to the particular country.

19 **The Magnitude of National and Regional CO₂ Emissions**

20 Figure 3 shows that from the beginning of the fossil-fuel era (1750 in these graphs) to the end of
21 2002, there were 93.5 Gt C released as CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption (and cement manufacturing) in
22 North America: 84.4 Gt C from the United States, 6.0 from Canada, and 3.1 from Mexico. All three
23 countries of North America are major users of fossil fuels, and this 93.5 Gt C is 31.5 % of the global total.
24 Among all countries, the United States, Canada, and Mexico rank as the first, eighth, and eleventh largest
25 emitters of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption, respectively (for 2002) (Marland *et al.*, 2005). Figure 4
26 shows, for each of these countries and for the sum of the three, the annual total of emissions and the
27 contributions from the different fossil fuels.

28
29 **Figure 3. The cumulative total of CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel consumption and cement**
30 **manufacturing as a function of time, for the three countries of North America and for the sum of the**

²The carbon is actually released to the atmosphere as CO₂, and it is accurate to report (as is often done) either the amount of CO₂ emitted or the amount of carbon in the CO₂. The numbers can be easily converted back and forth using the ratio of the molecular masses, i.e. (mass of carbon) × (44/12) = (mass of CO₂).

1 **three.** Figure 3a is for the United States, Figure 3b is for Canada, Figure 3c is for Mexico, and Figure 3d is
2 for the sum of the three. Note that in order to illustrate the contributions of the different fuels, the four plots
3 are not to the same vertical scale (from Marland *et al.*, 2005).

4
5 **Figure 4. Annual emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel use by fuel type.**

6
7 The long time series of emissions estimates illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 are from CDIAC (Marland
8 *et al.*, 2005). These estimates are derived from the “apparent consumption” of fuels and are based on data
9 from the UN Statistics Office back to 1950 and on data from a mixture of sources for the earlier years
10 (Andres *et al.*, 1999). There are other published estimates (with shorter time series) of national annual
11 CO₂ emissions. Most notably, IEA (2005) has reported estimates of emissions for many countries for all
12 years back to 1971, and most countries have now provided some estimates of their own emissions as part
13 of their national obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
14 (UNFCCC, <http://unfccc.int>). The latter two sets of estimates are based on data on actual fuel combustion
15 and thus are able to provide details as to the sector of the economy where fuel use is taking place.³

16 Comparing the data from multiple sources can give us some insight into the reliability of the
17 estimates generally. These different estimates of CO₂ emissions are not, of course, truly independent
18 because they all rely ultimately on national data on fuel use. However, they do represent different
19 manipulations of these primary data, and in many countries, there are multiple potential sources of energy
20 data. Many developing countries do not collect or do not report all of the data necessary to precisely
21 estimate CO₂ emissions. In these cases, differences can be introduced by how the various agencies derive
22 the basic data on fuel production and use. Because of the way data are collected, there are statistical
23 differences between “consumption” and “apparent consumption” as defined earlier.

24 To make comparisons of different estimates of CO₂ emissions, we would like to be sure that we are
25 indeed comparing estimates of the same thing. For example, emissions from cement manufacturing are
26 not available from all of the sources, so they are not included in the comparisons in Table 2. All of the
27 estimates in Table 2, except those from the IEA, include emissions from flaring natural gas at oil
28 production facilities. It is not easy to identify the exact reason the estimates differ, but the differences are
29 generally small. The differences have mostly to do with the statistical difference between consumption
30 and apparent consumption, the way a correction is made for non-fuel usage of fossil-fuel resources, the
31 conversion from mass or volume to energy units, and/or the way estimates of carbon content are derived.
32 Because the national estimates from CDIAC do not include emissions from the non-fuel uses of

³IEA provides estimates based on both the reference approach (estimates of apparent consumption) and the sectoral approach (estimates of actual consumption) as described by the IPCC (IPCC 1997). In the comparison here, we use the numbers that they believe to be the most accurate, those based on the sectoral approach.

1 petroleum products, we expect them to be slightly smaller than the other estimates shown here, all of
2 which do include these emissions.⁴ The comparisons in Table 2 reveal one number for which there is a
3 notable difference among the multiple sources: the emissions from Mexico in 1990. Losey (2004) has
4 suggested, based on other criteria, that there is an inaccuracy in the UN energy data set for Mexican
5 natural gas for the three-year period 1990–1992; these kinds of analyses result in reexamination of some
6 of the fundamental data.

7
8 **Table 2. Estimates (in Mt C) of CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel consumption for the United States,**
9 **Canada, and Mexico.**

10
11 IEA (2005, p. 1.4) has systematically compared its estimates with those reported to the UNFCCC by
12 the different countries, and it finds that the differences for most developed countries are within 5%. IEA
13 attributes most of the differences to the following:

- 14
- 15 • use of the IPCC Tier 1 method that does not take into account different technologies
 - 16 • use of energy data that may have come from different “official” sources within a country
 - 17 • use of average values for the net heating value of secondary oil products
 - 18 • use of average emissions values
 - 19 • use of incomplete data on non-fuel uses
 - 20 • different treatment of military emissions
 - 21 • a different split between what is identified as emissions from energy and emissions from industrial
22 processes.

23 24 **Emissions by Month and/or State**

25 With interest increasing in the details and processes of the global carbon cycle, there is also
26 increasing interest in knowing emissions at spatial and temporal scales finer than countries and years. For
27 the United States, energy data have been collected for many years at the level of states and months, and
28 thus estimates of CO₂ emissions can be made by state or by month. Figure 5 shows there is considerable
29 variation in United States emissions by month, and preliminary analyses by Gurney *et al.* (2005) reveal
30 that proper recognition of this variability can be very important in some exercises to model the details of
31 the global carbon cycle.

32

⁴The CDIAC estimate of global total emissions does include estimates of emissions from oxidation from non-fuel use of hydrocarbons.

1 **Figure 5. Emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption in the United States, by month.** Emissions
2 from cement manufacturing are not included (from Blasing *et al.*, 2005a).

3
4 Because of differences in the way energy data are collected and aggregated, it is not obvious that an
5 estimate of emissions from the United States will be identical to the sum of estimates for the 50 U.S.
6 states. Figure 6 shows that estimates of total annual CO₂ emissions are slightly different if we use data
7 directly from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and sum the estimates for the 50 states, or if we sum
8 the estimates for the 12 months of a given year, or if we take United States energy data as aggregated by
9 the UN Statistics Office and calculate the annual total of CO₂ emissions directly. Again, the state and
10 monthly emissions data are based on estimates of fuel consumption, while the national emissions
11 estimates calculated using UN data result from estimates of “apparent consumption.” There is a difference
12 between annual values for consumption and annual values of “apparent consumption” (the IEA calls this
13 difference simply “statistical difference”) that is related to the way statistics are collected and aggregated.
14 There are also differences in the way values for fuel chemistry and non-fuel usage are averaged at
15 different spatial and temporal scales, but the differences in CO₂ estimates are seen to be within the error
16 bounds generally expected.

17
18 **Figure 6. A comparison of three different estimates of national annual emissions of CO₂ from fossil-**
19 **fuel consumption in the United States.**

20
21 Data from DOE permit us to estimate emissions by state or by month (Blasing *et al.*, 2005a and
22 2005b), but they do not permit us to estimate CO₂ emissions for each state by month directly from the
23 published energy data. Nor do we have sufficiently complete data to estimate emissions from Canada and
24 Mexico by month or province. Andres *et al.* (2005), Gregg (2005), and Losey (2004) have shown that we
25 can disaggregate national total emissions by month or by some national subdivision (such as states or
26 provinces) if we have data on some large fraction of fuel use. Because this approach relies on determining
27 the fractional distribution of an otherwise-determined total, it can be done with incomplete data on fuel
28 use. The estimates, will of course, improve as the fraction of the total fuel use is increased. Figure 7 is
29 based on sales data for most fossil-fuel commodities and the CDIAC estimates of total national emissions.
30 It shows how the CO₂ emissions from North America vary at a monthly time scale.

31
32 **Figure 7. CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel consumption in North America, by month.** Monthly values
33 are shown where estimates are justified by the availability of monthly data on fuel consumption or sales
34 (from Andres *et al.*, 2005).

1 Emissions by Economic Sector

2 To understand how CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel use enter and interact in the global and regional
3 cycling of carbon, it is necessary to know the masses of emissions and their spatial and temporal patterns.
4 We have tried to summarize this information in this brief discussion. To understand the trends and the
5 driving forces behind the growth in fossil-fuel emissions, and the opportunities for controlling emissions,
6 it is necessary to look in more detail at how the fuels are used and at the economic sectors in which the
7 fuels are used and from which the CO₂ is emitted. This is the goal of the next four chapters of this
8 volume.

9 Before looking at the details of how energy is used and where CO₂ emissions occur in the economies
10 of North America, however, there are two indices of CO₂ emissions at the national level that provide
11 additional perspective on the scale and distribution of emissions. These two indices are emissions per
12 capita and emissions per unit of economic activity, the latter generally represented by CO₂ per unit of
13 gross domestic product (GDP). Figure 8 shows the 1950–2002 record of CO₂ emissions per capita for the
14 three countries of North America and, for perspective, includes the same data for the Earth as a whole.
15 Similarly, Table 3 shows CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP for the three countries of North America and for
16 the world total. These are, of course, very complex indices; and though they provide some insight, they
17 say nothing about the details and the distributions within the means. The data on CO₂ per capita for the
18 50 U.S. states (Figure 9) show that values range over a full order of magnitude, differing in complex ways
19 with the structure of the economies and probably with factors such as climate, population density, and
20 access to resources (Blasing *et al.*, 2005b; Neumayer, 2004).

21 Chapters 6 through 9 of this volume discuss the patterns and trends of CO₂ emissions by sector and
22 the driving forces behind the trends that are observed. Estimating emissions by sector brings special
23 challenges in defining sectors and assembling the requisite data. Readers will find that there is
24 consistency and coherence within the following chapters but will encounter difficulty in aggregating or
25 summing numbers across chapters. Different experts use different sector boundaries, different data
26 sources, different conversion factors, etc. Different analysts will find data for different base years and
27 may treat electricity and biomass fuels differently. Despite numeric differences, however, the 4 chapters
28 accurately characterize the patterns of emissions and the opportunities for controlling the growth in
29 emissions. They reveal that there are major differences between the countries of North America where,
30 for example, the United States derives 50% of its electricity from coal, Mexico gets 73% from petroleum
31 and natural gas, and Canada gets 60% from hydroelectric stations. Partially as a reflection of this
32 difference, 40% of United States CO₂ emissions are from enterprises whose primary business is to
33 generate electricity and heat, while this number is only 31% in Mexico and 23% in Canada (for 2002,
34 from IEA, 2004). Chapter 8 reveals that the sectors are not independent as, for example, a change from

1 fuel burning to electricity in an industrial process will decrease emissions from the industrial sector but
2 increase emissions in the electric power sector. The database of the International Energy Agency allows
3 us to summarize CO₂ emissions for the 3 countries according to sectors that closely correspond to the
4 sectoral division of chapters 6 through 9 (Table 4).

5
6 **Figure 8. Per capita emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption (and cement manufacturing) in**
7 **the United States, Canada, and Mexico and for the global total of emissions** (from Marland *et al.*,
8 2005).

9
10 **Table 3. Emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption (cement manufacturing and gas flaring are**
11 **not included) per unit of GDP for the United States, Canada, and Mexico and worldwide.**

12
13 **Figure 9. Per capita emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption for the 50 U.S. states in 2000.** To
14 demonstrate the range of values, values have been rounded to whole numbers of metric tons per capita. A
15 large portion of the range for extreme values is related to the occurrence of coal resources and inter-state
16 transfers of electricity (from Blasing *et al.*, 2005b).

17 18 **CONCLUSION**

19 There are a variety of reasons we want to know the emissions of CO₂ from fossil fuels, there are a
20 variety of ways of coming up with the desired estimates, and there are a variety of ways of using the
21 estimates. By the nature of the process of fossil-fuel combustion, and because of its economic importance,
22 there are reasonably good data over long time intervals that we can use to make reasonably accurate
23 estimates of CO₂ emissions to the atmosphere. In fact, it is the economic importance of fossil-fuel burning
24 that has assured us of both good data on emissions and great challenges in altering the rate of emissions.

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1 **Table 1. A sample of the coefficients used for estimating CO₂ emissions from the amount**
 2 **of fuel burned**
 3 (from IPCC, 1996)

Fuel	Emissions coefficient (kg carbon/10 ⁹ J net heating value)
Lignite	27.6
Anthracite	26.8
Bituminous coal	25.8
Crude oil	20.0
Residual fuel oil	21.1
Diesel oil	20.2
Jet kerosene	19.5
Gasoline	18.9
Natural gas	15.3

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Table 2. Estimates (in Mt C) of CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel consumption for the United States, Canada, and Mexico

Country		1990		1998		2002
United States	CDIAC	1305	CDIAC	1501	CDIAC	1580
	IEA	1320	IEA	1497	IEA	1545
	U.S. EPA	1316	U.S. EPA	1478	U.S. EPA	1534
Canada	CDIAC	112	CDIAC	119	CDIAC	139
	IEA	117	IEA	136	IEA	145
	U.S. EPA	117	U.S. EPA	133	U.S. EPA	144
Mexico	CDIAC	99	CDIAC	96	CDIAC	100
	IEA	80	IEA	96	IEA	100
	U.S. EPA	81	U.S. EPA	96	U.S. EPA	NA

13 Notes:
 14 These data have been multiplied by 12/44 to get the mass of carbon for the comparison here.
 15 Many of these data were published in terms of the mass of CO₂ .
 16 Values for the United States, Canada and Mexico represent consumption data as reported by CDIAC
 17 (Marland *et al.*, 2005), IEA (2005), and by the National Reports to the United Nations Framework
 18 Convention on Climate Change [United States (EPA, 2005), Canada (Environment Canada, 2005), and
 19 Mexico (2001)].
 20 All data except CDIAC include oxidation of non-fuel hydrocarbons.
 21 All data except IEA include flaring of gas at oil and gas processing facilities.
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3 **Table 3. Emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption**
4 **(cement manufacturing and gas flaring are not included) per**
5 **unit of GDP for the United States, Canada, and Mexico and**
worldwide

Country	CO ₂ emissions per unit of GDP ^d		
	Year		
	1990	1998	2002
United States	0.19	0.17	0.15
Canada	0.18	0.18	0.16
Mexico	0.13	0.12	0.11
Global total	0.17	0.15	0.14

6 ^aCO₂ is measured in kg carbon and GDP is reported in 2000
7 US\$ purchasing power parity (from IEA, 2005).
8
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15 **Table 4. Percentage of CO₂ emissions by sector for 2002**

Sector	United States	Canada	Mexico	North America
Energy extraction and conversion ^a	46.8	36.0	49.4	46.1
Transportation ^b	31.2	28.3	28.7	30.8
Industry ^c	11.0	16.8	13.2	11.6
Buildings ^d	11.0	18.9	8.8	11.6

16 ^aThe sum of three IEA categories, “public electricity and heat production,” “unallocated
17 autoproducers,” and “other energy industries.” (IEA, 2004)

18 ^bIEA category “transport.” (IEA, 2004)

19 ^cIEA category “manufacturing industries and construction.” (IEA, 2004)

20 ^dIEA category “other sectors.” (IEA, 2004)

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


Figure 1. Cumulative global emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel combustion and cement manufacture from 1751 to 2002.

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


Figure 2. The carbon content of coal varies with the heat content, shown here as the net heating value. To make them easier to distinguish, data for lignites and brown coals are shown on the left axis, and data for hard coals are offset by 20% and shown on the right axis. Heating value is plotted in the units at which it was originally reported, Btu/lb, where 1 Btu/lb = 2324 J/kg (from Marland et al. 1995).

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



Figure 3. The cumulative total of CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel consumption and cement manufacturing as a function of time, for the three countries of North America and for the sum of the three.

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(a)



(b)




Figure 4a and 4b. Annual emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel use by fuel type.

Figure 4a is for the United States, Figure 4b is for Canada, Figure 4c is for Mexico, and Figure 4d is for the sum of the three. Note that in order to illustrate the contributions of the different fuels, the four plots are not to the same vertical scale (from Marland et al. 2005).

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



Figure 4c and 4d. Annual emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel use by fuel type.

Figure 4a is for the United States, Figure 4b is for Canada, Figure 4c is for Mexico, and Figure 4d is for the sum of the three. Note that in order to illustrate the contributions of the different fuels, the four plots are not to the same vertical scale (from Marland et al. 2005).

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




Figure 5. Emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption in the United States, by month. Emissions from cement manufacturing are not included (from Blasing et al. 2005a).

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Estimates from DOE data on fuel consumption by state (black squares) vs estimates based on the UN Statistics Office data on apparent fuel consumption for the full United States (open squares).



Estimates based on DOE data on fuel consumption in the 50 U.S. states (black squares) vs estimates based on national fuel consumption for each of the 12 months (open squares). The state and monthly data include estimates of oxidation of non-fuel hydrocarbon products; the UN-based estimates do not (from Blasing et al. 2005b).

Figure 6. A comparison of three different estimates of national annual emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption in the United States.

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


Figure 7. CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel consumption in North America, by month. Monthly values are shown where estimates are justified by the availability of monthly data on fuel consumption or sales (from Andres et al. 2005).

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


Figure 8. Per capita emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption (and cement manufacturing) in the United States, Canada, and Mexico and for the global total of emissions (from Marland et al. 2005).

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


Figure 9. Per capita emissions of CO₂ from fossil-fuel consumption for the 50 US states in 2000. To demonstrate the range of values, values have been rounded to whole numbers of metric tons per capita. A large portion of the range for extreme values is related to the occurrence of coal resources and inter-state transfers of electricity (from Blasing et al. 2005b).

1

Chapter 6. Energy Extraction and Conversion

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KEY FINDINGS

- In recent years, extraction of primary energy sources and their conversion into energy delivery forms (solid, liquid, gas, and electric) in North America released on the order of 2800 Mt CO₂ per year to the atmosphere, approximately 40% of total North American emissions in 2003 and 10% of total global emissions. Electricity generation is responsible for most (90–95%) of North America's energy extraction and conversion emissions.
- Carbon dioxide emissions from energy extraction and conversion in North America are currently rising.
- The principal drivers behind carbon emissions from energy extraction and conversion are (1) the growing appetite for energy services such as comfort, convenience, mobility, and labor productivity, so closely related to economic and social progress, and (2) the market competitiveness of fossil energy sources compared with alternatives.
- Emissions from energy extraction and conversion in North America are projected to increase in the future. Projections vary among the countries, but increases approaching 50% or more appear likely. Projections for the United States., for example, indicate that CO₂ emissions from electricity generation alone will rise to about 3314 Mt CO₂ by 2025, a 45% increase over emissions in 2003, with three-quarters of the increase associated with greater coal use in electric power plants.
- The prospects for major reductions in CO₂ emissions from energy extraction and conversion in North America appear dependent upon the extent, direction, and pace of technological innovation and the likelihood that policy conditions favoring carbon emissions reduction that do not now exist will emerge if concerns about carbon cycle imbalances grow. In these regards, the prospects are brighter in the long term (e.g., more than several decades in the future) than in the near term.
- Research and development priorities for managing carbon emissions from energy extraction and conversion include, on the technology side, clarifying and realizing potentials for carbon capture and sequestration, and, on the policy side, understanding the public acceptability of policy incentives for reducing dependence on energy sources associated with carbon emissions.

1 INTRODUCTION

2 A significant component of the North American carbon cycle is the extraction of primary energy
3 sources and their conversion into energy delivery forms (solid, liquid, gas, and electric) because both
4 energy resource extraction and energy conversion activities in North America emphasize fossil fuels and
5 their associated emissions of greenhouse gases. This chapter summarizes the knowledge bases related to
6 energy extraction, energy conversion, and other energy supply activities such as energy movement and
7 energy storage, along with options and measures for managing emissions.

8 Clearly, this topic overlaps the subject matter of other chapters. For instance, the dividing line
9 between energy conversion and other types of industry is sometimes indistinct, as when industry practices
10 co-generation as an energy-efficiency strategy, and biomass energy extraction/conversion is directly
11 related to agriculture and forestry. In addition, in addressing options and measures, policy alternatives are
12 often directed at both supply and demand responses, i.e., involving not only emission reductions from
13 supply systems but also potential payoffs from efficiency improvements in buildings, industry, and
14 transportation, especially where they reduce the consumption of fossil fuels.

15

16 CARBON EMISSIONS INVENTORY

17 Carbon Emissions from Energy Extraction and Conversion

18 Carbon emissions from energy extraction (e.g., mining and oil/gas production) and conversion (e.g.,
19 electricity generation and refining) are one of the “big three” sectors accounting for most of total
20 emissions from human systems, along with industry and transportation. The largest share of total
21 emissions from energy supply (not including energy end use) are from (a) coal and other fossil fuel use in
22 producing electricity and (b) fossil fuel conversion activities such as oil refining. Other emission sources
23 are less well-defined but generally small, such as methane from reservoirs established partly to support
24 hydropower production (Tremblay *et al.*, 2004), or from materials production (e.g., metals production)
25 associated with other renewable or nuclear energy technologies.

26 Data on emissions from energy supply systems are unevenly available for the countries of North
27 America. Most emission data sets are organized by fuel consumed rather than by consuming sector, and
28 countries differ in sectors identified and the units of measurement. As a result, it seems more appropriate
29 to report inventories by country in whatever forms are available than to try to construct a North American
30 inventory that is consistent across all three major countries (which appears unattainable). Canada and
31 Mexico export energy supplies to the United States; therefore, some emissions from energy *supply*
32 systems in these countries are associated with energy *uses* in the United States.

33

34

1 Canada

2 Canada is the world's fifth-largest energy producing country, a significant exporter of both natural
3 gas and electricity to the United States. In Alberta, which produces nearly two-thirds of Canada's energy,
4 energy accounts for about one-quarter of the province's economic activity; its oil sands are estimated to
5 have more potential energy value than the remaining oil reserves of Saudi Arabia (DOE, 2004). Although
6 Canada has steadily reduced its energy and carbon intensities since the early 1970s, its overall energy
7 intensity remains high—in part due to its prominence as an energy producer—and total greenhouse gas
8 emissions have grown by 9% since 1990. As of 2003, greenhouse gas emissions in Mt CO₂ equivalents
9 were 134 for electricity and heat generation and 71 for petroleum refining and other fossil fuel production
10 (Environment Canada, 2003).

11

12 Mexico

13 Mexico is one of the largest sources of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions in Latin America,
14 although its per capita emissions are well below the per capita average of industrialized countries. The
15 first large oil-producing nation to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it has promoted shifts to natural gas use to
16 reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The most recent emission figures are from the country's Second
17 National Communication to the UN United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2001,
18 which included relatively comprehensive data from 1996 and some data from 1998. In 1998, CO₂
19 emissions from "energy industries" were 47.3 Mt CO₂; from electricity generation they totaled 101.3 Mt
20 CO₂, and "fugitive" emissions from oil and gas production and distribution were between 1.9 and 2.6 Mt
21 of CH₄, depending on the estimated "emission factor" (Government of Mexico, 2001). An estimate for,
22 say, 2003 might be constructed by increasing these totals in proportion to 1998–2003 gross domestic
23 product growth.

24

25 United States

26 The United States is the largest national emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and CO₂ emissions
27 associated with electricity generation in 2003 account for 2409 Mt of CO₂, or 41% of a national total of
28 5870 (EIA, 2004). Emissions from oil refining, natural gas transmission, and other fossil energy supply
29 activities are also substantial, though harder to document because they are grouped with aggregate
30 industrial emissions. Oil refineries are known to be a major source of methane as well as CO₂ emissions;
31 natural gas supply systems emit methane as well. For example, a study of greenhouse gas emissions from
32 a six-county area in southwestern Kansas found that compressor stations for natural gas pipeline systems
33 are a significant source of emissions at that scale (AAG, 2003).

34

1 Carbon Sinks Associated with Energy Extraction and Conversion

2 Generally, energy extraction and conversion are based heavily on mining hydrocarbons from carbon
3 sinks accumulated over millions of years, but carbon sequestration occurs in connection with energy
4 production from biomass during plant growth. Limited strictly to energy sector applications, the total
5 contribution of these sinks to the North American carbon cycle is potentially nontrivial but probably
6 relatively small.

8 TRENDS AND DRIVERS

9 Three principal drivers are behind carbon emissions from energy extraction and conversion.

10 (1) *The growing global and national appetite for energy services such as comfort, convenience,*
11 *mobility, and labor productivity, so closely related to progress with economic and social development*
12 *and the quality of life (Wilbanks, 1992).* Globally, the challenge is to increase total energy *services* (not
13 necessarily *supplies*) over the next half-century by a factor of at least three or four—more rapidly than
14 overall economic growth—while reducing environmental impacts from the associated supply systems
15 (NAS, 1999). Mexico shares this need, while increases in Canada and the United States are likely to be
16 more or less proportional to rates of economic growth.

17 (2) *The market competitiveness of fossil energy sources compared with supply- and demand-side*
18 *alternatives.* In some cases reinforced by policy conditions, production costs of electricity from coal, oil,
19 or natural gas at relatively large scales are currently lower than other sources besides large-scale
20 hydropower, and production costs of liquid and gas fuels are currently far lower than other sources,
21 though rising. These conditions appear likely to continue for some years. In many cases, the most cost-
22 competitive alternative to fossil fuel production and use is not alternative supply sources but from
23 efficiency improvement.

24 (3) *Enhanced future markets for alternative energy supply sources.* In the longer run, however,
25 emissions from energy supply systems may—and in fact are likely to—begin to decline as alternative
26 technology options are developed and/or improved. Other possible driving forces for attention to
27 alternatives to fossil fuels, at least in the mid to longer term, include the possibility of shrinking oil and/or
28 gas reserves and changes in attitudes toward energy policy interventions.

29 Given the power of the first two of these drivers, total carbon emissions from energy extraction and
30 conversion in North America are currently rising (e.g., Figure 6.1). National trends and drivers are as
31 follows.

32
33 **Figure 6.1. United States CO₂ emissions from electricity generation, 1990–2003, in million metric tons**
34 **CO₂** (Source: EIA, 2004).

1 Canada

2 Canada is the only Annex I country that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and it is seeking to meet the
3 Kyoto target of CO₂ emission reduction to 6% below 1990 levels. Of these reductions, 25% are to be
4 through domestic actions and 75% through market mechanisms such as purchases of carbon credits
5 (Government of Canada, 2005). Domestic actions will include a significant reduction in coal
6 consumption. Available projections, however, indicate a total national increase of emissions in CO₂
7 equivalent of 36.1% by 2020 from 1990 levels (Environment Canada, 2005). Emissions from electricity
8 generation would increase 2000–2020 from about 90 Mt of CO₂ equivalent to about 150, while emissions
9 from fossil fuel production would remain relatively stable at about 100 Mt.

10

11 Mexico

12 It has been estimated that total Mexican CO₂ emissions will grow 69% by 2010, although mitigation
13 measures could reduce this rate of growth by nearly half (Pew Center, 2002). Generally, energy sector
14 emissions in Mexico vary in proportion to economic growth (e.g., declining somewhat with a recession in
15 2001), but such factors as a pressing need for additional electricity supplies, calling for more than
16 doubling production capacity between 1999 and 2008, could increase net emissions while a national
17 strategy to promote greater use of natural gas (along with other policies related in part to concerns about
18 emissions associated with urban air pollution) could reduce emissions compared with a reference case
19 (EIA, 2005b).

20

21 United States

22 The Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2005a) projects that CO₂ emissions from electricity
23 generation in the United States will rise between 2003 and 2025 from about 2286 to about 3314 Mt, a
24 45% increase, with three-quarters of the increase associated with greater coal use in electric power plants.
25 EIA projects that technology advances could reduce the increase by as much as 7%. Projections of other
26 emissions from energy supply systems appear to be unavailable.

27

**28 OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF EMISSIONS FROM ENERGY EXTRACTION AND
29 CONVERSION**

30 Few aspects of the carbon cycle have received more attention in the past several decades than
31 emissions from fossil energy extraction and conversion. As a result, there is a wide array of technology
32 and policy options, many of which have been examined in considerable detail, although there is not a
33 strong consensus on courses of action.

34

1 Technology Options

2 Technology options for reducing energy-supply-related emissions (other than reduced requirements
3 due to end-use efficiency improvements) consist of

- 4
- 5 • reducing emissions from fossil resource extraction, conversion, and energy production (e.g., for
6 electricity generation, improving the efficiency of existing power plants, or moving toward the use of
7 lower-emission technologies such as coal gasification–combined cycle generation facilities) and
- 8 • shifting from fossil energy sources to other energy sources [e.g., energy from the sun (renewable
9 energy) or from the atom (nuclear energy)].

10

11 The most comprehensive description of emission-reducing and fuel switching technologies and their
12 potentials is the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP) draft *Strategic Plan* (CCTP, 2005),
13 especially Chapters 5 (energy supply) and 6 (capturing and sequestering CO₂)—see also National
14 Laboratory Directors (1997). The CCTP report focuses on five energy supply technology areas: low-
15 emission fossil-based fuels and power, hydrogen as an energy carrier, renewable energy and fuels, nuclear
16 fission, and fusion energy.

17 There is a widespread consensus that no one of these options, nor one family of options, is a good
18 prospect to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions from energy supply systems, nationally or globally,
19 because each faces daunting constraints (Hoffert *et al.*, 2002). Examples include very real limits to
20 effective global “decarbonization” (i.e., reducing the use of carbon-based energy sources as a proportion
21 of total energy supplies), including renewable or other non-fossil sources of energy use at scales that
22 would dramatically change the global carbon balance between now and 2050. One conclusion is that “the
23 disparity between what is needed and what can be done without great compromise may become more
24 acute.”

25 Instead, progress with technologies currently available or likely to be available in the coming decades
26 may depend on adding together smaller “wedges” of contributions by a variety of resource/technology
27 combinations (Pacala and Socolow, 2004), each of which may be feasible if the demands upon it are
28 moderate. If many wedges can be combined, the total effect could approach requirements for even
29 relatively ambitious carbon stabilization goals, at least in the first half of the century, although each
30 wedge would need to be economically competitive with current types of fossil energy sources.

31 A fundamental question is whether prospects for significant decarbonization depend on the
32 emergence of new technologies, in some cases requiring advances in science. For instance, efforts are
33 being made to develop economically affordable and socially acceptable options for large-scale capture of
34 carbon from fossil fuel streams—with the remaining hydrogen offering a clean energy source—and

1 sequestration of the carbon in the ground or the oceans. This approach is known to be technologically
2 feasible, and recent assessments suggest that it may have considerable promise (e.g., IPCC, 2006). If so,
3 there is at least some chance that fossil energy sources may be used to provide energy services in North
4 America and the world in large quantities in the mid to longer terms without contributing to a carbon
5 cycle imbalance, although the prospects remain speculative at this time.

6 What can be expected from technology options over the next quarter to half a century is a matter of
7 debate, partly because the pace of technology development and use depends heavily on policy conditions
8 Chapter 3 in the CCTP draft *Strategic Plan* (2005) shows three advanced technology scenarios drawn
9 from work by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, varying according to carbon constraints.
10 Potential contributions to global emission reduction by energy supply technology initiatives between
11 2000 and 2100 range from about 25 Gt C equivalent to nearly 350 Gt, which illustrates uncertainties
12 related to both science and policy issues. Carbon capture and storage, along with terrestrial sequestration,
13 could add between about 100 and 325 Gt. It has been suggested, however, that significantly decarbonizing
14 energy systems by 2050 could require massive efforts on a par with the Manhattan project or the Apollo
15 space program (Hoffert *et al.*, 2002).

16 Estimated costs of potential technology alternatives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from
17 energy supply systems are summarized after the following summary of policy options because estimates
18 are generally based on assumptions about policy interventions.

20 **Policy Options**

21 Policy options for carbon emission reduction from energy supply systems revolve around either
22 *incentives* or regulatory *requirements* for such reductions. Generally, interventions may be aimed at
23 (a) shaping technology choice and use or (b) shaping technology development and supply. Many of the
24 policy options are aimed at encouraging end-use efficiency improvement as well as supply-side emission
25 reduction.

26 Options for intervening to change the relative attractiveness of available energy supply technology
27 alternatives include appealing to voluntary action (e.g., improved consumer information, “green power”),
28 a variety of regulatory actions (e.g., mandated purchase policies such as energy portfolio standards),
29 carbon emission rights trading (where emission reduction would have market value), technology/product
30 standards, production tax credits for non-fossil energy production, tax credits for alternative energy use,
31 and carbon emission taxation or ceilings. Options for changing the relative attractiveness of investing in
32 carbon-emission-reducing technology development and dissemination include tax credits for certain kinds
33 of energy R&D, public-private sector R&D cost sharing, and electric utility restructuring. For a more
34 comprehensive listing and discussion, see Chapter 6 in IPCC (2002).

1 In some cases, perceptions that policies and market conditions of the future will be more favorable to
2 emission reduction than at present are motivating private industry to consider investments in technologies
3 whose market competitiveness would grow in such a future

4
5 [TEXT BOX HERE]
6

7 Most estimates of the impacts of energy policy options on greenhouse gas emissions do not
8 differentiate the contributions from energy supply systems from the rest of the energy economy [e.g.,
9 Interlaboratory Working Group (IWG), 1997; IWG, 2000; IPCC, 2001; National Commission on Energy
10 Policy, 2004; also see OTA, 1991, and NAS, 1992]. For instance the IWG (1997) considered effects of
11 \$25 and \$50 per ton carbon emission permits on both energy supply and use, while IWG considered fifty
12 policy/technology options (IWG, 2000; also see IPCC, 2001), most of which would affect both energy
13 supply and energy use decisions.
14

15 **Estimated Costs of Implementation**

16 Estimating the costs of emission reduction associated with the implementation of various technology
17 and policy options for energy supply and conversion systems is complicated by several realities. First,
18 many estimates are aggregated for the United States or the world as a whole, without separate estimates
19 for the energy extraction and conversion sector. Second, estimates differ in the scenarios considered, the
20 modeling approaches adopted, and the units of measure that are used.

21 More specifically, estimates of costs of emission reduction vary widely according to assumptions
22 about such issues as how welfare is measured, ancillary benefits, and effects in stimulating technological
23 innovation. According to IWG (2000), benefits of emission reduction would be comparable to costs, and
24 the National Commission on Energy Policy (2004) estimates that their recommended policy initiatives
25 would be, on the whole, revenue-neutral with respect to the federal budget. Other participants in energy
26 policymaking, however, are convinced that truly significant carbon emission reductions would have
27 substantial economic impacts (GAO, 2004).

28 Globally, IPCC (2001) projected that global CO₂ emissions from energy supply and conversion could
29 be reduced in 2020 by 350 to 700 Mt C equivalents per year, based on options that could be adopted
30 through the use of generally accepted policies, generally at a positive direct cost of less than U.S.\$100 per
31 t C equivalents. It estimated that the cost of emission reducing technologies for power generation,
32 compared with coal-fired power, range from 3 to 8 cents/kWh, except for more expensive photovoltaic
33 and solar thermal technologies. According to the IPCC report, based on DOE/EIA analyses in 2000,
34 advanced coal generation technologies such as integrated gasification combined cycle technology would

1 cost between 3 and 4 cents/kWh in the United States without CO₂ capture. CO₂ capture would raise costs
2 to between 5 and 7 cents. Nuclear energy costs would rise 5 to 6 cents/kWh. Solar energy options would
3 rise from 3 to 5 cents for wind power, 4 to 8 cents for biomass, and 9 to 25 cents for photovoltaics and
4 thermal solar. Within the United States, the report estimated that the cost of emission reduction per metric
5 ton of carbon emissions reduced would range from -\$170 to +\$880, depending on the technology used.
6 Marginal abatement costs for the total United States economy, in 1990 U.S. dollars per metric ton carbon,
7 were estimated by a variety of models compared by the Energy Modeling Forum at \$76 to \$410 with no
8 emission trading, \$14 to \$224 with Annex I trading, and \$5 to \$123 with global trading.

9 Similarly, the National Commission on Energy Policy (2004) considered costs associated with a
10 tradable emission permit system that would reduce United States national greenhouse gas emission
11 growth from 44% to 33% from 2002 to 2025, a reduction of 760 Mt CO₂ in 2025 compared with a
12 reference case. The cost would be a roughly 5% increase in total end-use expenditures compared with the
13 reference case. Electricity prices would rise by 5.4% for residential users, 6.2% for commercial users, and
14 7.6% for industrial users.

15 The IWG (2000) estimated that a domestic carbon trading system with a \$25/t C permit price would
16 reduce emissions by 13% compared with a reference case, or 230 Mt CO₂, while a \$50 price would
17 reduce emissions by 17 to 19%, or 306 to 332 Mt CO₂. Both cases assume a doubling of United States
18 government appropriations for cost-shared clean energy research, design, and development.

19 For carbon capture and sequestration, IPCC (2006) concluded that this option could contribute 15 to
20 55% to global mitigation between now and 2100 if technologies develop as projected in relatively
21 optimistic scenarios and very large-scale geological carbon sequestration is publicly acceptable. Under
22 these assumptions, the cost is projected at \$30 to \$70/t CO₂. With less optimistic assumptions, the cost
23 could rise to above \$200/t.

24 Net costs to the consumer, however, are balanced in some analyses by benefits from advanced
25 technologies which are developed and deployed on an accelerated schedule due to policy interventions
26 and changing public preferences. The U.S. Climate Change Technology Program (2005; see page 3-19 in
27 that report) illustrates how costs of achieving different stabilization levels can conceivably be reduced
28 substantially by the use of advanced technologies, and IWG (2000) estimates that net end-user costs of
29 energy can actually be reduced by a domestic carbon trading system if it accelerates the market
30 penetration of more energy-efficient technologies.

31 In many cases, however, discussions of the promise of technology options are not associated with cost
32 estimates. Economic costs of energy are not one of the drivers of the IPCC SRES scenarios, and such
33 references as Hoffert *et al.* (2002) and Pacala and Socolow (2004) are concerned with technological

1 potentials and constraints as a limiting condition on market behavior rather than with comparative costs
2 and benefits of particular technology options at the margin.

3 4 **Summary**

5 In terms of prospects for major emission reductions from energy extraction and conversion in North
6 America, the key issues appear to be the extent, direction, and pace of technological innovation and the
7 likelihood that policy conditions favoring carbon emissions reduction that do not now exist will emerge if
8 concerns about carbon cycle imbalances grow. In these regards, the prospects are brighter in the long term
9 (e.g., more than several decades in the future) than in the near term. History suggests that technology
10 solutions are usually easier to implement than policy solutions, but it is possible that observed impacts of
11 carbon cycle imbalances might change the political calculus for policy interventions in the future.

12 13 **RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS**

14 If it is possible that truly effective management of carbon emissions from energy supply and
15 conversion systems cannot be realized with the current portfolio of technology alternatives under current
16 policy conditions, then research and development needs and opportunities deserve expanded attention and
17 support (e.g., National Commission on Energy Policy, 2004). If so, the priorities include:

18
19 **Technology.** Several objectives seem to be especially relevant to carbon management potentials:

- 20 • clarifying and realizing potentials for carbon capture and sequestration;
- 21 • clarifying and realizing potentials of affordable renewable energy systems at a relatively large scale;
- 22 • addressing social concerns about the nuclear energy fuel cycle, especially in an era of concern about
23 terrorism;
- 24 • improving estimates of economic costs and emission reduction benefits of a range of energy;
25 technologies across a range of economic, technological, and policy scenarios; and
- 26 • “Blue Sky” research to develop new technology options and families, such as innovative approaches
27 for energy from the sun and from biomass, including possible applications of nanoscience (Caldeira *et*
28 *al.*, 2005; Lewis, 2005).

29
30 **Policy.** Research and development can also be applied to policy options in order to enlarge their
31 knowledge bases and explore their implications. For instance, research priorities might include learning
32 more about:

- 33 • the public acceptability of policy incentives for reducing dependence on energy sources associated
34 with carbon emissions,

- 1 • other incentives for the energy industry to increase its support for pathways not limited to fossil fuels,
- 2 • approaches toward a more distributed electric power supply enterprise in which certain renewable
- 3 (and hydrogen) energy options might be more attractive, and
- 4 • transitions from one energy system/infrastructure to another.

5
6 In these ways, technology and policy advances might be combined with multiple wedges of available
7 technology to transform the capacity to manage carbon emissions from energy supply systems, if that is a
8 high priority for North America.

9

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
1 *[BEGIN TEXTBOX]*

2
3 **THE CARBON MITIGATION INITIATIVE AT PRINCETON**

4
5 In September 2000, British Petroleum and Ford Motor Company established a partnership with the
6 Princeton Environmental Institute to explore pathways for capturing and sequestering a large fraction of
7 the carbon emissions from fossil fuels, with \$20 million in industry funding over a ten-year period. This
8 program assesses the potential of low-carbon energy technologies, studies the feasibility of long-term
9 underground carbon storage, considers impacts of carbon dioxide on the carbon cycle, and analyzes
10 possible pathways for carbon mitigation.

11
12 *[END TEXTBOX]*

1



2 **Figure 6.1. United States CO₂ emissions from electricity generation, 1990–2003, in million metric tons**
3 **CO₂** (Source: EIA, 2004).

4

Chapter 7. Transportation

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KEY FINDINGS

- The transportation sector of North America released 2120 Mt of CO₂ into the atmosphere in 2003, 37% of the total CO₂ emissions from worldwide transportation activity and about 22% of total global CO₂ emissions.
 - Transportation energy use in North America and the associated CO₂ emissions have grown substantially and relatively steadily over the past 40 years. Growth has been most rapid in Mexico, the country most dependent upon road transport.
 - Carbon emissions by transport are determined by the levels of passenger and freight activity, the shares of transport modes, the energy intensity of passenger and freight movements, and the carbon intensity of transportation fuels. The growth of passenger and freight activity is driven by population, per capita income, and economic output.
 - Chiefly as a result of economic growth, energy use by North American transportation is expected to increase by 46% from 2003 to 2025. If the mix of fuels is assumed to remain the same, carbon dioxide emissions would increase from 2151 Mt CO₂ in 2003 to 3149 Mt CO₂ in 2025. Canada, the only one of the three countries in North America to have committed to specific GHG reduction goals, is expected to show the lowest rate of growth in CO₂ emissions.
 - The most widely proposed options for reducing the carbon emissions of the North American transportation sector are increased vehicle fuel economy, increased prices for carbon fuels, liquid fuels derived from biomass, and in the longer term, hydrogen produced from renewables, nuclear energy, or from fossil fuels with carbon sequestration. Biomass fuels appear to be a promising near- and long-term option, while hydrogen could become an important energy carrier after 2025.
 - After the development of advanced energy efficient vehicle technologies and low-carbon fuels, the most pressing research need in the transportation sector is for comprehensive, consistent, and rigorous assessments of carbon emissions mitigation potentials and costs for North America. There is also a need for improved data, particularly the provision of data to complete the country-specific histories of emissions from transportation, and a consistent description of the accuracy of each country's data.
-

1 Transportation is the largest source of carbon emissions among North American energy end uses.
2 This fact reflects the vast scale of passenger and freight movements in a region that comprises one-fourth
3 of the global economy, as well as the dominance of relatively energy-intensive road transport and the near
4 total dependence of North American transportation systems on petroleum as a source of energy. If present
5 trends continue, carbon emissions from North American transportation are expected to increase by more
6 than one-half by 2050. Options for mitigating carbon emissions from the transportation sector like
7 increased vehicle fuel economy and biofuels could offset the expected growth in transportation activity.
8 However, at present only Canada has committed to achieving a specific reduction in future greenhouse
9 gas emissions: 6% below 1990 levels by 2012 (Government of Canada, 2005).

11 **INVENTORY OF CARBON EMISSIONS**

12 Worldwide, transportation produced about 22% (5.36 Gt yr⁻¹) of total global carbon dioxide
13 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels (24.2 Gt CO₂) in 2000 (page 3-1 in U.S. EPA, 2005;
14 Marland, Boden and Andres, 2005). Home to 6.7% of the world's 6.45 billion people and source of
15 24.8% of the world's \$55.5 trillion gross world product (CIA, 2005), North America produces 37% (an
16 estimated 2120 Mt CO₂ in 2005) of the total carbon emissions from worldwide transportation activity (an
17 estimated 5846 Mt CO₂ in 2005) (Fulton and Eads, 2004).

18 Transportation activity is driven by population, economic wealth, and geography. Of the
19 approximately 435 million residents of North America, 68.0% reside in the United States, 24.5% in
20 Mexico, and 7.5% in Canada. The differences in the sizes of the three countries' economies are far
21 greater. The United States is the world's largest economy, with an estimated gross domestic product
22 (GDP) of \$11.75 trillion in 2004. Although Mexico has approximately three times the population of
23 Canada, its GDP is roughly the same, \$1.006 trillion compared to \$1.023 trillion (measured in 2004
24 purchasing power parity dollars). With the largest population and largest economy, the United States has
25 by far the largest transportation system. The United States accounted for 87% of the energy used for
26 transportation in North America in 2003, Canada for 8%, and Mexico 5% (Fig. 7-1) (see Table 4-1 in
27 NATS, 2005). These differences in energy use are reflected in carbon dioxide emissions from the North
28 American transportation sector (Table 7-1).

29
30 **Figure 7-1. Transportation energy use in North America, 1990–2003.**

31
32 **Table 7-1. Carbon dioxide emissions from transportation in North America in 2003.**

1 Transportation is defined as private and public vehicles that move people and commodities (U.S.
2 EPA, 2005, p. 296). This includes automobiles, trucks, buses, motorcycles, railroads and railways
3 (including streetcars and subways), aircraft, ships, barges, and natural gas pipelines. This definition
4 excludes petroleum, coal slurry, and water pipelines, as well as the transmission of electricity, although
5 many countries consider pipelines part of the transport sector. It also generally excludes mobile sources
6 not engaged in transporting people or goods, such as construction equipment, and on-farm agricultural
7 equipment. In addition, carbon emissions from international bunker fuel use in aviation and waterborne
8 transport, though considered part of transport emissions, are generally accounted for separately from a
9 nation's domestic greenhouse gas inventory. In this chapter, upstream, or well-to-tank, carbon emissions
10 are not included with transportation end-use, nor are end-of-life emissions produced in the disposal or
11 recycling of materials used in transportation vehicles or infrastructure. These two categories of emissions
12 typically comprise 20–30% of total life cycle emissions for transport vehicles (see Table 5.4 in Weiss *et*
13 *al.*, 2000). In the future, it is likely that upstream carbon emissions will be of greater importance in
14 determining the total emissions due to transportation activities.

15 In addition to carbon dioxide, the combustion of fossil fuels by transportation produces other
16 greenhouse gases including methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides
17 (NO_x), and non-methane volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Those containing carbon are generally
18 oxidized in the atmosphere to ultimately produce CO₂. However, the quantities of non-CO₂ gases
19 produced by transportation vehicles are minor in comparison to the volume of CO₂ emissions. For
20 example, in the United States, mobile sources including international bunker fuels produced only 132,000
21 Mt CH₄ (or 2.8 Mt CO₂ equivalents) in 2003. This is a tiny fraction of the 1770.4 Mt of CO₂ emitted by
22 the transportation sector (see Tables 2-3, 2-4, and 2-7 in U.S. EPA, 2005). This chapter will therefore
23 address only the carbon dioxide emissions from transportation activities.

24

25 **Fuels Used in Transportation**

26 Virtually all of the energy used by the transport sector in North America is derived from petroleum,
27 and most of the remainder comes from natural gas (Table 7-2). In the United States, 96.3% of total
28 transportation energy is obtained by combustion of petroleum fuels (U.S. DOE/EIA, 2005a). Most of the
29 non-petroleum energy is natural gas used to power natural gas pipelines (2.5%, 744 PJ). During the past
30 two decades, ethanol use as a blending component for gasoline has increased from a negligible amount to
31 1.1% of transportation energy use (312 PJ). Electricity, mostly for passenger rail transport, comprises
32 only 0.1% of U.S. transport energy use. This pattern of energy use has persisted for more than half a
33 century (Fig. 7-1).

34

1 **Table 7-2. Summary of North American transport energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in 2003**
2 **by fuel type.**

3
4 The pattern of energy sources is only a little different in Mexico where 96.2% of transportation
5 energy use is gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel: 3.4% is liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and less than 0.2% is
6 electricity (Rodríguez, 2005). In Canada, natural gas use for natural gas pipelines accounts for 7.5% of
7 transport energy use, 91.8% is petroleum, 0.5% is propane (LPG) and only 0.1% is electricity (see Table 1
8 in NRCan, 2006).

9
10 **Mode of Transportation**

11 Mode of transportation refers to how people and freight are moved about, whether by road, rail, or air,
12 in light or heavy vehicles. Carbon dioxide emissions from the North American transportation sector are
13 summarized by mode in Table 7-3, and the distribution of emissions by mode for North America in 2003
14 is illustrated in Fig. 7-2.

15
16 **Table 7-3. Summary of North American transport energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in 2003**
17 **by fuel type**

18
19 **Figure 7-2. North American carbon emissions from transportation by mode, 2003.**

20
21 **Freight Transport**

22 Movement of freight is a major component of the transportation sector in North America. Total
23 freight activity in the United States, measured in metric ton-km, is 20 times that in Mexico and more than
24 10 times the levels observed in Canada (Figs. 7-3a, 7-3b, 7-3c).

25
26 **Figure 7-3a, 7-3b, and 7-3c. Freight activity by mode in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.**

27
28 In Mexico, trucking is the mode of choice for freight movements. Four-fifths of Mexican metric ton-
29 km are produced by trucks. Moreover, trucking's modal share has been increasing over time.

30 In Canada, rail transport accounts for the majority of freight movement (65%). Rail transport is well
31 suited to the approximately linear distribution of Canada's population in close proximity to the U.S.
32 border, the long-distances from east to west, and the large volumes of raw material flows typical of
33 Canadian freight traffic (see Table 5-2 in NATS, 2005).

1 In the United States, road freight plays a greater role than in Canada, and rail is less dominant,
2 although rail still carries the largest share of metric ton-km (40%). In none of the countries does air
3 freight account for a significant share of metric ton-km.

4 5 **Passenger Transport**

6 In all three countries, passenger transport is predominantly by road, followed in distant second by air
7 travel. Nearly complete data are available for passenger-kilometers-traveled (pkt) by mode in the United
8 States and Canada in 2001. Of the more than 8 trillion pkt accounted for by the United States, 88% was
9 by light-duty personal vehicles, roughly equally split between passenger cars and light trucks (Fig. 7-4a)
10 (motorcycle pkt, about 0.2% of the total, is included with passenger car). Air travel claims almost 9%;
11 other modes are minor.

12 13 **Figure 7-4a. Distribution of passenger travel in the United States by mode.**

14
15 Canadian passenger travel exhibits a very similar modal structure, but with a smaller role played by
16 light trucks and air and a large share for buses (Fig. 7-4b) (transit numbers for Canada were not available
17 at the time these figures were compiled).

18 19 **Figure 7-4b. Distribution of passenger travel by mode in Canada.**

20 21 **TRENDS AND DRIVERS**

22 In all three countries, transportation energy use has grown substantially and relatively steadily.
23 Figures 7-5a and 7-5b illustrate the evolution of transport energy use by mode for Mexico and the United
24 States. Energy use has grown most rapidly in Mexico, the country most dependent on road transport. In
25 the United States, the steady growth of transportation oil use was interrupted by oil price shocks in 1973–
26 74, 1979–80, and to a much lesser degree in 1991. The impact of the attack on the World Trade Center in
27 2001 is also visible, especially with respect to energy use for air travel.

28 29 **Figure 7-5a and 7-5b. Evolution of transport energy use in Mexico and the United States.**

30
31 The evolution of transport carbon emissions has closely followed the evolution of energy use. Carbon
32 dioxide emissions by mode are shown for the United States and Canada for the period 1990–2003 in
33 Figs. 7-6a and 7-6b. The Canadian data include light-duty commercial vehicles in road freight transport,
34 while all light trucks are included in the light-duty vehicle category in the U.S. data. These data illustrate

1 the relatively faster growth of freight transport energy use. Fuel economy standards in both countries were
2 effective in restraining the growth of passenger car and light-truck energy use (NAS, 2002). From 1990 to
3 2003 passenger kilometers traveled by road in Canada increased by 23%, while energy use increased by
4 only 15%. In 2003, freight activity accounted for more than 40% of Canada's transport energy use. And
5 while passenger transport energy use increased by 15% from 1990 to 2003, freight energy use increased
6 by 40%. The Canadian transport energy statistics do not include natural gas pipelines as a transport mode.

7
8 **Figure 7-6a and 7-6b. Transport CO₂ emissions in Canada and the United States, 1990–2003.**

9
10 Carbon emissions by transport are determined by the levels of passenger and freight activity, the
11 shares of transport modes, the energy intensity of passenger and freight movements, and the carbon
12 intensity of transportation fuels. In North America, petroleum fuels supply over 95% of transportation's
13 energy requirements and account for 98% of the sector's GHG emissions. Among modes, road vehicles
14 are predominant, producing almost 80% of sectoral GHG emissions. As a consequence, the driving forces
15 for transportation GHG emissions have been changes in activity and energy intensity. The principal
16 driving forces of the growth of passenger transportation are population and per capita income (WBCSD,
17 2004). With rising per capita income comes increased vehicle ownership, use, fuel consumption, and
18 emissions. In general, energy forecasters expect the greatest growth in vehicle ownership and fossil fuel
19 use in transportation over the next 25–50 years to occur in the developing economies (U.S. DOE/EIA,
20 2005b; IEA, 2004; WBCSD, 2004; Nakićenović, Grübler, McDonald, 1998). The chief driving forces for
21 freight activity are economic growth and the integration of economic activities at both regional and global
22 scales (WBCSD, 2004).

23 Population growth rates are similar in the three countries, 0.92% per year in the United States, 1.17%
24 per year in Mexico, and 0.90% per year in Canada. Recent annual GDP growth rates are 4.4% for the
25 United States, 4.1% for Mexico, and 2.4% for Canada (CIA, 2005). The U.S. Energy Information
26 Administration's Reference Case assumes annual GDP growth rates of 3.1% for the United States, 2.4%
27 for Canada, and 3.9% for Mexico (see Table A3 in U.S. DOE/EIA, 2005b). Assumed population growth
28 rates are United States: 0.9%; Canada: 0.6%; Mexico: 1.0% (see Table A14 in U.S. DOE/EIA, 2005b).

29 Projections of North American transportation energy use and carbon emissions to 2030 have been
30 published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. DOE/EIA, 2005b) and the International
31 Energy Agency (2005). Chiefly as a result of economic growth, energy use by North American
32 transportation is expected to increase by 46% from 2003 to 2025 (U.S. DOE/EIA, 2005b). If the mix of
33 fuels is assumed to remain the same, as it does in the IEO 2005 Reference Case projection, carbon dioxide
34 emissions would increase from 2151 Mt CO₂ in 2003 to 3149 Mt CO₂ in 2025 (Fig. 7-7). Canada, the

1 only one of the three countries to have committed to specific GHG reduction goals, is expected to show
2 the lowest rate of growth in CO₂ emissions.

3
4 **Figure 7-7. Projected carbon dioxide emissions from the North American transport sector in 2025.**

5
6 The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), in collaboration with the
7 International Energy Agency developed a model for projecting world transport energy use and
8 greenhouse gas emissions to 2050 (Table 7-4). The WBCSD's reference case projection foresees the most
9 rapid growth in carbon emissions from transportation occurring in Asia and Latin America (Fig. 7-8).
10 Still, in 2050 North America accounts for 26.4% of global carbon dioxide emissions from transport
11 vehicles (down from a 37.2% share in 2000).

12
13 **Table 7-4. Global CO₂ emissions from transportation vehicles to 2050 by regions, WBCSD reference
14 case projection.**

15
16 **Figure 7-8. WBCSD projections of world transportation vehicle CO₂ emissions to 2050.**

17
18 **OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT**

19 Dozens of policies and measures for reducing petroleum consumption and mitigating carbon
20 emissions from transportation in North America have been identified and assessed (e.g., U.S. DOT, 1998;
21 IEA, 2001; Greene and Schafer, 2003; Greene *et al.*, 2005; CBO, 2003; Harrington and McConnell, 2003;
22 NRTEE, 2005). However, there is no consensus about how much transportation GHG emissions can be
23 reduced and at what cost. In general, top-down models estimating the mitigation impacts of economy-
24 wide carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems find the cost of mitigation high and the potential modest. On
25 the other hand, bottom-up studies evaluating a wide array of policy options tend to reach the opposite
26 conclusion. Part of the explanation of this paradox may lie in the predominant roles that governments play
27 in constructing, maintaining, and operating the majority of transportation infrastructure and in the strong
28 interrelationship between land use planning and transportation demand. Estimates of the costs and
29 benefits of mitigation policies also vary widely and depend critically on premises concerning (1) the
30 efficiency of transportation energy markets, (2) the values consumers attach to vehicle attributes such as
31 acceleration performance and vehicle weight, and (3) the current and future status of carbon-related
32 technology.

33 A U.S. Energy Information Administration evaluation of a greenhouse gas cap and trade system,
34 expected to result in carbon permit prices of \$79/t C in 2010 and \$221/t C in 2025, was estimated to

1 reduce 2025 transportation energy use by 4.3 PJ and to cut transportation's carbon dioxide emissions by
2 10% from 826 Mt C in the reference case to 744 Mt C under this policy (U.S. DOE/EIA, 2003). The
3 average fuel economy of new light-duty vehicles was estimated to increase from 26.4 mpg (8.9 L per
4 100 km) to 29.0 mpg (8.1 L per 100 km) in the policy case, an improvement of only 10%. A 2002 study
5 by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS, 2002) estimated that "cost-efficient" fuel economy
6 improvements for U.S. light-duty vehicles using proven technologies ranged from 12% for subcompact
7 cars to 27% for large cars, and from 25% for small SUVs to 42% for large SUVs. The NAS study did not
8 include the potential impacts of diesel or hybrid vehicle technologies and assumed that vehicle size and
9 horsepower would remain constant.

10 The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2003) estimated that achieving a 10% reduction in U.S.
11 gasoline use would create total economic costs of approximately \$3.6 billion per year if accomplished by
12 means of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards, \$3.0 billion if the same standards allowed
13 trading of fuel economy credits among manufacturers, and \$2.9 billion if accomplished via a tax on
14 gasoline. This partial equilibrium analysis assumed that it would take about 14 years for the policies to
15 have their full impact. If one assumes that the United States would consume 22,600 PJ of gasoline in
16 2017, resulting in 1,419 Mt of CO₂ emissions, then a 10% reduction amounts to 142 Mt CO₂. At a total
17 cost of \$3 billion per year, and attributing the full cost to carbon reduction (vs other objectives such as
18 reducing petroleum dependence) produces an upper-bound mitigation cost estimate of \$21/t CO₂.

19 Systems of progressive vehicle taxes on purchases of less efficient new vehicles and subsidies for
20 more efficient new vehicles ("feebates") are yet another alternative for increasing vehicle fuel economy.
21 A study of the U.S. market (Greene *et al.*, 2005) examined a variety of feebate structures under two
22 alternative assumptions: (1) consumers consider only the first three years of fuel savings when making
23 new vehicle purchase decisions, and (2) consumers consider the full discounted present value of lifetime
24 fuel savings. The study found that if consumers consider only the first three years of fuel savings, then a
25 feebate of \$1000 per 0.01 gal/mile (3.5 L per 100 km), designed to produce no net revenue to the
26 government, would produce net benefits to society in terms of fuel savings and would reduce carbon
27 emissions by 139 Mt C (510 Mt CO₂) in 2030. If consumers fully valued lifetime fuel savings, the same
28 feebate system would cause a \$3 billion loss in consumers' surplus (a technical measure of the change in
29 economic well-being closely approximating income loss) and reduce carbon emissions by only 67 Mt C
30 (246 Mt CO₂), or an implied cost of \$12/Mt CO₂.

31 The most widely proposed options for reducing the carbon content of transportation fuels are liquid
32 fuels derived from biomass and hydrogen produced from renewables, nuclear energy, or from fossil fuels
33 with carbon sequestration. Biomass fuels, such as ethanol from sugar cane or cellulose or liquid
34 hydrocarbon fuels produced via biomass gasification and synthesis, appear to be a promising near- and

1 long-term option, while hydrogen could become an important energy carrier after 2025 (WBCSD, 2004).
2 The carbon emission reduction potential of biomass fuels for transportation is strongly dependent on the
3 feedstock and conversion processes. Advanced methods of producing ethanol from grain, the
4 predominant feedstock in the United States can reduce carbon emissions by up to 30% (Wang, 2005; p.
5 16 in IEA, 2004). Production of ethanol from sugar cane, as is the current practice in Brazil, or by not-
6 yet-commercialized methods of cellulosic conversion can achieve up to a 90% net reduction over the fuel
7 cycle. Conversion of biomass to liquid hydrocarbon fuels via gasification and synthesis may have a
8 similar potential (Williams, 2005). The technical potential for liquid fuels production from biomass is
9 very large and very uncertain; recent estimates of the global potential range from 10 to 400 exajoules per
10 year (see Table 6.8 in IEA, 2004). The U.S. Departments of Energy and Agriculture have estimated that
11 30% of U.S. petroleum use could be replaced by biofuels by 2030 (Perlack *et al.*, 2005). The economic
12 potential will depend on competition for land with other uses, the development of a global market for
13 biofuels, and advances in conversion technologies.

14 Hydrogen must be considered a long-term option because of the present high cost of fuel cells,
15 technical challenges in hydrogen storage, and the need to construct a new infrastructure for hydrogen
16 production and distribution (NAS, 2004; U.S. DOE, 2005). Hydrogen's potential to mitigate carbon
17 emissions from transport will depend most strongly on how hydrogen is produced. If produced from coal
18 gasification without sequestration of CO₂ emissions in production, it is conceivable that carbon emissions
19 could increase. If produced from fossil fuels with sequestration, or from renewable or nuclear energy,
20 carbon emissions from road and rail vehicles could be virtually eliminated (General Motors *et al.*, 2001).

21 In a comprehensive assessment of opportunities to reduce GHG emissions from the U.S.
22 transportation sector, a study published by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change (Greene and
23 Schafer, 2003) estimated that sector-wide reductions in the vicinity of 20% could be achieved by 2015
24 and 50% by 2030 (Table 7-4). The study's premises assumed no change in the year 2000 distribution and
25 efficiency of energy use by mode. A wide range of strategies was considered, including research and
26 development, efficiency standards, use of biofuels and hydrogen, pricing policies to encourage efficiency
27 and reduce travel demand, land-use transportation planning options, and public education (Table 7-5).
28 Key premises of the analysis were that (1) for efficiency improvements the value of fuel saved to the
29 consumer must be greater than or equal to the cost of the improvement, (2) there is no change in vehicle
30 size or performance, (3) pricing policies shift the incidence but do not increase the overall cost of
31 transportation, and (5) there is a carbon cap and trade system in effect equivalent to a charge of
32 approximately \$50/t C. Similar premises underlie the 2030 estimates, except that technological progress is
33 assumed.

34

Table 7-5. Potential impacts of transportation GHG reduction policies in the United States by 2015 and 2030 based on the 2000 distribution of emissions by mode and fuel.

The Pew Center study notes that if transportation demand continues to grow as the IEO 2005 and WBCSD projections anticipate, the potential reductions shown in Table 7.4 would be just large enough to hold U.S. transportation CO₂ emissions in 2030 to 2000 levels.

A study for the U.S. Department of Energy (ILWG, 2000) produced estimates of carbon mitigation potential for the entire U.S. economy using a variety of policies generally consistent with carbon taxes of \$25–\$50/t C. In the study's business as usual case, transportation CO₂ emissions increased from 1752 Mt CO₂ in 1997 to 2567 Mt CO₂ in 2020. A combination of technological advances, greater use of biofuel, fuel economy standards, paying for a portion of automobile insurance as a surcharge on gasoline, and others, were estimated to reduce 2020 transportation CO₂ emissions by 569 Mt CO₂ to 1998 Mt CO₂. The study did not produce cost estimates and did not consider impacts on global energy markets.

A joint study of the U.S. Department of Energy and Natural Resources Canada (Patterson *et al.*, 2003) considered alternative scenarios of highway energy use in the two countries to 2050. The study did not produce estimates of cost-effectiveness for greenhouse gas reduction strategies but rather focused on the potential impacts of differing social, economic, and technological trends. Two of the scenarios describe paths that lead to essentially constant greenhouse gas emissions from highway vehicles through 2050 through greatly increased efficiency and biofuel and hydrogen use and, in one scenario, reduced demand for vehicle travel.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

Research needs with respect to the transport sector as a part of the carbon cycle fall into three categories: (1) improved data, (2) comprehensive assessments of mitigation potential, and (3) advances in key mitigation technologies and policies for transportation. The available data are adequate to describe carbon inputs by fuel type and carbon emissions by very broad modal breakdowns by country. The North American Transportation Statistics project made a start at producing comprehensive and consistent estimates for all three countries. However, there are many items of missing data, and the country-specific time series are incomplete. Knowledge of the magnitudes of GHG emissions by type of activity and fuel and of trends is essential if policies are to be focused on the most important GHG sources. A consistent description of the accuracy of each country's data is also needed.

The most pressing research need is for comprehensive, consistent, and rigorous assessments of carbon emissions mitigation potential for North America. The lack of such studies for North America parallels a similar dearth of global analyses noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Moomaw and

1 Moreira, 2001). Existing studies focus almost exclusively on a single country, with premises and
2 assumptions varying widely from country to country. Even the best single country studies omit the
3 impacts of carbon reduction policies on global energy markets. Knowledge of how much contribution the
4 transport sector can make to GHG mitigation at what cost and what options and measures are capable of
5 achieving those potentials is crucial to the global GHG policy discussion.

6 Highly promising technologies for reducing transportation GHG emissions include hybrid vehicles,
7 plug-in hybrid vehicles capable of accepting electrical energy from the grid, and fuel cell vehicles
8 powered by hydrogen. While hybrids are already in the market and fuel cell vehicles are still years away,
9 all three technologies would benefit from cost reduction. Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles also face significant
10 technological challenges with respect to hydrogen storage and fuel cell durability. Technologies exist that
11 could greatly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from other transport modes. For example, blended wing-
12 body aircraft designs could reduce fuel burn rates by one-third. Biofuels in the near term and hydrogen in
13 the longer term appear to be the most promising low-carbon fuel options. To achieve the greatest
14 greenhouse gas reduction benefits, biofuels must be made from plants' lingo-cellulosic components either
15 by conversion to alcohol or by gasification and synthesis of liquid hydrocarbon fuels. Cost reductions in
16 both feedstock production and fuel conversion are needed.

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Table 7-1. Carbon dioxide emissions from transportation in North America in 2003

	Carbon dioxide emissions (Mt CO ₂)
North America	2151
Canada	1865
United States	169
Mexico	117

Note: Summarized from Table 7-3 in this chapter.

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Table 7-2. Summary of North American transport energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in 2003 by energy source or fuel type

North America energy source	Energy input (Petajoules)	Carbon input (Mt CO ₂)
Gasoline	20,923	1,314
Diesel/distillate	7,344	475
Jet fuel/kerosene	2,298	251
Residual	681	53
Other fuels	124	5
Natural gas	926	36
Electricity	36	3
Unalloc./error	466	0
Total	32,798	2,137
United States		
Gasoline	18,520	1,146
Diesel/distillate	6,193	393
Jet fuel/kerosene	1,986	229
Residual	612	48
Other fuels	50	1
Natural gas	748	35
Electricity	20	3
Unalloc./error	466.2	
Total	28,595.2	1,855
<i>Sources: U.S. EPA, 2005, Tables 3-7 and 2-17; Davis and Diegel, 2004, Tables 2.6 and 2.7.</i>		
Canada		
Gasoline	1,337	96
Diesel/distillate	704	51
Jet fuel/kerosene	206	16
Residual	66	5
Other fuels	17	1
Natural gas	178	0
Electricity	12	0
Unalloc./error	0	
Total	2,518	169
<i>NRCan, 2005, Tables 1 and 8.</i>		
Mexico		
Gasoline	1,066	72
Diesel/distillate	447	31
Jet fuel/kerosene	106	7
Residual	4	0
Other fuels	57	3
Natural gas	1	0
Electricity	4	
Unalloc./error		
Total	1,685	114
<i>Sources: Transportation energy use by fuel and mode from Rodriguez, 2005.</i>		

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1 *Source:* Fulton and Eads, 2004, spreadsheet model, output worksheet.

2 Data sources differ somewhat by country with respect to modal, fuel, and greenhouse gas definitions so that the
3 numbers are not precisely comparable. Canadian carbon emissions data include all greenhouse gases produced by
4 transportation in CO₂ equivalents, while the U.S. data are CO₂ emissions only. Carbon dioxide emissions for Mexico
5 were estimated by applying U.S. EPA emissions factors to the Mexican energy use data. Electricity is assumed to
6 produce no carbon emissions in end use.

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Table 7-3. Summary of North American transport energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in 2003 by mode of transportation

North America transport mode	Energy use (Petajoules)	Carbon emissions (Mt CO ₂)
Road	25,830	1,698
Air	2,667	194
Rail	751	50
Waterborne	1,386	68
Pipeline	990	57
	0	84
Total	31,624	2,151

United States

Road		
Light vehicles	17,083	1,113
Heavy vehicles	5,505	350
Air	2,335	171
Rail	655	43
Waterborne	1,250	58
Pipeline/other	986	47
Internatl./Bunker		84
Total	27,814	1,865

Source: U.S. EPA, 2005, Tables 3-7 and 2-17; Davis and Diegel, 2004, Tables 2-6 and 2-7.

Canada

Road		
Light vehicles	1,233	87
Heavy vehicles	491	46
Air	226	16
Rail	74	6
Waterborne	103	8
Pipeline/other		7
Total	2,126	169

Source: NRCan, 2005; Tables 1 and 8.

Mexico

Road	1,518	102
Light vehicles		
Heavy vehicles		
Air	107	7
Rail	22	2
Waterborne	33	2
Electric	4	4
Total	1,684	117

Source: Rodriguez, 2005.

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5 Data sources differ somewhat by country with respect to modal, fuel, and greenhouse gas definitions so that the
6 numbers are not precisely comparable. Canadian carbon emissions data include all greenhouse gases produced by
7 transportation in CO₂ equivalents, while the U.S. data are CO₂ emissions only. Carbon dioxide emissions for Mexico
8 were estimated by applying U.S. EPA emissions factors to the Mexican energy use data. Electricity is assumed to
9 produce no carbon emissions in end use.

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Table 7-4. Global CO₂ emissions from transportation vehicles to 2050 by regions, WBCSD reference case projection

	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
OECD North America	1995.6	2119.7	2285.0	2447.4	2594.4	2706.1	2814.8	2917.9	3021.1	3125.6	3232.5
OECD Europe	1146.3	1224.1	1314.7	1395.7	1438.1	1474.6	1510.7	1525.5	1540.2	1554.9	1569.7
OECD Pacific	489.2	499.5	521.9	542.2	560.5	574.4	589.0	603.7	620.1	637.7	656.4
FSU	176.9	203.7	234.1	274.3	324.2	361.1	401.2	444.0	484.4	523.2	561.5
Eastern Europe	84.1	92.7	103.3	115.6	130.2	142.0	154.6	172.2	191.9	214.4	240.4
China	251.9	314.8	394.9	488.8	599.0	702.7	826.8	967.8	1130.0	1316.2	1530.0
Other Asia	360.6	412.5	480.0	554.6	639.4	715.8	806.1	913.1	1037.7	1182.5	1350.1
India	137.6	163.9	199.6	242.1	292.0	338.8	395.2	457.8	534.2	628.1	743.5
Middle East	215.3	236.7	261.5	288.6	323.5	355.2	387.0	417.3	447.1	476.5	505.6
Latin America	348.2	397.8	467.0	543.1	630.5	703.1	792.0	892.2	1008.6	1141.2	1290.2
Africa	159.4	181.0	211.7	248.8	293.7	337.2	378.1	419.0	464.3	516.8	579.5
Total—All regions	5364.9	5846.3	6473.6	7141.4	7825.4	8411.1	9055.5	9730.3	10479.7	11317.1	12259.4

Source: Fulton and Eads, 2004.

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Table 7-5. Potential impacts of transportation GHG reduction policies in the United States by 2015 and 2030^a based on the 2000 distribution of emissions by mode and fuel (Greene and Schafer, 2003)

Management option	Carbon emission (Mt CO ₂) 2000	Reduction potential per mode/fuel (%)		Transportation sector reduction potential (%)	
		2015	2030	2015	2030
Research, development and demonstration					
Light-duty vehicles (LDVs)	1061	11 ^b	38 ^b	7 ^b	23 ^b
Heavy trucks	294	11 ^b	24 ^b	2 ^b	4 ^b
Commercial aircraft	196	11 ^b	27 ^b	1 ^b	3 ^b
Efficiency standards					
Light-duty vehicles	1061	9	31	6	18
Heavy trucks	294	9	20	2	3
Commercial aircraft	196	9	22	1	2
Replacement and alternative fuels					
Low-carbon replacement fuels (~10% of LDV fuel)	100	30	100	2	7
Hydrogen fuel (All LDV fuel)	1061	1	6	1	4
Pricing policies					
Low-carbon replacement fuels (~10% of LDV fuel)	100	30	100	2	6
Carbon pricing (All transportation fuel)	1792	3	6	3	6
Variabilization (All highway vehicle fuel)	1355	8	12	6	9
Behavioral					
Land use and infrastructure (2/3 of highway fuel)	903	5	10	3	5
System efficiency (25% LDV fuel)	265	2	5	0	1
Climate change education (All transportation fuel)	1792	1	2	1	2
Fuel economy information (All LDV fuel)	1061	1	2	1	1
Total	1792			22	48

Notes:

^aCarbon emissions for the year 2000 are used to weight percent reductions for the respective emissions source and example policy category in calculating total percent reduction potential. The elasticity of vehicle travel with respect to fuel price is -0.15 for all modes. Price elasticity of energy efficiency with respect to fuel price is -0.4.

^bR&D efficiency improvements have no direct effect on total. Their influence is seen through efficiency standards impacts.

Policies affecting the same target emissions, such as passenger car efficiency, low carbon fuels, and land use policies are multiplicative, to avoid double counting [e.g. (1-0.1)*(1.0-0.2) = 1-0.28, a 28% rather than a 30% reduction.]




Fig. 7-1. Transportation energy use in North America, 1990–2003.

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North American Carbon Emissions from Transportation
by Mode, 2003 (Million metric tons CO₂)




Fig. 7-2. North American carbon emissions from transportation by mode (million metric tons CO₂) 2003. Source: Table 7-3, this chapter.

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


Fig. 7-3a. Freight activity by mode in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.




Fig. 7-3b. Freight activity by mode in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

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


Fig. 7-3c. Freight activity by mode in Canada, Mexico and the United States.

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Distribution of Passenger Travel by Mode: U.S.A. 2001




Fig. 7-4a. Distribution of passenger travel in the United States by mode. Source: Table 8-1 in NATS, 2005.

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Distribution of Passenger Travel by Mode: Canada 2001




Fig. 7-4b. Distribution of passenger travel by mode in Canada. Source: Table 8-1 in NATS, 2005.

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


Fig. 7-5a. Evolution of transport energy use in Mexico and the United States.

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


Fig. 7-5b. Evolution of transport energy use in Mexico and the United States.

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



Fig. 7-6a. Transport CO₂ emissions in Canada and the United States, 1990–2003.


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
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Fig. 7-6b. Transport CO₂ emissions in Canada and the United States, 1990–2003.



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Fig. 7-7. Projected carbon dioxide emissions from the North American transport sector in 2025. Source: Fulton and Eads, 2004.



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Fig. 7-8. WBCSD projections of world transportation vehicle CO₂ emissions to 2050.
Source: Fulton and Eads, 2004.

Chapter 8. Industry and Waste Management

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KEY FINDINGS

- In 2002, North America's industry (not including fossil fuel mining and processing or electricity generation) contributed 826 Mt CO₂, 16% of the world's CO₂ emissions to the atmosphere from industry. Waste treatment plants and landfill sites in North America accounts for 13.4 Mt of CH₄ (282 Mt CO₂e), roughly 20% of global totals.
- Industrial CO₂ emissions from North America decreased nearly 11% between 1990 and 2002, while energy consumption in the United States and Canada increased 8% to 10% during that period. In both countries, a shift in production activity toward less energy-intensive industries and dissemination of more energy efficient equipment kept the rate of energy demand growth lower than industrial GDP growth.
- Changes in industrial CO₂ emissions are a consequence of changes in industrial energy demand and changes in the mix of fossil fuels used by industry to supply that demand. Changes in industrial energy demand are themselves a consequence of changes in total industrial output, shifts in the relative shares of industrial sectors, and increases in energy efficiency. Shifts from coal and refined petroleum products to natural gas and electricity contributed to a decline in total industrial CO₂ emissions since 1997 in both Canada and the United States.
- An increase in CO₂ emissions from North American industry is likely to accompany the forecasted increase in industrial activity (2.3% yr⁻¹ until 2025 for the United States). Emissions per unit of industrial activity will likely decline as non-energy intensive industries grow faster than energy intensive industries and with increased penetration of energy efficient equipment. However, continuation of the trend toward less carbon-intensive fuels is uncertain given the rise in natural gas prices relative to coal in recent years.
- Options and measures for reducing CO₂ emissions from North American industry can be broadly classified as methods to: (1) reduce process/fugitive emissions or converting currently released emissions; (2) increase energy efficiency, including combined heat and power; (3) change industrial processes (materials efficiency, recycling, substitution between materials or between materials and energy); (4) substitute less carbon intense fuels; and (5) capture and store carbon dioxide.

- Further work on materials substitution holds promise for industrial emissions reduction, such as the replacement of petrochemical feedstocks by biomass feedstocks, of steel by aluminium in the transport sector, and of concrete by wood in the buildings sector. The prospects for greater energy efficiency technologies, including efficient Hall-Heroult cell retrofits in aluminium production, black liquor gasification in kraft pulp production, and shape casting in iron and steel industries are equally substantial.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents two components of the carbon cycle. The first section assesses carbon flows through industry (manufacturing, construction, and industry process emissions, but excluding fossil fuel mining, and processing).¹ The second section assesses municipal waste disposal (primarily landfills) for its impact on the fate of carbon and the release of methane and other carbon-based gases.

In 2002, industry was responsible for 5220.6 Mt of CO₂, 21% of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions to the atmosphere worldwide (this includes 4322.9 Mt from fuel combustion and 897.7 Mt from the industrial processes described later in this chapter). North America's industry contributed 758.7 Mt of combustion-sourced emissions and 66.8 Mt of process emission for a total of 826 Mt, 16% of global totals. The manufacturing industry and its process emissions contributed only 12% of total North American GHG emissions, lower than in many other parts of the world, because of the high CO₂ intensity of the continent's transportation sector and the significance of heating and cooling energy demands. But with North America's population at 6.8% of the world total, the continent's industry contributed a proportionally larger share of total industrial emissions than the rest of the world (see comparative tables and graphs, Fig. 8-1a).²

Figure 8-1a. CO₂ emissions by sector in 2002.

Industrial CO₂ emissions decreased nearly 11% between 1990 and 2002, while energy consumption in the United States and Canada increased 8% to 10% during that period (EIA, 2005; CIEEDAC, 2005). In both countries, a shift in production activity toward less energy-intensive industries and dissemination of more energy efficient equipment kept the rate of energy demand growth lower than industrial GDP

¹This includes direct flows only. Indirect carbon flows, such as the carbon released due to electricity generation, are not associated with the industry that consumed the electricity but with power generation (see Chapter 6).

²North America, including Mexico, was responsible for about 27% of global CO₂ emissions in 2002.

1 growth (IEA, 2004).³ This slower demand growth in concert with a shift toward less carbon-intensive
2 fuels explains the decrease in industrial CO₂ emissions.

3 The municipal waste stream excludes agricultural and forestry wastes but includes wastewater. CO₂ is
4 generated from aerobic metabolism in waste removal and storage processes. Because this CO₂ arises from
5 biological material, it is considered neutral in terms of GHG emissions. Methane (CH₄), released from
6 anaerobic activity at waste treatment plants and landfill sites, forms a substantial portion of carbon
7 emissions to the atmosphere. Given its much higher rating as a GHG gas in terms of global warming
8 potential, methane plays an important role in the evaluation of possible climate change impacts (see
9 Fig. 8-1b).⁴ Globally, CH₄ emissions from waste amount to 66 Mt, or 1386 Mt CO₂ equivalent. North
10 American activity accounts for 13.4 Mt of CH₄ (282 Mt CO₂ equivalent), roughly 20% of global totals.

11
12 **Figure 8-1b. GHG emissions by sector in 2000, CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, PFCs, HFCs, and SF₆.**

13
14 Landfills are not “efficient” aerobic or anaerobic digesters; substantial sequestration of carbon
15 occurs.⁵ Data on carbon buried in landfills are poor. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used
16 data from Barlaz (1990, 1994) estimated that 30% of carbon in food waste and up to 80% of carbon in
17 newsprint, leaves, and branches remain in the landfill. Plastics show no deterioration and are assumed to
18 remain in the landfill site as sequestered carbon. In all, more than 80% of the carbon entering a landfill
19 site may be sequestered, depending on moisture, aeration, and other conditions of the site. In another
20 paper, Bogner and Spokas (1993) estimate that “in general, more than 75% of the carbon deposited in
21 landfills remains in sedimentary storage.”

22 23 **INDUSTRY CARBON CYCLE**

24 Carbon may enter industry as a fuel, providing energy for the completion of industrial processes, or as
25 a feedstock where the carbon becomes entrained in the final product generated by that industry. Thus,
26 carbon exits industrial sites either as a constituent of a product or as a waste. Carbon in the waste stream
27 can be distinguished as atmospheric and non-atmospheric, the former being comprised of process and
28 combustion-related emissions. Process emissions refer to CO₂ emitted as a result of the transformation of
29 the material inputs to the production process (i.e., a non-combustive source). For example, cement

³Decomposition analyses assess the changes in the overall energy consumption or emissions release in terms of the major factors affecting such a change. Changes in energy consumption, for example, can result from increase industry activity, changes in relative productivity to or from more intense industry subsectors, or changes in material or energy efficiency in industrial processes.

⁴While not carbon-based, N₂O from sewage treatment is shown in Fig. 2 to show its relative importance as a GHG.

⁵IPCC guidelines currently do not provide a methodology for addressing landfill sequestration. Such guidelines are to be included in the 2006 guidelines.

1 production involves the calcination of lime, a process that chemically alters limestone to form calcium
2 oxide and releases CO₂. Combustion-related emissions such as CO₂ occur when carbon-based fuels
3 provide thermal energy to industrial processes.
4

5 **Overview of Carbon Inputs and Outputs**

6 Relatively speaking, industry as it is here defined generates about one-third as much emitted carbon
7 as the production of electricity and other fuel supply in North America, and only about 55% as much as is
8 generated by the transportation sector.
9

10 **Carbon In**

11 Carbon-based raw materials typically enter industrial sites in the form of biomass (primarily wood),
12 limestone, soda ash, oil products, coal/coke, natural gas, and natural gas liquids. These inputs are
13 converted to dimension lumber and other wood products, various types of paper and paperboard, cement
14 and lime, glass, and a host of chemical products, plastics, and fertilizers based on oil, coal, natural gas,
15 and natural gas liquids.

16 While the bulk of the input raw material leaves the industrial site as a product, some of the carbon
17 leaves the process as CO₂ (e.g., from limestone in cement production), and some is converted to fuel
18 combusted in the plant. Waste wood (or hog fuel) and black liquor, a product generated in the production
19 of chemical pulps, are burned to provide process heat or steam for digesting wood chips in the production
20 of chemical pulp and for drying paper or wood products. In some cases, electricity is cogenerated from
21 this biomass energy. Chemical processes utilizing natural gas or natural gas liquids often generate off-
22 gases that can be mixed with conventional fuels to provide process heat. Finally, some of the carbon that
23 enters as a feedstock leaves as solid or liquid waste.

24 In some industries, carbon is used to remove oxygen from other input materials in a process known as
25 “reduction.” In most of the literature, such carbon is considered an input to the process even though it acts
26 as a fuel (i.e., it unites with oxygen to form CO₂ and releases heat, just as it would in combustion
27 processes). For example, in metal smelting and refining processes, a carbon-based reductant is used to
28 separate oxygen from the metal atoms. Coke, a product of the destructive distillation of high-quality coal,
29 enters a blast furnace with iron ore to strip off the oxygen associated with the iron, leaving pig iron at the
30 bottom of the blast furnace with CO₂ exiting at the top. Carbon anodes in electric arc furnaces in steel
31 mills and in the specialized electrolytic “Hall-Heroult” cells oxidize to CO₂ as they melt recycled steel or
32 reduce alumina to aluminum.
33

1 Carbon Out

2 Carbon leaves industry as part of the intended commodity or product (wood, paper, chemical
3 products), as a waste product (waste wood, pulp mill sludge), or as a gas, usually CO₂. The carbon in the
4 commodities generated may, in turn, be utilized by other industries to be released as another commodity
5 or as a waste product or emission.

6 Process emissions are CO₂ emissions that occur as a result of the process itself—the calcining of
7 limestone releases about 0.5 Mt CO₂ per metric ton of clinker (unground cement) or about 0.8 Mt per
8 metric ton of lime,⁶ depending on the degree to which limestone or dolomite is used as a feedstock.⁷ The
9 oxidation of carbon anodes generates about 1.5 Mt CO₂ in the production of a metric ton of aluminium.⁸
10 Striping hydrogen from methane to make ammonia releases about 1.6 Mt CO₂ per metric ton of ammonia.

11 Combustion of carbon-based fuels results in the release of CO₂ to the atmosphere. In many cases, the
12 combustion process is not complete, and other carbon-based compounds may also be released, such as
13 carbon monoxide, methane, or mixtures of more complex carbon products known as volatile organic
14 compounds (VOCs). These often decompose into CO₂, but their life spans in the atmosphere vary.

16 Carbon Flow

17 Figure 8-2 illustrates the flows of carbon in and out of industrial sites as per the industry categories in
18 Sect. 2.2. Numbers for the full North American budget are defined in the figure. Comparable diagrams for
19 the individual countries are presented in Appendix 8A. On the left side of Fig. 8-2, all carbon-based
20 material is accounted for by industry sector, whether in fuel or in feedstock. On the right, the exiting
21 arrows portray how much of the carbon leaves as part of the final products from that industry. The carbon
22 in the fossil fuel input to industry, as well as some of the feedstock materials, leave in the waste stream as
23 emissions from fuel combustion, process emissions, or as other products and waste. The potential for
24 carbon capture and storage is assessed in the industry subsections below.

25
26 **Figure 8-2. Carbon flows for Canada, the United States, and Mexico combined.**

28 Sectoral Trends in the Industrial Carbon Cycle

29 Energy-intensive industries differ significantly in their carbon cycle dynamics. Figure 8-2 shows the
30 current contribution to the carbon cycle of different industries.

31
⁶In these industries, more CO₂ is generated from the process of limestone transformation than from the fossils fuels
combusted to drive the transformation.

⁷The calcination of limestone also takes place in the iron and steel, pulp and paper, glass and sugar industries.


⁸Ceramic anodes may soon be available to aluminum producers and significantly reduce CO₂ release in the production of
aluminum.

1 **Pulp and Paper**

2 While pulp and paper products are quite energy-intensive, much of the energy used in their
 3 production is obtained from biomass. By using biomass waste, such as hog fuel and black liquor, some
 4 types of pulp mills (and associated paper plants) are energy self-sufficient. These plants could be
 5 considered carbon neutral because the capture of carbon as forests grow is assumed to offset the CO₂
 6 released from such activities.⁹ However, fuel handling difficulties and air quality concerns (especially
 7 from particulates) can arise from the use of biomass as a fuel depending on the location.


8
 9 **Cement, Lime, and Other Nonmetallic Minerals**

10 Cement and lime production requires the calcination of limestone, which releases CO₂. This process
 11 emission is releases about 0.78 Mt CO₂ per metric ton of lime calcined.



14
 15
 16 Outside of the combustion of fossil fuels, lime calcining is the single largest anthropogenic source of
 17 CO₂ emissions. Annual growth in cement production is forecast at 2.4% in the United States for at least
 18 the next decade. This industry could potentially utilize sequestration technologies to capture and store
 19 CO₂ generated during the calcining process.

20 The production of soda ash (sodium carbonate) from sodium bicarbonate in the Solvay Process
 21 releases CO₂ in its manufacture and, in some cases such as glass production, in its utilization. Soda ash is
 22 used in the production of pulp and paper to manufacture detergents and soften water.



25
 26
 27 **Nonferrous Metal Smelting and Iron and Steel Smelting**

28 Often metal smelting requires the reduction of metal oxides to obtain the pure metal. In such
 29 operations, a reductant, a substance that can carry away the oxygen from the metal, is required. Typically,
 30 the reductant is carbon, usually in the form of coke. The coke is added to the hot metal oxide, as in the
 31 case of iron, zinc, or magnesium, to generate the reduced metal and CO₂. Such reduction processes

⁹Based on guidelines from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, biomass-based industries such as pulp and paper are deemed, in effect, to be carbon neutral in so far as biomass is concerned (UNFCCC, IPCC guidelines).

1 generate relatively pure streams of CO₂ (with some CO), which improves the potential for capture and
2 storage.

3 In electric arc furnaces, carbon anodes decompose to CO₂ as they melt the scrap iron and steel feed in
4 steel mini-mills. In a Hall-Heroult cell in the aluminium industry, a carbon anode oxidizes when an
5 electric current forces oxygen from aluminium oxide (alumina) in the production of aluminium, with CO₂
6 as a by-product.

7

8 **Metal and Nonmetal Mining**

9 Mining involves the extraction of ore and its transformation into a more concentrated form. This
10 involves milling (grinding) the ore after it has been transported from the mine site and removing mineral-
11 bearing material from the ground rock. Much of the process involves grinding and separating, most of
12 which is done through the action of devices driven by electric motors. Thus, a large proportion of the
13 activity in mining operations requires electricity rather than fossil fuels directly—although fossil fuels
14 may have produced the electricity. Some processes, like the sintering or agglomeration of iron ore and the
15 liquid extraction of potash, use a considerable amount of fossil fuels directly. And, of course, much of the
16 movement of the ores from mine to mill is accomplished by diesel-driven motorized vehicles.

17

18 **Chemical Products**

19 This diverse group of industries includes energy-intensive electrolytic processes as well as the
20 consumption of large quantities of natural gas and natural gas liquids (hydrocarbon liquids found with
21 natural gas) as a feedstock to produce commodities like ammonia, methanol, and hydrogen from natural
22 gas and monomers such as ethylene and propylene from natural gas liquids. These products provide the
23 feedstock for many synthetic resins and plastics. Some chemical processes, such as the production of
24 ammonia, generate fairly pure streams of CO₂ suitable for capture and sequestration.

25

26 **Forest Products**

27 This industry uses biomass waste to dry commercial products such as lumber, plywood and other
28 laminated wood types, milled work, and shingles. The industry also includes silviculture, the practice of
29 replanting and managing forests.

30

31 **Other Manufacturing**

32 Most of the remaining industries, while economically important, each play a relatively minor role in
33 the carbon cycle because they are not energy intensive and use little biomass—the exceptions being the
34 food industry, the beverage industry, and some textile industries. Industries in this group include the

1 automotive industry, electronic products, leather and allied products, fabricated metals, furniture and
2 related products, and plastics and rubber products. In aggregate, however, these various industries
3 contribute significantly to total industrial CO₂ emissions.

5 **Changing Role of Industry in the Carbon Cycle**

6 Energy consumption per unit GDP has declined in Canada and the United States by more than 30%
7 since the mid-1970s. In manufacturing, the decline was even greater—more than 50% in the United States
8 since 1974.

9 The National Energy Modelling System operated by the United States Energy Information
10 Administration applies growth forecasts from the Global Insight macroeconomic model. While the United
11 States economy is forecast to grow at an average rate of 3.1% per year to 2025, industrial growth is
12 forecast at 2.3% per year—an amalgam of manufacturing growth of 2.6% per year and non-
13 manufacturing of 1.5% per year. Manufacturing industries are further disaggregated into energy-intensive
14 industries, growing at 1.5% per year, and non-energy intensive industries, growing at 2.9% per year. The
15 slower growth in the energy-intensive industries is reflected by an expected decline of 1.6% per year in
16 the energy intensity of United States industrial output over the forecast (EIA forecast 2005).

17 The International Energy Agency reviewed energy consumption and emissions during the last 30
18 years to identify and project underlying trends in carbon intensity.¹⁰ The review's decomposition analysis
19 (Fig. 8-3) attributes changes in industrial energy demand to changes in total industrial output (activity),
20 shifts in the relative shares of industrial sectors (structure), and increases in energy efficiency (intensity).

22 **Figure 8-3. Decomposition of energy use, manufacturing section, 1990–1998.**

24 Changes in carbon emissions result from these three factors, but also from changes in fuel shares—
25 substitution away from or toward more carbon-intensive fossil fuels. The shift from coal and refined
26 petroleum products to natural gas and electricity¹¹ contributed to a decline in total industrial CO₂
27 emissions since 1997 in both Canada and the United States. The continuation of this trend is uncertain
28 given the rise in natural gas prices relative to coal in recent years.

¹⁰Most of the information in this section is obtained from this report (IEA, 2004a).

¹¹Emissions associated with electricity are considered “indirect” to industry and are allocated to the electricity supply sector. Thus, a shift to electricity is like a shift from coal to natural gas, moving from a more CO₂ intense energy supply to a less intense one (in this case, to 0 CO₂/unit). However, one shifts the allocation of associated CO₂ to another sector as well; there is no net reduction in CO₂ emitted, unless the supply sector chooses to generate electricity from a less CO₂ intense source.

1 **Actions and Policies for Carbon Management in Industry**

2 Industry managers can reduce carbon flows through industry by altering the material or energy
3 intensity and character of production (IPCC, 2001). Greater materials efficiency typically reduces energy
4 demands in processing because of reduced materials handling. For example, recycling materials reduces
5 energy consumption per unit of output by 26 to 95% (see Table 8-1). Further work on materials
6 substitution also holds promise for reduced energy consumption and emissions reduction, such as the
7 replacement of petrochemical feedstocks by biomass feedstocks, of steel by aluminium in the transport
8 sector, and of concrete by wood in the buildings sector.

10 **Table 8-1. Energy reductions in recycling**

11
12 The prospects for greater energy efficiency are equally substantial. Martin *et al.* (2001) characterized
13 more than 50 key emerging energy efficient technologies, both generic and industry-specific. These
14 include efficient Hall-Heroult cell retrofits in aluminium production, black liquor gasification in kraft
15 pulp production, and shape casting in iron and steel industries. Worrel *et al.* (2004) covers many of the
16 same technologies and notes that significant potential exists in utilizing efficient motor systems and
17 advanced cogeneration technologies.

18 At the same time, energy is a valuable production input that along with capital can substitute for labor
19 as a means of increasing productivity. Thus, overall productivity gains in industry can be both energy-
20 saving and energy-augmenting, and the net impact depends on the nature of technological innovation and
21 the expected long-run cost of energy relative to other inputs. This suggests that, if policies to manage
22 carbon emissions from industry are to be effective, they would need to provide a significant signal to
23 technology innovators and adopters to reflect the negative value that society places on carbon emissions.
24 This suggests the application of regulations or financial instruments, examples being energy efficiency
25 regulations, carbon management regulations, and fees on carbon emissions.

27 **WASTE MANAGEMENT CARBON CYCLE**

28 The carbon cycle associated with human wastes includes industrial, commercial, construction,
29 demolition, and residential waste. Municipal solid waste contains significant amounts of carbon. Paper,
30 plastics, yard trimmings, food scraps, wood, rubber, and textiles made up more than 80% of the 236 Mt of
31 municipal solid waste generated in the United States in 2003 (EPA, 2005), as shown in Table 8-2. Of the
32 25 Mt generated in Canada, the contribution from each of these sources is about the same (Statistics
33 Canada, 2004). In Mexico, as much as 20% of wastes are not systematically collected, and no
34 disaggregated data are available (EPA, 2005).

1
2 **Table 8-2. Waste materials flows by region in North America, 2003**
3

4 A portion of municipal solid waste is recycled: 31% in the United States, 27% in Canada. Up to 14%
5 of the remaining waste is incinerated in the United States, a slightly lower percentage in Canada.

6 Incineration can reduce the waste stream in a given location by up to 80%, but this ensures that more of
7 the carbon reaches the atmosphere as opposed to being buried in solid form (or subsequently released as
8 methane) in a landfill. Incineration, however, can be used to cogenerate electricity and useful heat, which
9 may reduce carbon emissions from stand-alone facilities for electricity generation and heat production.

10 Once in a landfill, carbon in wastes may be acted upon biologically, releasing roughly equal amounts
11 of CO₂ and methane (CH₄) by volume¹² depending on the conditions of the landfill site, as well as a trace
12 amount of carbon monoxide (which soon becomes CO₂ in the atmosphere) and volatile organic
13 compounds. While no direct data on the quantity of CO₂ released from landfills exists, one can estimate
14 the CO₂ released by using this ratio; the estimated amount of CO₂ released from landfills in Canada and
15 the United States (no data from Mexico) would be approximately 38 Mt,¹³ a relatively small amount
16 compared to total other (sub)sectors in this chapter. One should consider this derived estimate highly
17 uncertain and not of the same calibre as other emissions data provided here. Also recall that, in the
18 context of IPCC assessment guidelines, CO₂ emissions from biological sources are considered GHG-
19 neutral and that these emissions are from biomass.

20 Depending on the degree to which aerobic or anaerobic metabolism takes place, a considerable
21 amount of carbon remains unaltered and more or less permanently stored in the landfill (75%–80%; see
22 Barlaz, 1990, 1994; and Bogner and Spokas, 1993). Because data on the proportions of carboniferous
23 material entering landfills can be estimated, approximate carbon contents of these materials can be
24 determined and the degree to which these materials can decompose, it would be possible to estimate the
25 amount of carbon sequestered in a landfill site (see EPIC, 2001; Mohareb *et al.*, 2003; EPA, 2003; EPA,
26 2005). However, the complexity of this assessment and the data required to support it from the multiple
27 sources prevented any further assessment from taking place for this report.

28 Fugitive methane gases are the result of anaerobic digestion and can be captured and, like
29 incineration, used to generate power and steam. Many of the 1,800 municipal solid waste sites in 2003 in
30 the United States captured and combusted landfill-generated methane; about half of all the methane
31 produced was combusted or oxidized in some way (EPA, 2005). In Canada, about 23% of the methane
32 emissions were captured and utilized to make energy in 2002 (Mohareb *et al.*, 2003). The resultant CO₂

¹²When based on gas volumes, this would mean that roughly equivalent amounts of carbon are released to the atmosphere in CO₂ as in CH₄.

¹³14 Mt of CH₄ (see Table 8-3) are equivalent, volume wise at standard temperature and pressure, to 38 Mt of CO₂.

1 released from such combustion is considered biological in origin (i.e., the methane used arose from
2 biological material). Thus, only methane emissions, at 21 times the CO₂ global warming potential, are
3 included as part of GHG inventories.¹⁴ Their combustion greatly alleviates the net contribution to GHG
4 emissions and provides power or steam that might prevent the combustion of fossil fuels elsewhere for
5 these purposes.

7 **COSTS RELATED TO CONTROLLING ANTHROPOGENIC IMPACTS ON THE** 8 **CARBON CYCLE**

9 The subject of defining costs associated with reducing anthropogenic impacts on the carbon cycle is
10 one of the most contentious of issues in any carbon-focussed analysis. Different modelling approaches to
11 cost assessments (top-down, bottom-up, applicable discount rates, social costing, cost effectiveness, no
12 regrets, etc.), different understandings of what costs actually include (risk, option values, welfare,
13 intangibles, etc.), different values associated with energy demand in different countries (accessibility,
14 availability, infrastructure, resource type and size), the number of possible actions and technologies
15 included in the analysis, and the perspective on technology development all have an impact on how one
16 evaluates costs. Should analysts consider only historical responses to energy prices, production and
17 demand elasticities, income changes and the like? Does one consider only technology options and their
18 strict financial costs? Should one review producers' or consumers' welfare issues associated with new
19 technologies? Are there local, national, international issues to be broached?

20 How might one reduce emissions in industrial and waste sectors? Methods of reduction can be
21 classified as:

- 22 • reducing process/fugitive emissions or converting currently released emissions (e.g., reduce process
23 emissions from cement, lime production, capture or prevent fugitive emissions leaks from pipelines or
24 combustion of emissions such as methane from landfills, cogeneration using landfill offgases);
- 25 • energy efficiency, including combined heat and power;
- 26 • process change (materials efficiency, recycling, substitution between materials or between materials
27 and energy);
- 28 • fuel substitution; and
- 29 • carbon capture and storage.

30
31 Variation within industries is significant, but some simple allocation of a broad range of costs can be
32 attributed to potential reductions over a set time period. We suggest the cost categories ("A" through "D")

¹⁴Theoretically, one should assume a factor of 20 because, were the methane released as CO₂, it would be considered to have no net GHG effect.

1 shown in Table 8-3. The table contains estimates of the percentage reduction at the grouped cost levels.
2 The costs represented here are not drawn from a single source but, rather, are the authors' estimates based
3 on a long history of interaction with cost reported in various documents.

4 5 **Table 8-3. Approximate costs and reductions potential**

6
7 When looking at cost numbers like this, one should remember that, for each \$10 cost increment per
8 Mt CO₂ (or \$2.73 per Mt C), gasoline prices would increase about 2.4¢/L (9¢/U.S. gal). Diesel fuel cost
9 would be slightly higher, at nearly 2.7¢/L (10¢/U.S. gal). At this rate, costs per GJ (slightly smaller than
10 one million BTU) vary by fuel: coal would rise about 90¢/GJ, depending on type, HFO by 73¢, and
11 natural gas by 50¢. Were one to use these fuels to generate electricity at a 35% efficiency rate, the cost
12 increase in coal-fired electricity generation would be about 0.8¢/kWh, about 0.65¢/kWh for HFO fired
13 electricity, and about 0.45¢/kWh if natural gas was used.

14 Of course, as the cost of carbon increases one can always obtain greater reductions, but the return on
15 these expenditures becomes marginal or insignificant and so are not included in the cells of Table 8-3. If
16 two cost categories are shown in a cell (e.g., A/B) and the quantity reduced (%Q_{red}) as 15/20 in the
17 neighbouring cell, the value associated with the second portrays the marginal addition that may be made
18 at that increased expenditure level. In this example, spending up to \$25/t CO₂ may reduce emissions by
19 15% and with a further expenditure of up to \$50/t CO₂ would add a further 20% for a total of 35% were
20 all expenditures to reduce emissions made (see "Metal Smelt" in Table 8-3).

21 Because not all actions are applicable to all industries, as one aggregates to an "all industry" level
22 (top line in the table), the total overall emissions reduction level may be less than any of the individual
23 industries sited. We provide an approximation of each industry, but if potentials for a certain option are
24 not available in that industry (e.g., process change), this lowers the average for the aggregate category.

25 26 **Some Explanatory Notes**

27 The five categories are not independent, and thus, reductions are not additive across categories. We
28 have tried to isolate somewhat what reductions might be like were one to focus only on that particular
29 category. Data come from a variety of sources and often focus on more than one of the following aspects
30 (Hertzog, 1999; Martin *et al.*, 2001; Jaccard *et al.*, 2002; Jaccard *et al.*, 2003; Jaccard, Nyboer, *et al.*,
31 2003; Worrel *et al.*, 2004; DOE, 2006).

32 **Process and Fugitives:** Process and fugitive reductions are only available in certain industries. For
33 example, cement and lime calcination, ammonia production, and others (see above) have process
34 emissions that one may be able to control or manipulate. Because wood products industries burn a lot of

1 wood waste, fugitives (methane and VOCs) are higher than in other industries and reduction potentials
2 exist. In this particular example, fugitive emission and reduction potential are small compared to those
3 possible in petroleum refining and upstream gas and oil.

4 In the waste sector, the reductions potentials are very large; we have simply estimated possible
5 reductions if we were to trap and burn all landfill methane. The costs for this are quite low. In an EPA
6 study (EPA, 2003a), estimates of between 40% and 60% of methane available for capture may generate
7 net economic benefits.

8 **Energy Efficiency:** While efficiency is important for more than just CO₂ reduction, depending on
9 how one views the advent and penetration of new technologies, potentials for reduction are limited if one
10 does not consider changing processes or switching fuels; that is, the potential for emissions reductions
11 from efficiency improvements is strongly linked with these other two avenues. For example, using DRI
12 processes in iron smelting, moving to Cermet anodes in electric arc furnaces in iron and steel and
13 aluminium smelting industries or shifting to hydrometallurgic processes from pyrometallurgic ones in
14 nonferrous metal smelting can significantly improve efficiencies and lower both combustion and process
15 GHG emissions; we include them here as an efficiency improvement even though they may be considered
16 a process change and fall under the next column in Table 8-3.

17 Because so much emphasis is placed on this particular avenue to reductions, we define it here as a
18 separate category even though it is difficult to disaggregate from fuel switching and process change.
19 Modeling from a more technical, strict end-use approach using technology possibility curves or similar
20 factors for efficiency improvement over time tends to show higher potentials than when one uses hybrid
21 approaches that try to assess the impacts of costs on technology choice (and thus energy demand); we
22 have portrayed the outcome of the latter and provide what some may consider conservative estimates of
23 reduction potential (see particularly Martin *et al.*, 2001; Jaccard *et al.*, 2002; Jaccard *et al.*, 2003; Jaccard,
24 Nyboer, *et al.*, 2003; Worrel *et al.*, 2004).

25 **Process Change:** Process change in its broader sense is difficult to estimate; it requires not only an
26 understanding of the industry and its potential for change but also an understanding of the market demand
27 for industry products that may be different than before the change was made. In pulp production, for
28 example, one could move away from kraft pulp and increase production ratios (the kraft process only
29 converts one-half the tree into pulp), but will market acceptability for the end product be unaffected?
30 Reducing the actual clinker content of ground cement can radically alter emissions levels. Numerous
31 substitution possibilities exist in the rather diverse Other Manufacturing section (carpet recycling,
32 alternative uses for plastics, etc.).

33 **Fuel Substitution:** As mentioned, it is difficult to isolate fuel substitution and efficiency
34 improvement because fuel types do contain inherent qualities that affect efficiency. While fuel

1 substitution is an important method of reducing carbon, this is beneficial only if options to move to less
2 carbon-intense fuels exist. In pulp and paper, one can move to biomass, but the industry already depends
3 on at least one-half of its energy from biomass. Some operating pulp and paper plants are totally self-
4 sufficient. Even so, further potential exists especially in combination with energy efficiency improvement
5 such as cogeneration. Most of the cement and lime, in Canada at least, is produced using coal or coke,
6 allowing for reductions were they to move to biomass, waste fuels, natural gas, or even oil. In some
7 industries, like mining, the bulk of the energy used is electricity, and direct reduction opportunities are
8 small.

9 **Carbon Capture and Storage (CC&S):** In one sense, all industries and landfills could invoke CC&S
10 but the methods to accomplish this are not well understood and/or the costs are very high. For example,
11 one could introduce an oxygen stream into all combustion devices such that the exhaust steam is CO₂
12 rich, suitable for capture and storage. Some industries, like cement production (nonmetal minerals), are
13 reasonable candidates for capture, but transport of the CO₂ for storage may prohibit implementation (see
14 particularly Hertzog, 1999; DOE, 2006).

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24 University of California at Berkeley.
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Table 8-1. Energy reductions in recycling

Recycled material	Energy saved	Recycled material	Energy saved
Aluminum	95%	Glass	31%
Tissue paper	54%	Newsprint	45%
Printing/writing paper	35%	Corrugated cardboard	26%
Plastics	57%–75%	Steel	61%

Source: Hershkowitz, 1997.

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Table 8-2. Waste materials flows by region in North America, 2003

	United States	Canada	Mexico
Total waste (Mt yr ⁻¹)	236.0	24.8	29.2
Recycled	72.0	6.6	–
Carbon-based waste	197.1	19.6	–
Carbon recycled	47.3	4.3	–
Methane (kt yr ⁻¹)			
Generated	12,486	1,452	–
Captured, oxidized	6,239	336	–
Emitted	6,247	1,117	–
Emitted (CO ₂ equivalents)	131,187	23,453	–

Source: EPA, 2003b, 2005; Statistics Canada, 2004; Mohareb, 2003 for Canada methane data; California Environmental Protection Agency, 2003 for Mexico data point.

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Table 8-3. Approximate costs and reductions potential

Sector	Reduction of fugitives		Energy efficiency		Process change		Fuel substitution		Carbon Capture and Storage	
	Cost category	%Q _{red}	Cost category*	%Q _{red} *	Cost category	%Q _{red}	Cost category	%Q _{red}	Cost category	%Q _{red}
All industry	B	3	A/B	12/8	B	20	A	10	C	30
P&P	B	5	A/B	10/5	B	40	A	40	D	?
Nonmetal min			A	10	A	40	A	40	C	80
Metal smelt			A/B	15/20	B	10	A	15	C	40
Mining			A	5						
Chemicals	B	10	A/B	10/5	B	25	A	5	C/D	40/20
Forest products	B	5	A	5						
Other man			A	15	A	20	A	5	D	?
Waste	A	90							D	30

3 *If two letters appear, two percent quantities reduced are shown. Each shows the quantity reduced at that cost. That is, if all
4 lesser and higher costs were made, emissions reduction would be the sum of the two values.

5 Note: The reductions across categories are NOT additive. For example, if “Carbon Capture and Storage” is employed, then
6 fuel switching would have little bearing on the emissions reduction possible. Also, it is difficult to isolate process switching and
7 efficiency improvements.






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9 The “Cost Categories” are as follows:

10 **CO₂-Based:** A: \$0–\$25/t CO₂; B: \$25–\$50/t CO₂; C: \$50–\$100/t CO₂; D: >\$100/t CO₂


11 **Carbon-Based:** A: \$0–\$92/t C; B: \$92–\$180/t C; C: \$180–\$367/t C; D: >\$367/t C

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
Fig. 8-1a. CO₂ emissions by sector in 2002. Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 3.0 (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2005).



[1] N₂O data not available. [2] CH₄ data not available.

1 **Fig. 8-1b. GHG emissions by sector in 2000, CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, PFCs, HFCs, and SF₆.** Source: Climate Analysis
 2 Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 3.0 (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2005).

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
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
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Fig. 8-2. Carbon flows for Canada, the United States and Mexico combined. Values in kilotons carbon can be converted to kilotons CO₂ equivalents by multiplying by 44/12, the ratio of carbon dioxide mass to carbon mass. Comparable diagrams for the individual countries are in Appendix 8A. *Source:* Energy data from Statistics Canada Industrial Consumption of Energy survey, Conversion coefficients, IEA Oil Information 2004, IEA Coal Information 2005, IEA Natural Gas Information 2004. Process emissions from Environment Canada, *Canada GHG Inventory, 2002*, EPA, U.S. Emissions Inventory. Production data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 002-0010, Tables 303-0010, -0014 to -0021, -0024, -0060, Pub. Cat. Nos.: 21-020, 26-002, 45-002, Canadian Pulp and Paper Association on forestry products. Production of forestry products: USDA Database; FO-2471000, -2472010, -2482000, -2483040, -6342000, -6342040, U.S. Timber Production, Trade, Consumption, and Price Statistics 1965–2005. Production of organic products (e.g., food): USDA PS&D Official Statistical Results. Steel: International Iron and Steel institute, World steel in figures 2003. Minerals production: USGS mineral publications.



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Fig. 8-3. Decomposition of energy use, manufacturing sector, 1990–1998. *Source:* IEA, 2004.



1 **Fig. 8-4. GHG emissions by gas from waste in 2000.** Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT)
 2 Version 3.0 (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2005).

Appendix 8A**Industry and Waste Management – Supplemental Material**

This appendix presents diagrams of the carbon flows in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, respectively (Figs. 8A-1 through 8A-3). The numerical data in these figures are shown in thousands of metric tons of carbon, which can be converted into thousands of metric tons of CO₂ equivalents by multiplying the carbon values by 44/12 (i.e., the ratio of carbon dioxide mass to carbon mass). The combined carbon flows for all three nations are presented in Fig. 8-2 in Chapter 8 of this report.


Figure 8A-1. Carbon flows, Canada.

Figure 8A-2. Carbon flows, United States.

Figure 8A-3. Carbon flows, Mexico.

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Canada Carbon Flows (All Values in Kilotonnes of C)




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Fig. 8A-1. Carbon flows, Canada. *Source:* Energy data from Statistics Canada Industrial Consumption of Energy survey, conversion coefficients and process emissions from Environment Canada, *Canada GHG Inventory, 2002*. Production data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 002-0010, Tables 303-0010, -0014 to -0021, -0024, -0060, Pub. Cat. Nos.: 21-020, 26-002, 45-002, Canadian Pulp and Paper Association on forestry products.

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US Carbon Flows (All Values in Kilotonnes of C)



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
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Fig. 8A-2. Carbon flows, United States. *Source:* Energy data from IEA Oil Information 2004, IEA Coal Information 2005, IEA Natural Gas Information 2004. Process emissions: EPA, U.S. Emissions Inventory. Production of forestry products: USDA Database; FO-2471000 and -2472010, U.S. Timber Production, Trade, Consumption, and Price Statistics 1965–2005, Production of organic products (e.g., food): USDA PS&D Official Statistical Results, Steel: International Iron and Steel institute, World steel in figures 2003, Minerals production: USGS mineral publications.

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Mexico Carbon Flows (All Values in Kilotonnes of C)



*Insufficient Data for the inclusion of the Cement Industry, data estimated from CAIT data

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5 **Fig. 8A-3. Carbon flows, Mexico.** Source: Energy data from IEA Oil Information 2004, IEA Coal Information
 6 2005, IEA Natural Gas Information 2004. Process emissions: EPA, U.S. Emissions Inventory. Production of forestry
 7 products: USDA Database; FO-2471000, -2472010, -2482000, -2483040, -6342000, -6342040. Production of
 8 organic products (e.g., food): USDA PS&D Official Statistical Results. Steel: International Iron and Steel institute,
 9 World steel in figures 2003.

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Chapter 9. Buildings

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KEY FINDINGS

- The buildings sector of North America was responsible for the annual emission of 2,712 Mt CO₂ in 2003, which is 36% of total North American CO₂ emissions and 9% of global emissions. U.S. buildings alone are responsible for more CO₂ emissions than total CO₂ emissions of any country in the world, except China.
- Carbon dioxide emissions from energy use in buildings in the United States and Canada has increased by 30% since 1990, an annual growth rate of 2.1% per year.
- Carbon dioxide emissions from buildings have grown with energy consumption, which in turn is increasing with population and income. Rising incomes have led to larger residential buildings, with the amount of living area per capita increasing in all three countries of North America.
- These trends are likely to continue in the future, with increased energy efficiency of building materials and equipment and slowing population growth, especially in Mexico, only partially offsetting the general growth in population and income.
- Options for reducing the CO₂ emissions of new and existing buildings include increasing the efficiency of equipment and implementing insulation and passive design measures to provide thermal comfort and lighting with reduced energy. Current best practices can reduce emissions from buildings by at least 60% for offices and 30% for homes. Technology options need to be supported by a portfolio of policy options that take advantage of synergies, avoid unduly burdening certain sectors and are cost effective.
- Because reducing CO₂ emissions from buildings is currently secondary to reducing building costs, continued improvement of energy efficiency in buildings and reduced CO₂ emissions from the building sector will require a better understanding of the total societal cost of CO₂ emissions as an externality of building costs, including the costs of mitigation compared to the costs of continued emissions.

1 Buildings are responsible for 36% of carbon emissions in North America (2712 Mt CO₂ in 2003)
2 (Natural Resources Canada, 2005; SENER México, 2005; U.S. DOE-EIA, 2005a¹) and 9% in the world
3 (U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005²). U.S. buildings alone are responsible for more CO₂ emissions than total CO₂
4 emissions of any country in the world except China (Kinsey *et al.*, 2002). Significant carbon emissions
5 are due to energy consumption during the operation of the buildings; other emissions, not well quantified,
6 may occur from water use in and around the buildings and from land-use impacts related to buildings.
7 Buildings are responsible for 72% of U.S. electricity consumption and 54% of natural gas consumption
8 (U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005.³). The discussions in this chapter include an accounting of CO₂ emissions from
9 electricity consumed in the buildings sector; however, this accounting represents a potential double-
10 counting of the CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels that are used to generate that electricity (see Chapter 6).
11 This chapter provides a description of how energy, including electrical energy, is used within the
12 buildings sector. Following the discussion of such end uses of energy, this chapter then describes the
13 opportunities and potential for reducing energy consumption within the sector.

14 Many options are available for reducing the carbon impacts of new and existing buildings, such as
15 increasing equipment efficiency and implementing alternative design, construction, and operational
16 measures to provide thermal comfort and lighting with reduced energy. Current best practices can reduce
17 carbon emissions by at least 60% for offices⁴ and 30% for homes.⁵ Residential and commercial buildings
18 in the United States and Canada contain 27 billion m² (2.7 million hectares) of floor space, providing a
19 large area available for siting non-carbon-emitting on-site energy supplies (e.g., photovoltaic panels on
20 roofs). With the most cutting-edge technology, at the least, emissions can be dramatically reduced, and, at
21 best, buildings can produce electricity without carbon emissions by means of on-site renewable electricity
22 generation.

24 Carbon Fluxes

25 Carbon fluxes from energy emissions in buildings are well understood. Primary energy inputs from
26 the source of production are tracked, their emissions rates are known, and the total end user consumption
27 data are gathered and reported by energy utilities, typically monthly. The quantity of energy consumed by
28 each end use is slightly less well known because attribution requires detailed data on use patterns in a
29 wide variety of contexts. The governments of North America have invested in detailed energy
30 consumption surveys, which allow researchers to identify opportunities for reducing energy use.

¹U.S. Sector Emissions from Table 18 in U.S. DOE-EIA (2005a).

² See Table 3.1.1 in U.S. DOE-EERE (2005).

³ See Tables 1.1.6 and 1.1.7 in U.S. DOE-EERE (2005).

⁴ Leadership in Energy and Environment Design (LEED) Gold Certification.

⁵ U.S. DOE Building America Program.

1 Currently, the influence of secondary fluxes due to use of materials and consumption of water is more
2 uncertain.

3 The largest contribution to carbon emissions from buildings is through the operation of energy-using
4 equipment. The energy consumed in the average home accounts for 10.7 metric tons⁶ of carbon dioxide
5 per year in the United States, 6.5 metric tons⁷ per year in Canada, and 5.0 metric tons⁸ in Mexico (U.S.
6 DOE-EIA, 2005a; Natural Resources Canada, 2005; SENER México, 2005). Energy consumption in a
7 500-m² commercial, government, or public-use building in the United States produces 7.1 metric tons of
8 CO₂ (U.S. DOE-EIA, 2005a).⁹ Energy consumption includes electricity as well as the direct combustion
9 of fossil fuels (natural gas, bottled gas, and petroleum distillates) and the burning of wood. Because most
10 electricity in North America is produced from fossil fuels, each kilowatt-hour consumed in a building
11 contributed about 660 g of CO₂ to the atmosphere in 2003 (U.S. DOE-EIA, 2005a).¹⁰ The equivalent
12 amount of energy from natural gas or other fuels contributed about 190 g of CO₂ (U.S. DOE-EIA,
13 2005a).¹¹ Renewable energy accounted for 9% of electricity production in 2003, down from 12% in 1990.
14 Renewable site energy use in buildings also decreased in that time, from 4% to 2%, mostly due to
15 decreasing use of wood as a household fuel (U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005).¹²

16 Buildings sector carbon dioxide emissions and the relative contribution of each end use are shown in
17 Fig. 9-1. In the United States, five end uses account for 87% of primary energy consumption in buildings:
18 space conditioning (including space heating, cooling, and ventilation), 40.9%; lighting, 19.8%; water
19 heating, 10.5%; refrigeration, 9%; and electronics (including televisions, computers, and office
20 equipment), 7.7% (U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005).¹³ Space heating and cooling are the largest single uses for
21 residences, commercial, and public-sector buildings, accounting for 46% and 35% of primary energy,
22 respectively, in the United States (U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005).¹⁴ Water heating is the second-highest energy
23 consumer in the United States and Canada, while lighting is the second-highest source of carbon dioxide
24 emissions, due to the higher emissions per unit of electricity compared to natural gas.

25

26 **Fig. 9-1. U.S. carbon emissions by sector and—for commercial and residential buildings—by end use.**

27

⁶ U.S. residential sector emissions of 1213 Mt CO₂ divided by 114 million households in 2004.

⁷ Canada residential sector emissions of 45.2Mt CO₂ divided by 12.2 million households in 2003.

⁸ Mexico residential sector emissions of 85.2 Mt CO₂ divided by 167 million households in 2004.

⁹ U.S. commercial sector emissions per m² in 2003 times 500 m².

¹⁰ U.S. emissions from electricity divided by delivered energy.

¹¹ U.S. emissions from electricity divided by delivered energy.

¹² See Table 1.5.4 and Summary Table 2 in U.S. DOE-EERE (2005).

¹³ Does not include adjustment EIA uses to relieve differences between data sources.

¹⁴ Table 1.2.3 and Table 1.3.3; available on-line at <http://buildingsdatabook.eere.energy.gov> (2003 data).

1 Heating and cooling loads are highly climate dependent; colder regions use heating during much of
2 the year (primarily with natural gas), while warm regions seldom use heating. The majority of U.S.
3 households own an air conditioner; and, although air-conditioner ownership has been historically low in
4 Mexico, sales of this equipment are now growing significantly, 14% per year over the past 10 years.¹⁵
5 Space-conditioning energy end use depends significantly on building construction (e.g., insulation, air
6 infiltration) and operation (thermostat settings). Water heating is a major consumer of energy in the
7 United States and Canada, where storage-tank systems are common.

8 Aside from heating and cooling, lighting, and water heating, energy is consumed by a variety of
9 appliances, mostly electrical. Most homes in the United States and Canada own all of the major
10 appliances, including refrigerators, freezers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, dishwashers, and at least one
11 color television. The remainder of household energy consumption comes from small appliances (blenders
12 and microwaves, for example) and, increasingly, from electronic devices such as entertainment equipment
13 and personal computers. In Mexico, major appliances are common in middle- and upper-income
14 households, and even the poorest electrified households own a television, a refrigerator, and small
15 appliances.

16 Many end uses—such as water heating and heating, cooling, and ventilation—occur in most
17 commercial sector buildings. Factors such as climate and building construction influence the carbon
18 emissions from these buildings. In addition, commercial buildings contain specialized equipment, such as
19 large-scale refrigeration units in supermarkets; cooking equipment in food preparation businesses; and
20 computers, printers, and copiers in office buildings. Office equipment is the largest component of
21 electricity use aside from cooling and lighting. Due to heat from internal loads, many commercial
22 buildings use air-conditioning year round in most climates in North America.

23 Residential and commercial buildings in the United States are responsible for 38% of CO₂ emissions
24 from energy nationally and 33% of emissions from energy in North America as a whole. Total emissions
25 from buildings in the United States are ten times as high as in the other two countries combined, due to a
26 large population compared to Canada, and high per capita consumption compared to Mexico. On a per
27 capita basis, building energy consumption in the United States is comparable with that of Canada, about
28 40 GJ equivalent per person per year. This is about six times higher than in Mexico, where 7 GJ is
29 consumed per person per year.

30 In general, contributions from the residential sector are roughly equal to that of the commercial
31 sector, except in Mexico, where the commercial sector contributes less. Electricity contributes twice as
32 many emissions as all other fuels combined in the United States and Mexico (2.2 and 2.1 times as much,
33 respectively). In Canada, natural gas is on par with electricity (1.03 times as many emissions), due to high

¹⁵ *Air conditioner sales 1995–2004 from Asociacion Nacional de Fabricantes de Aparatos Domesticos (ANFAD).*

1 heating loads resulting from the cold climate. Fuel oil represents most of Canada’s “other fuels” for the
2 commercial sector. Firewood (leña) remains an important fuel for many Mexican households for heating,
3 water heating, and cooking. Table 9-1 summarizes CO₂ emissions by country, sector, and fuel.

4
5 **Table 9-1. Carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumed in buildings.**

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7 The energy consumed during building operation is the most important input to the carbon cycle from
8 buildings; but it is not the only one. The construction, renovation, and demolition of buildings also
9 generate a significant flux of wood and other materials. Construction of a typical 204-ft² (2200-ft²) house
10 requires about 20 Mt of wood and creates 2 to 7 Mt of construction waste (U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005).¹⁶
11 Building lifetimes are many decades and, especially for commercial buildings, may include several cycles
12 of remodeling and renovation. Water consumption in buildings also impacts the carbon cycle because
13 water supply, treatment, and waste disposal require energy. In California, for example, total water use
14 accounts for 19% of statewide electricity (CEC, 2005). In the United States as a whole, water supplied to
15 residential and commercial customers accounts for about 6% of total national freshwater consumption.

16 17 **Trends and Drivers**

18 Several factors influence trends in carbon emissions in the buildings sector. Some driver variables
19 tend to increase emissions, while others decrease emissions. In general, the trend over the last decade has
20 been toward emissions growth, with emissions from energy use in buildings in the United States and
21 Canada increasing 30% since 1990 (U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005; Natural Resources Canada, 2005),¹⁷
22 corresponding to an annual growth rate of 2.1%.

23 Carbon emissions from buildings have grown with energy consumption, which in turn is increasing
24 with population and income. Demographic shifts therefore have a direct influence on residential energy
25 consumption. Rising incomes have led to larger residential buildings—the amount of living area per
26 capita is increasing in all three countries in North America. On one hand, total population growth is
27 slowing, especially in Mexico, as families are having fewer children than in the past. Annual population
28 growth during the 1990s was 1.1% in the United States, 1.0% in Canada, and 1.7% in Mexico. In the
29 period from 1970 to 1990 it was 1.0%, 1.2%, and 2.5%, respectively.¹⁸ On the other hand, a shift from
30 large, extended-family households to nuclear-family and single-occupant households means an increase in

¹⁶ Table 2.1.7. Wood content estimated from lumber content. Construction waste from Table 3.4.1.

¹⁷ U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005 Table 3.1.1.

¹⁸ Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

1 the number of households per unit population—each with its own heating and cooling systems and
2 appliances.

3 The consumption of energy on a per capita basis or per unit economic activity [gross domestic
4 product (GDP)] is also not constant but depends on several underlying factors. Economic development is
5 a primary driver of overall per capita energy consumption and influences the mix of fuels used.¹⁹ Per
6 capita energy consumption generally grows with economic development because wealthier people live in
7 larger households and have more appliances. Recently, computers, printers, and other office equipment
8 have become commonplace in nearly all businesses and in most homes. These end uses now constitute
9 7% of primary household energy consumption. As a result of these growing electricity uses, the fraction
10 of electricity to total household primary energy has increased. This is significant because of the large
11 emissions associated with the combustion of fossil fuels in power plants. Electricity can be generated
12 from renewable sources, such as solar or wind, but their full potential has yet to be realized.

13 In the United States, the major drivers of energy consumption growth are growth in commercial
14 floorspace and an increase in the size of the average home. The size of an average U.S. single-family
15 home has grown from 160 m² for a house built in 1980 to 216 m² in 2003. In the same time, commercial
16 floor space per capita has increased from 20 m² to 22.6 m² (U.S. DOE-EERE, 2005).²⁰ Certain end uses
17 once considered luxuries have now become commonplace. Only 56% of U.S. homes in 1978 used
18 mechanical space-cooling equipment (U.S. DOE-EIA, 2005b). By 2001, ownership grew to 83%, driven
19 by near total saturation in warmer climates and a demographic shift in new construction to these regions.
20 Table 9-2 shows emissions trends, as well as the underlying drivers.

21 **Table 9-2. Principal drivers of buildings emissions trends**

22
23
24 Although the general trend has been toward growth in per capita emissions, emissions per unit of
25 GDP has decreased in past decades, due to improvements in efficiency. Efficiency performance of most
26 types of equipment has generally increased, as has the thermal insulation of buildings, due to influences
27 such as technology improvements and voluntary and mandatory efficiency standards and building codes.
28 The energy crisis of the 1970s was followed with a sharp decline in economic energy intensity. Efficiency
29 increases were driven both by market-related technology improvements and incentives and by the
30 establishment of federal and state/provincial government policies designed to encourage or require energy
31 efficiency.

32

¹⁹ For example, whether biomass, natural gas or electricity is used for space heating and cooking.

²⁰ See Table 2.1.6 and 2.2.1 in U.S. DOE-EERE (2005). Residential data are from 1981.

1 *[SIDEBAR 1 TEXT BOX HERE]*

3 **Options for Management**

4 A variety of alternatives exist for reducing emissions from the buildings sector. Technology- and
5 market-driven improvements in efficiency are expected to continue for most equipment but will probably
6 not be sufficient to adequately curtail emissions growth without government intervention. The
7 government has many different ways in which it can manage emissions that have been proven effective in
8 influencing the flow of products from manufacturers to users (Interlaboratory Working Group, 2000).
9 That flow may involve six steps: advancing technologies; product development and manufacturing;
10 supply, distribution, and wholesale purchasing; retail purchasing; system design and installation; and
11 operation and maintenance (S. Wiel and J. E. McMahon, 2005). Options for specific products or packages
12 include government investment in research and development, information and education programs,
13 energy pricing and metering, incentives and financing, establishment of voluntary guidelines,
14 procurement programs, energy audits and retrofits, and mandatory regulation. The most effective
15 approaches will likely include one or more of these options in a policy portfolio that takes advantage of
16 synergies, avoids unduly burdening certain sectors, and is cost-effective. Major participants include
17 federal agencies, state and local governments, energy and water utilities, private research and
18 development firms, equipment manufacturers and importers, energy services companies (ESCOs),
19 nonprofit organizations, building owners, and occupants.

- 20 • **Technology adoption supported by research and development:** Government has the opportunity
21 to encourage development and adoption of energy-efficient technologies through investment in
22 research and development, which can advance technologies and bring down prices, therefore enabling
23 a larger market. Successful programs have contributed to the development of high-efficiency lighting,
24 heating, cooling, and refrigeration. Research and development has also had an impact on the
25 improvement of insulation, ducting, and windows. Finally, government support of research and
26 development has been critical in the reduction of costs associated with development of renewable
27 energy.
- 28 • **Voluntary Programs:** By now, there are a wide range of efficiency technologies and best practices
29 available, and if the most cost-effective among them were widely utilized, carbon emissions would be
30 reduced. Voluntary measures can be effective in overcoming some market barriers. Government has
31 been active with programs to educate consumers with endorsement labels or ratings [such as the U.S.
32 Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Energy Star Appliances and Homes], public-private
33 partnerships [such as the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Building America program].
34 Government is not the only player, however. Energy utilities can offer rebates for efficient appliances,

1 and ESCOs can facilitate best practices at the firm level. Finally, nongovernment organizations and
2 professional societies (such as U.S. Green Building Council and the American Institute of Architects)
3 can play a role in establishing benchmarks and ratings.

- 4 • **Regulations:** Governments can dramatically impact energy consumption through well-considered
5 regulations that address market failures with cost-effective measures. Regulations facilitate best
6 practices in two ways: they eliminate the lowest-performing equipment from the market, and they
7 boost the market share of high-efficiency technologies. Widely used examples are mandatory energy
8 efficiency standards for appliances, equipment, and lighting; mandatory labeling programs; and
9 building codes. Most equipment standards are instituted at a national level, whereas most states have
10 their own set of prescriptive building codes (and sometimes energy performance standards for
11 equipment) to guarantee a minimum standard for energy-saving design in homes and businesses.
12

13 Although large strides in efficiency improvement have been made over the past three decades,
14 significant improvements are still possible. They will involve continued improvement in equipment
15 technology but will increasingly take a whole-building approach that integrates the design of the building
16 and the energy consumption of the equipment inside it. The improvements may also involve alternative
17 ways to provide energy services, such as cogeneration of heat and electricity and thermal energy storage
18 units.

19
20 *[SIDEBAR 2 TEXT BOX HERE]*
21

22 Whole-building certification standards evaluate a package of efficiency and design options. An
23 example is the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification system developed
24 by the U.S. Green Building Council, a nongovernment, nonprofit organization. In existence for five years,
25 the LEED program has certified 36 million m² of commercial and public-sector buildings and has recently
26 implemented a certification system for homes. The LEED program includes a graduated rating system.
27 Typical energy savings achieved by LEED Gold-rated buildings are 50–60% (U.S. GBC, 2005).

28 On the government side, the EPA's Energy Star Homes program awards certification to new homes
29 that are independently verified to be at least 30% more energy-efficient than homes built to the 1993
30 national Model Energy Code, or 15% more efficient than state energy code, whichever is more rigorous.
31 Likewise, the DOE's Building America program partners with home builders, providing research and
32 development toward goals to decrease primary energy consumption by 30% for participating projects by
33 2007, and by 50% by 2015.
34

1 Research and Development Needs

2 Research, development, demonstration, and deployment of technologies and programs to improve
3 energy efficiency in buildings and to produce energy with fewer carbon emissions have involved
4 significant effort over the last 30 years. These efforts have contributed options toward carbon
5 management. Technologies and markets continue to evolve, representing new crops of “low-hanging
6 fruit” available for harvesting. However, in most buildings-related decisions in North America, reducing
7 carbon emissions remains a secondary objective to other goals, such as reducing first costs. The questions
8 for which answers could significantly change the discussion about options for carbon management
9 include the following.

- 10 • What is the total societal cost of environmental externalities, including carbon emissions? Energy
11 resources in North America have been abundant and affordable, but externality costs have not been
12 completely accounted for. Most economic decisions are weighted toward the short term and do not
13 consider the complete costs. Total societal costs of carbon emissions are unknown and, because it is a
14 global issue, difficult to allocate. Practical difficulties notwithstanding, this is a key issue, answers to
15 which could influence priorities for research and development as well as policies such as energy
16 pricing, carbon taxes or credits.
- 17 • What cost-effective non-carbon-emitting equipment and building systems (including energy demand
18 and supply) are available in the short, medium, and long term? Policymakers must have sufficient
19 information to be confident that particular new technology types or programs will be effective and
20 affordable. For consumers to seriously consider a set of options, the technologies must be manifested
21 as products that are widely available and competitive in the marketplace. Therefore, economic and
22 market analyses are necessary before attractive options for managing carbon can be proposed.
- 23 • How do the costs of mitigation compare to the costs of continued emissions? The answers to the
24 previous two questions can be compared in order to develop a supply curve of conserved carbon
25 comprising a series of least-cost options, whether changes to energy demand or to supply, for
26 managing carbon emissions. The roadmap will need to be updated at regular intervals to account for
27 changes in technologies, production practices, and market acceptance of competing solutions.


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1 **[BEGIN SIDEBAR 1]**

2 Since the mid-1970s, the state of California has pursued an aggressive set of efficiency regulations. As a
 3 result, per capita electricity consumption has stabilized in that state even while it continues to grow in the
 4 United States as a whole.




Since the mid-1970s, the state of California has pursued an aggressive set of efficiency regulations. As a result, per capita electricity consumption has stabilized in that state even while it continues to grow in the United States as a whole.

5

6 **[END SIDEBAR 1]**

1 **[BEGIN SIDEBAR 2]**


2 Between 1974 and 2001, the energy consumption of the average refrigerator sold in the United States
 3 dropped by 74%, a change driven by market forces and regulations. From 1987 to 2005, the U.S.
 4 Congress and DOE promulgated minimum efficiency standards for more than 30 residential and
 5 commercial product types. Canada and Mexico also have many product efficiency standards, and a
 6 program is under way to harmonize standards throughout North America in connection with North
 7 American Free Trade Agreement.



8

9 **[END SIDEBAR 2]**

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Fig. 9-1. U.S. carbon emissions by sector and—for commercial and residential buildings—by end use.

1 **Table 9-1. Carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumed in buildings**

	Greenhouse emission (megatons) CO ₂				Total
	Electricity	Natural gas	Other fuels	Wood	
United States	1609.1	434.6	166.3	0.0	2210.0
Residential	823.7	265.9	105.1	0.0	1194.7
Commercial	785.4	168.7	61.2	0.0	1015.4
Canada	61.6	58.5	22.0	1.9	143.9
Residential	31.4	32.3	9.1	1.9	74.7
Commercial	30.2	26.2	12.9	0.0	69.3
Mexico	52.7	1.7	16.2	2.1	72.7
Residential	40.2	1.3	15.8	2.1	59.4
Commercial	12.5	0.4	0.4	0.0	13.3
Total	1723.4	494.8	204.5	4.0	2426.6

2
3
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8 **Table 9-2. Principal drivers of buildings emissions trends**

Drivers	United States		Canada		Mexico	
	Total 2000	Growth rate 1990–2000	Total 2000	Growth rate 1990–2000	Total 2000	Growth rate 1990–2000
Population (millions)	288	1.1%	31.0	1.0%	100	1.7%
Household size (persons/HH)	2.5	–0.6%	2.6	–0.9%	5.3	–0.1%
GDP/Cap (thousand \$U.S. 1995)	31.7	2.0%	23.0	1.8%	3.8	1.8%
Res. floorspace (billion m ²)	15.7	0.0%	1.5	2.4%	NA	NA
Comm. floorspace (million m ²)	6.4	0.6%	0.5	1.6%	NA	NA
Building energy emissions/GDP (g CO ₂ /\$U.S.)	256	–0.5%	217	–0.9%	NA	NA

9

PART III OVERVIEW

The Carbon Cycle in Land and Water Systems

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The six chapters (Chapters 10–15) in Part III consider the current and future carbon balance of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems in North America. Although the amount of carbon exchanged between these ecosystems and the atmosphere each year through photosynthesis and plant and microbial respiration is large, the net balance for all of the ecosystems, combined, is currently a net sink of 472-592 Mt C yr⁻¹, and offsets only about 25-30% of current fossil fuel emissions from the region (1856 Mt C yr⁻¹ in 2003) (Chapter 3). If managed properly, these systems have the potential to become significantly larger sinks of carbon in the future; they may also become significant net sources of carbon if managed poorly or if the climate warms.

Much of the current North American carbon sink is the result of past changes in land use and management. The large sink in the forests of Canada and the United States, for example, is partly the result of continued forest growth following agricultural abandonment that occurred in the past, partly the result of current and past management practices (e.g., fire suppression), and partly the result of forest responses to a changing environment (climatic change, CO₂ fertilization, and the increased mobilization of nutrients). However, the relative importance of these three broad factors in accounting for the current sink is unknown. Estimates vary from attributing nearly 100% of the sink in United States forests to regrowth (Caspersen *et al.*, 2000; Hurtt *et al.*, 2002) to attributing nearly all of it to CO₂ fertilization (Schimel *et al.*, 2002). The attribution question is critical because the current sink may be expected to increase in the future if the important mechanism is CO₂ fertilization, for example, but may be expected to decline if the important mechanism is forest regrowth (forests accumulate carbon more slowly as they age). Understanding the history of land use, management, and disturbance is critical because disturbance and recovery are major determinants of the net terrestrial carbon flux.

Land-use change and management have been, and will be, important in the carbon balance of other ecosystems besides forests. The expansion of cultivated lands in Canada and the United States in the 19th century released large amounts of carbon to the atmosphere (Houghton *et al.*, 1999), leaving those lands with the potential for recovery (i.e., a future carbon sink), if managed properly. For example, recent

1 changes in farming practice may have begun to recover the carbon that was lost decades ago. Grazing
2 lands, although not directly affected by cultivation, were, nevertheless, managed in the United States
3 through fire suppression. The combined effects of grazing and fire suppression are believed to have
4 promoted the invasion of woody vegetation, possibly a carbon sink at present. Wetlands are the second
5 largest net carbon sink (after forests), but the magnitude of the sink was larger in the past than it is today,
6 again, as a result of land-use change (draining of wetlands for agriculture and forestry). The only lands
7 that seem to have escaped management are those lands overlying permafrost, and they are clearly subject
8 to change in the future as a result of global warming. Settled lands, by definition, are managed and are
9 dominated by fossil fuel emissions. Nevertheless, the accumulation of carbon in urban and suburban trees
10 suggests a net sequestration of carbon in the biotic component of long-standing settled lands. Residential
11 lands recently cleared from forests, on the other hand, are sources of carbon (Wienert and Hamburg,
12 2006).

13 From the perspective of carbon and climate, ecosystems are important if (1) they are currently large
14 sources or sinks of carbon or (2) they have the potential to become large sources or sinks of carbon in the
15 future through either management or environmental change, where ‘large’ sources or sinks, in this
16 context, are determined by the product of area (hectares) times flux per unit area (or flux density) (Mg
17 $\text{C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$).

18 The largest carbon sink in North America (350 Mt C yr^{-1}) is associated with forests (Chapter 11)
19 (Table 1). The sink includes the carbon accumulating in wood products (e.g., in increasing numbers of
20 houses and landfills) as well as in the forests themselves. A sink is believed to exist in wetlands
21 (Chapter 13), including the wetlands overlying permafrost (Chapter 12), although the magnitude of this
22 sink is uncertain. More certain is the fact that the current sink is considerably smaller than it was before
23 wetlands were drained for agriculture and forestry. The other important aspect of wetlands is that they
24 hold nearly two thirds of the carbon in North America. Thus, despite the current net sink in these systems,
25 their potential for future emissions is large.

26

27 **Table 1. Ecosystems in North America: their areas, net annual fluxes of carbon, and their potential**
28 **for sources (+) or sinks (-) in the future**

29

30 Although management has the potential to increase the carbon sequestered in agricultural (cultivated)
31 lands, these lands today are nearly in balance with respect to carbon (Chapter 10). The carbon lost to the
32 atmosphere from cultivation of organic soils is approximately balanced by the carbon accumulated in
33 mineral soils. In the past, before cultivation, these soils held considerably more carbon than they do today,
34 but about 25% of that carbon was lost soon after the lands were initially cultivated. In large areas of

1 grazing lands, there is the possibility that the invasion and spread of woody vegetation (woody
2 encroachment) is responsible for a significant net carbon sink at present (Chapter 10). The magnitude
3 (and even sign) of this flux is uncertain, however, in part because some ecosystems lose carbon
4 belowground (soils) as they accumulate it aboveground (woody vegetation), and in part because the
5 invasion and spread of exotic grasses into semi-arid lands of the western United States are increasing the
6 frequency of fires, reversing woody encroachment, and releasing carbon (Bradley *et al.*, in press).

7 The emissions of carbon from settled lands are largely considered in the chapters in Part II and in
8 Chapter 14 of this report. Non-fossil carbon seems to be accumulating in trees in these lands, but the net
9 changes in soil carbon are uncertain.

10 The only ecosystems that appear to release carbon to the atmosphere are the coastal waters. The
11 estimated flux of carbon is close to zero (and difficult to determine) because the gross fluxes (from river
12 transport, photosynthesis, and respiration) are large and variable in both space and time.

13 The average net fluxes of carbon expressed as $\text{Mg C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ in Table 1 are for comparative
14 purposes. They show the relative flux density for different types of ecosystems. These annual fluxes of
15 carbon are rarely determined with direct measurements of flux, however, because of the extreme
16 variability of fluxes in time and space, even within a single ecosystem type. Extrapolating from a few
17 isolated measurements to an estimate for the whole region's flux is difficult. Rather, the net changes are
18 more often based on differences in measured stocks over intervals of 10 years, or longer (see Chapter 3),
19 or are based on the large and rapid changes per hectare that are reasonably well documented for certain
20 forms of management, such as the changes in carbon stocks that result from the conversion of forest to
21 cultivated land. Thus, most of the flux estimates in the Table are long-term and large-area estimates.

22 Nevertheless, average flux density is one factor important in determining an ecosystem's role as a net
23 source or sink for carbon. The other important factor is area. Permafrost wetlands, for example, are
24 currently a small net sink for carbon. They cover a large area, however, hold large stocks of carbon, and
25 thus have to potential to become a significant net source of carbon if the permafrost thaws with global
26 warming (Smith *et al.*, 2005, Smith *et al.*, 2001, Osterkamp *et al.*, 1999, 2000). Forests clearly dominate
27 the net sequestration of carbon in North America, although wetlands and settled lands have mean flux
28 densities that are above average.

29 The two factors (flux density and area) demonstrate the level of management required to remove a
30 significant amount of carbon from the atmosphere and keep it on land. Under current conditions,
31 sequestration of 100 Mt C yr^{-1} , for example (~5% of fossil fuel emissions from North America), requires
32 management over hundreds of millions of hectares (e.g., the area presently in agriculture or forests)
33 (Table 1). Enhancement of this terrestrial carbon sink through management would require considerable
34 effort. Nevertheless, the cost (in \$/metric ton CO_2) may be low relative to other options for managing

1 carbon. For example, forestry activities are estimated to have the potential to sequester 100–200 Mt C yr⁻¹
2 in the United States at prices ranging from less than \$10/ton of CO₂ for improved forest management, to
3 \$15/ton for afforestation, to \$30–50/ton for production of biofuels. Somewhat smaller sinks of 10–70 Mt
4 C yr⁻¹ might be sequestered in agricultural soils at low to moderate costs (\$3–30/ton CO₂). The maximum
5 amounts of carbon that might be accumulated in forests and agricultural soils are not known, and thus the
6 number of years these rates of sequestration might be expected to continue is also unknown. It seems
7 unlikely that the amount of carbon currently held in forests and agricultural lands could double. Changes
8 in climate will also affect carbon storage, but the net effect of management and climate is uncertain.

9 Despite the limited nature of carbon sequestration in offsetting the global emissions of carbon from
10 fossil fuels, local and regional activities may, nevertheless, offset local and regional emissions of fossil
11 carbon. This offset, as well as other co-benefits, may be particularly successful in urban and suburban
12 systems (Chapter 14).

13 The effects and cost of managing aquatic systems are less clear. Increasing the area of wetlands, for
14 example, would presumably sequester carbon; but it would also increase emissions of CH₄, countering the
15 desired effect. Fertilization of coastal waters with iron has been proposed for increasing oceanic uptake of
16 CO₂, but neither the amount of carbon that might be sequestered nor the side effects are known
17 (Chapter 15).

18 A few studies have estimated the potential magnitudes of future carbon sinks as a result of
19 management (Chapters 10, 11). However, the contribution of management, as opposed to the
20 environment, in today's sink is unclear (see Chapter 3), and for the future the relative roles of
21 management and environmental change are even less clear. The two drivers might work together to
22 enhance terrestrial carbon sinks, as seems to have been the case during recent decades (Prentice *et al.*,
23 2001) (Chapter 2). On the other hand, they might work in opposing directions. A worst-case scenario,
24 quite possible, is one in which management will become ineffective in the face of large natural sources of
25 carbon not previously experienced in the modern world. In other words, while management is likely to be
26 essential for sequestering carbon, it may not be sufficient to preserve the current terrestrial carbon sink
27 over North America, let alone to offset fossil fuel emissions.

28 At least one other observation about sequestering carbon in terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems should
29 be mentioned. In contrast to the hundreds of millions of hectares that must be managed to sequester
30 100 Mt C annually, a few million hectares of forest fires can release an equivalent amount of carbon in a
31 single year. This disparity in flux densities underscores the fact that a few million hectares are disturbed
32 each year, while hundreds of millions of hectares are recovering from past disturbances. The natural
33 cycling of carbon is large in comparison to net fluxes. The observation is relevant for carbon
34 management, because the cumulative effects of small managed net sinks to mitigate fossil fuel emissions

1 will have to be understood, analyzed, monitored and evaluated in the context of larger, highly variable
2 and uncertain sources and sinks in the natural cycle.

3 The major challenge for future research is quantification of the mechanisms responsible for current
4 (and future) fluxes of carbon. In particular, what are the relative effects of management (including land-
5 use change), environmental change, and natural disturbance in determining today's and tomorrow's
6 sources and sinks of carbon? Will the current natural sinks continue, grow in magnitude, or reverse to
7 become net sources? What is the role of soils in the current (and future) carbon balance (Davidson and
8 Janssens, 2006)? What are the most cost-effective means of managing carbon?

9 Answering these questions will require two scales of measurement: (1) an expanded network of
10 intensive research sites dedicated to understanding basic processes (e.g., the effects of management and
11 environmental effects on carbon stocks), and (2) extensive national-level networks of monitoring sites,
12 through which uncertainties in carbon stocks (inventories) would be reduced and changes, directly
13 measured. Elements of these measurements are underway, but the effort has not yet been adequate for
14 resolving these questions.

15 16 **KEY UNCERTAINTIES AND GAPS IN UNDERSTANDING THE CARBON CYCLE OF** 17 **NORTH AMERICA**

- 18 • As mentioned above, the net flux of carbon resulting from woody encroachment and its inverse,
19 woody elimination, is highly uncertain. Even the sign of the flux is in question.
- 20 • Rivers, lakes, dams, and other inland waters are mentioned in Chapter 15 as being a source of carbon,
21 but they are claimed elsewhere to be a sink (Chapter 3). The sign of the net carbon flux attributable to
22 erosion, transport, deposition, accumulation and decomposition is uncertain (e.g., Stallard, 1998; Lal,
23 2001; Smith *et al.*, 2005).
- 24 • Several chapters cite studies that have attempted to quantify potential future carbon sinks in countries
25 in North America, but no reference is made to estimates of future sources of carbon. Clearly, there are
26 modeling studies that project large future carbon emissions, although these studies are largely global
27 in scope (e.g., Cox *et al.*, 2000; Jones *et al.*, 2005). Are there no studies of future carbon sources and
28 sinks for North America? Melting permafrost, in particular, is likely to increase emissions of carbon
29 to the atmosphere, CH₄ as well as CO₂.
- 30 • The sum of land areas reported in these chapters is about 330 million ha larger than the area of North
31 America (Table 1). The reason for this double-counting is unclear, but it implies a double counting of
32 carbon stocks and, perhaps, current sinks, as well.

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Table 1. Ecosystems in North America: their areas, net annual fluxes of carbon, and their potential for sources (+) or sinks (-) in the future

Type of ecosystem	Area (10 ⁶ ha)	Current mean flux density (Mg C ha ⁻¹ yr ⁻¹)	Current flux (Mt C yr ⁻¹)	Carbon stocks (Mt C)	Future potential flux (Mt C yr ⁻¹)
Agriculture	231	0.0	0±15 ¹	18,500	-(50 to 100) to +??
Grass, shrub and arid	558	-0.01	-6 ²	59,950	-34
Forests	771	-0.45	-350 ³	171,475	-(100 to 200) to +??
Permafrost wetlands	621 ⁴	-0.02	-14 ⁵	213,320	
Wetlands	246	-0.28	-70	220,000	
Settled lands	104	-0.31 ⁶	-32 ⁶	~1,000 ⁶	
Coastal waters	384	0.05	19		
Sum	2531 ⁷	-0.18 ⁸	-472 ⁹	684,245	
Total	2126 ¹⁰				

1. Fossil fuel inputs to crop management are not included. Some of the C sequestration is occurring on grasslands as well as croplands, but the inventories do not separate these fluxes. The near-zero flux is for Canada and the United States only. Including Mexican croplands would likely change the flux to a net source because croplands are expanding in Mexico, and the carbon in biomass and soil is released to the atmosphere as native ecosystems are cultivated.
2. Fossil fuels are not included. The small net sink results from the Conservation Reserve Program in the United States including Mexico is likely to change the net sink to a source because forests are being converted to grazing lands. Neither woody encroachment nor woody elimination (Bradley *et al.*, in press) is included in this estimate of flux because the uncertainties are so large.
3. Includes an annual sink of 67 Mt C yr⁻¹ in wood products as well as a sink of 283 Mt C yr⁻¹ in forested ecosystems.
4. Includes zones with isolated and sporadic permafrost.
5. This estimate is for peatlands (not mineral soils) in permafrost regions. The net flux for mineral soil permafrost areas is unknown. This estimate of flux may be high because it does not include the losses resulting from fires, but it may be low if mineral soils are also accumulating carbon in permafrost regions.
6. Urban trees only (does not include soil carbon).
7. Sum does not include coastal waters. The summed area is too high because an estimated 75 × 10⁶ ha of permafrost peatlands in Canada are treed (and may be included in forest area as well as permafrost area). Nevertheless, another ~330 × 10⁶ ha are double counted (United States forests on non-permafrost wetlands? Other wooded lands that are included as both forests and rangelands? Large areas of grasslands and shrublands on non-permafrost lands within areas defined as sporadic or isolated permafrost? Inland waters?).
8. Weighted average; does not include coastal waters.
9. Does not include coastal waters. The total annual sink of 472 Mt C is lower than the estimate of 592 Mt C presented in Chapter 3 (Table 3-1). The largest difference results from the flux of carbon attributed to woody encroachment. Chapter 3 includes a sink of 120 Mt C yr⁻¹; Table 1, above, presents a net flux of zero (see note 2). Other differences between the two estimates include: (1) an additional sink in Table 1 of 14 Mt C yr⁻¹ in permafrost wetlands; (2) an additional sink in Table 1 of 32 Mt C yr⁻¹ in settled lands; and (3) a sink of 25 Mt C yr⁻¹ in rivers and reservoirs that is included in Table 3-1 but not in Table 1. In addition, there are small differences in the estimates for agricultural lands and grasslands.
10. Areas (10⁶ ha) (*The Times Atlas of the World*, 1990)

	Globe	North America	Canada	United States	Mexico
	14,900	2,126	992	936	197

Chapter 10. Agricultural Lands, Grasslands, Shrublands, and Arid Lands

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KEY FINDINGS

- Agricultural lands, including croplands and grazinglands (grasslands, shrublands, and arid lands), occupy 789 million ha (47% of the land area of North America) and contain 78.5 ± 19.5 Gt C (17.4% of North American terrestrial carbon) in the soil alone.
- Agricultural lands in the United States and Canada are currently near neutral with respect to their soil carbon balance (but less so for Mexico because of ongoing land use change). Although agricultural soils are estimated to be sequestering currently $6\text{--}15.5$ Mt C yr⁻¹, the cultivation of organic soils releases $5.3\text{--}10.3$ Mt C yr⁻¹. The emissions of carbon from fossil fuel inputs to agriculture (46.3 Mt C yr⁻¹) and the manufacture of fertilizer (6.4 Mt C yr⁻¹) yields a net source from the agricultural sector of $27\text{--}41$ Mt C yr⁻¹.
- As much as 120 Mt C yr⁻¹ may be accumulating through woody encroachment of arid and semi-arid lands of North America. This value is highly uncertain.
- The emissions and sequestration of carbon on agricultural lands are mainly determined by two conditions: management and changes in the environment. The effects of converting forest and grassland to agricultural lands and of agricultural management (e.g., cultivation, conservation tillage) are reasonably well known and have been responsible for historic losses of carbon in Canada and the United States (and for current losses in Mexico); the effects of climate change or of elevated concentrations of atmospheric CO₂ are uncertain.

- 1 • Conservation-oriented management of agricultural lands (e.g., use of conservation tillage, improved
2 cropping and grazing systems, reduced bare fallow, set-asides of fragile lands, and restoration of
3 degraded soils) can significantly increase soil carbon sequestration.
 - 4 • Projections of future trends in agricultural land area and soil carbon stocks are unavailable or highly
5 uncertain because of uncertainty in future land-use change and agricultural management practice.
 - 6 • Annualized prices of \$15/tonne CO₂, would yield mitigation amounts of 168 Mt CO₂ yr⁻¹ through
7 agricultural soil C sequestration and 53 Mt CO₂ yr⁻¹ from fossil fuel use reduction. At lower prices of
8 \$5/tonne CO₂, the corresponding values would be 123 Mt CO₂ yr⁻¹ and 32 Mt CO₂ yr⁻¹, respectively.
 - 9 • Policies designed to suppress emissions of one greenhouse gas need to consider complex
10 interactions to ensure that *net* emissions are reduced. For example, increased use of fertilizer or
11 irrigation may increase crop residues and carbon sequestration, but may stimulate emissions of CH₄
12 or N₂O.
 - 13 • Many of the practices that lead to carbon sequestration and reduced CO₂ and CH₄ emissions from
14 agricultural lands not only increase production efficiencies, but lead to environmental co-benefits, for
15 example, improved soil fertility, reduced erosion and pesticide immobilization.
 - 16 • An expanded network of intensive research sites is needed to better understand the effects of
17 management on carbon cycling and storage in agricultural systems. An extensive national-level
18 network of soil monitoring sites in which changes in carbon stocks are directly measured is needed to
19 reduce the uncertainty in the inventory of agricultural carbon. Better information about the spatial
20 extent of woody encroachment, the amount and growth of woody biomass, and variation in impacts
21 on soil carbon stocks would help reduce the large uncertainty of the carbon impacts of woody
22 encroachment.
-

23
24

25

26 INVENTORY

27 Background

28 Agricultural lands, including croplands and grazing lands—grasslands, shrublands, and arid lands¹—
29 occupy 47% of the land area in North America (59% in the United States, 70% in Mexico, and 11% in
30 Canada), and contain 17.4% of the terrestrial carbon (Pacala *et al.*, 2006). These lands differ from other
31 types of ecosystems in that most of their carbon is held in soils. Live vegetation in cultivated systems
32 generally contains less than 5% of the total carbon, whereas vegetation in grazing lands contains a greater
33 proportion (5–30%), but still less than that in forested systems (30–65%). These systems in North
34 America contain 78.5±19.5 (±1SE) Gt C in the soil (Table 10-1). Significant increases in vegetation

¹We refer collectively to these lands as grazing lands since grazing is their primary use, even though not all of these lands are grazed.

1 carbon stocks in some grazing lands have been observed and, together with soil carbon stocks from
2 croplands and grazing lands, likely contribute significantly to the large North American terrestrial carbon
3 sink (Houghton *et al.*, 1999; Pacala *et al.*, 2001; Eve *et al.*, 2002; Ogle *et al.*, 2003). These lands also emit
4 greenhouse gases: fossil fuel use for on-farm machinery and buildings, for manufacture of agricultural
5 inputs, and for transportation account for 3–5% of total CO₂ emissions in developed countries (Enquete
6 Commission, 1995); activities on agricultural and grazing lands, like livestock production, animal waste
7 management, biomass burning, and rice cultivation, emit 35% of global anthropogenic CH₄ (27% of
8 United States, 31% of Mexican, and 27% of Canadian CH₄ emissions) (Mosier *et al.*, 1998b; CISCC,
9 2001; Matin *et al.*, 2004; EPA, 2005); and agricultural and grazing lands are the largest anthropogenic
10 source of N₂O emissions (CAST, 2004; see Text Box 1). However, agricultural lands are actively
11 managed and have the capacity to take up more carbon into soil; thus improving management could lead
12 to substantial reductions in CO₂ and CH₄ emissions and could sequester carbon to offset emissions from
13 other lands or sectors.

14
15
16 **Table 10-1. Carbon pools in agricultural and grazing lands in Canada, Mexico, and the United**
17 **States; the area (M ha) for each climatic zone are in parentheses.** Carbon pools for undisturbed native
18 systems were derived using the intersection of MODIS-IGBP^a land cover types (Friedl *et al.*, 2002) and
19 mean soil carbon contents to 1m depth from Sombroek *et al.* (1993) spatially arrayed using FAO soil
20 classes (ISRIC, 2002).

21 22 **Carbon Dioxide Fluxes from Agricultural and Grazing Land**

23 The basic processes governing the carbon balance of agricultural and grazing lands are the same as
24 for other ecosystems: the photosynthetic uptake and assimilation of CO₂ into organic compounds and the
25 release of gaseous carbon through respiration (primarily CO₂ but also CH₄). In agricultural lands, carbon
26 assimilation is directed towards production of food, fiber, and forage by manipulating species
27 composition and growing conditions. Biomass, being predominantly herbaceous (i.e., non-woody), is a
28 small, transient carbon pool (compared to forests) and hence soils constitute the dominant carbon stock.
29 Cropland systems can be among the most productive ecosystems, but restricted growing season length,
30 fallow periods, and grazing-induced shifts in species composition or production can reduce carbon uptake
31 relative to that in other ecosystems. These factors, along with tillage-induced soil disturbances and
32 removal of plant carbon through harvest, have depleted soil carbon stocks by 20–40% or more from pre-
33 cultivated conditions (Davidson and Ackerman, 1993; Houghton and Goodale, 2004). Soil organic carbon
34 stocks in grazing lands (see Text Box 2 for information on inorganic soil carbon stocks) have been

1 depleted to a lesser degree than for cropland (Ogle *et al.*, 2004), and in some regions biomass has
2 increased due to suppression of disturbance and subsequent woody encroachment (see Text Box 3).
3 Woody encroachment is potentially a significant sink for atmospheric CO₂, but the magnitude of the sink
4 is poorly constrained (Houghton *et al.*, 1999; Pacala *et al.*, 2001). Increased decomposition rates of
5 aboveground litter and harvest removal of some (30–50% of forage in grazing systems, 40–50% in grain
6 crops) or all (e.g., corn for silage) of the aboveground biomass, have drastically altered carbon cycling
7 within agricultural lands and thus the sources and sinks of CO₂ to the atmosphere.

8 Much of the carbon lost from agricultural land soil and biomass pools can be recovered with changes
9 in management practices that increase carbon inputs, stabilize carbon within the system, or reduce carbon
10 losses (Figure 10-1; Table 10-2), while still maintaining outputs of food, fiber, and forage. Within Canada
11 and the United States, mineral soils have been sequestering 0.1 and 6.5–16 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Smith *et al.*, 1997;
12 Smith *et al.*, 2001b; Ogle *et al.*, 2003), respectively, largely through improved practices on annual
13 cropland. Conversion of agricultural land to grassland, like under the Conservation Reserve Program in
14 the United States (6 Mt C yr⁻¹ on 14 M ha of land), and afforestation have also sequestered carbon in
15 agricultural and grazing lands. In contrast, cultivation of organic soils (e.g., peat-derived soils) is
16 releasing an estimated 0.1 and 5-10 Mt C yr⁻¹ from soils in Canada and the United States (Ogle *et al.*,
17 2003; Matin *et al.*, 2004). Compared with other systems, the high productivity and management-induced
18 disturbances of agricultural systems promote movement and redistribution (through erosion, runoff and
19 leaching) of organic and inorganic carbon, sequestering potentially large amounts of carbon in sediments
20 and water (Raymond and Cole, 2003; Smith *et al.* 2005; Yoo *et al.*, 2005). However, the net impact of
21 soil erosion on carbon emissions to the atmosphere remains highly uncertain.

22
23 **Figure 10-1. North American agricultural and grazing land CO₂ (left side) and methane (right side)**
24 **fluxes for the years around 2000.** Negative values indicate net flux from the atmosphere to soil and
25 biomass carbon pools. All data are from Canadian (Matin *et al.*, 2004) and U.S. (EPA, 2005) National
26 Inventories and from the second Mexican National Communication (CISCC, 2001), except for Canadian
27 [from Kulshreshtha *et al.* (2000)] and U.S. fossil fuel inputs [from Lal *et al.* (1998)] and woody
28 encroachment [from Houghton *et al.* (1999)]. Values are for 2003 for the United States and Canada and
29 1998 for Mexico. A global warming potential of 23 for methane was used to convert emissions of CH₄ to
30 CO₂ equivalents (IPCC, 2001) and a factor of 12/44 to convert from CO₂ to carbon. Asterisks indicate
31 unavailable data. Data ranges are indicated by error bars where available.

32
33 **Table 10-2. North American agricultural and grazing land carbon fluxes for the years around 2000.**
34 Negative numbers (in parentheses) indicate net flux from the atmosphere to soil and biomass carbon pools.
35 Unless otherwise noted, data are from Canadian (Matin *et al.*, 2004) and U.S. (EPA, 2005) National

1 Inventories and from the second Mexican National Communication (CISCC, 2001). Values are for 2003 for
2 United States and Canada and 1998 for Mexico. A global warming potential of 23 for methane was used to
3 convert emissions of CH₄ to CO₂ equivalents (IPCC, 2001) and a factor of 12/44 to convert from CO₂ to
4 carbon.

5
6 Production, delivery, and use of field equipment, fertilizer, seed, pesticides, irrigation water, and
7 maintenance of animal production facilities contribute 3–5% of total fossil fuel CO₂ emissions in
8 developed countries (Enquete Commission, 1995). On-farm fossil fuel emissions plus CO₂ emissions
9 embodied in applied fertilizers and pesticides contribute emissions of 28 Mt C yr⁻¹ within the United
10 States (Lal *et al.*, 1998) and 2.8 Mt C yr⁻¹ in Canada (Sobool and Kulshreshtha, 2005). Energy
11 consumption for heating and cooling high intensity animal production facilities is among the largest CO₂
12 emitters within the agricultural sector (Enquete Commission, 1995).

13 Much of the ammonia production and urea application (U.S.: 4.3 Mt C yr⁻¹; Mexico: 0.4 Mt C yr⁻¹;
14 Canada: 1.7 Mt C yr⁻¹) and phosphoric acid manufacture (U.S.: 0.4 Mt C yr⁻¹; Mexico: 0.2 Mt C yr⁻¹;
15 Canada: not reported) are devoted to agricultural uses.

16 17 **Methane Fluxes from Agricultural and Grazing Lands**

18 Cropland and grazing land soils act as both sources and sinks for atmospheric CH₄ (Figure 10-1;
19 Table 10-2). Methane formation is an anaerobic process and is most significant in waterlogged soils, like
20 those under paddy rice cultivation (U.S.: 0.328 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹; Mexico: 0.015 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹; Canada:
21 negligible, not reported). Methane is also formed by incomplete biomass combustion of crop residues
22 (U.S.: 0.038 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹; Mexico: 0.011 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹; Canada: negligible, not reported). Methane
23 oxidation in soils is a global sink for about 5% of CH₄ produced annually and is mainly limited by CH₄
24 diffusion into the soil. However, intensive cropland management tends to reduce soil methane
25 consumption relative to forests and extensively grazing lands (CAST, 2004). Recent research has shown
26 that live plant biomass and litter produce substantial amounts of CH₄, potentially making plants as large a
27 source of CH₄ as livestock (Keppler *et al.*, 2006). If this is the case, activities that increase plant
28 biomass—and sequester CO₂—may lead to increased CH₄ production (Keppler *et al.*, 2006).

29 30 **Methane Fluxes from Livestock**

31 Enteric fermentation (the process of organic matter breakdown by gut flora within the gastrointestinal
32 tract of animals, particularly ruminants) allows for the digestion of fibrous materials that provide energy
33 to microbes and their hosts, but the extensive fermentation of the ruminant diet requires 5–7% of the
34 dietary gross energy to be belched out as CH₄ to sustain the anaerobic processes (Johnson and Johnson,

1 1995). Methane emissions from livestock contribute significantly to total CH₄ emissions in the United
2 States (54 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹, 21% of total U.S. CH₄ emissions), Canada (0.8 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹, 22% of total)
3 (Sobool and Kulshreshtha, 2005), and Mexico (2.0 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹, 27% of total) with the vast majority of
4 enteric CH₄ emissions are from beef (72%) and dairy cattle (23%). Emissions from ruminants are tightly
5 coupled to feed consumption, since CH₄ emission per unit of feed energy is consistent, except for feedlot
6 cattle with diets high in cereal grain contents, for which the fractional loss falls to one-third to one-half of
7 normal rates (Johnson and Johnson, 1995). Between 1990 and 2002, CH₄ emissions from enteric
8 fermentation fell 2% in the United States but increased by 20% in Canada (EPA, 2000; Matin *et al.*,
9 2004).

10 Methane emissions during manure storage (U.S.: 1.9 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹; Mexico: 0.06 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹;
11 Canada: 0.3 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹) are governed by the amount of degradable organic matter, degree of anoxia,
12 storage temperature, and duration of storage. Unlike enteric CH₄, the major sources of manure CH₄
13 emissions in the United States are from swine (44%) and dairy cattle (39%). Manure CH₄ production is
14 greater for production systems with anoxic lagoons, largely anoxic pits, or manure handled or stored as
15 slurry. Between 1990 and 2002, CH₄ emissions from manure management increased 25% in the United
16 States and 21% in Canada (EPA, 2000; Matin *et al.*, 2004).

17 18 **DRIVERS AND TRENDS**

19 The extent to which agricultural options will contribute to greenhouse gas mitigation will largely
20 depend on government policy decisions, but mitigation opportunities will also be constrained by changing
21 environmental conditions, i.e., global warming (NAS, 2001) may make it more difficult to reduce
22 emissions from cropland and grazing lands (see discussion below). Estimates from national inventories
23 suggest that U.S. and Canadian agricultural soils are currently near neutral or small net sinks for CO₂,
24 which has occurred as a consequence of changing management (e.g., reduced tillage intensity) and
25 government programs designed for purposes other than greenhouse gas mitigation (e.g., soil conservation,
26 commodity regulation). However, to realize the much larger potential for soil carbon sequestration and for
27 significant reductions in CH₄ (and N₂O) emissions, specific policies targeted at greenhouse gas reductions
28 are required. It is generally recognized that farmers (and other economic actors) are, as a group, 'profit-
29 maximizers,' which implies that to change from current practices to ones that reduce net emissions,
30 farmers will incur additional costs (termed 'opportunity cost'). Hence, where the incentives (e.g., carbon
31 offset market payments, government subsidies) to adopt new practices exceed the opportunity costs,
32 farmers will adopt new practices. Crop productivity, production input expenses, marketing costs, etc.
33 (which determine profitability) vary widely within (and between) countries. Thus, the payment needed to
34 achieve a unit of emission reductions will vary, among and within regions. In general, each successive

1 increment of carbon sequestration or emission reduction comes at a progressively higher cost (this
2 relationship is often shown in the form of an upward bending marginal cost curve).

3 Feedbacks between temperature and soil carbon stocks could counteract efforts to reduce greenhouse
4 gases via carbon sequestration within agricultural ecosystems. Increased temperatures tend to increase the
5 rate of biological processes—including plant respiration and organic matter decay and CO₂ release by soil
6 organisms—particularly in temperate climates that prevail across most of North America. Because soil
7 carbon stocks, including those in agricultural lands, contain such large amounts of carbon, small
8 percentage increases in rate of soil organic matter decomposition could lead to substantially increased
9 emissions (Jenkinson *et al.*, 1991; Cox *et al.*, 2000). There is currently a scientific debate about the
10 relative temperature sensitivity of the different constituents making up soil organic matter (e.g., Kätterer
11 *et al.*, 1998; Giardina and Ryan, 2000; Ågren and Bosatta, 2002; Knorr *et al.*, 2005), reflecting
12 uncertainty in the possible degree and magnitude of climate change feedbacks. Despite this uncertainty,
13 the potential for climate feedbacks to influence the carbon balance of agricultural systems by perturbing
14 productivity (and carbon input rates) and organic matter turnover, and potentially soil N₂O and CH₄
15 fluxes, cannot be overlooked.

17 **OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT**

18 **Carbon Sequestration**

19 Agricultural and grazing land management practices capable of increasing carbon inputs or
20 decreasing carbon outputs, while still maintaining yields, can be divided into two classes: those that
21 impact carbon inputs, and those that affect carbon release through decomposition and disturbance.
22 Reversion to native vegetation or setting agricultural land aside as grassland, such as in the Canadian
23 Prairie Cover Program and the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program, can increase the proportion of
24 photosynthesized carbon retained in the system and sequester carbon in the soil² (Post and Kwon, 2000;
25 Follett *et al.*, 2001b) (Figure 10-2). In annual cropland, improved crop rotations, yield enhancement
26 measures, organic amendments, cover crops, improved fertilization and irrigation practices, and reduced
27 bare fallow tend to increase productivity and carbon inputs, and thus soil carbon stocks (Lal *et al.*, 1998;
28 Paustian *et al.*, 1998; VandenBygaart *et al.*, 2003) (Figure 10-2). Tillage, traditionally used for soil
29 preparation and weed control, disturbs the soil and stimulates decomposition and loss of soil carbon.
30 Practices that substantially reduce (reduced-till) or eliminate (no-till) tillage-induced disturbances are

²The bulk of carbon sequestration potential in agricultural and grazing lands is restricted to soil carbon pools, though carbon can be sequestered in woody biomass in agroforestry systems (Sheinbaum and Masera, 2000). Woody encroachment on grasslands can also store substantial amounts of carbon in biomass, but the phenomenon is neither well-controlled nor desirable from the standpoint of livestock production, since it results in decreased forage productivity, and the impacts on soil carbon pools are highly variable and poorly understood.

1 being increasingly adopted and generally increase soil carbon stocks while maintaining or enhancing
2 productivity levels (Paustian *et al.*, 1997; Ogle *et al.*, 2003) (Figure 10-2). Estimates of the technical
3 potential for annual cropland soil carbon sequestration are on the order of 50–100 Mt C yr⁻¹ in the United
4 States (Lal *et al.*, 2003; Sperow *et al.*, 2003) and approximately 5 Mt C yr⁻¹ in Canada (Boehm *et al.*,
5 2004).

6
7 **Figure 10-2. Relative soil carbon following implementation of new agricultural or grassland**
8 **management practices.** Conventionally tilled, medium-input cultivated land and moderately grazed
9 grasslands with moderate inputs are defaults for agricultural and grazing lands, respectively. Default soil
10 carbon stocks (like those in Table 10-1) can be multiplied by one or more emission factors to estimate
11 carbon sequestration rates. Temperature/precipitation divisions are the same as those described in Table 10-
12 1. Data are from Nabuurs *et al.* (2004) and Ogle *et al.* (2004).

13
14 Within grazing lands, historical overgrazing has substantially reduced productive capacity in many
15 areas, leading to loss of soil carbon stocks (Conant and Paustian, 2002) (Figure 10-2). Conversely,
16 improved grazing management and production inputs—like fertilizer, organic amendments, and
17 irrigation—can increase productivity, carbon inputs, and soil carbon stocks, potentially storing 0.44 Mt C
18 yr⁻¹ in Canada (Lynch *et al.*, 2005) and as much as 33.2 Mt C yr⁻¹ in the United States (Follett *et al.*,
19 2001a).

20 21 **Fossil Fuel-Derived Emission Reductions**

22 The efficiency with which on-farm (from tractors and machinery) and off-farm (from production of
23 agricultural input) energy inputs are converted to agricultural products varies several-fold (Lal, 2004).
24 Where more energy-efficient practices can be substituted for less efficient ones, fossil fuel CO₂ emissions
25 can be reduced (Lal, 2004). For example, converting from conventional plowing to no-tillage can reduce
26 on-farm fossil fuel emissions by 25–80% (Frye, 1984; Robertson *et al.*, 2000) and total fossil fuel
27 emissions by 14–25% (West and Marland, 2003). Substitution of legumes for mineral nitrogen can reduce
28 energy input by 15% in cropping systems incorporating legumes (Pimentel *et al.*, 2005). More efficient
29 heating and cooling (e.g., better building insulation) could reduce CO₂ emissions associated with housed
30 animal (e.g., dairy) facilities. Substitution of crop-derived for fossil fuels could decrease net emissions.

31 Energy intensity (energy per unit product) for the U.S. agricultural sector has declined since the 1970s
32 (Paustian *et al.*, 1998). Between 1990 and 2000, fossil fuel emissions on Canadian farms increased by
33 35% (Sobool and Kulshreshtha, 2005).

34

1 Methane Emission Reduction

2 Reducing flood duration and decreasing organic matter additions to paddy rice fields can reduce CH₄
3 emissions. Soil amendments such as ammonium sulfate and calcium carbide inhibit CH₄ formation.
4 Coupled with adoption of new rice cultivars that favor lower CH₄ emissions, these management practices
5 could reduce CH₄ emission from paddy rice systems by as much as 40% (Mosier *et al.*, 1998b).

6 Biomass burning is uncommon in most Canadian and U.S. crop production systems; less than 3% of
7 crop residues are burned annually in the United States (EPA, 2004). Biomass burning in conjunction with
8 land clearing and with subsistence agriculture still occurs in Mexico, but these practices are declining.
9 The primary path for emission reduction is reducing residue burning (CAST, 2004).

10 Refinement of feed quality, feed rationing, additives, and livestock production efficiency chains can
11 all reduce CH₄ emissions from ruminant livestock with minimal impacts on productivity or profits
12 (CAST, 2004). Boadi *et al.* (2004) review several examples of increases in energy intensity. Wider
13 adoption of more efficient practices could reduce CH₄ production from 5–8% to 2–3% of gross feed
14 energy (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 1999), reducing CH₄ emissions by 20–30% (Mosier *et al.*,
15 1998b).

16 Methane emissions from manure storage are proportional to duration of storage under anoxic
17 conditions. Handling solid rather than liquid manure, storing manure for shorter periods of time, and
18 keeping storage tanks cool will limit emissions from stored manure (CAST, 2004). More important,
19 capture of CH₄ produced during anaerobic decomposition of manure—in covered lagoons or small- or
20 large-scale digesters—can reduce emissions by 70–80% (Mosier *et al.*, 1998b). Use of digester systems is
21 spreading in the United States, with 50 digesters currently in operation and 60 systems in construction or
22 planned (NRCS, 2005). Energy production using CH₄ captured during manure storage will reduce energy
23 demands and associated CO₂ emissions.

24

25 Environmental Co-benefits from Carbon Sequestration and Emission Reduction

26 Activities

27 Many of the practices that lead to carbon sequestration and reduced CO₂ and CH₄ emissions not only
28 increase production efficiencies but also lead to environmental co-benefits. Practices that sequester
29 carbon in agricultural and grazing land soils improve soil fertility, buffering capacity, and pesticide
30 immobilization (Lal, 2002; CAST, 2004). Increasing soil carbon content makes the soil more easily
31 workable and reduces energy requirements for field operations (CAST, 2004). Decreasing soil
32 disturbance and retaining more surface crop residues enhance water infiltration and prevent wind and
33 water erosion, improving air quality. Increased water retention plus improved fertilizer management
34 reduces nitrogen losses and subsequent NO₃⁻ leaching and downstream eutrophication.

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Economics and Policy Assessment

Policies for agricultural mitigation activities can range from transfer payments (as subsidies, tax credits, etc.) to encourage greenhouse gas mitigating practices (or taxes or penalties to discourage practices with high emissions), to emission offset trading in a free market-based system with governmental sanction. Currently the policy context of the three countries differs greatly. Canada and the United States are both Annex 1 (developed countries) within the UNFCCC, but Canada is obligated to mandatory emission reductions as a party to the Kyoto Protocol, while the United States currently maintains a national, voluntary emission reduction policy outside of Kyoto. Mexico is a non-Annex 1 (developing country) and thus is not currently subject to mandatory emission reductions under Kyoto.

At present there is relatively little practical experience upon which to judge the costs and effectiveness of agricultural mitigation activities—governments are still in the process of developing policies and, moreover, the economics of various mitigation activities will only be known when there is a significant economic incentive for emission reductions, e.g., through regulatory emission caps or government-sponsored bids and contracts. However, several economic analyses have been performed in the United States, using a variety of models (e.g., McCarl and Schneider, 2001; Antle *et al.*, 2003; Lewandrowski *et al.*, 2004). Most studies have focused on carbon sequestration, and less work has been done on the economics of reducing CH₄ and N₂O emissions. While results differ between models and for different parts of the country, some preliminary conclusions have been drawn (see Boehm *et al.*, 2004; CAST, 2004).

- Significant amounts (10–70 Mt yr⁻¹) of carbon sequestration in soils can be achieved at low to moderate costs (\$10–100 per metric ton of carbon).
- Mitigation practices that maintain the primary income source (i.e., crop/livestock production), e.g., conservation tillage, pasture improvement, have a lower cost/ton sequestered carbon compared with practices where mitigation would be a primary income source, such as land set-asides, even if the latter have a higher biological sequestration potential.
- At higher prices, major shifts in land use in favor of energy crops and afforestation may occur, at the expense of annual cropland and pasture.
- Policies based on per-ton payments (for carbon sequestered) are more economically efficient than per-hectare payments (for adopting specific practices), although the former have a higher verification cost (i.e., measuring actual carbon sequestered versus measuring adoption of specific farming practices on a given area of land).

1 A recent study commissioned by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2005b), estimated
2 economic potential for some agricultural mitigation options, assuming constant price scenarios for 2010–
3 2110, where the price represents the incentive required for the mitigation activity. Annualized prices of
4 \$15/ton of CO₂ would yield mitigation amounts of 168 Mt CO₂ per year through agricultural soil carbon
5 sequestration and 53 Mt CO₂ per year from fossil fuel use reduction (compare with estimated U.S.
6 national ecosystem carbon sink of 1760 Mt CO₂ per year). At lower prices of \$5/ton CO₂, the
7 corresponding values would be 123 Mt CO₂ per year (for soil sequestration) and 32 Mt CO₂ per year (for
8 fossil fuel reduction), respectively, reflecting the effect of price on the supply of mitigation activities.
9

10 Other Policy Considerations

11 Agricultural mitigation of CO₂ through carbon sequestration and emission reductions for CH₄ (and
12 N₂O), differ in ways that impact policy design and implementation. Direct emission reductions of CH₄
13 and CO₂ from fossil fuel use are considered ‘permanent’ reductions, while carbon sequestration is a ‘non-
14 permanent’ reduction, in that carbon stored through conservation practices could potentially be re-emitted
15 if management practices revert back to the previous state or otherwise change so that the stored carbon is
16 lost. This *permanence* issue applies to all forms of carbon sinks. In addition, a given change in
17 management (e.g., tillage reduction, pasture improvement, afforestation) will stimulate carbon storage for
18 a finite duration. For many practices, soil carbon storage will tend to level off at a new equilibrium level
19 after 15–30 years, after which there is no further accumulation of carbon (West and Wali, 2002). Thus, to
20 maintain these higher stocks, the management practices will need to be maintained. Key implications for
21 policy are that the value of sequestered carbon will be discounted compared to direct emission reductions
22 to compensate for the possibility of future emissions. Alternatively, long-term contracts will be needed to
23 build and maintain C stocks, which will tend to increase the price per unit of sequestered carbon.
24 However, even temporary storage of carbon has economic value (CAST, 2004), and various proposed
25 concepts of leasing carbon storage or applying discount rates could accommodate carbon sequestration as
26 part of a carbon offset trading system (CAST, 2004). In addition, switching to practices that increase soil
27 carbon (and hence improve soil fertility) can be more profitable to farmers in the long-run, so that
28 additional incentives to maintain the practices once they become well established may not be necessary
29 (Paustian *et al.*, 2006).

30 Another policy issue relating to carbon sequestration is *leakage* (also termed ‘slippage’ in
31 economics), whereby mitigation actions in one area (e.g., geographic region, production system) stimulate
32 additional emissions elsewhere. For forest carbon sequestration, leakage is a major concern—for
33 example, reducing harvest rates in one area (thereby maintaining higher biomass carbon stocks) can
34 stimulate increased cutting and reduction in stored carbon in other areas, as was seen with the reduction in

1 harvesting in the Pacific Northwest during the 1990s (Murray *et al.*, 2004). Preliminary studies suggest
2 that leakage is of minor concern for agricultural carbon sequestration, since most practices would have
3 little or no effect on the supply and demand of agricultural commodities. However, there are uncertain
4 and conflicting views on whether land-set asides—where land is taken out of agricultural production,
5 such as the Conservation Reserve Program in the United States, might be subject to significant leakage.

6 A further question, relevant to policies for carbon sequestration, is how practices for conserving
7 carbon affect emissions of other greenhouse gases. Of particular importance is the interaction of carbon
8 sequestration with N₂O emission, because N₂O is such a potent greenhouse gas (Robertson and Grace,
9 2004; Six *et al.*, 2004; Gregorich *et al.*, 2005). (See Text Box 4). In some environs, carbon-sequestration
10 practices, such as reduced tillage, can stimulate N₂O emissions thereby offsetting part of the benefit;
11 elsewhere, carbon-conserving practices may suppress N₂O emissions, amplifying the net benefit (Smith *et*
12 *al.*, 2001a; Smith and Conen, 2004; Conant *et al.*, 2005; Helgason *et al.*, 2005).

13 Similarly, carbon-sequestration practices might affect emissions of CH₄, if the practice, such as
14 increased use of forages in rotations, leads to higher livestock numbers. These examples demonstrate that
15 policies designed to suppress emission of one greenhouse gas need to also consider complex interactions
16 to ensure that *net* emissions are reduced.

17 A variety of other factors will affect the willingness of farmers to adopt greenhouse gas reducing
18 practices and the efficacy of agricultural policies, including perceptions of risk, information and extension
19 efforts, technological developments and social and ethical values (Paustian *et al.*, 2006) Many of these
20 factors are difficult to incorporate into traditional economic analyses. Pilot mitigation projects, along
21 with additional research using integrated ecosystem and economic assessment approaches (e.g., Antle *et*
22 *al.*, 2001), will be needed to get a clearer picture of the actual potential of agriculture to contribute to
23 greenhouse gas mitigation efforts.

24 25 **RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS**

26 Expanding the network of intensive research sites dedicated to understanding basic processes,
27 coupled with national-level networks of soil monitoring/validation sites could reduce inventory
28 uncertainty and contribute to attributing changes in ecosystem carbon stocks to changes in land
29 management (see Bellamy *et al.*, 2005). Expansion of both networks should be informed by information
30 about how different geographic areas and ecosystems contribute to uncertainty and the likelihood that
31 reducing uncertainty could inform policy decisions. For example, changes in ecosystem carbon stocks due
32 to woody encroachment on grasslands constitute one of the largest, but least certain, aspects of terrestrial
33 carbon cycling in North America (Houghton *et al.*, 1999; Pacala *et al.*, 2001). Better information about
34 the spatial extent of woody encroachment, the amount and growth of woody biomass, and variation in

1 impacts on soil carbon stocks would help reduce that uncertainty. Identifying location, cause, and size of
2 this sink could help identify practices that may promote continued sequestration of carbon and would
3 constrain estimates of carbon storage in other lands, possibly helping identify other policy options.
4 Uncertainty in land use, land use change, soil carbon responses to management (e.g., tillage) on particular
5 soils, and impacts of cultivation on soil carbon stocks (e.g., impacts of erosion) are the largest
6 contributors to uncertainty in the Canadian and U.S. national agricultural greenhouse gas inventories
7 (Ogle *et al.*, 2003; VandenBygaart *et al.*, 2004). Finally, if the goal of a policy instrument is to reduce
8 greenhouse gas emissions, net impacts on CO₂, CH₄, and N₂O emissions, which are not as well
9 understood, should be considered.

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16

1 **[START OF TEXT BOX 1]**

2
3 **Nitrous oxide (N₂O) emissions from agricultural and grazing lands**

4
5 Nitrous oxide (N₂O) is the most potent greenhouse gas in terms of global warming potential, with a radiative
6 forcing 296 times that of CO₂ (IPCC, 2001). Agricultural activities that add mineral or organic nitrogen—
7 fertilization, plant N₂ fixation, manure additions, etc.—augment naturally occurring N₂O emissions from
8 nitrification and denitrification by 0.0125 kg N₂O per kg N applied (Mosier *et al.*, 1998a). Agriculture contributes
9 significantly to total global N₂O fluxes through soil emissions (35% of total global emissions), animal waste
10 handling (12%), nitrate leaching (7%), synthetic fertilizer application (5%), grazing animals (4%), and crop residue
11 management (2%). Agriculture is the largest source of N₂O in the United States (78% of total N₂O emissions),
12 Canada (59%), and Mexico (76%).

13
14 **[END OF TEXT BOX 1]**

15
16
17
18
19 **[START OF TEXT BOX 2]**

20
21 **Inorganic soil carbon in agricultural and grazing ecosystems**

22
23 Inorganic carbon in the soil is comprised of primary carbonate minerals, such as calcite (CaCO₃) or dolomite
24 [CaMg(CO₃)₂], or secondary minerals formed when carbonate (CO₃²⁻), derived from soil CO₂, combines with base
25 cations (e.g., Ca²⁺, Mg²⁺) and precipitates within the soil profile in arid and semi-arid ecosystems. Weathering of
26 primary carbonate minerals in humid regions is a source of CO₂, whereas formation of secondary carbonates in drier
27 areas is a sink for CO₂; however, the magnitude of either flux is highly uncertain. Agricultural liming involves
28 addition of primary carbonate minerals to the acid soils to increase the pH. In the United States, about 1 Mt C yr⁻¹ is
29 emitted from liming (EPA, 2006).

30
31 **[END OF TEXT BOX 2]**

1 *[START OF TEXT BOX 3]*

2
3 **Impacts of woody encroachment into grasslands on ecosystem carbon stocks**

4
5 Encroachment of woody species into grasslands—caused by overgrazing-induced reduction in grass biomass
6 and subsequent reduction or elimination of grassland fires—is widespread in the United States and Mexico,
7 decreases forage production, and is unlikely to be reversed without costly mechanical intervention (Van Auken,
8 2000). Encroachment of woody species into grassland tends to increase biomass carbon stocks by $1 \text{ Mg C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$
9 (Pacala *et al.*, 2001), with estimated net sequestration of $0.12\text{--}0.13 \text{ Gt C yr}^{-1}$ in encroaching woody biomass
10 (Houghton *et al.*, 1999; Pacala *et al.*, 2001). In response to woody encroachment, soil carbon stocks can significantly
11 increase or decrease, thus predicting impacts on soil carbon or ecosystem carbon stocks is very difficult (Jackson *et*
12 *al.*, 2002).

13
14 *[END OF TEXT BOX 3]*

15
16
17
18
19 *[START OF TEXT BOX 4]*

20
21 **Agricultural and grazing land N₂O emission reductions**

22
23 When mineral soil nitrogen content is increased by nitrogen additions (i.e., fertilizer), a portion of that nitrogen
24 can be transformed to N₂O as a byproduct of two microbiological processes (nitrification and denitrification) and
25 lost to the atmosphere. Coincidental introduction of large amounts of easily decomposable organic matter and NO₃⁻
26 from either a plow down of cover crop or manure addition greatly stimulates denitrification under wet conditions
27 (Peoples *et al.*, 2004). Some practices intended to sequester atmospheric carbon in soil could prompt increases in
28 N₂O fluxes. For example, reducing tillage intensity tends to increase soil moisture, leading to increased N₂O fluxes,
29 particularly in wetter environments (Six *et al.*, 2004). Synchronizing organic amendment applications with plant
30 nitrogen uptake and minimizing manure storage under anoxic conditions can reduce N₂O emissions by 10–25% and
31 will increase nitrogen use efficiency which can decrease indirect emissions (in waterways) by 5–20% (CAST, 2004).

32
33 *[END OF TEXT BOX 4]*

1

Table 10-1. Carbon pools in agricultural and grazing lands in Canada, Mexico, and the United States; the area (M ha) for each climatic zone are in parentheses

Carbon pools for undisturbed native systems were derived using the intersection of MODIS-IGBP^a land cover types (Friedl *et al.*, 2002) and mean soil carbon contents to 1-m depth from Sombroek *et al.* (1993), spatially arrayed using Food and Agriculture Organization soil classes (ISRIC, 2002), and summed by climate zone. These stock values were then multiplied by soil carbon loss factors for tillage- and overgrazing-induced losses (Nabuurs *et al.*, 2004; Ogle *et al.*, 2004) to estimate current soil carbon stocks (see Figure 10-2)

Practice	Temperate dry ^{b,c}	Temperate wet	Tropical dry	Tropical wet	Total
Gt C					
Agricultural lands					
Canada	1.79±0.35 (17.3)	1.77±0.36 (22.1)	–	–	3.60±0.77 (39.4)
Mexico	–	–	0.24±0.06 (3.9)	0.53±0.14 (10.2)	0.81±0.22 (14.1)
United States	3.31±0.74 (34.8)	8.66±2.18 (108.4)	0.35±0.08 (5.6)	1.53±0.33 (28.4)	14.05±3.20 (177.1)
Total	5.16±1.07 (52.1)	10.57±2.42 (130.5)	0.61±0.14 (9.5)	2.18±0.54 (38.6)	18.5±4.16 (230.6)
Grazing lands					
Canada	2.17±0.55 (18.4)	9.49±1.27 (40.8)	–	–	11.66±4.88 (59.2)
Mexico	–	–	7.20±1.62 (99.1)	2.19±0.58 (20.3)	9.99±2.60 (119.4)
United States	16.89±3.62 (209.9)	5.67±1.39 (55.0)	4.26±0.98 (68.1)	4.30±0.89 (46.7)	32.88±7.18 (379.7)
Total	19.34±4.27 (228.3)	21.07±5.80 (95.8)	12.59±2.73 (167.1)	6.94±1.86 (67.0)	59.95±14.65 (558.2)

^aCropland area was derived from the IGBP cropland land cover class plus the area in the cropland/natural vegetation IGBP class in Mexico and one-half of the area in the cropland/natural vegetation IGBP class in Canada and the United States. Grazing land area includes IGBP woody savannas, savannas, and grasslands in all three countries, plus open shrubland in Mexico and open shrublands not in Alaska in the United States

^bTemperate zones are those located above 30° latitude. Tropical zones (<30° latitude) include subtropical regions.

^cDry climates were defined as those where the ratio of mean annual precipitation (MAP) to potential evapotranspiration (PET) is less than 1; in wet areas, MAP/PET >1.

1

Table 10-2. North American agricultural and grazing land carbon fluxes for the years around 2000

Negative numbers (in parentheses) indicate net flux from the atmosphere to soil and biomass carbon pools.

Unless otherwise noted, data are from Canadian (Matin *et al.*, 2004) and U.S. (EPA, 2005) National Inventories and from the second Mexican National Communication (CISCC, 2001). Values are for 2003 for United States and Canada and 1998 for Mexico. A global warming potential of 23 for methane was used to convert emissions of CH₄ to CO₂ equivalents (IPCC, 2001) and a factor of 12/44 to convert from CO₂ to carbon

	Canada	Mexico	United States	Total
	Mt C yr ⁻¹			
CO₂				
Total production and use of agricultural inputs	2.8 ^a	ND	28 ^b	46.3
Fertilizer manufacture	1.7	ND	4.7	6.4
Mineral soil carbon sequestration	(0.1)	ND	(6.5)–(16)	(6)–(15.5)
Organic soil cultivation	0.1	ND	5–10	5.3–10.3
Woody encroachment	ND	ND	(120) ^c	(120)
Total	19.8	ND	(88.8)–(93.3)	
	Mt C-equivalents yr ⁻¹			
CH₄				
Rice production	0	0.1	1.9	2.0
Biomass burning	0	0.1	0.2	0.3
Livestock	5.6	12.4	38.9	56.9
Manure	0.2	0.3	10.3	10.8
Total	5.8	12.9	51.3	70.0


ND = no data reported.

^aFrom Sobool and Kulshreshtha (2005).

^bFrom Lal *et al.* (1998).


^cFrom Houghton *et al.* (1999).

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2
 3 **Figure 10-1. North American agricultural and grazing land CO₂ (left side) and methane (right side)**
 4 **fluxes for the years around 2000.** Negative values indicate net flux from the atmosphere to soil and biomass
 5 carbon pools. All data are from Canadian (Matin *et al.*, 2004) and U.S. (EPA, 2005) National Inventories and from
 6 the second Mexican National Communication (CISCC, 2001), except for Canadian [from Kulshreshtha *et al.* (2000)]
 7 and U.S. fossil fuel inputs [from Lal *et al.* (1998)] and woody encroachment [from Houghton *et al.* (1999)]. Values
 8 are for 2003 for the United States and Canada and 1998 for Mexico. A global warming potential of 23 for methane
 9 was used to convert emissions of CH₄ to CO₂ equivalents (IPCC, 2001) and a factor of 12/44 to convert from CO₂ to
 10 carbon. Asterisks indicate unavailable data. Data ranges are indicated by error bars where available.

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Figure 10-2. Relative soil carbon following implementation of new agricultural or grassland management practices. Conventionally tilled, medium-input cultivated land and moderately grazed grasslands with moderate inputs are defaults for agricultural and grazing lands, respectively. Default soil carbon stocks (like those in Table 10-1) can be multiplied by one or more emission factors to estimate carbon sequestration rates. Temperature/precipitation divisions are the same as those described in Table 10-1. Data are from Nabuurs *et al.* (2004) and Ogle *et al.* (2004).

Chapter 11. North American Forests

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KEY FINDINGS

- North American forests contain more than 170 Gt of carbon, of which 28% is in live biomass and 72% is in dead organic matter.
- North American forests were a sink of approximately 350 Mt C yr⁻¹ for the decade of the 1990s. This number is highly uncertain.
- There is general understanding that forests of North America were a source of CO₂ to the atmosphere during the 19th and early 20th century as forests were converted to agricultural land; this process continues today in Mexico where forests are a source of 50-62 Mt C yr⁻¹. Only in more recent decades have forests of Canada and the United States become a sink as a consequence of the recovery of forests following the abandonment of agricultural land.
- Many factors that cause changes in carbon stocks of forests and wood products have been identified, including land-use change, timber harvesting, natural disturbance, increasing atmospheric CO₂, climate change, nitrogen deposition, and tropospheric ozone. Existing monitoring and modeling capability is still somewhat inadequate for a definitive assessment of the relative importance of these factors. Consequently, there is a lack of general consensus about how these different natural and anthropogenic factors contribute to the current sink, and the relative importance of factors probably varies by country.
- There have been several continental- to subcontinental-scale assessments of future changes in carbon and vegetation distribution in North America, but the resulting projections of future trends for North American forests are highly uncertain. Some of this is due to uncertainty in future climate, but there is also considerable uncertainty in forest response to climate change and in the interaction of climate with other natural and anthropogenic factors.

- 1 • Forest management strategies can be adapted to manipulate the carbon sink strength of forest
2 systems. The net effect of these management strategies will depend on the area of forests under
3 management, management objectives for resources other than carbon, and the type of disturbance
4 regime being considered.
 - 5 • Decisions concerning carbon storage in North American forests and their management as carbon
6 sources and sinks will be significantly improved by (1) filling gaps in inventories of carbon pools and
7 fluxes, (2) a better understanding of how management practices affect carbon in forests, and (3) the
8 increased availability of decision support tools for carbon management in forests.
-

12 INTRODUCTION

13 The forest area of North America totals 771 million hectares, about 20% of the world's forest area
14 (Food and Agriculture Organization 2001) (see Table 11-1). About 45% of this forest area is classified as
15 boreal, mostly in Canada and some in Alaska. Temperate and tropical forests constitute the remainder of
16 the forest area.

18 **Table 11-1. Area of forest land by biome and country, 2000 (1000 ha).**

19
20 North American forests are critical components of the global carbon cycle, exchanging large amounts
21 of CO₂ and other gases with the atmosphere and oceans. Forests and wood products constitute more than
22 60% of the total annual carbon sink on land in North America ($-557 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$; see Chapter 3), including
23 the -23 Mt C yr^{-1} stored in land defined by the census as urban and suburban trees in the United States. In
24 this chapter we present the most recent estimates of the role of forests in the North American carbon
25 balance, describe the main factors that affect forest carbon stocks and fluxes, and discuss management
26 options and research needs.

28 CARBON STOCKS AND FLUXES

29 Ecosystem Carbon Stocks And Pools

30 North American forests contain more than 170 Gt of carbon, of which 28% is in live biomass and
31 72% is in dead organic matter (Table 11-2). Among the three countries, Canada's forests contain the most
32 carbon and Mexico's forests the least.

34 **Table 11-2. Carbon stocks in forests by ecosystem carbon pool and country (Mt C).**

1 In Canada, mean carbon density values for forest biomass range from about 20 t C ha⁻¹ in the eastern
2 portion of the boreal forest to over 140 t C ha⁻¹ in Pacific Cordilleran forests. Dead organic matter (DOM)
3 values range from 138 t C ha⁻¹ in the western boreal to nearly 250 t C ha⁻¹ in the subarctic. DOM
4 represents 60–90% of total C density, with a countrywide average of 83% (Kurz and Apps, 1999).

5 In the United States, the total carbon currently stored in forest ecosystems is 66,575 Mt C (Heath and
6 Smith 2004), of which forest land in Alaska constitutes 14,000 Mt C (Birdsey and Heath, 1995). For the
7 conterminous United States, about 40% of the total ecosystem carbon is in the aboveground carbon pool,
8 which includes live trees, understory vegetation, standing and down deadwood, and the forest floor.
9 About 8% is in roots of live trees, and the remainder, a little more than half, is in the soil (Heath and
10 Smith, 2004). DOM represents roughly 63% of the total ecosystem carbon stocks in U.S. forests.

11 In Mexico, in unmanaged forested areas, temperate forests contain 4,500 Mt C, tropical forests
12 contain 4,100 Mt C, and semiarid forests contain 5,000 Mt C. In forest plantations 800 Mt C are
13 sequestered in long and short rotations, restoration, and bioenergy plantations. Managed temperate and
14 tropical forests store 500 Mt C, and protected forests store 2,000 Mt C. Agroforestry systems harbor
15 100 MtC.

17 **Net North American Forest Carbon Fluxes**

18 According to nearly all published studies, North American lands are a net carbon sink (Pacala *et al.*,
19 2001); however, the magnitude of the Canadian and Mexican forest contribution to the land carbon sink is
20 categorized as highly uncertain (meaning there is 95% certainty that the actual value is within $\pm 100\%$ of
21 the reported estimate). The estimated carbon sink of the United States forests is categorized as uncertain
22 (meaning that there is a 95% certainty that the actual value is within 50% of the reported estimate.) A
23 summary of currently available data from greenhouse gas inventories and other sources suggests that the
24 magnitude of the North American forest carbon sink was approximately $-350 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$ for the decade of
25 the 1990s (Table 11-3).

27 **Table 11-3. Change in carbon stocks for forests and wood products by country (Mt C yr⁻¹).**

29 Canadian forests and forest products may be a net sink of about $-109 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$ (Table 11-3). These
30 estimates pertain to the area of forest considered to be “managed” under international reporting
31 guidelines, which is 53% of the total area of Canada’s forests. The estimates also include the carbon
32 changes that result from land-use change. Changes in forest soil carbon are not included. High interannual
33 variability is averaged into this estimate—the annual change varied from approximately -190 Mt C in
34 1990 to -70 Mt C in 2003 (Environment Canada, 2005).

1 In the United States, forest ecosystem carbon stocks are estimated to be a net sink of $-236 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$,
2 and for wood products, the estimated sink is -57 Mt C yr^{-1} (Table 11-3). Most of the net sink is in
3 aboveground carbon pools, which account for $-146 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$ (Smith and Heath, 2005). The net sink for
4 the belowground carbon pool is estimated at -90 Mt C (Pacala *et al.*, 2001). The size of the carbon sink in
5 U.S. forest ecosystems appears to have declined slightly over the last decade (Smith and Heath, 2005). In
6 contrast, a steady or increasing supply of timber products now and in the foreseeable future (Haynes,
7 2003) means that the rate of increase in the wood products carbon pool is likely to remain steady.

8 For Mexico, the most comprehensive available estimate for the forest sector suggests a source of
9 $+52 \text{ Mt C}$ per year (Masera *et al.*, 1997). This estimate does not include changes in the wood products
10 carbon pool. The main cause of the estimated source is deforestation, which is offset to a much lesser
11 degree by restoration and recovery of degraded forestland.

12 Large-scale estimates of ecosystem carbon fluxes can only be explained by a more detailed
13 examination of the dynamics of individual forest stands that have unique combinations of disturbance
14 history, management intensity, vegetation, and site characteristics. How carbon fluxes change over time
15 in response to disturbance helps explain the aggregated estimates at larger scales. Extensive land-based
16 measurements of forest/atmosphere carbon exchange reveal patterns and causes of sink or source strength.
17 Representative estimates for North America are summarized in Appendix 11.A.

18

19 **TRENDS AND DRIVERS**

20 **Overview of Trends and Drivers of Change in Carbon Stocks**

21 Many factors that cause changes in carbon stocks of forests and wood products have been identified,
22 but there is some agreement on the relative magnitude of their influence (Barford *et al.*, 2001; Caspersen
23 *et al.*, 2000; Goodale *et al.*, 2002; Körner 2000; Schimel *et al.*, 2000). The long-term effects of land-use
24 change, timber harvesting, natural disturbance, increasing atmospheric CO_2 , climate change, nitrogen
25 deposition, and tropospheric ozone are all considered major factors affecting carbon stocks in forests and
26 wood products. Furthermore, the relative impacts of these different drivers can vary in magnitude,
27 depending on the type of forest and the kind of landscape involved. It is particularly difficult, yet very
28 important for policy and management, to separate the effects of direct human actions from natural factors.

29 North American forest ecosystems are a net C sink of roughly $-312 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$ (Table 11-3), but there
30 is a lack of consensus about precisely how natural and anthropogenic factors have contributed to this
31 overall estimate, and the relative importance of factors varies by country. In Canada, one study estimated
32 that impacts of wildfire and insects caused emissions of about $+40 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$ of carbon to the atmosphere
33 over the last two decades (Kurz and Apps, 1999). Yet another study concluded that the positive effects of
34 climate, CO_2 , and nitrogen deposition outweighed the effects of increased natural disturbances, making

1 Canada's forests a net carbon sink in the same period (Chen *et al.*, 2003). In the United States between
2 1953 and 1997, carbon stocks in forest ecosystems (excluding soils) increased by about 175 Mt C yr⁻¹,
3 and for the approximate year 2000, the average annual increase in forest ecosystem carbon stocks is
4 146 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Smith and Heath, 2005). This declining trend is based mainly on dynamics of vegetation
5 change following a long history of land-use change and management (Birdsey *et al.*, 2006). Mexico emits
6 52.3 Mt C yr⁻¹ as a consequence of land use change, including deforestation, forest degradation, forest
7 fires and forest regeneration (Masera *et al.* 1997; de Jong *et al.*, 2000). These driving factors are expected
8 to continue influencing forests in the near future.

10 **Effects of Land-Use Change**

11 Since 1990, approximately 549,000 ha of former cropland or grassland in Canada have been
12 abandoned and are reverting to forest, while 71,000 ha of forest have been converted to cropland,
13 grassland, or settlements, for a net increase in forest area of 478,000 ha (Environment Canada 2005).
14 Land-use change in Canada caused a net increase in total carbon storage of about -50 Mt C yr⁻¹ in 1990,
15 with the sink strength declining through 2003 to about -20 Mt C yr⁻¹.

16 In the last century more than 130 million hectares of land in the conterminous United States were
17 either afforested (62 million ha) or deforested (70 million ha) (Birdsey and Lewis 2003). Even though the
18 net change in the area of forest land was not significant during that time, the magnitude of the shifts in
19 land use caused significant redistribution of carbon stocks among land categories. Over the longer term,
20 Houghton *et al.* (1999) estimated that cumulative changes in forest carbon stocks for the period from
21 1700 to 1990 in the United States were about +25 Gt C, primarily from conversion of forestland to
22 agricultural use and reduction of carbon stocks for wood products.

23 Mexican forests emit +50 to +62 Mt C yr⁻¹ to the atmosphere as a consequence of land use change
24 (Masera *et al.*, 1997). In Mexico, deforestation and forest degradation were responsible for an annual
25 forest loss of 720,000 ha in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Masera *et al.*, 1997). The deforestation rate of
26 unmanaged forests was about 619,000 ha per year in 1990; however, based on total forest cover change
27 between 1993 and 2000, Palacio *et al.* (2000) estimated a deforestation rate of 880,000 ha yr⁻¹.
28 Deforestation is primarily driven by conversion of tropical forest to pastures (73% of deforested tropical
29 evergreen forest, and 61% of deforested tropical deciduous forest, Masera *et al.*, 2001). About 13 to 15%
30 of deforested land gets converted to agricultural land (Masera *et al.*, 2001). The highest deforestation rates
31 occur in the tropical deciduous forests (304,000 ha in 1990) and the lowest in temperate broadleaf forests
32 (59,000 ha in 1990) (Masera *et al.*, 2001). Carbon fluxes in tropical rainforests in La Selva Lacandona
33 resulting from a 31% reduction of closed forest cover between 1976 and 1996 correspond to total

1 emissions of 41.7 ± 12.1 Mt C [95% confidence interval (CI)] with 31.9 ± 7.0 Mt C (95% CI) from
2 vegetation and 9.5 ± 10.4 Mt C (95% CI) from soils (de Jong *et al.*, 2000).

4 **Effects of Forest Management**

5 The direct human impact on North American forests ranges from very minimal for protected areas to
6 very intense for plantations (Table 11-4). Between these extremes is the vast majority of forestland, which
7 has a wide range of human impacts that seems to vary by country.

9 **Table 11-4. Area of forestland by management class and country, 2000 (1000 ha).**

10
11 Forests and other wooded land in Canada occupy about 404 Mha, of which 214 Mha (53%) are under
12 active forest management (Environment Canada 2005). Managed forests are considered to be under the
13 direct influence of human activity and not reserved. Less than 1% of the area under active management is
14 harvested annually. Apps *et al.* (1999) used a carbon budget model to simulate carbon in harvested wood
15 products (HWP) for Canada. Approximately 800 Mt C were stored in the Canadian HWP sector in 1989,
16 of which 50 Mt C were in imported wood products, 550 Mt C in exported products, and 200 Mt C in
17 wood products produced and consumed domestically.

18 Between 1990 and 2000, about 4 Mha yr⁻¹ were harvested in the U.S., two-thirds by means of some
19 form of partial-cut harvest and one-third by a clearcut method (Birdsey and Lewis 2003). Between 1987
20 and 1997, about 1 Mha yr⁻¹ were planted with trees, and about 800,000 ha were treated to improve the
21 quality and/or quantity of timber produced (Birdsey and Lewis 2003). Harvesting in U.S. forests accounts
22 for substantially more tree mortality than natural causes such as wildfire and insect outbreaks (Smith *et*
23 *al.*, 2004). In 2002, about 170 Mt C of tree biomass were removed from forests by harvest, offset by 280
24 Mt C of net primary productivity (which includes growth and mortality from natural causes), making U.S.
25 tree biomass a net sink of -110 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Smith and Heath 2005). The harvested wood resulted in
26 -57 Mt C added to landfills and products in use, and an additional 88 Mt C were emitted from harvested
27 wood burned for energy (Skog and Nicholson 1998).

28 About 80% of the forested area in Mexico is socially owned by communal land grants (*ejidos*) and
29 rural communities. About 95% of timber harvesting occurs in native temperate forests (SEMARNAP
30 1996). Extensive overexploitation (e.g., illegal deforestation and fuelwood extraction) of natural resources
31 from forests have caused dramatic land degradation in forested land (21.4 Mha affected in 1990). It is
32 estimated that illegal wood extraction reaches 13.3 million m³ of wood every year (Torres 2004). Unlike
33 U.S. and Canadian forests, Mexican forests have been affected since pre-Columbian times by the almost
34 ubiquitous influence of a large proportion of the rural population, which controls the carbon fluxes and

1 stocks through fire; wood extraction; legal and illegal logging; shifting agriculture practices; and
2 conversion of land to plantations (e.g., coffee), fields for agricultural crops (e.g., sugar cane), and
3 pastures. Also, the differences in property rights, land ownership, and associated management policies
4 (and lack thereof), which are preeminently important in Mexico, where most of the land is communal,
5 also contribute to different socioeconomic controls over the carbon cycle.

7 **Effects of Climate and Atmospheric Chemistry**

8 Some studies indicate that the combined effects of climate and atmospheric chemistry changes on
9 carbon sequestration are likely to be significantly smaller than the effects of land management and land-
10 use change (Caspersen *et al.*, 2000; Schimel *et al.*, 2000), but existing monitoring and modeling
11 capability is still somewhat inadequate for a definitive assessment of the relative importance of these
12 factors (U.S. Climate Change Science Program 2003). Environmental factors, including climate
13 variability, nitrogen deposition, tropospheric ozone, and elevated CO₂, have been recognized as
14 significant factors affecting the carbon cycle of forests (Aber *et al.*, 2001; Ollinger *et al.*, 2002).
15 Experimental studies have clearly shown that rising atmospheric CO₂ increases photosynthesis in plants.
16 Recent reviews of ecosystem-scale studies known as Free Air CO₂ Exchange (FACE) experiments
17 suggest an increase in net primary productivity (NPP) of 12–23% over all species (Norby *et al.*, 2005;
18 Nowak *et al.*, 2004). However, at the ecosystem scale, it is uncertain whether this effect results in a
19 lasting increase in sequestered carbon or causes a more rapid cycling of carbon between the ecosystem
20 and the atmosphere (Korner *et al.*, 2005; Lichter 2005). Experiments have also shown that the effects of
21 rising CO₂ are significantly moderated by increasing tropospheric ozone (Karnosky *et al.*, 2003; Loya *et al.*,
22 2003). When nitrogen is also considered, reduced soil fertility limits the response to rising CO₂, but
23 nitrogen deposition can increase soil fertility to counteract that effect (Johnson *et al.*, 1998; Oren *et al.*,
24 2001).

26 **Effects of Natural Disturbances**

27 Wildfires were the largest disturbance in the twentieth century in Canada (Weber and Flannigan,
28 1997). In the 1980s and 1990s, the average total burned area was 2.6 Mha yr⁻¹ in Canada's forests, with a
29 maximum 7.6 Mha yr⁻¹ in 1989. Carbon emissions from forest fires are substantial and arise mostly from
30 northern forests (boreal, subarctic). Emissions range from less than +1 Mt C yr⁻¹ in the interior of British
31 Columbia to more than +10 Mt C yr⁻¹ in the western boreal forest. Total emissions from forest land in
32 Canada averaged approximately +27 Mt C yr⁻¹ between 1959 and 1999 (Amiro *et al.*, 2001). Much of the
33 Canadian forest is expected to experience increases in fire severity (Parisien *et al.*, 2005) and burn areas
34 (Flannigan *et al.*, 2005). Outbreaks of forest pests are also likely (Volney and Hirsch, 2005). While some

1 of this disturbance may be reduced through enhanced suppression efforts, a long-term increase in impacts
2 of disturbance is likely in the future, with associated losses of forest carbon stocks.

3 Estimated carbon emissions from four major insect pests in Canadian forests (spruce budworm, jack
4 pine budworm, hemlock looper, and mountain pine beetle) varied from +5 to 10 Mt C yr⁻¹ in the 1970s to
5 less than +2 Mt C yr⁻¹ in the mid-1990s¹. Large emissions occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s as a
6 result of extremely large spruce budworm outbreaks in Ontario and Quebec (18 to 30 Mha in each
7 province). The area of outbreaks and associated carbon emissions has recently increased as a result of the
8 mountain pine beetle outbreak in British Columbia, which affected 3.7 Mha in 2003, when emissions
9 were approximately +4 Mt C yr⁻¹.

10 Natural disturbance is commonplace in U.S. forests, where insects, diseases, and wildfire combined
11 affect more than 30 Mha per decade (Birdsey and Lewis 2003). Damage from weather events (hurricanes,
12 tornados, ice storms) may exceed 20 Mha per decade (Dale *et al.*, 2001). There are few estimates of the
13 impact of selected natural disturbances on carbon pools of temperate forests. McNulty (2002) estimated
14 that large hurricanes in the United States could convert 20 Mt C of live biomass into detrital carbon pools.
15 The impacts of fire are clearly significant. According to one estimate, the average annual carbon
16 emissions from biomass burning in the contemporary United States ranges from 9 to 59 Mt C (Leenhouts
17 1998).

18 Pests and diseases are important natural disturbance agents in temperate forests of Mexico; however,
19 no statistics exist on the extent of the affected land area. The number and area of sites affected by forest
20 fires in Mexico have fluctuated considerably between 1970 and 2002 with a clear tendency of an
21 increasing number of fire events (4,000–7,000 in the 1970s and 1,800–15,000 in the 1990s), and overall,
22 larger areas are being affected (0.08–0.25 Mha in 1970s and 0.05–0.85 Mha in 1990s). During El Nino
23 years, increasing drought increases fire frequencies (Torres 2004). Between 1995 and 2000, an average
24 8,900 fire events occurred per year and affected about 327,000 ha of the forested area. Currently, no
25 estimates are available on the contribution of these fires to CO₂ emissions.

27 **Projections of Future Trends**

28 There have been several continental- to subcontinental-scale assessments of future changes in carbon
29 and vegetation distribution in North America (VEMAP Members, 1995; Pan *et al.*, 1998; Neilson *et al.*,
30 1998; Joyce *et al.*, 2001). For the conterminous United States, the VEMAP study suggested that under
31 most future climate conditions, NPP would respond positively to changing climate (20.8% ± 2.4%) but

¹These estimates are the product of regional carbon density values, the proportion of mortality in defoliated stands given in Kurz and Apps (1999), data on area affected taken from NFDP (2005), and the proportion of C in insect-killed stands that is emitted directly to the atmosphere (0.1) from the disturbance matrix for insects used in the CBM-CFS (Kurz *et al.*, 1992).

1 that total carbon storage would remain relatively constant ($2.0\% \pm 3.5\%$). Under most climate scenarios
2 the West gets wetter; when coupled with higher CO₂ and longer growing seasons, simulations show
3 woody expansion and increased sequestration of carbon as well as increases in fire (Bachelet *et al.*, 2001).
4 However, recent scenarios from the Hadley model show some drying in the Northwest, which produces
5 some forest decline (Price *et al.* 2004). Many simulations show continued growth in eastern forests
6 through the end of the twenty-first century while others show the opposite, especially in the Southeast.
7 Eastern forests could experience a period of enhanced growth in the early stages of warming, due to
8 elevated CO₂, increased precipitation, and a longer growing season. However, further warming could
9 bring on increasing drought stress, reducing the carrying capacity of the ecosystem and causing carbon
10 losses through drought-induced dieback and increased fire and insect disturbances.

11 Large portions of the Canadian and Alaskan forest are expected to be particularly sensitive to climate
12 change due to its high latitude and interior continental location (Hogg and Bernier, 2005). Climate change
13 effects on forest growth could be positive (e.g., increased rates of photosynthesis and increased water use
14 efficiency) or negative (decreased water availability, higher rates of respiration) (Baldocchi and Amthor,
15 2001). It is difficult to predict the direction of these changes and they will likely vary by species and local
16 conditions of soils and topography (Johnston and Williamson, 2005). Because of the large area of boreal
17 forests and expected high degree of warming, Canada and Alaska require close monitoring over the next
18 few decades as these areas will likely be critical to determining the carbon balance of North America.

19 Future trends for Mexican forests are less certain. Deforestation will continue to cause large carbon
20 emissions in the years to come. However, government programs (since 2001) are trying to reduce
21 deforestation rates and forest degradation, implement sustainable forestry in native forests, promote
22 commercial plantations and diverse agroforestry systems, and promote afforestation and protection of
23 natural areas (Masera *et al.*, 1997).

24

25 **OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT**

26 Forest management strategies can be adapted to manipulate the carbon sink strength of forest systems.
27 The net effect of these management strategies on carbon stocks will depend on the area of forests under
28 management, management objectives for resources other than carbon, and the type of disturbance regime
29 being considered. The following sections describe current management strategies and provide some
30 general information about how ecological principles might be applied to actively manipulate forest and
31 atmosphere carbon stocks.

32 Although the science of managing forests specifically for carbon sequestration is not well developed,
33 some management principles are emerging to guide management decisions (Appendix 11.B). The
34 prospective role of forestry in helping to stabilize atmospheric CO₂ depends on harvesting and

1 disturbance rates, expectations of future forest productivity, the fate and longevity of forest products, and
2 the ability to deploy technology and forest practices to increase the retention of sequestered CO₂. Market
3 factors are also important in guiding the behavior of the private sector. The forest sector includes a variety
4 of activities that can contribute to increasing carbon sequestration, including: afforestation, mine land
5 reclamation, forest restoration, agroforestry, forest management, biomass energy, forest preservation,
6 wood products management, and urban forestry (Birdsey *et al.*, 2000).

7 In the United States, forestry activities could increase carbon sequestration by significant amounts, in
8 the range of -100 to -200 Mt C yr⁻¹ for the United States alone according to several studies (Birdsey *et*
9 *al.*, 2000; Lewandrowski 2004; Environmental Protection Agency, 2005; Stavins and Richards, 2005).
10 The studies also suggest that the rate of annual mitigation would likely decline over time as low-cost
11 forestry opportunities become scarcer, forestry sinks become saturated, and timber harvesting takes place.

12 For Canada, Price *et al.* (1997) used the Carbon Budget Model of the Canadian Forest Sector (CBM-
13 CFS) to examine the effects of reducing natural disturbance, manipulating stand density, and changing
14 rotation lengths for a forested landscape in northwest Alberta. By replacing natural disturbance (fire) with
15 a simulated harvesting regime, they found that long-term equilibrium carbon storage increased from 105
16 to 130 Mt C in a boreal-cordilleran forest management unit. Controlling stand density following harvest
17 had minimal impacts in the short term but increased landscape-level carbon storage by 13% after 150
18 years, as the older, low-productivity stands were replaced by younger, higher-productivity stands. The
19 main reason for the increased carbon storage was that the natural disturbance return interval (50 yr) was
20 considerably shorter than the harvest rotation (up to 100 yr).

21 In a separate modeling study using the CBM-CFS model, Kurz *et al.* (1998) investigated the impacts
22 on landscape-level carbon storage of the transition from natural to managed disturbance regimes. For a
23 boreal landscape in northern Quebec, a simulated fire disturbance interval of 120 yr was replaced by a
24 harvest cycle of 120 yr. The net impact was that the average age of forests in the landscape declined from
25 110 yr to 70 yr, and total carbon storage in forests declined from 16.3 to 14.8 Mt C (including both
26 ecosystem and forest products pools). In this case the disturbance frequencies were the same, so the
27 decline in carbon storage occurred because the harvesting regime preferentially selected older, high-
28 biomass-density stands.

29 Market approaches and incentive programs to manage greenhouse gases, particularly CO₂, are under
30 development in the United States, the European Union, and elsewhere (Totten, 1999). Since forestry
31 activities have highly variable costs because of site productivity and operational variability, most recent
32 studies of forestry potential develop “cost curves,” i.e., estimates of how much carbon will be sequestered
33 by a given activity for various carbon prices (value in a market system) or payments (in an incentive
34 system). There is also a temporal dimension to the analyses because the rate of change in forest carbon

1 stocks is variable over time, with forestry activities tending to have a high initial rate of net carbon
2 sequestration followed by a lower or even a negative rate as forests reach advanced age.

3 Here we address costs of three broad categories of forestry activities: afforestation (conversion of
4 agricultural land to forest), improved management of existing forests, and use of woody biomass for fuel.
5 In general, analyses suggest that improved management of existing forestlands may be attractive to
6 landowners at a carbon prices below \$10 per ton of CO₂, that afforestation requires a moderate price of
7 \$15 per ton of CO₂ or more to induce landowners to participate, and that biofuels become dominant at
8 prices of \$30 to \$50 per ton of CO₂ (Lewandrowski, 2004; Stavins and Richards, 2005; Environmental
9 Protection Agency, 2005). Table 11-5 shows a simple scenario of emissions reduction below baseline,
10 annualized over the time period from 2010 to 2110, for forestry activities as part of a bundle of reduction
11 options for the land base.

12
13 **Table 11-5. Illustrative emissions reduction potential of various forestry activities in the United**
14 **States under a range of prices and sequestration rates.**

15
16 Co-benefits are vitally important for inducing good forest carbon management. For example,
17 conversion of agricultural land to forest will generally have positive effects on water, air, and soil quality
18 and on biodiversity. In practice, some forest carbon sequestration projects have already been initiated
19 even though sequestered carbon has little current value (Winrock International, 2005). In many of the
20 current projects, carbon is a secondary objective that supports other landowner interests, such as
21 restoration of degraded habitat. But co-effects may not all be beneficial. Water quantity may decline
22 because of increased transpiration by trees relative to other vegetation. And taking land out of crop
23 production may affect food prices—at higher carbon prices, nearly 40 million ha may be converted from
24 cropland to forest (Environmental Protection Agency, 2005). Implementation of a forest carbon
25 management policy will need to carefully consider co-effects, both positive and negative.

26 27 **DATA GAPS AND INFORMATION NEEDS FOR DECISION SUPPORT**

28 Decisions concerning carbon storage in North American forests and their management as carbon
29 sources and sinks will be significantly improved by (1) filling gaps in inventories of carbon pools and
30 fluxes, (2) a better understanding of how management practices affect carbon in forests, and (3) the
31 increased availability of decision support tools for carbon management in forests.

32

1 Major Data Gaps in Estimates of Carbon Pools and Fluxes

2 Effective carbon management options to increase the retention time of sequestered carbon require a
3 thorough understanding of current carbon stock sizes and flux rates in boreal, temperate, and tropical
4 forest ecosystems in North America. However, major gaps exist in the data used to estimate the pools of
5 carbon and carbon fluxes for the forests of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. These gaps complicate
6 the prediction of how natural, social, and economic drivers will change carbon stocks and fluxes. Forests
7 in an area as large as North America are quite diverse, and comprehensive data sets that better represent
8 this diversity are needed.

9 In the United States, the range of estimates of the size of the land carbon sink is between 0.30 and
10 0.58 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Pacala *et al.*, 2001). Significant data gaps among carbon pools include carbon in wood
11 products, soils, woody debris, and water transport (Birdsey 2004; Pacala *et al.*, 2001). Geographic areas
12 that are poorly represented in the available data sets include much of the Intermountain Western United
13 States and Alaska, where forests of low productivity have not been inventoried as intensively as more
14 productive timberlands (Birdsey 2004). Accurate quantification of the relative magnitude of various
15 causal mechanisms at large spatial scales is not yet possible, given the limitations of our ability to
16 combine various approaches and data sets: large-scale observations, process-based modeling, ecosystem
17 experiments, and laboratory investigations (Foley and Ramankutty, 2004).

18 Large data gaps exist for Canada, particularly regarding changes in forest soil carbon and forestlands
19 that are considered “unmanaged” (47% of forest lands). Aboveground biomass is better represented in
20 forest inventories; however, the information needs to be updated and made more consistent among
21 provinces. The new Canadian National Forest Inventory, currently under way, will provide a uniform
22 coverage at a 20 × 20 km grid; it will be the basis for future forest carbon inventories. Data are also
23 lacking on carbon fluxes, particularly those due to insect outbreaks and forest stand senescence. The
24 ability to model forest carbon stock changes has considerably improved with the release of the CBM
25 (Kurz *et al.*, 2002); however the CBM does not consider climate change impacts (Price *et al.*, 1999; Hogg
26 and Bernier, 2005).

27 For Mexico, there is very little data about measured carbon stocks for all forest types. Information on
28 forest ecosystem carbon fluxes is primarily based on deforestation rates, while fundamental knowledge of
29 carbon exchange processes in almost all forest ecosystems is missing. That information is essential for
30 understanding the effects of both natural and human-induced drivers (hurricanes, fires, insect outbreaks,
31 climate change, migration, and forest management strategies), which all strongly impact the forest carbon
32 cycle. Current carbon estimates are derived from studies in preferred sites in natural reserves with
33 species-rich tropical forests. Therefore, inferences made from the studies on regional and national carbon
34 stocks and fluxes probably give biased estimates on the carbon cycle.

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Major Data Gaps in Knowledge of Forest Management Effects

With the exception of land use change (afforestation and deforestation), there is very little information available about how forest management affects various carbon pools, and there is some uncertainty about the longevity of effects (Caldeira *et al.*, 2004). As with more general estimates of forest carbon pools and fluxes, there is more information available about effects on live biomass and woody debris than about soils and wood products. Agroforestry systems offer a promising economic alternative to slash-and-burn agriculture, including highly effective soil conservation practices and mid-term and long-term carbon mitigation options (Soto-Pinto *et al.*, 2001; Nelson and de Jong, 2003; Albrecht and Kandji, 2003). However, a detailed assessment of current implementations of agroforestry systems in different regions of Mexico is missing. Refining management of forests to realize significant carbon sequestration while continuing to satisfy the other needs provided for by forests (e.g., timber, watershed management) will require a multi-criteria decision support framework for a holistic and adaptive management program of the carbon cycle in North American forests. This framework would necessarily influence considerations of policy and practice. Little is known about how this might be accomplished effectively, but given the importance of forests in the global carbon cycle, success in this endeavor could have important long-term and large-scale effects on global atmospheric carbon stocks.

Availability Of Decision-Support Tools

Few decision-support tools for managers are available, and they are either in early development modes or have been used primarily in research studies (Proctor *et al.*, 2005; Potter *et al.*, 2003). As markets emerge for trading carbon credits, and if credits for forest management activities have value, then the demand for decision-support tools will encourage their development.

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Table 11-1. Area of forest land by biome and country, 2000 (1000 ha)¹

Ecological zone:	Canada ²	U.S. ³	Mexico ⁴	Total
Tropical/subtropical	0	115,168	30,735	145,903
Temperate	101,100	142,445	32,851	276,396
Boreal/polar	303,000	45,461	0	348,461
Total	404,100	303,074	63,586	770,760

¹There is 95% certainty that the actual values are within 10% of those reported in this table (e.g., for the United States see Bechtold and Patterson, 2005).

²Canadian Forest Service, 2005

³Smith *et al.*, 2004

⁴Palacio *et al.*, 2000

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Table 11-2. Carbon stocks in forests by ecosystem carbon pool and country (Mt C)¹

Ecosystem carbon pool:	Canada ²	U.S. ³	Mexico ⁴	Total
Biomass	14,500	24,901	7,700	47,101
Dead organic matter ⁵	71,300	41,674	11,400	124,374
Total	85,800	66,575	19,100	171,475

¹There is 95% certainty that the actual values are within 25% of those reported in this table (Heath and Smith, 2000; Smith and Heath, 2000).

²Kurz and Apps, 1999

³Heath and Smith, 2004; Birdsey and Heath, 1995

⁴Masera *et al.*, 2001

⁵Includes litter, coarse woody debris, and soil carbon

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Table 11-3. Change in carbon stocks for forests and wood products by country (Mt C yr⁻¹)

Carbon pool:	Canada ¹	U.S. ²	Mexico ³	Total
Forest Ecosystem	-99	-236	+52	-283
Wood Products	-10	-57	ND ⁴	-67
Total	-109	-293	+52	-350

¹Environment Canada (2005), Goodale *et al.* (2002). There is 95% certainty that the actual values are within 100% of those reported for Canada.

²From Smith and Heath, 2005 (excluding soils), and Pacala *et al.*, 2001 (soils). Estimates do not include urban forests. There is 95% certainty that the actual values are within 50% of those reported for the United States.

³From Masera, 1997. There is 95% certainty that the actual values are within 100% of those reported for Mexico.

⁴Estimates are not available.

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Table 11-4. Area of forestland by management class and country, 2000 (1000 ha)¹

Management class:	Canada	U.S.	Mexico	Total
Protected	19,321	66,668	6,010	91,999
Plantation	4,486	16,238	150	20,874
Other	380,293	220,168	57,426	657,887
Total	404,100	303,074	63,586	770,760

¹From Food and Agriculture Organization 2001; Natural Resources Canada 2005. Estimates in this table are within 10% of the true value at the 95% confidence level (e.g. for the U.S. see Bechtold and Patterson 2005).

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Table 11-5. Illustrative emissions reduction potential of various forestry activities in the United States under a range of prices and sequestration rates¹

Forestry activity	Carbon sequestration rate (t CO ₂ ha ⁻¹ yr ⁻¹)	Price range (\$/t CO ₂)	Emissions reduction potential (Mt CO ₂ yr ⁻¹)
Afforestation	5.4–23.5	15–30	137–823
Forest management	5.2–7.7	1–30	25–314
Biofuels	11.8–13.6	30–50	375–561

¹Adapted from Environmental Protection Agency (2005). Maximum price analyzed was \$50/t CO₂.

APPENDIX 11A

ECOSYSTEM CARBON FLUXES

The recent history of disturbance largely determines whether a forest system will be a net source or sink of C. For example, net ecosystem productivity (NEP, gains due to biomass growth minus losses due to respiration in vegetation and soil) is being measured across a range of forest types in Canada using the eddy covariance technique. In mature forests, values range from $-19.6 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ in a white pine plantation in southern Ontario (Arain and Restrepo-Coupe, 2005) to $-3.2 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ in a jack pine forest in (Amiro *et al.*, 2005; Griffis *et al.*, 2003). In recently disturbed forests, NEP ranges from $+58.0 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ in a harvested Douglas-fir forest (Humphreys *et al.*, 2005) to $+5.7 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ in a 7 year old harvested jack pine forest (Amiro *et al.*, 2005). In general, forest stands recovering from disturbance are sources of carbon until uptake from growth becomes greater than losses due to respiration, usually within 10 years (Amiro *et al.*, 2005).

In the United States, extensive land-based measurements of forest/atmosphere carbon exchange reveal patterns and causes of sink or source strength (Table 11A-1). Results show that net ecosystem exchange (NEE) of carbon in temperate forests ranges from a source of $+12.7 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ to a sink of $-5.9 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$. Forests identified as sources are primarily forests in the earliest stages of regeneration (up to about 8 years) following stand-replacing disturbances such as wildfire and logging (Law *et al.*, 2002). Mature temperate deciduous broadleaf forests and mature evergreen coniferous forests were an average sink of -2.7 and $-2.5 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$, respectively (12 sites, 54 site-years of data). Values ranged from a source of $+0.3$ for a mixed deciduous and evergreen forest to a sink of -5.8 for an aggrading deciduous forest, averaged over multiple years. Young temperate evergreen coniferous forests (8 to 20 years) ranged from a sink of -0.6 to $-5.9 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (mean 3.1). These forests are still rapidly growing and have not reached the capacity for carbon uptake.

Mature forests can be substantial sinks for atmospheric carbon. Disturbances that replace or remove forests can result in the land being a net source of carbon dioxide for a few years in mild climates to 10–20 years in harsh climates while the forests are recovering (Law *et al.*, 2004; Clark *et al.*, 2004). Thus, the range of observed annual NEE of carbon dioxide ranges from a source of about $+13 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ in a clearcut forest to a net sink of -6 t C ha^{-1} in mature temperate forests.

For Mexican forests, estimates of net ecosystem carbon exchange are unavailable, but estimates from other tropical forests may indicate rates for similar systems in Mexico. In Puerto Rico, aboveground NPP in tropical forests range from -9.2 to $-11.0 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Lugo *et al.*, 1999). Belowground NPP measurements exist for only one site with $-19.5 \text{ t C ha}^{-1} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Lugo *et al.*, 1999). In Hawaii, aboveground

1 and belowground NPP of native forests dominated by *Metrosideros polymorpha* vary depending on
 2 substrate age and precipitation regime. Aboveground NPP ranges between -4.0 to -14.0 t C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹,
 3 while belowground NPP ranges between -5.2 and -9.0 t C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ (Giardina *et al.*, 2004). Soil carbon
 4 emissions along the substrate age gradient range from $+2.2$ to $+3.3$ t C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹, and along the
 5 precipitation gradient from $+4.0$ to $+9.7$ t C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ (Osher *et al.*, 2003). NEP estimates are not available
 6 for these tropical forests, so their net impact on atmospheric carbon stocks cannot be calculated.

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Table 11A-1. Comparison of net ecosystem exchange (NEE) for different types and ages of temperate forests. Positive NEE means the forest is a sink for atmospheric CO₂. Eighty-one site years of data are from multiple published papers from each of the AmeriFlux network sites, and a network synthesis paper (Law *et al.* 2002). NEE was averaged by site, then the mean was determined by forest type and age class. SD is standard deviation among sites in the forest type and age class.

	NEE (t C ha ⁻¹ y ⁻¹)		
	Regenerating Clearcut (-1 ~ 3 years after disturbance) (1 site, 5 site-years)	Young forest (8 ~ 20 years old) (4 sites, 16 site-years)	Mature forest (>20 years old) (13 sites, 60 site-years)
Evergreen Coniferous Forests	-12.7 ~ 1.7, mean -7.1 (SD 4.7) (1 site, 5 site-years)	0.6 ~ 5.9, mean 3.1 (SD 2.6) (4 sites, 16 site-years)	0.6 ~ 4.5, mean 2.5 (SD 1.4) (6 sites, 20 site-years)
Mixed Evergreen and Deciduous Forests	NA	NA	0.3 ~ 2.1, mean -1.0 (SD 0.6) (1 site, 6 site-years)
Deciduous Broadleaf Forests	NA	NA	0.6 ~ 5.8, mean 2.7 (SD 1.8) (6 sites, 34 site-years)

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1 Several less general principles can be applied to specific carbon pools, fluxes, or situations:

- 2 • Management activities that move live carbon to dead pools (such as CWD or soil C) over short
3 periods of time will often dramatically enhance decomposition (R_h), although considerable carbon
4 can be stored in decomposing pools (Harmon and Marks 2002). Regimes seeking to reduce the
5 decomposition-related flows from residue following harvest may enhance overall sink capacity of
6 these forests if these materials are used for energy generation or placed into forest products that last
7 longer than the residue.
- 8 • Despite the importance of decomposition rates to the overall stand-level forest carbon balance,
9 management of CWD pools is mostly impacted by recruitment of new CWD rather than by changing
10 decomposition rates (Janisch and Harmon, 2002; Pregitzer and Euskirchen, 2004). Decreasing the
11 interval between harvests can significantly decrease the store in this pool.
- 12 • Live coarse root biomass accounts for approximately 20–25% of aboveground forest biomass
13 (Jenkins *et al.* 2003), and there is additional biomass in fine roots. Following harvest, this pool of live
14 root biomass is transferred to the dead biomass pool, which can form a significant carbon store. Note
15 that roots of various size classes and existing under varying environmental conditions decompose at
16 different rates.
- 17 • Some carbon can be sequestered in wood products from harvested wood, though due to
18 manufacturing losses only about 60% of the carbon harvested is stored in products (Harmon, 1996).
19 Clearly, longer-lived products will sequester carbon for longer periods of time. The replacement of
20 fossil fuel by biomass fuel can be counted as an emissions offset, if residue or manufacturing “waste”
21 would otherwise be lost via decomposition or other processes. Faster-growing, larger trees (achieved
22 via thinning, fertilization, or genetic improvement, for example) may also become products with
23 longer lifespans, providing a positive feedback to carbon sequestration.

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25 Little published research has been aimed at quantifying the impacts of specific forest management
26 activities on carbon storage, but examples of specific management activities can be given.

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28 **Practices aimed at increasing NPP:** fertilization; genetically improved trees that grow faster (Peterson
29 *et al.*, 1999); any management activity that enhances growth rate without causing a concomitant
30 increase in decomposition (Stanturf *et al.*, 2003; Stainback and Alavalapati, 2005).

31 **Practices aimed at reducing R_h** (i.e., minimizing the time forests are a source to the atmosphere
32 following disturbance): low impact harvesting (that does not promote soil respiration); utilization of
33 logging residues (biomass energy and fuels); incorporation of logging residue into soil during site

1 prep (but note that this could also speed up decomposition); thinning to capture mortality;
2 fertilization.

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4 Since NECB changes with time as forests age, if a landscape is composed of stands with different
5 ages then carbon gains in one stand can be offset by losses from another stand. The net result of these
6 stand-level changes determines overall landscape-level carbon stores. Note that disturbance-induced Rh
7 losses are typically larger than annual gains, such that a landscape where forest area is increasing might
8 still be neutral with respect to carbon stocks overall. Thus, at the landscape level practices designed to
9 enhance carbon sequestration must, on balance, replace lower-C-density systems with higher-C-density
10 systems. Examples of these practices include: reducing fire losses; emphasizing very long-lived forest
11 products; increasing the interval between disturbances; or reducing decomposability of dead material.

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Chapter 12. Carbon Cycles in the Permafrost Region of North America

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KEY FINDINGS

- Much of northern North America (more than 6 million km²) is characterized by the presence of permafrost, soils or rocks that remain frozen for at least two consecutive years. This permafrost region contains approximately 25% of the world's total soil organic carbon, a massive pool of carbon that is vulnerable to release to the atmosphere as CO₂ in response to an already detectable polar warming.
- The soils of the permafrost region of North America contain 213 Gt of organic carbon, approximately 61% of the carbon in all soils of North America.
- The soils of the permafrost region of North America are currently a net sink of approximately 11 Mt C yr⁻¹.
- The soils of the permafrost region of North America have been slowly accumulating carbon for the last 5-8 thousand years. More recently, increased human activity in the region has resulted in permafrost degradation and at least localized loss of soil carbon.
- Patterns of climate, especially the region's cool and cold temperatures and their interaction with soil hydrology to produce wet and frozen soils, are primarily responsible for the historical accumulation of carbon in the region. Non-climatic drivers of carbon change include human activities, including flooding associated with hydroelectric development, that degrade permafrost and lead to carbon loss. Fires, increasingly common in the region, also lead to carbon loss.
- Projections of future warming of the polar regions of North America lead to projections of carbon loss from the soils of the permafrost region, with upwards of 78% (34 Gt) and 41% (40 Gt) of carbon stored in soils of the Subarctic and Boreal regions, respectively, being severely or extremely severely affected by future climate change.
- Options for management of carbon in the permafrost region of North America, including construction methods that cause as little disturbance of the permafrost and surface as possible, are primarily those which avoid permafrost degradation and subsequent carbon losses.

- Most research needs for the permafrost region are focused on reducing uncertainties in knowing how much carbon is vulnerable to a warming climate and how sensitive that carbon loss is to climate change. Development and adoption of measures that reduce or avoid the negative impact of human activities on permafrost are also needed.
-

INTRODUCTION

It is especially important to understand the carbon cycle in the permafrost region of North America because the soils in this area contain large amounts of organic carbon, carbon that is vulnerable to release to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide and methane in response to climate warming. It is predicted that the average annual air temperature in the permafrost region will increase 3–4°C by 2020 and 5–10°C by 2050 (Hengeveld, 2000). The soils in this region contain approximately 61% of the organic carbon occurring in all soils in North America (Lacelle *et al.*, 2000) even though the permafrost area covers only about 21% of the soil area of the continent. Release of even a fraction of this carbon in greenhouse gases could have global consequences.

Permafrost is defined, on the basis of temperature, as soils or rocks that remain below 0°C for at least two consecutive years (van Everdingen, 1998 revised May 2005). Permafrost terrain often contains large quantities of ground ice in the upper section of the permafrost. If this terrain is well protected by forests or peat, this ground ice is generally in equilibrium with the current climate. If this insulating layer is not sufficient, however, even small temperature changes, especially in the southern part of the permafrost region, could cause degradation and result in severe thermal erosion (thawing). For example, some of the permafrost that formed in central Alaska during the Little Ice Age is now degrading in response to warming during the last 150 years (Jorgenson *et al.*, 2001).

The permafrost region in North America is divided into four zones on the basis of the percentage of the land area underlain by permafrost (Fig. 12-1). These zones are the Continuous Permafrost Zone (≥ 90 to 100%), the Discontinuous Permafrost Zone (≥ 50 to $< 90\%$), the Sporadic Permafrost Zone (≥ 10 to $< 50\%$), and the Isolated Patches Permafrost Zone (0 to $< 10\%$) (Brown *et al.*, 1997).

Figure 12-1. Permafrost zones in North America (Brown *et al.*, 1997).

These permafrost zones encompass three major ecoclimatic provinces (ecological regions) (Fig. 12-2): the Arctic (north of the arctic tree line), the Subarctic (open canopy coniferous forest), and the Boreal (closed canopy forest, either coniferous or mixed coniferous and deciduous). Peatlands (organic

1 wetlands characterized by more than 40 cm of peat accumulation) cover large areas in the Boreal,
2 Subarctic, and southern part of the Arctic ecoclimatic provinces.

3
4 **Figure 12-2. Arctic, Subarctic, and Boreal ecoclimatic provinces (ecological regions) in North**
5 **America (Ecoregions Working Group, 1989; Baily and Cushwa, 1981).**

6
7 Although northern ecosystems (Arctic, Subarctic, and Boreal) in North America cover
8 approximately 14% of the global land area, they contain approximately 25% of the world's total soil
9 organic carbon (Oechel and Vourlitis, 1994). In addition, Oechel and Vourlitis (1994) indicate that the
10 tundra (Arctic) ecosystems alone contain approximately 12% of the global soil carbon pool, even though
11 they account for only 6% of the total global land area. The soils of the permafrost region of North
12 America are currently a carbon sink and are unique because they are able to actively sequester carbon and
13 store it for thousands of years.

14 The objectives of this chapter are to give the below-ground carbon stocks and to explain the
15 mechanisms associated with the carbon cycle (sources and sinks) in the soils of the permafrost region of
16 North America.

17 18 **PROCESSES AFFECTING THE CARBON CYCLE IN A PERMAFROST** 19 **ENVIRONMENT**

20 **Soils of the Permafrost Region**

21 Soils cover approximately 6,211,340 km² of the area of the North American permafrost region
22 (Tables 12-1 and 12-2), with approximately 58% of the soil area being occupied by permafrost-affected
23 (perennially frozen) soils (Cryosols/Gelisols) and the remainder by non-permafrost soils. Approximately
24 17% of this area is associated with organic soils (peatlands), the remainder with mineral soils. It is
25 important to distinguish between mineral soils and organic soils in the region because different processes
26 are responsible for the carbon cycle in these two types of soils.

27
28 **Table 12-1. Areas of mineral soils in the various permafrost zones.**

29
30 **Table 12-2. Areas of peatlands (organic soils) in the various permafrost zones.**

31 32 **Mineral Soils**

33 The schematic diagram in Fig. 12-3 provides general information about the carbon sinks and sources
34 in mineral soils. Most of the permafrost-affected mineral soils are carbon sinks because of the process of

1 cryoturbation, which moves organic matter into the deeper soil layers. Other processes, such as
2 decomposition, wildfires, and thermal degradation, release carbon into the atmosphere and, thus, act as
3 carbon sources.

4
5 **Figure 12-3. Carbon cycle in permafrost-affected upland (mineral) soils, showing below-ground**
6 **organic carbon sinks and sources.**

7
8 For unfrozen soils and noncryoturbated frozen soils in the permafrost region, the carbon cycle is
9 similar to that in soils occurring in temperate regions. In these soils, organic matter is deposited on the
10 soil surface. Some soluble organic matter may move downward, but because these soils are not affected
11 by cryoturbation, they have no mechanism for moving organic matter from the surface into the deeper soil
12 layers and preserving it from decomposition and wildfires. Most of their below-ground carbon originates
13 from roots and its residence time is relatively short.

14 The role of cryoturbation: Although permafrost-affected ecosystems produce much less biomass than
15 do temperate ecosystems, permafrost-affected soils that are subject to cryoturbation (frost-churning), a
16 cryogenic process, have a unique ability to sequester a portion of this organic matter and store it for
17 thousands of years. A number of models have been developed to explain the mechanisms involved in
18 cryoturbation (Mackay, 1980; Van Vliet-Lanoë, 1991; Vandenberghe, 1992). The most recent model
19 involves the process of differential frost heave (heave–subsidence), which produces downward and lateral
20 movement of materials (Walker *et al.*, 2002; Peterson and Krantz, 2003).

21 Part of the organic matter produced annually by the vegetation is deposited as litter on the soil
22 surface, with some decomposing as a result of biological activity. A large portion of this litter, however,
23 builds up on the soil surface, forming an organic soil horizon. Cryoturbation causes some of this organic
24 material to move down into the deeper soil layers (Bockheim and Tarnocai, 1998). Soluble organic
25 materials move downward because of the effect of gravity and the movement of water along the thermal
26 gradient toward the freezing front (Kokelj and Burn, 2005). Once the organic material has moved down to
27 the cold, deeper soil layers where very little or no biological decomposition takes place, it may be
28 preserved for many thousands of years. Radiocarbon dates from cryoturbated soil materials ranged
29 between 490 and 11,200 yr BP (Zoltai *et al.*, 1978). These dates were randomly distributed within the soil
30 and did not appear in chronological sequence by depth (the deepest material was not necessarily the
31 oldest), indicating that cryoturbation is an ongoing process.

32 The permafrost table (top of the permafrost) is very dynamic and is subject to deepening due to
33 factors such as removal of vegetation and/or the insulating surface organic layer, wildfires, global climate
34 change, and other natural or human activities. When this occurs, the seasonally thawed layer (active layer)

1 becomes deeper and the organic material is able to move even deeper into the soil (translocation).
2 However, if such factors cause thawing of the soil and melting of the ground ice, some or all of the
3 organic materials locked in the system could be exposed to the atmosphere. This change in soil
4 environment gives rise to both aerobic and anaerobic decomposition, releasing carbon into the atmosphere
5 as carbon dioxide and methane, respectively (Fig. 12-3). At this stage, the soil can become a major carbon
6 source.

7 If, however, the permafrost table rises (and the active layer becomes shallower) because of
8 reestablishment of the vegetation or buildup of the surface organic layer, this deep organic material
9 becomes part of the permafrost and is, thus, more securely preserved. This is the main reason that
10 permafrost-affected soils contain high amounts of organic carbon not only in the upper (0–100 cm) layer,
11 but also in the deeper layers. These cryoturbated, permafrost-affected soils are effective carbon sinks.
12

13 **Peatlands (Organic Soils)**

14 The schematic diagram in Fig. 12-4 provides general information about the processes driving the
15 carbon sinks and sources in peatland soils. The water-saturated conditions, low soil temperatures, and
16 acidic conditions of northern peatlands provide an environment in which very little or no decomposition
17 occurs; hence, the litter is converted to peat and preserved. This gradual buildup process has been ongoing
18 in peatlands during the last 5,000–8,000 years, resulting in peat deposits that are an average of 2–3 m
19 thick and, in some cases, up to 10 m thick. At this stage, peatlands can act as very effective carbon sinks
20 for many thousands of years (Fig. 12-4).
21

22 **Figure 12-4. Carbon cycle in permafrost peatlands, showing below-ground organic carbon sinks and**
23 **sources.**
24

25 **Carbon dynamics:** Data for carbon accumulation in various peatland types in the permafrost regions
26 are given in Table 12-3. Although some values for the rate of peat accumulation are higher (associated
27 with unfrozen peatlands), the values for frozen peatlands, which are more widespread, generally range
28 around $13 \text{ g C m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$. Peat accumulations in the various ecological regions were calculated on the basis
29 of the thickness of the deposit and the date of the basal peat. The rate of peat accumulation is generally
30 highest in the Boreal region and decreases northward (Table 12-3). Note, however, that if the surface of
31 the peat deposit has eroded, the calculated rate of accumulation (based on the age of the basal peat and a
32 decreased deposit thickness) will appear to be higher than it should be. This is probably the reason for
33 some of the high rates of peat accumulation found for the Arctic region, which likely experienced a rapid
34 rate of accumulation during the Hypsithermal Maximum with subsequent erosion of the surface of some

1 of the deposits reducing their thicknesses. Wildfires, decomposition, and leaching of soluble organic
2 compounds release approximately one-third of the carbon input, causing most of the carbon loss in these
3 peatlands.

4
5 **Table 12-3. Organic carbon accumulation and loss in various Canadian peatlands.** Positive values
6 indicate net flux into the atmosphere (source); negative values indicate carbon sequestration (land sinks).

8 **BELOW-GROUND CARBON STOCKS**

9 The carbon content of mineral soils to a 1-m depth is 49–61 kg m⁻² for permafrost-affected soils and
10 12–17 kg m⁻² for unfrozen soils (Tables 12-4 and 12-5). The carbon content of organic soils (peatlands)
11 for the total depth of the deposit is 81–129 kg m⁻² for permafrost-affected soils and 43–144 kg m⁻² for
12 unfrozen soils (Tables 12-4 and 12-5) (Tarnocai, 1998 and 2000).

13
14 **Table 12-4. Soil carbon pools and fluxes for the permafrost areas of Canada.** Positive flux numbers
15 indicate net flux into the atmosphere (source); negative values indicate carbon sequestration (land sinks).

16
17 **Table 12-5. Average organic carbon content for soils in the various ecological regions (Tarnocai 1998**
18 **and 2000).**

19
20 Soils in the permafrost region of North America contain 213 Gt of organic carbon (Tables 12-6 and
21 12-7), which is approximately 61% of the organic carbon in all soils on this continent (Lacelle *et al.*,
22 2000). Mineral soils contain approximately 99 Gt of organic carbon in the 0- to 100-cm depth
23 (Table 12-6). Although peatlands (organic soils) cover a smaller area than mineral soils (17% vs 83%),
24 they contain approximately 114 Gt of organic carbon in the total depth of the deposit, or more than half
25 (54%) of the soil organic carbon of the region (Table 12-7).

26
27 **Table 12-6. Organic carbon mass in mineral soils in the various permafrost zones.**

28
29 **Table 12-7. Organic carbon mass in peatlands (organic soils) in the various permafrost zones.**

31 **CARBON FLUXES**

32 **Mineral Soils**

33 Very little information is available about carbon fluxes in both unfrozen and perennially frozen
34 mineral soils in the permafrost regions. For unfrozen upland mineral soils, Trumbore and Harden (1997)

1 report a carbon accumulation of 60–100 g C m⁻² yr⁻¹ (Table 12-4). They further indicate that the slow
2 decomposition results in rapid organic matter accumulation, but the turnover time due to wildfires (every
3 500–1000 years) eliminates the accumulated carbon except for the deep carbon derived from roots in the
4 subsoil. The turnover time for this deep carbon is 100–1600 years. Therefore, the carbon stocks in these
5 unfrozen soils are low, and the turnover time of this carbon is 100 to 1000 years.

6 As with unfrozen mineral soils, very little information has been published on the carbon cycle in
7 perennially frozen mineral soils. The carbon cycle in these soils differs from that in unfrozen soils in that,
8 because of cryogenic activities, these soils are able to move the organic matter deposited on the soil
9 surface into the deeper soil layers. Assuming that cryoturbation was active in these soils during the last
10 six thousand years (Zoltai *et al.*, 1978), an average of 9 Mt C have been added annually to these soils.
11 Most of this carbon has been cryoturbated into the deeper soil layers, but some of the carbon in the
12 surface organic layer is released by decomposition and, periodically, by wildfires. The schematic diagram
13 in Fig. 12-5 shows the carbon cycle in these soils.

14
15 **Figure 12-5. Carbon cycle in perennially frozen mineral soils in the permafrost region.**

16 17 **Peatlands (Organic Soils)**

18 Peatland vegetation deposits various amounts of organic material (litter) annually on the peatland
19 surface. Reader and Stewart (1972) found that the amount of litter (dry biomass) deposited annually on
20 the bog surface in Boreal peatlands in Manitoba, Canada was 489–1750 g m⁻². Approximately 25% of the
21 original litter fall was found to have decomposed during the following year. In the course of the study,
22 they found that the average annual accumulation rate was 10% of the annual net primary production.
23 Robinson *et al.* (2003) found that, in the Sporadic Permafrost Zone, mean carbon accumulation rates over
24 the past 100 years for unfrozen bogs and frost mounds were 88.6 and 78.5 g m⁻² yr⁻¹, respectively. They
25 also found that, in the Discontinuous Permafrost Zone, the mean carbon accumulation rate during the past
26 1200 years in frozen peat plateaus was 13.31 g m⁻² yr⁻¹, while in unfrozen fens and bogs the comparable
27 rates were 20.34 and 21.81 g m⁻² yr⁻¹, respectively.

28 Because peatlands cover large areas in the permafrost region of North America, their contribution to
29 the carbon stocks is significant (Table 12-5). Zoltai *et al.* (1988) estimated that the annual carbon
30 accumulation capacity of Boreal peatlands is approximately 9.8 Mt. Gorham (1988), in contrast,
31 estimated that Canadian peatlands accumulate approximately 30 Mt of carbon annually.

32 Currently, wildfires are probably the greatest natural force in converting peatlands to a carbon source.
33 Ritchie (1987) found that the western Canadian Boreal forests have a fire return interval of 50–100 years,
34 while Kuhry (1994) indicated that, for wetter Sphagnum bogs, the interval is 400–1700 years. For peat

1 plateau bogs, each fire resulted in an average decrease in carbon mass of 1.46 kg m^{-2} and an average
2 decrease in height of 2.74 cm, which represents about 150 years of peat accumulation (Robinson and
3 Moore, 2000). In recent years, the number of these wildfires has increased, as has the area burned,
4 releasing increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere.

5 The schematic diagram presented in Fig. 12-6 summarizes the carbon cycle in peatlands in the
6 permafrost region. Based on average values for the rate of peat accumulation, approximately 17 g C m^{-2}
7 yr^{-1} , or 18 Mt C, is added annually to peatlands in this region of North America. Approximately 1.46 kg
8 C m^{-2} is released to the atmosphere every 600 years by wildfires in the northern boreal peatlands. In
9 addition, decomposition of unfrozen peatlands releases approximately $2.0 \text{ g C m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$, and a further 2.0 g
10 $\text{C m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ is released by leaching of dissolved organic carbon (DOC), leading to a carbon decrease of
11 approximately 4 Mt annually, not including that released by wildfires (Fig. 12-6). Note that these values
12 are based on current measurements. However, rates of peat accumulation have varied during the past
13 6000–8000 years, with periods during which the rate of peat accumulation was much higher than at
14 present.

15
16 **Figure 12-6. Carbon cycle in peatlands in the permafrost region.**

17 18 **Total Flux**

19 Based on the limited data available for this vast, and largely inaccessible, area of the continent,
20 approximately 27 Mt C yr^{-1} is deposited on the surface of mineral soils and peatlands (organic soils) in
21 the permafrost region of North America. Approximately 8 Mt yr^{-1} of surface carbon (excluding
22 vegetation) is released by decomposition and wildfires, and by leaching into the water systems. Thus, the
23 soils in the permafrost region of North America currently act as a sink for approximately 19 Mt C yr^{-1} and
24 as a source for approximately 8 Mt C yr^{-1} and are, therefore, a net carbon sink (Figs. 12-5 and 12-6).

25 26 **POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE**

27 The permafrost region is unique because the soils in this vast area contain large amounts of organic
28 materials and much of the carbon has been actively sequestered by peat accumulation (organic soils) and
29 cryoturbation (mineral soils) and stored in the permafrost for many thousands of years. Historical patterns
30 of climate are responsible for the large amount of carbon found in the soils of the region today, but
31 cryoturbation is a consequence of the region's current cool to cold climate and the effects of that climate
32 on soil hydrology. As a result, patterns of climate and climate change are dominant drivers of carbon
33 cycling in the region. Future climate change will determine the fate of that carbon and whether the region

1 will remain a slow but significant carbon sink, or whether it will reverse and become a source, rapidly
2 releasing large amounts of CO₂ and methane to the atmosphere.

4 **Peatlands**

5 A model for estimating the sensitivity of peatlands to global climate change was developed using
6 current climate (1x CO₂), vegetation, and permafrost data together with the changes in these variables
7 expected in a 2x CO₂ environment (Kettles and Tarnocai, 1999). The data generated by this model were
8 used to produce a peatland sensitivity map. Using GIS techniques, this map was overlaid on the peatland
9 map of Canada to determine both the sensitivity ratings of the various peatland areas and the associated
10 organic carbon masses. The sensitivity ratings, or classes, used are no change, very slight, slight,
11 moderate, severe, and extremely severe. Because global climate change is expected to have the greatest
12 impact on the ecological processes and permafrost distribution in peatlands in the severe and extremely
13 severe categories (Kettles and Tarnocai, 1999), the areas and carbon masses of peatlands in these two
14 sensitivity classes are considered to be most vulnerable to climate change. The sensitivity ratings are
15 determined by the degree of change in the ecological zonation combined with the degree of change in the
16 permafrost zonation, with the greater the change, the more severe the sensitivity rating. For example, if a
17 portion of the Subarctic becomes Boreal in ecology and the associated sporadic permafrost disappears (no
18 permafrost remains in the region), the sensitivity of this region is rated as extremely severe. If however, a
19 portion of the Boreal remains Boreal in ecology, but the discontinuous permafrost disappears (no
20 permafrost remains in the region), the sensitivity of this region is rated as severe.

21 The peatland sensitivity model indicates that the greatest effect of global climate change will occur in
22 the Subarctic region, where about 85% (314,270 km²) of the peatland area and 78% (33.96 Gt) of the
23 organic carbon mass will be severely or extremely severely affected by climate change, with 66% of the
24 area and 57% of the organic carbon mass being extremely severely affected (Fig. 12-7) (Tarnocai, in
25 press). The second largest effect will occur in the Boreal region, where about 49% (353,100 km²) of the
26 peatland area and 41% (40.20 Gt) of the organic carbon mass will be severely or extremely severely
27 affected, with 10% of both the area and organic carbon mass being extremely severely affected. These
28 two regions contain almost all (99%) of the Canadian peatland area and organic carbon mass that is
29 predicted to be severely or extremely severely affected (Fig. 12-7) (Tarnocai, in press).

30
31 **Figure 12-7. The organic carbon mass in the various sensitivity classes for the Subarctic and Boreal**
32 **Ecoclimatic Provinces (ecological regions) (Tarnocai, in press).**
33

1 In the Subarctic region and the northern part of the Boreal region, where most of the perennially
2 frozen peatlands occur, the increased temperatures are expected to cause increased thawing of the
3 perennially frozen peat. Thawing of the ice-rich peat and the underlying mineral soil will initially result in
4 water-saturated conditions. These water-saturated conditions, together with the higher temperatures, result
5 in anaerobic decomposition, leading to the production of CH₄.

6 In the southern part of the Boreal region, where the peatlands are generally unfrozen, the main impact
7 is expected to be drought conditions resulting from higher summer temperatures and higher
8 evapotranspiration. Under such conditions, peatlands become a net source of CO₂ because the oxygenated
9 conditions lead to aerobic decomposition (Melillo *et al.*, 1990; Christensen, 1991). These dry conditions
10 will likely also increase wildfires and, eventually, burning of peat, leading to the release of CO₂ to the
11 atmosphere.

12

13 **Permafrost-Affected Mineral Soils**

14 The same model described above was used to determine the effect of climate change on mineral
15 permafrost-affected soils. The model suggests that approximately 21% (11.9 Gt) of the total organic
16 carbon in these soils could be severely or extremely severely affected by climate warming (Tarnocai,
17 1999). The model also suggests that the permafrost will probably disappear from the soils (the soils will
18 become unfrozen) in the Sporadic and Isolated Patches permafrost zones. The main reason for the high
19 sensitivity of mineral soils in these zones is that soil temperatures at both the 100- and 150-cm depths are
20 only slightly below freezing (-0.3°C). The slightest disturbance or climate warming could initiate rapid
21 thawing in these soils, with resultant loss of carbon (Tarnocai, 1999).

22

23 **NON-CLIMATIC DRIVERS**

24 Wildfires are an important part of the ecology of Boreal and Subarctic forests and are probably the
25 major non-climatic drivers of carbon change in the permafrost region. There has been a rapid increase in
26 both the frequency of fires and the area burned as a result of warmer and drier summers and increased
27 human activity in the region. According to observations of natives, not only has the frequency of
28 lightning strikes increased in the more southerly areas, but they have now appeared in more northerly
29 areas where they were previously unknown. Because lightning is the major cause of wildfires in areas of
30 little habitation, it is likely largely responsible for the increase in wildfires now being observed.

31 Increased human activity as a result of the construction of pipelines, roads, airstrips, and mines,
32 expansion of agriculture, and development and expansion of town sites has disturbed the natural soil
33 cover and exposed the organic-rich soil layers, leading to increased soil temperatures and, hence,
34 decomposition of the exposed organic materials. Burgess and Tarnocai (1997), studying the Norman

1 Wells Pipeline, provide some examples of the effect of pipeline construction on frozen peatlands and
2 permafrost in Canada.

3 Shoreline erosion along rivers, lakes, and oceans and thermal erosion (thermokarst) are also common
4 processes in the permafrost region, exposing the carbon-rich frozen soil layers to the atmosphere and
5 making the organic materials available for decomposition. As a result, carbon is released into the
6 atmosphere as either CO₂ or methane, or it enters the water system as dissolved organic carbon.

7 Large hydroelectric projects in northern areas, such as Southern Indian Lake in Manitoba and the
8 James Bay region of Quebec, have flooded vast areas of peatlands and initiated permafrost degradation
9 and decomposition of organic carbon, some of which is released into the atmosphere as methane. Of
10 greater immediate concern, however, is the carbon that has entered the water system as dissolved organic
11 carbon. These compounds include contaminants such as persistent organic pollutants [e.g., PCBs, DDT,
12 HCH, and chlorobenzene (AMAP, 2004)] that have been widely distributed in northern ecosystems over
13 many years, much of it deposited by snowfalls, concentrated by cryoturbation, and stored in the organic
14 soils. Of particular concern is the release of methylmercury because peatlands are net producers of this
15 compound (Driscoll *et al.*, 1998; Suchanek *et al.*, 2000), which is a much greater health hazard than
16 inorganic or elemental mercury. Natives in the regions where these hydroelectric developments have
17 taken place have developed mercury poisoning after ingesting fish contaminated by this mercury, leading
18 to serious health problems for many of the people. This is an example of what can happen when
19 permafrost degrades as a result of human activities. When climate warming occurs, the widespread
20 degradation of permafrost, with the resulting release of such dangerous pollutants into the water systems,
21 could cause serious health problems for fish, animals, and humans that rely on such waters.

22

23 **OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF CARBON IN THE PERMAFROST REGION**

24 Although wildfires are the most effective mechanism for releasing carbon into the atmosphere, they
25 are also an important factor in maintaining the integrity of northern ecosystems. Therefore, such fires are
26 allowed to burn naturally and are controlled only if they are close to settlements or other manmade
27 structures.

28 The construction methods currently used in permafrost terrain are designed to cause as little surface
29 disturbance as possible and to preserve the permafrost. Thus, the construction of pipelines, airstrips, and
30 highways is commonly carried out in the winter so that the heavy equipment used will cause minimal
31 surface disturbance.

32 The greatest threat to the region is a warmer (and possibly drier) climate, which would drastically
33 affect not only the carbon cycle, but also the biological systems, including human life. Unfortunately, we
34 know very little about how to manage the natural systems in this new environment.

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DATA GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The permafrost environment is a very complex system, and the data available for it are very limited with numerous gaps and uncertainties. Information on the distribution of soils in the permafrost region is based on small-scale maps, and the carbon stocks calculated for these soils are derived from a relatively small number of datasets. Although there is some understanding of the carbon sinks and sources in these soils, the limited amount of data available make it very difficult, or impossible, to assign reliable values. Only limited amounts of flux data have been collected for the permafrost-affected soils and, in some cases, it has been collected on sites that are not representative of the overall landscape. This makes it very difficult to scale this information up for a larger area. As Davidson and Janssens (2006) state:

“...the unresolved question regarding peatlands and permafrost is not the degree to which the currently constrained decomposition rates are temperature sensitive, but rather how much permafrost is likely to melt and how much of the peatland area is likely to dry significantly. Such regional changes in temperature, precipitation, and drainage are still difficult to predict in global circulation models. Hence, the climate change predictions, as much as our understanding of carbon dynamics, limit our ability to predict the magnitude of likely vulnerability of peat and permafrost carbon to climate change.”

To obtain more reliable estimates of the carbon sinks and sources in permafrost-affected soils, we need much more detailed data on the distribution and characteristics of these soils. More measurements of carbon fluxes and inputs are also needed if we are to understand the carbon sequestration process in these soils in the various permafrost zones. Our understanding of the effect that rapid climate warming will have on the carbon sinks and sources in these soils is also very limited. Future research should focus in greater detail on how the interactions of climate with the biological and physical environments will affect the carbon balance in permafrost-affected soils.

The changes that are occurring, and will occur, in the permafrost region are almost totally driven by natural forces and so are almost impossible for humans to manage on a large scale. Human activities, such as they are, are aimed at protecting the permafrost and, thus, preserving the carbon. Perhaps we humans should realize that there are systems (e.g., glaciers, ocean currents, droughts, and rainfall) that will be impossible for us to manage. We simply must learn to accept them and, if possible, adapt.

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Table 12-1. Areas of mineral soils in the various permafrost zones

Permafrost zones	Area (10 ³ × km ²)		
	Canada ^a	Alaska ^b	Total
Continuous	2001.80	353.46	2355.26
Discontinuous	636.63	479.15	1115.78
Sporadic	717.63	110.98	828.61
Isolated Patches	868.08	0.73	868.81
Total	4224.14	944.32	5168.46

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^aCalculated using the Soil Carbon of Canada Database (Soil Carbon Database Working Group, 1993).

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^bCalculated using the Northern and Mid Latitudes Soil Database (Cryosol Working Group, 2001).

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Table 12-2. Areas of peatlands (organic soils) in the various permafrost zones

Permafrost zones	Area (10 ³ × km ²)		
	Canada ^a	Alaska ^b	Total
Continuous	176.70	51.31	228.01
Discontinuous	243.51	28.74	272.25
Sporadic	307.72	0.62	308.34
Isolated Patches	221.23	13.05	234.28
Total	949.16	93.72	1042.88

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^aCalculated using the Peatlands of Canada Database (Tarnocai *et al.*, 2005).

13

^bCalculated using the Northern and Mid Latitudes Soil Database (Cryosol Working Group, 2001).

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1 **Table 12-3. Organic carbon accumulation and loss in various Canadian peatlands.** Positive
 2 values indicate net flux into the atmosphere (source); negative values
 3 indicate carbon sequestration (land sinks)

Peatlands	Amount of carbon
Boreal peatlands	-9.8 Mt yr ^{-1a}
All Canadian peatlands	-30 Mt yr ^{-1b}
All mineral and organic soils	-18 mg m ⁻² yr ^{-1c}
Rich fens	-13.58 g m ⁻² yr ^{-1d}
Poor fens (unfrozen, Discontinuous Permafrost Zone)	-20.34 g m ⁻² yr ^{-1d}
Peat plateaus (frozen, Discontinuous Permafrost Zone)	-13.31 g m ⁻² yr ^{-1d}
Collapse fens	-13.54 g m ⁻² yr ^{-1d}
Bogs (unfrozen, Discontinuous Permafrost Zone)	-21.81 g m ⁻² yr ^{-1d}
Dissolved organic carbon (DOC)	+2 g m ⁻² yr ^{-1e}
Arctic peatlands	-0 to -16 cm/100 yr ^f
Subarctic peatlands	-2 to -5 cm/100 yr ^f
Boreal peatlands	-2 to -11 cm/100 yr ^f
Carbon release by each fire in northern boreal peatlands	+1.46 kg C m ^{-2g}
Carbon release by fires in all terrain	+27 Mt yr ^{-1h}
Carbon release by fires in Western Canadian peatlands	+5.9 Mt yr ^{-1h}

4 ^aZoltai *et al.*, 1988.

5 ^bGorham, 1988.

6 ^cLiblik *et al.*, 1997.

7 ^dRobinson and Moore, 1999.

8 ^eMoore, 1997.

9 ^fCalculated based on the thickness of the deposit and the date of the basal peat (National Wetlands
 10 Working Group, 1988).

11 ^gRobinson and Moore, 2000.

12 ^hTuretsky *et al.*, 2004.

1 **Table 12-4. Soil carbon pools and fluxes for the permafrost areas of Canada.** Positive flux numbers indicate net
 2 flux into the atmosphere (source); negative values indicate carbon sequestration (land sinks)

Type	Peatlands		Mineral soils		Total
	Perennially frozen	Unfrozen	Perennially frozen	Unfrozen	
Current area ($\times 10^3$ km ²)	422 ^a	527 ^a	2088 ^b	2136 ^b	5173
Current pool (Gt)	47 ^c	65 ^a	56 ^c	28 ^b	196
Current atm. flux (g m ⁻² yr ⁻¹)	-5.7 ^d	-15.2 ^e			
Carbon accumulation (g m ⁻² yr ⁻¹)	-13.3 ^f	-20.3 to -21.8 ^f		-60 to -100 ^g	
Carbon release by fires (g m ⁻² yr ⁻¹) ^h	+7.57 ⁱ				
Methane flux (g m ⁻² yr ⁻¹)		+2.0 ^j			

3 ^aCalculated using the Peatlands of Canada Database (Tarnocai *et al.*, 2005).
 4 ^bCalculated using the Soil Carbon of Canada Database (Soil Carbon Database Working Group, 1993).
 5 ^cTarnocai, 1998.
 6 ^dUsing C accumulation rate of 0.13 mg ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ (this report).
 7 ^eUsing C accumulation rate of 0.194 mg ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ (Vitt *et al.*, 2000).
 8 ^fRobinson and Moore, 1999.
 9 ^gTrumbore and Harden, 1997.
 10 ^hFires recur every 150–190 years (Kuhry, 1994; Robinson and Moore, 2000).
 11 ⁱRobinson and Moore, 2000.
 12 ^jMoore and Roulet, 1995.

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Table 12-5. Average organic carbon content for soils in the various ecological regions (Tarnocai, 1998 and 2000)

Ecological regions	Average carbon content (kg m ⁻²)			
	Mineral soils ^a		Organic soils (peatlands) ^b	
	Frozen	Unfrozen	Frozen	Unfrozen
Arctic	49	12	86	43
Subarctic	61	17	129	144
Boreal	50	16	81	134

^aFor the 1-m depth.

^bFor the total depth of the peat deposit.

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Table 12-6. Organic carbon mass in mineral soils in the various permafrost zones

Permafrost zones	Carbon mass ^a (Gt)		
	Canada ^b	Alaska ^c	Total
Continuous	51.10	9.04	60.14
Discontinuous	10.33	4.82	15.15
Sporadic	9.15	0.75	9.90
Isolated Patches	13.59	0	13.59
Total	84.17	14.61	98.78

^aCalculated for the 0–100 cm depth.

^bCalculated using the Soil Carbon of Canada Database (Soil Carbon Database Working Group, 1993).

^cCalculated using the Northern and Mid Latitudes Soil Database (Cryosol Working Group, 2001).

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Table 12-7. Organic carbon mass in peatlands (organic soils) in the various permafrost zones

Permafrost zones	Carbon mass ^a (Gt)		
	Canada ^b	Alaska ^c	Total
Continuous	21.82	1.46	23.28
Discontinuous	26.54	0.84	27.38
Sporadic	30.66	0.27	30.93
Isolated Patches	32.95	0	32.95
Total	111.97	2.57	114.54


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^aCalculated for the total depth of the peat deposit.

^bCalculated using the Peatlands of Canada Database (Tarnocai *et al.*, 2005).

^cCalculated using the Northern and Mid Latitudes Soil Database (Cryosol Working Group, 2001).

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


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Fig. 12-1. Permafrost zones in North America (Brown *et al.*, 1997).

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Fig. 12-2. Arctic, Subarctic, and Boreal ecoclimatic provinces (ecological regions) in North America

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(Ecoregions Working Group, 1989; Baily and Cushwa, 1981).

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Carbon sinks




Permafrost-affected soil with a thick surface organic layer, dark-colored organic intrusions in the brown soil layer, and an underlying frozen, high-ice-content layer. The organic intrusions were translocated from the surface by cryoturbation. (Mackenzie Valley, Canada)

Carbon sources



Eroding high-ice-content permafrost soil composed of a dark frozen soil layer with an almost pure ice layer below. The thawing process generated a flow slide in which high-organic-content soil materials slumped into the water-saturated environment. (Mackenzie Delta area, Canada)




Perennially frozen deposit composed of an active layer that freezes and thaws annually and an underlying perennially frozen layer that has a high ice content.

Organic material deposited annually on the soil surface builds up as an organic soil layer. Some of this surface organic material is translocated into the deeper soil layers by cryoturbation (1). In addition, soluble organic matter is translocated into the deeper soil layers by movement of water to the freezing front and by gravity (2). Because these deeper soil layers have low temperatures (0 to -15°C), the organic material decomposes very slowly. Thus more organic material accumulates as long as the soil is frozen. In this state, the permafrost soil acts as a carbon sink.


Thermal erosion initiated by climate warming, wildfires or human activity causes the high-ice-content mineral soils to thaw, releasing the organic materials locked in the system. In this environment aerobic (3) and anaerobic (4) decomposition occurs releasing carbon dioxide and methane. In this state, the soil is a source of carbon.

2 **Fig. 12-3. Carbon cycle in permafrost-affected upland (mineral) soils, showing below-ground organic**
 3 **carbon sinks and sources.**
 4



1 Fig. 12-4. Carbon cycle in permafrost peatlands, showing below-ground organic carbon sinks and
 2 sources.

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
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Fig. 12-5. Carbon cycle in perennially frozen mineral soils in the permafrost region.

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
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Fig. 12-6. Carbon cycle in peatlands in the permafrost region.

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Fig. 12-7. The organic carbon mass in the various sensitivity classes for the Subarctic and Boreal Ecoclimatic Provinces (ecological regions) (Tarnocai, in press).

3

4

Chapter 13. Wetlands

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Observation and Science

KEY FINDINGS

- North America is home to approximately 41% of the global wetland area, encompassing about 2.5 million km² with a carbon pool of approximately 220 Gt, mostly in peatland soils.
 - North American wetlands currently are a CO₂ sink of approximately 70 Mt C yr⁻¹, but that estimate has an uncertainty of greater than 100%. North American wetlands are also a source of approximately 26 Mt yr⁻¹ of methane, a more potent atmospheric heat-trapping gas. The uncertainty in that flux is also greater than 100%.
 - Historically, the destruction of North American wetlands through land-use change has reduced carbon storage in wetlands by 43 Mt C yr⁻¹, primarily through the oxidation of carbon in peatland soils as they are drained and a more general reduction in carbon sequestration capacity of wetlands converted to other land uses. Methane emissions have also declined with the loss of wetland area.
 - Projections of future carbon storage and methane emissions of North American wetlands are highly uncertain and complex, but the large carbon pools in peatlands may be at risk for oxidation and release to the atmosphere as CO₂ if they become substantially warmer and drier. Methane emissions may increase with warming, but the response will likely vary with wetland type and with changes in precipitation.
 - Because of the potentially significant role of North American wetlands in methane production, the activities associated with the restoration, creation and protection of wetlands are likely to focus on the ecosystem services that wetlands provide, such as filtering of toxics, coastal erosion protection, wildlife habitat, and havens of biodiversity, rather than on carbon sequestration per se.
 - Research needs to reduce the uncertainties in carbon storage and fluxes in wetlands to provide information about management options in terms of carbon sequestration and trace gas fluxes.
-

1 INTRODUCTION

2 While there are a variety of legal and scientific definitions of a wetland (National Research Council,
3 1995; National Wetlands Working Group, 1997), most emphasize the presence of waterlogged conditions
4 in the upper soil profile during at least part of the growing season, and plant species and soil conditions
5 that reflect these hydrologic conditions. Waterlogging tends to suppress microbial decomposition more
6 than plant productivity, so wetlands are known for their ability to accumulate large amounts of carbon,
7 most spectacularly seen in large peat deposits that are often many meters deep. Thus, when examining
8 carbon dynamics, it is important to distinguish between freshwater wetlands with surface soil organic
9 matter deposits >40 cm thick (i.e., peatlands) and those with lesser amounts of soil organic matter (i.e.,
10 freshwater mineral-soil wetlands, FWMS). Some wetlands have permafrost; fluxes and pools in wetlands
11 with and without permafrost are discussed separately in Appendix 13A. We also differentiate between
12 freshwater wetlands and estuarine wetlands (salt marshes, mangroves, and mud flats) with marine-derived
13 salinity.

14 Peatlands occupy about 3% of the terrestrial global surface, yet they contain 16–33% of the total soil
15 carbon pool (Gorham, 1991; Maltby and Immirzi, 1993). Most peatlands occur between 50 and 70° N,
16 although significant areas occur at lower latitudes (Matthews and Fung, 1987; Aselmann and Crutzen,
17 1989; Maltby and Immirzi, 1993). Large areas of peatlands exist in Alaska, Canada, and in the northern
18 midwestern, northeastern, and southeastern United States (Bridgman *et al.*, 2000). This peat has formed
19 over thousands of years, and therefore the potential emissions from the large pool of soil carbon are likely
20 more significant to the global carbon budget than the current soil carbon sequestration rate. Large areas of
21 wetlands have been converted to other land uses globally and in North America (Dugan, 1993; OECD,
22 1996), which may have resulted in a net flux of carbon to the atmosphere (Armentano and Menges, 1986;
23 Maltby and Immirzi, 1993). Additionally, wetlands emit 92–237 Mt methane (CH₄) yr⁻¹, a large fraction
24 of the total annual global flux of about 600 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹ (Ehhalt *et al.*, 2001). This is important because
25 methane is a potent greenhouse gas, second in importance to only carbon dioxide (Ehhalt *et al.*, 2001).

26 A number of previous studies have examined the role of peatlands in the global carbon balance
27 (reviewed in Mitra *et al.*, 2005). Roulet (2000) focused on the role of Canadian peatlands in the Kyoto
28 process. Here we augment these previous studies by considering all types of wetlands (not just peatlands)
29 and integrate new data to examine the carbon balance in the wetlands of Canada, the United States, and
30 Mexico.

31 Given that many undisturbed wetlands are a natural sink for carbon dioxide and a source of methane,
32 a note of caution in interpretation of our data is important. Using the International Panel on Climate
33 Change (IPCC) terminology, a radiative forcing denotes “an externally imposed perturbation in the
34 radiative energy budget of the Earth’s climate system” (Ramaswamy *et al.*, 2001). Thus, it is the change

1 from a baseline condition in greenhouse gas fluxes in wetlands that constitute a radiative forcing that will
2 impact climate change, and the emissions of greenhouse gases from unperturbed wetlands is important
3 only in establishing a baseline condition. Thus, we consider changes from historical (~1800) fluxes and
4 present and future perturbations of greenhouse gas fluxes in North American wetlands.

6 INVENTORIES

7 Current Wetland Area and Rates of Loss

8 The current and historical wetland area and rates of loss are the basis for all further estimates of pools
9 and fluxes in this chapter. The loss of wetlands has caused the oxidation of their soil carbon, particularly
10 in peatlands; reduced their ability to sequester carbon; and reduced their emissions of methane. The
11 strengths and weakness of the wetland inventories of Canada, the United States, and Mexico are discussed
12 in Appendix 13A.

13 The conterminous United States has 312,000 km² of FWMS wetlands, 93,000 km² of peatlands, and
14 23,000 km² of estuarine wetlands, which encompass 5.5% of the land area (Table 13-1). This represents
15 just 48% of the original wetland area in the conterminous United States (Table 13A-1 in Appendix 13A).
16 However, wetland losses in the United States have declined from 1,855 km² yr⁻¹ in the 1950s–1970s to
17 237 km² yr⁻¹ in the 1980s–1990s (Dahl, 2000). Such data mask large differences in loss rates among
18 wetland classes and conversion of wetlands to other classes, with potentially large effects on carbon
19 stocks and fluxes (Dahl, 2000). For example, the majority of wetland losses in the United States have
20 occurred in FWMS wetlands. As of the early 1980s, 84% of U.S. peatlands were unaltered (Armentano
21 and Menges, 1986; Maltby and Immirzi, 1993; Rubec, 1996), and, given the current regulatory
22 environment in the United States, recent rates of loss are likely small.

23
24 **Table 13-1. The area, carbon pool, net carbon balance, and methane flux from wetlands in North**
25 **America and the world.** Positive fluxes indicate net fluxes to the atmosphere, whereas negative fluxes
26 indicate net fluxes into an ecosystem. Citations and assumptions in calculations are in the text and in
27 Appendix 13A.

28
29 Canada has 1,301,000 km² of wetlands, covering 14% of its land area, of which 87% are peatlands
30 (Table 13-1). Canada has lost about 14% of its wetlands, mainly due to agricultural development of
31 FWMS wetlands (Rubec, 1996), although the ability to estimate wetland losses in Canada is limited by
32 the lack of a regular wetland inventory.

1 The wetland area in Mexico is estimated at 36,000 km² (Table 13-1), with an estimated historical loss
2 of 16,000 km² (Table 13A-1 in Appendix 13A). However, given the lack of a nationwide wetland
3 inventory and a general paucity of data, this number is highly uncertain.

4 Problems with inadequate wetland inventories are even more prevalent in lesser developed countries
5 (Finlayson *et al.*, 1999). We estimate a global wetland area of 6.0×10^6 km² (Table 13-1); thus, North
6 America currently has about 43% of the global wetland area. It has been estimated that about 50% of the
7 world's historical wetlands have been converted to other uses (Moser *et al.*, 1996).

8 9 **Carbon Pools**

10 We estimate that North American wetlands have a current soil and plant carbon pool of 220 Gt, of
11 which approximately 98% is in the soil (Table 13-1). The majority of this carbon is in peatlands, with
12 FWMS wetlands contributing about 18% of the carbon pool. The large amount of soil carbon (27 Gt) in
13 Alaskan FWMS wetlands had not been identified in previous studies (see Appendix 13A).

14 15 **Soil Carbon Fluxes**

16 North American peatlands currently have a net carbon balance of about -18 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Table 13-1),
17 but several large fluxes are incorporated into this estimate. (**Negative numbers indicate net fluxes into
18 the ecosystem, whereas positive numbers indicate net fluxes into the atmosphere.**) Peatlands
19 sequester -34 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Table 13A-2 in Appendix 13A), but peatlands in the conterminous United States
20 that have been drained for agriculture and forestry had a net oxidative flux of 18 Mt C yr⁻¹ as of the early
21 1980s (Armentano and Menges, 1986). Despite a substantial reduction in the rate of wetland loss since the
22 1980s (Dahl 2000), drained organic soils continue to lose carbon over many decades, so the actual flux to
23 the atmosphere is probably close to the 1980s estimate. There has also been a loss in sequestration
24 capacity in drained peatlands of 2.4 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Table 13-1), so the overall soil carbon sink of North
25 American peatlands is about 21 Mt C yr⁻¹ smaller than it would have been in the absence of disturbance.

26 Very little attention has been given to the role of FWMS wetlands in North American or global
27 carbon balance estimates, with the exception of methane emissions. Carbon sequestration associated with
28 sediment deposition is a potentially large, but poorly quantified, flux in wetlands (Stallard, 1998). Using a
29 review by Johnston (1991), we calculate a substantial carbon accumulation rate in sedimentation in
30 FWMS wetlands of -129 g C m⁻² yr⁻¹ (see Appendix 13A). However, it is extremely unlikely that the
31 actual sequestration rate is this high, as the data are probably strongly biased by researchers choosing
32 wetlands with high sediment deposition to study this process. More fundamentally, carbon in sediments
33 that are simply redistributed in the landscape due to erosion from a terrestrial source to a wetland sink
34 does not represent carbon sequestration except to the extent that decomposition rates are lower in

1 wetlands. Much of this sediment-associated carbon is probably relatively stable in upland soils, so FWMS
2 wetlands may not represent a substantial sediment carbon sink at the landscape scale. There are no data to
3 our knowledge to evaluate this important caveat. Based upon this reasoning, we somewhat arbitrarily
4 reduced our calculated FWMS wetland sediment carbon sequestration rate by 75% to -34 Mt C yr^{-1} (Table
5 13A-2 in Appendix 13A). This is still a substantial sink and an important unknown in carbon budgets. For
6 example, Stallard (1998) estimated that global wetlands are a large sediment sink, with a flux on the order
7 of -1 Gt C yr^{-1} . However, this analysis was based on many assumptions and was acknowledged by the
8 author to be a first guess at best.

9 Decomposition of soil carbon in FWMS wetlands that have been converted to other land uses appears
10 to be responsible for only a negligible loss of soil carbon currently (Table 13A-2 in Appendix 13A).
11 However, due to the historical loss of FWMS wetland area, we estimate that they currently sequester
12 21 Mt C yr^{-1} less than they did prior to disturbance (Table 13-1). This estimate has the same unknowns
13 described in the previous paragraph on current sediment carbon sequestration in FWMS wetlands.

14 We estimate that estuarine wetlands currently sequester $-9.7 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$, with a historical reduction in
15 sequestration capacity of 1.4 Mt C yr^{-1} due to loss of area (Table 13-1). Despite the relatively small area
16 of estuarine wetlands, they currently contribute about 26% of total wetland carbon sequestration in the
17 conterminous United States and about 14% of the North American total. Estuarine wetlands sequester
18 carbon at a rate about 10 times higher on an area basis than other wetland ecosystems due to high
19 sedimentation rates, high soil carbon content, and constant burial due to sea level rise. Estimates of
20 sediment deposition rates in estuarine wetlands are robust, but it is unknown to what extent soil carbon
21 sequestration is divided into allochthonous carbon (sediment-derived carbon from outside the wetland)
22 and autochthonous carbon (derived from rates of plant productivity being greater than decomposition
23 within the wetland). As with FWMS wetlands, soil carbon sequestration in estuarine wetlands is
24 overestimated to the extent that allochthonous carbon simply represents redistribution of carbon in the
25 landscape. There is also large uncertainty in the area of mud flats.

26 Overall, North American wetland soils appear to be a substantial carbon sink with a net flux of
27 -70 Mt C yr^{-1} (with very large error bounds because of FWMS wetlands) (Table 13-1). The large-scale
28 conversion of wetlands to upland uses has led to a reduction in the wetland soil carbon sequestration
29 capacity of 25 Mt C yr^{-1} from the likely historical rate (Table 13-1), but this estimate is driven by large
30 losses of FWMS wetlands with their highly uncertain sedimentation carbon sink. With the current net
31 oxidative flux of 18 Mt C yr^{-1} from conterminous U.S. peatlands, we estimate that North American
32 wetlands currently sequester 43 Mt C yr^{-1} less than they did historically (Table 13A-2 in Appendix 13A).
33 Furthermore, North American peatlands and FWMS wetlands have lost 2.6 Gt and 4.9 Gt of soil carbon,
34 respectively, and collectively they have lost 2.4 Gt of plant carbon since approximately 1800. Very little

1 data exist to estimate carbon fluxes for freshwater Mexican wetlands, but because of their small area, they
2 will not likely have a large impact on the overall North American estimates.

3 The global wetland soil carbon balance has only been examined in peatlands. The current change in
4 soil carbon flux in peatlands is about 176 to 266 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Table 13A-2 in Appendix 13A), largely due to
5 the oxidation of peat drained for agriculture and forestry and secondarily due to peat combustion for fuel
6 (Armentano and Menges, 1986; Maltby and Immirzi 1993). Thus, globally peatlands are a moderate
7 atmospheric source of carbon. The cumulative historical shift in soil carbon stocks has been estimated to
8 be 5.5 to 7.1 Gt C (Maltby and Immirzi, 1993).

10 Methane and Nitrous Oxide Emissions

11 We estimate that North American wetlands emit 26 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹ (Table 13-1). Our synthesis is
12 substantially higher than the previous estimate by Bartlett and Harriss (1993) (see Appendix 13A). A
13 mechanistic methane model yielded similar rates of 3.8 and 7.1 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹ for Alaska and Canada,
14 respectively (Zhuang et al., 2004). For comparison, a regional inverse atmospheric modeling approach
15 estimated total methane emissions (from all sources) of 16 and 54 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹ for boreal and temperate
16 North America, respectively (Fletcher *et al.*, 2004a).

17 Methane emissions are currently about 24 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹ less than they were historically in North
18 American wetlands (see Table 13A-4 in Appendix 13A) because of the loss of wetland area. We do not
19 consider the effects of conversion of wetlands from one type to another (Dahl 2000), which may have a
20 significant impact on methane emissions. Similarly, we estimate that global methane emissions from
21 natural wetlands are only about half of what they were historically (Table 13A-4 in Appendix 13A).
22 However, this may be an overestimate because wetland losses have been higher in more developed
23 countries than less developed countries (Moser *et al.*, 1996), and wetlands at lower latitudes have higher
24 emissions on average (Bartlett and Harriss, 1993).

25 When we multiplied the very low published estimates of nitrous oxide emissions from natural and
26 disturbed wetlands (Joosten and Clarke, 2002) by North American wetland area, the flux was insignificant
27 (data not shown).

28 The global warming potential (GWP) of a gas depends on its instantaneous radiative forcing and its
29 lifetime in the atmosphere, with methane having GWPs of 1.9, 6.3, and 16.9 CO₂-carbon equivalents on a
30 mass basis across 500-year, 100-year, and 20-year time frames, respectively (Ramaswamy *et al.*, 2001).¹
31 Thus, depending upon the time frame and within the large confidence limits of many of our estimates in

¹ GWPs in Ramaswamy *et al.* (2001) were originally reported in CO₂-mass equivalents. We have converted them into CO₂-carbon equivalents so that the net carbon balance and methane flux columns in Table 13-1 can be directly compared by multiplying methane fluxes by the GWPs given here].

1 Table 13-1, North American wetlands as a whole currently are in a range between approximately neutral
2 and a large source of net CO₂-carbon equivalents to the atmosphere (but note caution in the *Introduction*
3 in converting this into radiative forcing). It is likely that FWMS wetlands, with their high methane
4 emissions, are a net source of CO₂-carbon equivalents to the atmosphere. In contrast, estuarine wetlands
5 are a net sink for CO₂-carbon equivalents because they support both rapid rates of carbon sequestration
6 and low methane emissions. However, caution should be exercised in using GWPs to draw conclusions
7 about changes in the net flux of CO₂-carbon equivalents because GWPs are based upon a pulse of a gas
8 into the atmosphere, whereas carbon sequestration is more or less continuous. For example, if one
9 considers continuous methane emissions and carbon sequestration in peat over time, most peatlands are a
10 net sink for CO₂-carbon equivalents because of the long lifetime of carbon dioxide sequestered as peat
11 (Frolking *et al.*, 2006).

12 13 **Plant Carbon Fluxes**

14 We estimate that wetland forests in the conterminous United States currently sequester
15 -10.3 Mt C yr⁻¹ as increased plant biomass (see Table 13A-3 in Appendix 13A). Sequestration in plants in
16 undisturbed wetland forests in Alaska and many peatlands is probably minimal, although there may be
17 substantial logging of Canadian forested peatlands that we do not have the data to account for.

18 19 **TRENDS AND DRIVERS OF WETLAND CARBON FLUXES**

20 Historically, the destruction of wetlands through land-use changes has had the largest effect on the
21 carbon fluxes and the GWPs of North American wetlands. The primary effects have been a reduction in
22 their ability to sequester carbon (a small to moderate increase in radiative forcing depending on carbon
23 sequestration by sedimentation in FWMS and estuarine wetlands), oxidation of their soil carbon reserves
24 upon drainage (a small increase in radiative forcing), and a reduction in the emission of methane to the
25 atmosphere (a moderate decrease in radiative forcing) (Table 13A-1 and Appendix 13A). While extensive
26 research has been done on carbon cycling and pools in North American wetlands, to our knowledge, this
27 is the first attempt at an overall carbon budget for all of the wetlands of North America, although others
28 have examined the carbon budget for North American peatlands as part of global assessments (Armentano
29 and Menges, 1986; Maltby and Immirzi, 1993; Joosten and Clarke, 2002). Globally, the disturbance of
30 peatlands appears to have shifted them into a net source of carbon to the atmosphere. Any positive effect
31 of wetland loss due to a reduction in their methane emissions, and hence radiative forcing, will be more
32 than negated by the loss of the many ecosystem services they provide such as havens for biodiversity,
33 recharge of groundwater, reduction in flooding, fish nurseries, etc. (Zedler and Kercher, in press).

1 A majority of the effort in examining future global change impacts on wetlands has focused on
2 northern peatlands because of their large soil carbon reserves, although under current climate conditions
3 they have modest methane emissions (Moore and Keddy, 1989; Roulet, 2000; Joosten and Clarke, 2002
4 and references therein). Data (Bartlett and Harriss, 1993; Moore *et al.*, 1998; Updegraff *et al.*, 2001) and
5 modeling (Gedney *et al.*, 2004; Zhuang *et al.*, 2004) strongly support the contention that water table
6 position and temperature are the primary environmental controls over methane emissions. How this
7 generalization plays out with future climate change is, however, more complex. For example, most
8 climate models predicted much of Canada will be warmer and drier in the future. Based upon this
9 prediction, Moore *et al.* (1998) proposed a variety of responses to climate change in the carbon fluxes
10 from different types of Canadian peatlands. Methane emissions may increase in collapsed former-
11 permafrost bogs (which will be warmer and wetter) but decrease in fens and other types of bogs (warmer
12 and drier). A methane-process model predicted that modest warming will increase global wetland
13 emissions, but larger increases in temperature will decrease emissions because of drier conditions (Cao *et al.*,
14 1998). Another methane-process model suggested that net methane emissions from northern wetlands
15 have increased by 0.08 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹ during the twentieth century and by 1.0 Mt CH₄ yr⁻¹ during the 1980s
16 (Zhuang *et al.*, 2004). Inverse modeling also shows that atmospheric anomalies in methane during the
17 1990s may be partially explained by interannual climate effects on wetland emissions (Fletcher *et al.*,
18 2004b; Wang *et al.*, 2004). Thus, the above-mentioned studies suggest that past climate change has
19 already had an effect on wetland methane emissions and that this will only be exacerbated in the future.

20 Other important anthropogenic forcing factors that will affect future methane emissions include
21 atmospheric sulfate deposition (Vile *et al.*, 2003; Gauci *et al.*, 2004), atmospheric carbon dioxide
22 concentrations (Megonigal and Schlesinger, 1997; Vann and Megonigal, 2003), and nutrient additions
23 (Keller *et al.*, 2005). These external forcing factors in turn will interact with internal ecosystem
24 constraints such as pH and carbon quality (Moore and Roulet, 1995; Bridgham *et al.*, 1998), anaerobic
25 carbon flow (Hines and Duddleston, 2001), and net ecosystem productivity and plant community
26 composition (Whiting and Chanton, 1993; Updegraff *et al.*, 2001; Strack *et al.*, 2004) to determine the
27 actual response.

28 The effects of global change on carbon sequestration in peatlands is probably of minor importance as
29 a global flux because of the relatively low rate of peat accumulation. However, losses of soil carbon
30 stocks in peatlands drained for agriculture and forestry (Table 13A-2 in Appendix 13A) attest to the
31 possibility of large losses from the massive soil carbon deposits in northern peatlands if they become
32 substantially drier in a future climate. Furthermore, Turetsky *et al.* (2004) estimated that up to
33 5.9 Mt C yr⁻¹ are released from western Canadian peatlands by fire and predicted that increases in fire
34 frequency may cause these systems to become net atmospheric carbon sources. Northern peatlands may

1 also emit more methane with warmer temperatures, depending on changes in water table levels. The
2 effects of global change on estuarine wetlands is of concern because sequestration rates are rapid, and
3 they can be expected to increase with the rate of sea level rise provided the estuarine wetland area does
4 not decline. It remains to be determined whether rising atmospheric carbon dioxide, temperature, nitrogen
5 deposition, and shoreline construction will permit the area of estuarine wetlands to remain stable.

7 **OPTIONS AND MEASURES**

8 Wetland policies in the United States and Canada are driven by a variety of federal, state or
9 provincial, and local laws and regulations in recognition of the many wetland ecosystem services and
10 large historical loss rates (Lynch-Stewart *et al.*, 1999; National Research Council, 2001; Zedler and
11 Kercher, in press). Thus, any actions to enhance the ability of wetlands to sequester carbon, or reduce
12 their methane emissions, must be implemented within the context of the existing regulatory framework.
13 The most important option in the United States has already been largely achieved, and that is to reduce
14 the historical rate of peatland losses with their accompanying large oxidative losses of the stored soil
15 carbon.

16 There has been strong interest expressed in using carbon sequestration as a rationale for wetland
17 restoration and creation in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere (Wylynko, 1999; Watson *et al.*,
18 2000). However, high methane emissions from conterminous U.S. wetlands suggest that creating and
19 restoring wetlands may increase net radiative forcing, although adequate data do not exist to evaluate this.
20 Roulet (2000) came to a similar conclusion concerning the restoration of Canadian wetlands. The
21 possibility of increasing radiative forcing by creating or restoring wetlands does not apply to estuarine
22 wetlands, which emit relatively little methane compared to the carbon they sequester. Restoration of
23 drained peatlands may stop the rapid loss of their soil carbon, which may compensate for increased
24 methane emissions. However, Canadian peatlands restored from peat extraction operations increased their
25 net emissions of carbon because of straw addition during the restoration process, although it was assumed
26 that they would eventually become a net sink (Cleary *et al.*, 2005).

27 Regardless of their internal carbon balance, the area of restored wetlands is currently too small to
28 form a significant carbon sink at the continental scale. Between 1986 and 1997, only 4,157 km² of
29 uplands were converted into wetlands in the conterminous United States (Dahl, 2000). However, larger
30 areas of wetland restoration may have a significant impact on carbon sequestration. A simulation model
31 of planting 20,000 km² into bottomland hardwood trees as part of the Wetland Reserve Program in the
32 United States showed a sequestration of 4 Mt C yr⁻¹ through 2045 (Barker *et al.*, 1996), although they did
33 not account for the GWP of increased methane emissions.

1 Potentially more significant is the conversion of wetlands from one type to another; for example,
2 8.7% (37,200 km²) of the wetlands in the conterminous United States in 1997 were in a previous wetland
3 category in 1986 (Dahl, 2000). The net effect of these conversions on wetland carbon fluxes is unknown.
4 Similarly, Roulet (2000) argued that too many uncertainties exist to include Canadian wetlands in the
5 Kyoto Protocol.

6 In summary, North American wetlands form a very large carbon pool because of storage as peat and
7 are a small-to-moderate carbon sink (excluding methane effects), with the largest unknown being the role
8 of carbon sequestration by sedimentation in FWMS wetlands. With the exception of estuarine wetlands,
9 methane emissions from wetlands may largely offset any positive benefits of carbon sequestration in soils
10 and plants. Given these conclusions, it is probably unwarranted to use carbon sequestration as a rationale
11 for the protection and restoration of FWMS wetlands, although the many other ecosystem services that
12 they provide justify their protection. However, protecting and restoring peatlands will stop the loss of
13 their soil carbon (at least over the long term), and estuarine wetlands are an important carbon sink given
14 their limited areal extent and low methane emissions. The most important areas for further scientific
15 research in terms of current carbon fluxes in the United States are to establish an unbiased, landscape-
16 level sampling scheme to determine sediment carbon sequestration in FWMS and estuarine wetlands and
17 to take additional measurements of annual methane emissions to better constrain these important fluxes. It
18 would also be beneficial if the approximately decadal National Wetland Inventory (NWI) status and
19 trends data were collected in sufficient detail with respect to the Cowardin *et al.* (1979) classification
20 scheme to determine changes among mineral-soil wetlands and peatlands.

21 Canada lacks any regular inventory of its wetlands, and thus it is difficult to quantify land-use impacts
22 upon their carbon fluxes and pools. While excellent scientific data exists on most aspects of carbon
23 cycling in Canadian peatlands, Canadian FWMS and estuarine wetlands have been relatively poorly
24 studied, despite having suffered large proportional losses to land-use change. Wetland data for Mexico is
25 almost entirely lacking. Thus, anything that can be done to improve upon this would be helpful. All
26 wetland inventories should consider the area of estuarine mud flats which have the potential to sequester
27 considerable carbon.

28 Global change effects on the carbon pools and fluxes of North American wetlands are the largest
29 future unknown. We will not be able to accurately predict the role of North American wetlands as
30 potential positive or negative feedbacks to anthropogenic climate change without knowing the integrative
31 effects of changes in temperature, precipitation, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, and
32 atmospheric deposition of nitrogen and sulfur within the context of internal ecosystem drivers of
33 wetlands. To our knowledge, no manipulative experiment has simultaneously measured more than two of
34 these perturbations in any North American wetland, and few have been done at any site. Modeling

1 expertise of the carbon dynamics of wetlands has rapidly improved in the last few years (Frolking *et al.*,
2 2002; Zhuang *et al.*, 2004 and references therein), but this needs even further development in the future,
3 including for FWMS wetlands.

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1 **Table 13-1. The area, carbon pool, net carbon balance, and methane flux from wetlands in North America and the world.** Positive fluxes indicate net
 2 fluxes to the atmosphere, whereas negative fluxes indicate net fluxes into an ecosystem. Citations and assumptions in calculations are in the text and in Appendix
 3 13A.

	Area ^a (km ²)		Carbon Pool ^b (Gt C)		Net Carbon Balance ^c (Mt C yr ⁻¹)		Historical Loss in Sequestration Capacity (Mt C yr ⁻¹)		Methane Flux (Mt CH ₄ yr ⁻¹)	
Canada										
Peatland	1,135,608	****	149	****	-19	***	0.3	*	3.2	**
Freshwater Mineral	158,720	**	4.9	**	-5.1	*	6.5	*	5.7	*
Estuarine	6,400	***	0.1	***	-1.3	**	0.5	*	0.0	***
Total	1,300,728	****	154	****	-25	**	7.2	*	8.9	*
Alaska										
Peatland	132,196	****	15.9	**	-2.0	**	0.0	****	0.3	*
Freshwater Mineral	555,629	****	27.1	**	-18	*	0.0	****	1.4	*
Estuarine	8,400	****	0.1	***	-1.9	**	0.0	****	0.1	***
Total	696,224	****	43.2	**	-22	*	0.0	****	1.8	*
Conterminous United States										
Peatland	93,477	****	14.4	***	4	*	2.1	*	3.4	**
Freshwater Mineral	312,193	****	6.2	***	-18	*	15	*	11.2	**
Estuarine	23,000	****	0.6	****	-4.9	**	0.4	*	0.1	***
Total	428,670	****	21.2	***	-19	*	17	*	14.7	**
U.S. Total	1,124,895	****	64	**	-41	*	17	*	17	**
Mexico										
Peatland	10,000	*	1.5	*	-1.6	*	ND ^d	*	0.4	*
Freshwater Mineral	20,685	*	0.4	*	-0.7	*	ND	*	0.7	*
Estuarine	5,000	*	0.2	*	-1.6	*	0.5	*	0.0	*
Total	35,685	*	2.1	*	-3.9	*	ND	*	1.1	*
North America										
Peatland	1,371,281	****	180	****	-18	*	2.4	*	7	**

Freshwater Mineral	1,047,227	****	39	***	-42	*	21	*	19	*
Estuarine	42,800	***	1.0	***	-9.7	**	1.4	*	0.2	**
Total	2,461,308		220		-70	*	25	*	26	*
Global										
Peatland	3,443,000	***	460	***	150	**	16	*	37	**
Freshwater Mineral	2,315,000	***	46	***	-75	*	87	*	68	**
Estuarine	203,000	*	5.4	*	-43	*	13.2	*	1.5	**
Total	5,961,000	***	511	***	32	*	116	*	107	**

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^aEstuarine includes salt marsh, mangrove, and mudflat, except for Mexico and global for which no mudflat estimates were available.

^bIncludes soil C and plant C, but overall soil C is 98% of the total pool.

^cIncludes soil C sequestration, plant C sequestration, and loss of C due to drainage of wetlands. Plant C sequestration and soil oxidative flux due to drainage are either unknown or negligible for North American wetlands except for the conterminous United States (see Appendix 13A).

^dNo data.

The error categories are as follows:

***** = 95% certain that the actual value is within 10% of the estimate reported.

**** = 95% certain that the actual value is within 25%.

*** = 95% certain that the actual value is within 50%.

** = 95% certain that the actual value is within 100%.

* = uncertainty > 100%

Appendix 13A

Wetlands – Supplemental Material

INVENTORIES

Current Wetland Area and Rates of Loss

The ability to estimate soil carbon pools and fluxes in North American wetlands is constrained by the national inventories (or lack thereof) for Canada, the United States, and Mexico (Davidson *et al.*, 1999). The National Wetland Inventory (NWI) program of the United States has repeatedly sampled several thousand wetland sites using aerial photographs and more limited field verification. The data are summarized in a series of reports detailing changes in wetland area in the conterminous United States for the periods of the mid-1950s to mid-1970s (Frayer *et al.*, 1983), mid-1970s to mid-1980s (Dahl and Johnson, 1991), and 1986 to 1997 (Dahl, 2000). We used these relatively high-quality data sets extensively for estimating wetland area and loss rates in the conterminous United States, including mud flats. However, the usefulness of the NWI inventory reports for carbon budgeting was limited by the level of classification used to define wetland categories with the Cowardin *et al.* (1979) wetland classification system. At the level used in the national status and trend reports, vegetated freshwater wetlands are classified by dominant physiognomic vegetation type, and it is impossible to make the important distinction between wetlands with deep organic soils (i.e., peatlands) and wetlands with mineral soils. The data are not at an adequate spatial resolution to combine with U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) soil maps to discriminate between the two types of wetlands (T. Dahl, personal comm.). Because of these data limitations, we used the NRCS soil inventory of peatlands (i.e., Histosols and Histels, or peatlands with and without permafrost, respectively) to estimate historical peatland area (Bridgham *et al.*, 2000) and combined these data with regional estimates of loss (Armentano and Menges, 1986) to estimate current peatland area in the conterminous United States. We calculated the current area of freshwater mineral-soil (FWMS) wetlands in the conterminous United States by subtracting peatland area from total wetland area (Dahl, 2000). This approach was limited by the Armentano and Menges peatland area data being current only up to the early 1980s, although large losses of peatlands since then are unlikely due to the institution of wetland protection laws.

We used a similar approach for Alaskan peatlands: peatland area was determined by the NRCS soil inventory [N. Bliss, query of the NRCS State Soil Geographic (STATSGO) database, February 2006] and overall wetland inventory was determined by standard NWI methods (Hall *et al.*, 1994). However, our

1 peatland estimate of 132,000 km² (Table 13A-1) is 22% of the often cited value by Kivinen and Pakarinen
2 (1981) of 596,000 km².

3
4 **Table 13A-1. Current and historical area of wetlands in North America and the world ($\times 10^3$ km²).**
5 Historical refers to approximately 1800, unless otherwise specified
6

7 Kivinen and Pakarinen also used NRCS soils data (Rieger *et al.*, 1979) for their peatland estimates, but
8 they defined a peatland as having a minimum organic layer thickness of 30 cm, whereas the current U.S.
9 and Canadian soil taxonomies require a 40-cm thickness. The original 1979 Alaska soil inventory has
10 been reclassified with current U.S. soil taxonomy (J. Moore, Alaska State Soil Scientist, personal comm.).
11 Using the reclassified soil inventory, Alaska has 417,000 km² of wetlands with a histic modifier that are
12 not Histosols or Histels, indicating significant carbon accumulation in the surface horizons of FWMS
13 wetlands. Thus, we conclude that Kivinen and Pakarinen's Alaska peatland area estimate is higher
14 because many Alaskan wetlands have a thin organic horizon that is not deep enough to qualify as a
15 peatland under current soil taxonomy. Our smaller peatland area significantly lowers our estimate of
16 carbon pools and fluxes in Alaskan peatlands compared to earlier studies (see *Carbon Pools* below).

17 A regular national inventory of Canada's wetlands has not been undertaken, although wetland area
18 has been mapped by ecoregion (National Wetlands Working Group, 1988). Extensive recent effort has
19 gone into mapping Canadian peatlands (Tarnocai, 1998; Tarnocai *et al.*, 2005). We calculated mineral-
20 soil wetlands as the difference between total wetland area and peatland area in National Wetland Working
21 Group (1988). Historical FWMS wetland area was obtained from Rubec (1996). There are no reliable
22 country-wide estimates of mud flat area for Canada, but a highly uncertain extrapolation from a limited
23 number of regional estimates was possible.

24 No national wetland inventories have been done for Mexico. Current freshwater wetland estimates for
25 Mexico were taken from Davidson *et al.* (1999), who used inventories of discrete wetland regions
26 performed by a variety of organizations. Thus, freshwater wetland area estimates for Mexico are highly
27 unreliable and are possibly a large underestimate. For salt marshes and mangroves area in Mexico, we
28 used the estimates compiled by Mendelsohn and McKee (2000), which are similar to estimates reported
29 in Davidson *et al.* (1999) and Spalding *et al.* (1997). There are no reliable estimates of mud flat area for
30 Mexico.

31 **CARBON POOLS**

32 **Freshwater Mineral-Soil (Gleysol) Carbon Pools**

33 Gleysol is a soil classification used by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and many
34 countries that denotes mineral soils formed under waterlogged conditions (FAO-UNESCO, 1974).
35

1 Tarnocai (1998) reported a soil carbon density of 200 Mg C ha⁻¹ for Canadian Gleysols but did not
2 indicate to what depth this extended. Batjes (1996) determined soil carbon content globally from the *Soil*
3 *Map of the World* (FAO, 1991) and a large database of soil pedons. He gave a very similar average value
4 for soil carbon density of 199 Mg C ha⁻¹ (CV² = 212%, n = 14 pedons) for Gleysols of the world to 2-m
5 depth; to 1-m depth, he reported a soil carbon density of 131 Mg C ha⁻¹ (CV = 109%, n = 142 pedons).

6 Gleysols are not part of the U.S. soil taxonomy scheme, and mineral soils with attributes reflecting
7 waterlogged conditions are distributed among numerous soil groups. We used the NRCS State Soil
8 Geographic (STATSGO) soils database to query for soil carbon density in “wet” mineral soils of the
9 conterminous United States (all soils that had a surface texture described as peat, muck, or mucky peat, or
10 appeared on the 1993 list of hydric soils, which were not classified as Histosols) (N. Bliss, query of
11 NRCS STATSGO database, Dec. 2005). We found soil carbon densities of 162 Mg C ha⁻¹ for FWMS
12 wetlands in the conterminous United States and Mexico, which was used in this analysis.

13 However, some caution is necessary regarding the use of Gleysol or wet mineral soil carbon densities,
14 as apparently they include large areas of seasonally wet soils that are not considered wetlands by the more
15 conservative definition of wetlands used by the United States and many other countries and organizations.
16 For example, Eswaran *et al.* (1995) estimated that global wet mineral-soil area was 8,808,000 km², which
17 is substantially higher than the commonly accepted mineral-soil wetland area estimated by Matthews and
18 Fung (1987) of 2,289,000 km² and Aselmann and Crutzen (1989) of 2,341,000 km², even accounting for
19 substantial global wetland loss. In our query of the NRCS STATSGO database for the United States, we
20 found 1,258,000 km² of wet soils in the conterminous United States versus our estimate of 312,000 km²
21 of FWMS wetlands currently and 762,000 km² historically (Table 13A-1). We assume that including
22 these wet-but-not-wetland soils will decrease the estimated soil carbon density, but to what degree we do
23 not know. However, just considering the differences in area will give large differences in the soil carbon
24 pool. For example, Eswaran *et al.* (1995) estimated that wet mineral soils globally contain 108 Gt C to
25 1-m depth, whereas our estimate is 46 Gt C to 2-m depth (Table 13A-2).

26 For Alaska, many soil investigations have been conducted since the STATSGO soil data was coded.
27 We updated STATSGO by calculating soil carbon densities from data obtained from the NRCS on
28 479 pedons collected in Alaska, and then we used this data for both FWMS wetlands and peatlands. For
29 some of the Histosols, missing bulk densities were calculated using averages of measured bulk densities
30 for the closest matching class in the USDA Soil Taxonomy (NRCS, 1999). A matching procedure was
31 developed for relating sets of pedons to sets of STATSGO components. If there were multiple
32 components for each map unit in STATSGO, the percentage of the component was used to scale area and
33 carbon data. We compared matching sets of pedons to sets of components at the four top levels of the

² CV is the “coefficient of variation,” or 100 times the standard deviation divided by the mean.

1 U.S. Soil Taxonomy: Orders, Suborders, Great Groups, and Subgroups. For example, the soil carbon for
2 all pedons having the same soil order were averaged, and the carbon content was applied to all of the soil
3 components of the same order (e.g., Histosol pedons are used to characterize Histosol components). At
4 the Order level, all components were matched with pedon data. At the suborder level, pedon data were not
5 available to match approximately 20,000 km² (compared to the nearly 1,500,000-km² area of soil in the
6 state), but the soil characteristics were more closely associated with the appropriate land areas than at the
7 Order level. At the Great Group and Subgroup levels, pedon data were unavailable for much larger areas,
8 even though the quality of the data when available became better. For this study, we used the Suborder-
9 level matching. The resulting soil carbon density for Alaskan FWMS wetlands was 469 Mg C ha⁻¹,
10 reflecting large areas of wetlands with a histic epipedon as noted above.

11 12 **Peatland Soil Carbon Pools**

13 The carbon pool of permafrost and non-permafrost peatlands in Canada had been previously
14 estimated by Tarnocai *et al.* (2005) based upon an extensive database. Good soil-carbon density data are
15 unavailable for peatlands in the United States, as the NRCS soil pedon information typically only goes to
16 a maximum depth of between 1.5 to 2 m, and many peatlands are deeper than this. Therefore, we used the
17 carbon density estimates of Tarnocai *et al.* (2005) of 1,441 Mg C ha⁻¹ for Histosols and 1,048 Mg C ha⁻¹
18 for Histels to estimate the soil carbon pool in Alaskan peatlands.

19 The importance of our using a smaller area of Alaskan peatlands becomes obvious here. Using the
20 larger area from Kivinen and Pakarinen (1981), Halsey *et al.* (2000) estimated that Alaskan peatlands
21 have a soil carbon pool of 71.5 Gt, almost 5-fold higher than our estimate. However, some of the
22 difference in soil carbon between the two estimates can be accounted for by the 26 Gt C that we
23 calculated resides in Alaskan FWMS wetlands (Table 13A-2).

24 25 **Table 13A-2. Soil carbon pools (Gt) and fluxes (Mt yr⁻¹) of wetlands in North America and the world.**

26 “Sequestration in current wetlands” refers to carbon sequestration in wetlands that currently exist;
27 “oxidation in former wetlands” refers to emissions from wetlands that have been converted to non-wetland
28 uses or conversion among wetland types due to human influence; “historical loss in sequestration capacity”
29 refers to the loss in the carbon sequestration function of wetlands that have been converted to non-wetland
30 uses; “change in flux from wetland conversions” is the sum of the two previous fluxes. Positive flux
31 numbers indicate a net flux into the atmosphere, whereas negative numbers indicate a net flux into the
32 ecosystem

33
34 The peatlands of the conterminous United States are different in texture, and probably depth, from those
35 in Canada and Alaska, so it is probably inappropriate to use the soil carbon densities for Canadian

1 peatlands for those in the conterminous United States. For example, we compared the relative percentage
2 of the Histosol suborders (excluding the small area of Folists, as they are predominantly upland soils) for
3 Canada (Tarnocai, 1998), Alaska (updated STATSGO data, J. Moore, personal comm.), and the
4 conterminous U.S. (NRCS, 1999). The relative percentage of Fibrists, Hemists, and Saprists, respectively,
5 in Canada are 37%, 62%, and 1%, in Alaska are 53%, 27%, and 20%, and in the conterminous United
6 States are 1%, 19%, and 80%. Using the STATSGO database (N. Bliss, query of NRCS STATSGO
7 database, December 2005), the average soil carbon density for Histosols in the conterminous United
8 States is $1,089 \text{ Mg C ha}^{-1}$, but this is an underestimate as many peatlands were not sampled to their
9 maximum depth. Armentano and Menges (1986) reported average carbon density of conterminous U.S.
10 peatlands to 1-m depth of 1,147 to $1,125 \text{ Mg C ha}^{-1}$. Malterer (1996) gave soil carbon densities of
11 conterminous U.S. peatlands of $2,902 \text{ Mg C ha}^{-1}$ for Fibrist, $1,874 \text{ Mg C ha}^{-1}$ for Hemists, and $2,740 \text{ Mg}$
12 C ha^{-1} for Saprists, but it is unclear how he derived these estimates. Batjes (1996) and Eswaran *et al.*
13 (1995) gave average soil carbon densities to 1-m depth for global peatlands of 776 and $2,235 \text{ Mg C ha}^{-1}$,
14 respectively. We chose to use an average carbon density of $1,500 \text{ Mg C ha}^{-1}$, which is in the middle of the
15 reported range.

16

17 **Estuarine Soil Carbon Pools**

18 Tidal wetland soil carbon density was based on a country-specific analysis of data reported in an
19 extensive compilation by Chimura *et al.* (2003). There were more observations for the United States
20 ($n = 75$) than Canada ($n = 34$) or Mexico ($n = 4$), and consequently there were more observations of
21 marshes than mangroves. The Canadian salt marsh estimate was used for Alaska, and country-specific
22 marsh or mangrove estimates were used for mudflats. Although Chimura *et al.* (2003) reported some
23 significant correlations between soil carbon density and mean annual temperature, scatter plots suggest
24 the relationships are weak or driven by a few sites. Thus, we did not separate the data by region or latitude
25 and used mean values for scaling. Chimura *et al.* (2003) assumed a 50-cm-deep profile for the soil carbon
26 pool, which may be an underestimate.

27

28 **Plant Carbon Pools**

29 While extensive data on plant biomass in individual wetlands have been published, no systematic
30 inventory of wetland plant biomass has been undertaken in North America. Nationally, the forest carbon
31 biomass pool (including aboveground and belowground biomass) has been estimated to be 5.49 kg C m^{-2}
32 (Birdsey, 1992), which we used for forested wetlands in the United States and Canada. This approach
33 assumes that wetland forests do not have substantially different biomass carbon densities from upland
34 forests. There is one regional assessment of forested wetlands in the southeastern United States, which

1 comprise approximately 35% of the total forested wetland area in the conterminous United States. We
2 utilized the southeastern U.S. regional inventory to evaluate this assumption; aboveground tree biomass
3 averaged $125.2 \text{ m}^3 \text{ ha}^{-1}$ for softwood stands and $116.1 \text{ m}^3 \text{ ha}^{-1}$ for hardwood stands. Using an average
4 wood density and carbon content, the carbon density for these forests would be 3.3 kg C m^{-2} for softwood
5 stands and 4.2 kg C m^{-2} for hardwood stands. However, these estimates do not include understory
6 vegetation, belowground biomass, or dead trees, which account for 49% of the total forest biomass
7 (Birdsey, 1992). Using that factor to make an adjustment for total forest biomass, the range would be 4.9
8 to 6.6 kg C m^{-2} for the softwood and hardwood stands, respectively. Accordingly, the assumption of using
9 5.49 kg C m^{-2} seems reasonable for a national-level estimate.

10 The area of forested wetlands in Canada came from Tarnocai *et al.* (2005), for Alaska from Hall *et al.*
11 (1994), and for the conterminous United States from Dahl (2000).

12 Since Tarnocai *et al.* (2005) divided Canadian peatland area into bog and fen, we used aboveground
13 biomass for each community type from Vitt *et al.* (2000), and assumed that 50% of biomass is
14 belowground. We used the average bog and fen plant biomass from Vitt *et al.* (2000) for Alaskan
15 peatlands. For other wetland areas, we used an average value of $2,000 \text{ g C m}^{-2}$ for non-forested wetland
16 biomass carbon density (Gorham, 1991).

17 Tidal marsh root and shoot biomass data were estimated from a compilation in Table 8-7 in Mitsch
18 and Gosselink, (1993). There was no clear latitudinal or regional pattern in biomass, so we used mean
19 values for each. Mangrove biomass has been shown to vary with latitude (Twilley *et al.*, 1992). Biomass
20 was estimated from an empirical equation for aboveground biomass as a function of latitude (Twilley *et*
21 *al.* 1992). We made a simple estimate using a single latitude that visually bisected the distribution of
22 mangroves either in the United States (26.9°) or Mexico (23.5°). Total biomass was estimated using a
23 root-to-shoot ratio of 0.82 and a carbon-mass-to-biomass ratio of 0.45, both from Twilley *et al.* (1992).

24 Plant biomass carbon data are presented in Table 13A-3.

25
26 **Table 13A-3. Plant carbon pools (Gt) and fluxes (Mt yr^{-1}) of wetlands in North America and the**
27 **world.** Positive flux numbers indicate a net flux into the atmosphere, whereas negative numbers indicate a
28 net flux into the ecosystem
29

30 CARBON FLUXES

31 Peatland Soil Carbon Accumulation Rates

32 Most studies report the long-term apparent rate of carbon accumulation (LORCA) in peatlands based
33 upon basal peat dates, but this assumes a linear accumulation rate through time. However, due to the slow
34 decay of the accumulated peat, the true rate of carbon accumulation will always be less than the LORCA

1 (Clymo *et al.*, 1998), so most reported rates are inherently biased upwards. Tolonen and Turunen (1996)
2 found that the true rate of peat accumulation was about 67% of the LORCA.

3 For estimates of soil carbon sequestration in conterminous U.S. peatlands, we used the data from 82
4 sites and 215 cores throughout eastern North America (Webb and Webb III, 1988). They reported a
5 median accumulation rate of 0.066 cm yr⁻¹ (mean = 0.092, sd = 0.085). We converted this value into a
6 carbon accumulation rate of -1.2 Mg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ by assuming 58% C (see NRCS Soil Survey Laboratory
7 Information Manual, available on-line at <http://soils.usda.gov/survey/nscd/lim/>), a bulk density of 0.59 g
8 cm⁻³, and an organic matter content of 55%. (Positive carbon fluxes indicate net fluxes to the atmosphere,
9 whereas negative carbon fluxes indicate net fluxes into an ecosystem.) The bulk density and organic
10 matter content were the average from all Histosol soil map units greater than 202.5 ha (n = 5,483) in the
11 conterminous United States from the National Soil Information System (NASIS) data base provided by S.
12 Campbell (USDA NRCS, Portland, OR). For comparison, Armentano and Menges (1986) used soil
13 carbon accumulation rates that ranged from -0.48 Mg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ in northern conterminous U.S. peatlands
14 to -2.25 Mg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ in Florida peatlands.

15 Peatlands accumulate lesser amounts of soil carbon at higher latitudes, with especially lower rates
16 occurring in permafrost peatlands (Ovenden, 1990, Robinson and Moore, 1999). The rates used in this
17 report reflect this gradient, going from -0.13 to -0.19 to -1.2 Mg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ in permafrost peatlands, non-
18 permafrost Canadian and Alaskan peatlands, and peatlands in the conterminous United States and
19 Mexico, respectively (Table 13A-2).

21 **Freshwater Mineral-Soil Wetland Carbon Accumulation Rates**

22 Many studies have estimated sediment deposition rates in FWMS wetlands, with an average rate of
23 1,680 g m⁻² yr⁻¹ (range 0 to 7,840) in a review by Johnston (1991). Assuming 7.7% carbon for FWMS
24 wetlands (Batjes, 1996), this gives a substantial accumulation rate of -129 g C m⁻² yr⁻¹. Johnston (1991)
25 found many more studies that just reported vertical sediment accumulation rates, with an average of
26 0.69 cm yr⁻¹ (range -0.6 to 2.6). If we assume a bulk density of 1.38 g cm⁻³ for FWMS wetlands (Batjes,
27 1996), this converts into an impressive accumulation rate of -733 g C m⁻² yr⁻¹. However, we believe that
28 these values cannot be used directly as estimates of carbon sequestration rates for of two reasons. First, it
29 is likely that researchers preferentially choose wetlands with high sedimentation rates to study this
30 process. Secondly, and more fundamentally, at a landscape scale a redistribution of sediments from
31 uplands to wetlands represents no net carbon sequestration if the decomposition rate of carbon is the same
32 in both environments. The carbon associated with sediments is likely relatively recalcitrant and often
33 physically protected from decomposers by association with mineral soils. Thus, despite the anaerobic
34 conditions in wetlands, decomposition rates in deposited sediments may not be substantially lower than in

1 the uplands from which those sediments were eroded. Because of this reasoning, we somewhat arbitrarily
2 reduced our calculated rates of carbon sequestration in FWMS wetlands by 75% to $-34 \text{ g C m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$, which
3 still represents a substantial carbon sink.

4 Agriculture typically increases sedimentation rates by 10- to 100-fold, and 90% of sediments are
5 stored within the watershed, or about 3 Gt yr^{-1} in the United States (Meade *et al.*, 1990, as cited in
6 Stallard, 1998). Converting this to 1.5% C equates to -45 Mt C yr^{-1} , part of which will be stored in
7 wetlands and is well within our estimated storage rate in FWMS wetlands (Table 13A-2).

9 **Estuarine Carbon Accumulation Rates**

10 Carbon accumulation in tidal wetlands was assumed to be entirely in the soil pool. This should
11 provide a reasonable estimate because marshes are primarily herbaceous, and mangrove biomass should
12 be in steady state unless the site was converted to another use. An important difference between soil
13 carbon sequestration in tidal and non-tidal systems is that tidal sequestration occurs primarily through
14 burial driven by sea level rise. For this reason, carbon accumulation rates can be estimated well with data
15 on changes in soil surface elevation and carbon density. Rates of soil carbon accumulation were
16 calculated from Chimura *et al.* (2003) as described for the soil carbon pool (above). These estimates are
17 based on a variety of methods, such as ^{210}Pb dating and soil elevation tables, which integrate vertical soil
18 accumulation rates over periods of time ranging from 1–100 yr.

20 **Extractive Uses of Peat**

21 Use of peat for energy production is, and always has been, negligible in North America, as opposed to
22 other parts of the world (WEC, 2001). However, Canada produces a greater volume of horticultural and
23 agricultural peat than any other country in the world (WEC, 2001). Currently, 124 km^2 of Canadian
24 peatlands have been under extraction now or in the past (Cleary *et al.*, 2005). A life-cycle analysis by
25 these authors estimated that as of 1990 Canada emitted 0.9 Mt yr^{-1} of $\text{CO}_2\text{-C}$ equivalents through peat
26 extraction. The U.S. production of horticultural peat is about 19% of Canada's (Joosten and Clarke,
27 2002), which assuming a similar life-cycle as for Canada, suggests that the United States produces 0.2 Mt
28 of $\text{CO}_2\text{-C}$ equivalents through peat extraction.

30 **Methane Fluxes**

31 Moore *et al.* (1995) reported a range of methane fluxes from 0 to $130 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ from 120
32 peatland sites in Canada, with the majority $<10 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$. They estimated a low average flux rate of
33 2 to $3 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$, which equaled an emission of 2–3 $\text{Mt CH}_4 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ from Canadian peatlands. We used
34 an estimate of $2.5 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ for Canadian peatlands and Alaskan freshwater wetlands (Table 13A-4).

1
2 **Table 13A-4. Methane fluxes (Mt yr^{-1}) from wetlands in North America and the world.**

3
4 To our knowledge, the last synthesis of methane fluxes was done by Bartlett and Harriss (1993). We
5 supplemented their analysis with all other published field studies (using chamber or eddy covariance
6 techniques) we could find that reported annual or average daily methane fluxes in the conterminous
7 United States (Table 13A-5). We excluded a few studies that used cores or estimated diffusive fluxes.

8
9 **Table 13A-5. Methane fluxes measured in the conterminous United States.** The conversion factor is the
10 ratio of the daily average flux to the measured annual flux $\times 10^3$. The calculated annual flux was
11 determined based upon the average conversion factor for freshwater (FW) and saltwater wetlands (SW).
12 The used annual flux was the measured annual flux if that was available; otherwise, it was the calculated
13 annual flux.

14
15 In cases where multiple years from the same site were presented, we took the average of those years.
16 Similarly, when multiple sites of the same type were presented in the same paper, we took the average.
17 Studies were separated into freshwater and estuarine systems.

18 In cases where papers presented both an annual flux and a mean daily flux, we calculated a
19 conversion factor [annual flux/(average daily flux $\times 10^3$)] to quantify the relationship between those two
20 numbers (Table 13A-5). When we looked at all studies ($n = 30$), this conversion factor was 0.36,
21 suggesting that there is a 360-day emission season. There was surprisingly little variation in this ratio, and
22 it was similar in freshwater (0.36) and estuarine (0.34) wetlands. In contrast, previous syntheses used a
23 150-day emission season for temperate wetlands (Matthews and Fung, 1987, Bartlett and Harriss, 1993).
24 While substantial winter methane emissions have been found in some studies, it is likely that flux data
25 from most studies have a non-normal distribution with occasional periods of high flux rates that are better
26 captured with annual measurements.

27 Using the conversion factors for freshwater and estuarine wetlands, we estimated average annual
28 fluxes from the average daily fluxes. For freshwater wetlands, the calculated average annual flux rate was
29 $38.6 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ ($n = 74$), which is slightly larger than the average actual measured flux rate of
30 $32.1 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ ($n = 32$). For estuarine wetlands, the average calculated annual flux rate was
31 $9.8 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ ($n = 25$), which is smaller than the average measured flux rate of $16.9 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$
32 ($n = 13$). However, if we remove one outlier, the average measured flux rate is $10.2 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$.

33 Finally, we combined both approaches. In cases where a paper presented an annual value, we used
34 that number. In cases where only an average daily number was presented, we used that value corrected

1 with the appropriate conversion factor. For conterminous U.S. wetlands, FWMS Canadian wetlands, and
2 Mexican wetlands, we used an average flux of $36 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$, and for estuarine wetlands, we used an
3 average flux of $10.3 \text{ g CH}_4 \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$.

5 **Plant Carbon Fluxes**

6 We have limited our focus on plant carbon fluxes to those processes that would result in the
7 accumulation of plant carbon biomass on an interannual basis. Tree biomass carbon sequestration
8 averages $-140 \text{ g C m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ in U.S. forests across all forest types (Birdsey, 1992). Using the tree growth
9 estimates from the southeastern U.S. regional assessment of wetland forests (Brown *et al.*, 2001) yields an
10 even lower estimate of sequestration in aboveground tree biomass (approx. $-50.2 \text{ g C m}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}$). We have
11 used this lower value to estimate that U.S. wetland forests currently sequester $-10.3 \text{ Mt C yr}^{-1}$.

12 We have assumed that the largely undisturbed forested wetlands of Alaska and Canada are at an
13 approximate steady state in terms of biomass, with no interannual plant carbon accumulation. It is likely
14 that plant carbon sequestration occurs largely as woody biomass, so we also assumed that non-forested
15 wetlands have no interannual plant carbon accumulation.

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1 **Table 13A-1. Current and historical area of wetlands in North America and the world ($\times 10^3$ km²).** Historical refers to approximately 1800, unless otherwise
 2 specified.

	Permafrost peatlands	Non-permafrost peatlands	Mineral-soil freshwater	Salt marsh	Mangrove	Mudflat	Total
<u>Canada</u>							
Current	422 ^a	714 ^a	159 ^b	0.4 ^c	0	6 ^d	1301
Historical	424 ^e	726 ^f	359 ^g	1.3 ^b	0	7 ^h	1517
<u>Alaska</u>							
Current	89 ⁱ	43 ⁱ	556 ^j	1.4 ^c	0	7 ^k	696
Historical	89	43	556	1.4	0	9b	698
<u>Conterminous United States</u>							
Current	0	93 ^L	312 ^m	18 ^c	3 ^c	2 ⁿ	428
Historical	0	111 ⁱ	762 ^o	20 ^p	4 ⁿ	3 ⁿ	899
<u>Mexico</u>							
Current	0	10 ^p	21 ^q	0	5 ^c	ND ^r	36
Historical	0		45 ^p	0	7 ^h	ND	52
<u>North America</u>							
Current	511	861	1,047	20	8	15	2,461
Historical	513	894 ^s	1,706 ^s	23	11	19	3,166
<u>Global</u>							
Current	3,443 ^t		2,289 to 2,341 ^u	22 ^v	181 ^w	ND	~6,000
Historical	3,880-4,086 ^x		5,000 ^y	ND	ND	ND	~9,000 ^y

3
 4 ^aTarnocai *et al.* (2005).

5 ^bNational Wetlands Working Group (1988).

6 ^cMendelssohn and McKee (2000).

7 ^dEstimated from the area of Canadian salt marshes and the ratio of mudflat to salt marsh area reported by Hanson and Calkins (1996).

8 ^eAccounting for losses due to permafrost melting in western Canada (Vitt *et al.*, 1994). This is an underestimate, as similar, but undocumented, losses have
 9 probably also occurred in eastern Canada and Alaska.

10 ^f9000 km² lost to reservoir flooding (Rubec, 1996), 250 km² to forestry drainage (Rubec, 1996), 124 km² to peat harvesting for horticulture (Cleary *et al.*,
 11 2005), and 16 km² to oil sands mining (Turetsky *et al.*, 2002). See note e for permafrost melting estimate.

- 1 ^gRubec (1996).
- 2 ^hAssumed same loss rate as the conterminous United States since 1954 (Dahl, 2000).
- 3 ⁱHistorical area from NRCS soil inventory (Bridgham *et al.*, 2000), except Alaska inventory updated by N. Bliss from a February 2006 query of the
4 STATSGO database. Less than 1% wetland losses have occurred in Alaska (Dahl, 1990).
- 5 ^jTotal freshwater wetland area from Hall *et al.* (1994) minus peatland area.
- 6 ^kHall *et al.*, 1994.
- 7 ^LHistorical area from Bridgham *et al.* (2000) minus losses in Armentano and Menges (1986).
- 8 ^mOverall freshwater wetland area from Dahl (2000) minus peatland area.
- 9 ⁿDahl (2000).
- 10 ^oTotal historical wetland area from Dahl (1990) minus historical peatland area minus historical estuarine area.
- 11 ^pDavidson *et al.* (1999).
- 12 ^qSpiers (1999).
- 13 ^rND indicates that no data are available.
- 14 ^sAssuming that historical proportion of peatlands to total wetlands in Mexico was the same as today.
- 15 ^tBridgham *et al.* (2000) for the United States, Tarnocai *et al.* (2005) for Canada, Joosten and Clarke (2002) for the rest of world. Recent range in literature
16 2,974,000–3,985,000 km² (Matthews and Fung, 1987; Aselmann and Crutzen, 1989; Maltby and Immerzi, 1993; Bridgham *et al.*, 2000; Joosten and Clarke,
17 2002).
- 18 ^uMatthews and Fung (1987); Aselmann and Crutzen (1989). For subsequent calculations, used the average of 2,315,000 km².
- 19 ^vChmura *et al.* (2003). Underestimated because no inventories were available for the continents Asia, South America and Australia which are mangrove-
20 dominated but also support salt marsh.
- 21 ^wSpalding *et al.* (1997).
- 22 ^xMaltby and Immerzi (1993). For subsequent calculations, used 4,000,000 km².
- 23 ^yApproximately 50% loss from Moser *et al.* (1996). For subsequent calculations, used an original global mineral-soil wetland area of 5,000,000 km².

1 **Table 13A-2. Soil carbon pools (Gt) and fluxes (Mt yr⁻¹) of wetlands in North America and the world.** “Sequestration in current wetlands” refers to carbon
 2 sequestration in wetlands that currently exist; “oxidation in former wetlands” refers to emissions from wetlands that have been converted to non-wetland uses or
 3 conversion among wetland types due to human influence; “historical loss in sequestration capacity” refers to the loss in the carbon sequestration function of
 4 wetlands that have been converted to non-wetland uses; “change in flux from wetland conversions” is the sum of the two previous fluxes. Positive flux numbers
 5 indicate a net flux into the atmosphere, whereas negative numbers indicate a net flux into the ecosystem
 6

	Permafrost peatlands	Non-permafrost peatlands	Mineral-soil freshwater	Salt marsh	Mangrove	Mudflat	Total
<u>Canada</u>							
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	44.2 ^a	102.9 ^a	4.6 ^b	0.0 ^c	0.0	0.1 ^d	151.8
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	-5.5 ^e	-13.6 ^f	-5.1 ^g	-0.1	0.0	-1.2 ^d	-25.5
Oxidation in Former Wetlands		0.2 ^h	0.0 ⁱ	0.0 ^j	0.0	0.0	0.2
Historical Loss in Sequestration Capacity	0.0 ^e	0.2 ^f	6.5 ^g	0.2	0.0	0.3	7.2
Change in Flux From Wetland Conversions		0.4	6.5	0.2	0.0	0.3	7.4
<u>Alaska</u>							
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	9.3 ^k	6.2 ^k	26.0 ^L	0.0	0.0	0.1	41.7
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	-1.1 ^e	-0.8 ^f	-18.0 ^g	-0.3	0.0	-1.6	-21.9
Oxidation in Former Wetlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Historical Loss in Sequestration Capacity	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Change in Flux From Wetland Conversions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Conterminous United States</u>							
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	0	14.0 ^m	5.1 ^L	0.4	0.1	0.1	19.7
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	0	-11.6 ⁿ	-10.1 ^g	-3.9	-0.5	-0.5	-26.6
Oxidation in Former Wetlands	0	18.0 ^o	0.1 ⁱ	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.1
Historical Loss in Sequestration Capacity	0	2.1 ⁿ	14.5 ^g	0.3	0.0	0.1	17.1
Change in Flux from Wetland Conversions	0	20.1	14.6	0.3	0.0	0.1	35.2
<u>Mexico</u>							
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	0.0	1.5 ^m	0.3 ^L	0.0	0.1	ND*	1.9

Sequestration in Current Wetlands	0	-1.6 ^p	-0.7 ^g	0.0	-1.6	ND	-3.9
Oxidation in Former Wetlands	0	ND	ND	0.0	0.0	0.0	ND
Historical Loss in Sequestration Capacity	0	ND	ND	0.0	0.5	ND	0.5
Change in Flux from Wetland Conversions	0	ND	ND	0.0	0.5	ND	0.5
North America							
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	53.5	124.6	36.0	0.4	0.2	0.3	215.1
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	-6.6	-27.6	-33.9	-4.3	-2.1	-3.3	-77.8
Oxidation in Former Wetlands	18.2		0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.3
Historical Loss in Sequestration Capacity	0	2.3	21.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	24.8
Change in Flux from Wetland Conversions	20.5		21.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	43.1
Global							
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	234 to 679 ^q		46 ^r	0.4 ^s	5.0 ^s	ND	286 to 730
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	-40 to -70 ^t		-75 ^g	-4.6 ^s	-38.0 ^s	ND	-158 to -188
Oxidation in Former Wetlands	160 to 250 ^u		ND	0	0	0	160 to 250
Historical Loss in Sequestration Capacity	16 ^u		87 ^g	0.5 ^v	12.7 ^w	ND	116
Change in Flux From Wetland Conversions	176 to 266 ^u		> 87 ^x	0.5	12.7	ND	276 to 366

- 1
- 2 *ND indicates that no data are available.
- 3 ^aTarnocai *et al.* (2005).
- 4 ^bTarnocai (1998).
- 5 ^cRates calculated from Chimura *et al.* (2003); areas from Mendelssohn and McKee (2000).
- 6 ^dAssumed the same carbon density and accumulation rates as the adjacent vegetated wetland ecosystem (mangrove data for Mexico and salt marsh data
- 7 elsewhere).
- 8 ^eSoil carbon accumulation rate of 0.13 Mg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹ (see Chapter 12 in this report).
- 9 ^fCarbon accumulation rate of 0.19 Mg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹. This is an average value of the reported range of long-term apparent accumulation rate of 0.05–0.35
- 10 (Ovenden, 1990, Maltby and Immirzi, 1993; Trumbore and Harden, 1997; Vitt *et al.*, 2000; Turunen *et al.*, 2004).

- 1 ^gPotential rate calculated as the average sediment accumulation rate of 1680 g m⁻² yr⁻¹ (range 0–7840) from Johnston (1991) times 7.7% C (CV = 109) (Batjes,
2 1996). It was assumed that the actual rate was 25% of the potential rate because of bias in choosing sampling sites and considerations of the redistribution of
3 sediment due to erosion without a change in the sequestration rate on a landscape scale.
- 4 ^hSum of -0.24 Mt C yr⁻¹ from horticulture removal of peat (Cleary *et al.*, 2005) and 0.10 Mt C yr⁻¹ from increased peat sequestration due to permafrost melting
5 (Turetsky *et al.*, 2002).
- 6 ⁱAssumed that the oxidized soil C is lost over 50 yr.
- 7 ^jAssumed that conversion of tidal systems is caused by fill and results in burial and preservation of SOM define SOM rather than oxidation.
- 8 ^kSoil carbon densities of 1,441 Mg C ha⁻¹ for Histosols and 1,048 Mg C ha⁻¹ for Histels (Tarnocai *et al.*, 2005).
- 9 ^lSoil carbon density of 162 Mg C ha⁻¹ for the conterminous United States and Mexico and 468 Mg C ha⁻¹ for Alaska based upon NRCS STATSGO database
10 and soil pedon information.
- 11 ^mAssumed soil carbon density of 1,500 Mg C ha⁻¹.
- 12 ⁿWebb and Webb (1988).
- 13 ^oEstimated loss rate as of early 1980s (Armentano and Menges,1986). Overall wetlands losses in the United States have declined dramatically since then
14 (Dahl, 2000) and probably even more so for Histosols, so this number may still be representative.
- 15 ^pUsing peat accumulation rate of 1.6 Mg C ha⁻¹ (range 1.0–2.25) (Maltby and Immirzi, 1993).
- 16 ^qGorham (1991), Maltby and Immirzi (1993), Eswaran *et al.* (1995), Batjes (1996), Lappalainen (1996), Joosten and Clarke (2002).
- 17 ^rSoil carbon density of 199 Mg C ha⁻¹ (Batjes, 1996).
- 18 ^sChmura *et al.* (2003).
- 19 ^tJoosten and Clarke (2002). Using the peatland estimate in Table 13A-1 and a carbon accumulation rate of 0.19 Mg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹, we calculate a global flux of
20 –65 Mt C yr⁻¹ in peatlands.
- 21 ^uCurrent oxidative flux is the difference between the change in flux and the historical loss in sequestration capacity from this table. The change in flux is from
22 Maltby and Immirzi (1993) and the historical loss in sequestration capacity is from this table for North America, from Armentano and Menges (1986) for other
23 northern peatlands, and from Maltby and Immirzi (1993) for tropical peatlands.
- 24 ^vAssumed that global rates approximate the North America rate because most salt marshes inventoried are in North America.
- 25 ^wAssumed 25% loss globally since the late 1800s.
- 26 ^x> sign indicates that this a minimal loss estimate.

1 **Table 13A-3. Plant carbon pools (Gt) and fluxes (Mt yr⁻¹) of wetlands in North America and the world.** Positive flux numbers indicate a net
 2 flux into the atmosphere, whereas negative numbers indicate a net flux into the ecosystem.

	Permafrost peatlands	Non-perma- frost peatlands	Mineral- soil freshwater	Salt marsh	Mangrove	Total
<u>Canada</u>						
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	1.4 ^a		0.3 ^b	0.0 ^c	0.0	1.7
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	0.0	ND*		0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Alaska</u>						
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	0.4 ^a		1.1 ^d	0.0	0.0	1.5
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Conterminous United States</u>						
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	0.0	1.5 ^d		0.0	0.0	1.5
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	0.0	-10.3 ^e		0.0	0.0	-10.3
<u>Mexico</u>						
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	0.0	0.0 ^b	0.0 ^b	0.0	0.1	0.1
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	0.0	ND	ND	0.0	ND	0.0
<u>North America</u>						
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	4.8			0.0	0.1	4.9
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	0.0	-10.3		0.0	ND	-10.3
<u>Global</u>						
Pool Size in Current Wetlands	6.9 ^b		4.6 ^b	0.0 ^f	4.0 ^g	15.5
Sequestration in Current Wetlands	0.0	ND	ND	0.0	ND	ND

3 *ND indicates that no data are available.

4 ^aBiomass for non-forested peatlands from Vitt *et al.* (2000), assuming 50% of biomass is belowground. Forest biomass density from
 5 Birdsey (1992) and forested area from Tarnocai *et al.* (2005) for Canada and from Hall *et al.* (1994) for Alaska.

6 ^bAssumed 2000 g C m⁻² in aboveground and belowground plant biomass (Gorham, 1991).

7 ^cBiomass data from Mitsch and Gosselink (1993).

8 ^dBiomass for non-forested wetlands from Gorham (1991). Forest biomass density from Birdsey (1992), and forested area from Dahl (2000).

9 ^e50 g C m⁻² yr⁻¹ sequestration from forest growth from a southeastern U.S. regional assessment of wetland forest growth (Brown *et al.*, 2001).

10 ^fAssumed that global pools approximate those from North America because most salt marshes inventoried are in North America.

11 ^gTwilley *et al.* (1992).

1 **Table 13A-4. Methane fluxes (Mt yr⁻¹) from wetlands in North America and the world.**

	Permafrost peatlands	Non-permafrost peatlands	Mineral-soil freshwater	Salt marsh	Mangrove	Mudflat	Total
<u>Canada</u>							
CH ₄ Flux in Current Wetlands	1.1 ^a	2.1 ^{a,b}	5.7	0.0	0.0	0.0 ^c	8.9
Historical change in CH ₄ Flux	0.0	0.3	-7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	-6.9
<u>Alaska</u>							
CH ₄ Flux in Current Wetlands	0.2	0.1	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.8
Historical change in CH ₄ Flux	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Conterminous United States</u>							
CH ₄ Flux in Current Wetlands	0.0	3.4	11.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	14.7
Historical change in CH ₄ Flux	0.0	-0.6	-16.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	-16.8
<u>Mexico</u>							
CH ₄ Flux in Current Wetlands	0.0	0.4	0.7	0.0	0.0	ND*	1.1
Historical change in CH ₄ Flux	0.0	-0.5		0.0	0.0	ND	-0.5
<u>North America</u>							
CH ₄ Flux in Current Wetlands	1.3	5.9	19.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	26.5
Historical change in CH ₄ Flux	0.0	-24.2		0.0	0.0	0.0	-24.2
<u>Global</u>							
CH ₄ Flux in Current Wetlands	14.1 ^d	22.5 ^d	68.0 ^d	0.1 ^e	1.4	ND	92–237 ^f
Historical change in CH ₄ Flux	-3.6		-79	0.0 ^g	-0.5	ND	-83

2 *ND indicates that no data are available.

3 ^aUsed CH₄ flux of 2.5 g m⁻² yr⁻¹ (range 0 to 130, likely mean 2–3) (Moore and Roulet, 1995) for Canadian peatlands and all Alaskan freshwater wetlands. Used CH₄ flux of
 4 36.0 g m⁻² yr⁻¹ for Canadian freshwater mineral-soil wetlands and all U.S. and Mexican freshwater wetlands and 10.3 g m⁻² yr⁻¹ for estuarine wetlands—from synthesis of
 5 published CH₄ fluxes for the United States (see Table 13A-5).

6 ^bIncludes a 17-fold increase in CH₄ flux (Kelly *et al.*, 1997) in the 9000 km² of reservoirs that have been formed on peatlands (Rubec, 1996) and an estimated CH₄ flux of 15 g
 7 m⁻² yr⁻¹ (Moore *et al.*, 1998) from 2,630 km² of melted permafrost peatlands (Vitt *et al.*, 1994).

8 ^cAssumed trace gas fluxes from unvegetated estuarine wetlands (i.e., mudflats) was the same as adjacent wetlands.

9 ^dBartlett and Harriss (1993).

10 ^eAssumed that global rates approximate the North America rate because most salt marshes area is in North America.

11 ^fEhhalt *et al.* (2001).

12 ^gAssumed a conservative 25% loss since the late 1800s.

1 **Table 13A-5. Methane fluxes measured in the conterminous United States.** The conversion factor is the ratio of the daily average flux to the measured annual
 2 flux $\times 10^3$. The calculated annual flux was determined based upon the average conversion factor for freshwater (FW) and saltwater wetlands (SW). The used
 3 annual flux was the measured annual flux if that was available; otherwise, it was the calculated annual flux
 4

Habitat	State	Method ^a	Salt/ Fresh	Daily Average Flux (mg CH ₄ m ⁻² d ⁻¹)	Measured Annual Flux (g CH ₄ m ⁻² yr ⁻¹)	Conversion Factor	Calculated Annual Flux (g CH ₄ m ⁻² yr ⁻¹)	Used Annual Flux (g CH ₄ m ⁻² yr ⁻¹)	Reference
Fens	CO	C	FW		40.7			40.7	Chimner and Cooper (2003)
Wet Alpine Meadow	CO	C	FW	0.1			0.0	0.0	Neff <i>et al.</i> (1994)
Lake - Average	CO	C	FW	25.4			9.2	9.2	Smith and Lewis (1992)
Wetland - Average	CO	C	FW	28.3			10.3	10.3	Smith and Lewis (1992)
Nuphar Bed	CO	C	FW	202.1			73.6	73.6	Smith and Lewis (1992)
Tundra - Carex Meadow	CO	C	FW	2.8			1.0	1.0	West <i>et al.</i> (1999)
Tundra - Acomastylis Meadow	CO	C	FW	-0.5			-0.2	-0.2	West <i>et al.</i> (1999)
Tundra - Kobresia Meadow	CO	C	FW	-0.8			-0.3	-0.3	West <i>et al.</i> (1999)
Moist Grassy	CO	C	FW	6.1	1.9	0.32	2.2	1.9	Wickland <i>et al.</i> (1999)
Moist Mossy	CO	C	FW	1.5	0.5	0.33	0.5	0.5	Wickland <i>et al.</i> (1999)
Wetland	CO	C	FW		41.7			41.7	Wickland <i>et al.</i> (1999)
Hardwood Hammock	FL	C	FW	0.0			0.0	0.0	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Dwarf Cypress / Sawgrass	FL	C	FW	7.5			2.7	2.7	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Spikerush	FL	C	FW	29.4			10.7	10.7	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Sawgrass < 1m	FL	C	FW	38.8			14.1	14.1	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Sawgrass/Spkerush/Periphyton	FL	C	FW	45.1			16.4	16.4	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Swamp Forest	FL	C	FW	68.9			25.1	25.1	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Sawgrass > 1m	FL	C	FW	71.9			26.2	26.2	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Sawgrass	FL	C	FW	107.0			38.9	38.9	Burke <i>et al.</i> (1988)
Pond Open Water	FL	C	FW	624.0			227.1	227.1	Burke <i>et al.</i> (1988)
Everglades - Cladium	FL	C	FW	45.4			16.5	16.5	Chanton <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Everglades - Typha	FL	C	FW	142.9			52.0	52.0	Chanton <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Wet Prairie (Marl)	FL	C	FW	87.0			31.6	31.6	Happell <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Wet Prairie (Marl)	FL	C	FW	27.4			10.0	10.0	Happell <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Marsh (Marl)	FL	C	FW	30.0			10.9	10.9	Happell <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Marsh (Marl)	FL	C	FW	49.6			18.0	18.0	Happell <i>et al.</i> (1993)

Marsh (Peat)	FL	C	FW	45.4			16.5	16.5	Happell <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Marsh (Peat)	FL	C	FW	13.0			4.7	4.7	Happell <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Marsh (Peat)	FL	C	FW	163.6			59.6	59.6	Happell <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Marsh (Peat)	FL	C	FW	20.4			7.4	7.4	Happell <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Wet Prairie / Sawgrass	FL	C	FW	61.0			22.2	22.2	Harriss <i>et al.</i> (1988)
Wetland Forest	FL	C	FW	59.0			21.5	21.5	Harriss <i>et al.</i> (1988)
Cypress Swamp - Flowing Water	FL	C	FW	67.0			24.4	24.4	Harriss and Sebacher (1981)
Open Water Swamp	FL	C	FW	480.0			174.7	174.7	Schipper and Reddy (1994)
Waterlily Slough	FL	C	FW	91.0			33.1	33.1	Schipper and Reddy (1994)
Cypress Swamp - Deep Water	GA	C	FW	92.3			33.6	33.6	Harriss and Sebacher (1981)
Bottotmand Hardwoods/ Swamps	GA	C	FW		23.0			23.0	Pulliam (1993)
Swamp Forest	LA	C	FW	146.0			53.1	53.1	Alford <i>et al.</i> (1997)
Freshwater Marsh	LA	C	FW	251.0			91.4	91.4	Alford <i>et al.</i> (1997)
Fresh	LA	C	FW	587.0	213.0	0.36	213.6	213.0	DeLaune <i>et al.</i> (1983)
Fresh	LA	C	FW	49.0	18.7	0.38	17.8	18.7	DeLaune <i>et al.</i> (1983)
Sphagnum Bog	MD	C	FW	-1.1			-0.4	-0.4	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1990)
Bog	MI	C	FW	193.0			70.2	70.2	Shannon and White (1994)
Bog	MI	C	FW	28.0			10.2	10.2	Shannon and White (1994)
Beaver Meadow	MN	C	FW		2.3			2.3	Bridgham <i>et al.</i> (1995)
Open Bogs	MN	C	FW		0.0			0.0	Bridgham <i>et al.</i> (1995)
Bog (Forested Hummock)	MN	C	FW	10.0	3.5	0.35	3.6	3.5	Dise (1993)
Bog (Forested Hollow)	MN	C	FW	38.0	13.8	0.36	13.8	13.8	Dise (1993)
Fen Lagg	MN	C	FW	35.0	12.6	0.36	12.7	12.6	Dise (1993)
Bog (Open Bog)	MN	C	FW	118.0	43.1	0.37	42.9	43.1	Dise (1993)
Fen (Open Poor Fen)	MN	C	FW	180.0	65.7	0.37	65.5	65.7	Dise (1993)
Poor Fen	MN	C	FW	242.0			88.1	88.1	Dise and Verry (2001)
Sedge Meadow	MN	C	FW		11.7			11.7	Naiman <i>et al.</i> (1991)
Submergent	MN	C	FW		14.4			14.4	Naiman <i>et al.</i> (1991)
Deep Water	MN	C	FW		0.5			0.5	Naiman <i>et al.</i> (1991)
Poor Fen	MN	T	FW		14.6			14.6	Shurpali and Verma (1998)
Submerged Tidal	NC	C, E	FW	144.8			52.7	52.7	Kelley <i>et al.</i> (1995)
Banks Tidal	NC	C, E	FW	20.1			7.3	7.3	Kelley <i>et al.</i> (1995)
Tidal Marsh	NC	C	FW	3.0	1.0	0.34	1.1	1.0	Megonigal and Schlesinger (2002)
Tidal Marsh	NC	C	FW	3.5	2.3	0.65	1.3	2.3	Megonigal and Schlesinger (2002)
Prairie Marsh	NE	T	FW		64.0			64.0	Kim <i>et al.</i> (1998)
Poor Fen	NH	C	FW	503.3	110.6	0.22	183.2	110.6	Carroll and Crill (1997)

Poor Fen	NH	C	FW		69.3			69.3	Frolking and Crill (1994)
Forested Peatland	NY	C	FW	0.6	0.2	0.37	0.2	0.2	Coles and Yavitt (2004)
Pools Forested Swamp	NY	C	FW	224.6	69.0	0.31	81.7	69.0	Miller <i>et al.</i> (1999)
Typha Marsh - Mineral Soils	NY	C	FW	344.4			125.3	125.3	Yavitt (1997)
Typha Marsh - Peat Soils	NY	C	FW	65.1			23.7	23.7	Yavitt (1997)
Typha Marsh - All soils	NY	C	FW	204.8			74.5	74.5	Yavitt (1997)
Cypress Swamp - Floodplain	SC	C	FW	9.9			3.6	3.6	Harriss and Sebacher (1981)
Swamp	VA	C	FW	470.3			171.2	171.2	Chanton <i>et al.</i> (1992)
Maple/gum Forested Swamp	VA	C	FW		0.5			0.5	Harriss <i>et al.</i> (1982)
Emergent Tidal Freshwater Marsh	VA	C	FW		96.2			96.2	Neubauer <i>et al.</i> (2000)
Oak Swamp (Bank Site)	VA	C	FW	117.0	43.7	0.37	42.6	43.7	Wilson <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Emergent Macrophytes (Peltandra)	VA	C	FW	155.0			56.4	56.4	Wilson <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Emergent Macrophytes (Smartweed)	VA	C	FW	83.0			30.2	30.2	Wilson <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Ash Tree Swamp	VA	C	FW	152.0			55.3	55.3	Wilson <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Bog	WA	C	FW	73.0			26.6	26.6	Lansdown <i>et al.</i> (1992)
Lowland Shrub and Forested Wetland	WI	T	FW		12.4			12.4	Werner <i>et al.</i> (2003)
Sphagnum Eriophorum (Poor Fen)	WV	C	FW	6.6			2.4	2.4	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1990)
Sphagnum Shrub (Fen)	WV	C	FW	0.1			0.0	0.0	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1990)
Polytrichum Shrub (Fen)	WV	C	FW	-0.1			0.0	0.0	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1990)
Sphagnum Forest	WV	C	FW	9.6			3.5	3.5	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1990)
Sedge Meadow	WV	C	FW	1.5			0.5	0.5	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1990)
Beaver Pond	WV	C	FW	250.0			91.0	91.0	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1990)
Low Gradient Headwater Stream	WV	C	FW	300.0			109.2	109.2	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1990)
Sphagnum-Eriophorum	WV	C	FW	52.1	19.0	0.37	18.9	19.0	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Polytrichum	WV	C	FW	41.1	15.0	0.37	15.0	15.0	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Sphagnum-Shrub	WV	C	FW	4.4	1.6	0.37	1.6	1.6	Yavitt <i>et al.</i> (1993)
Salt Marsh	DE	C	SW	0.5			0.2	0.2	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Red Mangroves	FL	C	SW	4.2			1.4	1.4	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
Dwarf Red Mangrove	FL	C	SW	81.9			27.9	27.9	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1989)
High Marsh	FL	C	SW	3.9			1.3	1.3	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Marsh	FL	C	SW	0.6			0.2	0.2	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Water Mangroves	FL	C	SW	4.0			1.4	1.4	Harriss <i>et al.</i> (1988)
Salt Marsh	GA	C	SW	13.4			4.6	4.6	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Short Spartina Marsh - High Marsh	GA	C	SW	145.2	53.1	0.37	49.5	53.1	King and Wiebe (1978)
Mid Marsh	GA	C	SW	15.8	5.8	0.37	5.4	5.8	King and Wiebe (1978)
Tall Spartina Marsh - Low Marsh	GA	C	SW	1.2	0.4	0.34	0.4	0.4	King and Wiebe (1978)

Intermediate Marsh	LA	C	SW	912 ^b					Alford <i>et al.</i> (1997)
Salt Marsh	LA	C	SW	15.7	5.7	0.36	5.4	5.7	DeLaune <i>et al.</i> (1983)
Brackish	LA	C	SW	267.0	97.0		91.1	97.0	DeLaune <i>et al.</i> (1983)
Salt Marsh	LA	C	SW	4.8	1.7	0.35	1.6	1.7	DeLaune <i>et al.</i> (1983)
Brackish	LA	C	SW	17.0	6.4	0.38	5.8	6.4	DeLaune <i>et al.</i> (1983)
Cypress Swamp - Floodplain	SC	C	SW	1.5			0.5	0.5	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Marsh	SC	C	SW	0.4			0.1	0.1	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Marsh	VA	C	SW	3.0	1.3	0.43	1.0	1.3	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Marsh	VA	C	SW	5.0	1.2	0.24	1.7	1.2	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Meadow	VA	C	SW	2.0	0.4	0.22	0.7	0.4	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Marsh	VA	C	SW	-0.8			-0.3	-0.3	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Marsh	VA	C	SW	1.5			0.5	0.5	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Salt Meadow	VA	C	SW	-1.9			-0.6	-0.6	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1985)
Tidal Salt Marsh	VA	C	SW	16.0	5.6	0.35	5.5	5.6	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1987)
Tidal Brackish Marsh	VA	C	SW	64.6	22.4	0.35	22.0	22.4	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1987)
Tidal Brackish/Fresh Marsh	VA	C	SW	53.5	18.2	0.34	18.2	18.2	Bartlett <i>et al.</i> (1987)

FW

Average = 32.1 0.36 38.6 36.0

FW n = 32 18 74 88

FW

StError= 7.9 0.02 6.0 5.0

SW

Average = 16.9 0.34 9.8 10.3

SW n = 13 12 25 25

SW

StError= 7.8 0.02 4.1 4.4

1

2 ^aC = chamber, T = tower, eddy covariance, E = ebullition measured separately.

3 ^bOutlier that was removed from further analysis.

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Chapter 14. Human Settlements and the North American Carbon Cycle

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KEY FINDINGS

- Human settlements occupy almost 5 % of the North American land area.
- There is currently insufficient information to determine the complete carbon balance of human settlements in North America. Fossil fuel emissions, however, very likely dominate carbon fluxes from settlements.
- An estimated 410 to 1679 Mt C are currently stored in the urban tree component of North American settlements. The growth of urban trees in North America produces a sink of approximately 16 to 49 Mt C yr⁻¹, which is 1 to 3% of the fossil fuel emissions from North America in 2003.
- Estimates of historical trends of the net carbon balance of North American settlements are not available. Fossil fuel emissions have likely gone up with the growth of urban lands but the net balance of carbon loss during conversion of natural to urban or suburban land cover and subsequent sequestration in lawns and urban trees is highly uncertain.
- The density and development patterns of human settlements are drivers of fossil fuel emissions, especially in the residential and transportation sectors. Biological carbon gains and losses are influenced by type of predevelopment land cover, post-development urban design and landscaping choices, soil and landscape management practices, and the time since land conversion.
- Projections of future trends in the net carbon balance of North American settlements are not available. However, the projected expansion of urban areas in North America will strongly impact the future North American carbon cycle as human settlements affect (1) the direct emission of CO₂ from fossil fuel combustion, (2) alter plant and soil carbon cycling in converting wild lands to residential and urban land cover.
- A number of municipalities in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. have made commitments to voluntary GHG emission reductions under the Cities for Climate Protection program of International Governments for Local Sustainability [formerly the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI)]. Reductions have in some cases been associated with improvements in air quality.

- 1 • Research is needed to improve comprehensive carbon inventories for settled areas, to improve
2 understanding of how development processes relate to driving forces for the carbon cycle, and to
3 improve linkages between understandings of human and environmental systems in settled areas.
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6 Activities in human settlements form the basis for much of North America's contribution to global
7 CO₂ emissions. Settlements such as cities, towns, and suburbs vary widely in density, form, and
8 distribution. Urban settlements, as they have been defined by the census bureaus of the United States,
9 Canada, and Mexico, make up approximately 75 to 80% of the population of the continent, and this
10 proportion is projected to continue to increase (United Nations, 2004). The density and forms of new
11 development will strongly impact the future trajectory of the North American carbon cycle as human
12 settlements affect the carbon cycle by (1) direct emission of CO₂ from fossil fuel combustion,
13 (2) alterations to plant and soil carbon cycles in conversion of wildlands to residential and urban land
14 cover, and (3) indirect effects of residential and urban land cover on energy use and ecosystem carbon
15 cycling.

16 17 **CARBON INVENTORIES OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS**

18 Conversion of agricultural and wildlands to settlements of varying densities is occurring at a rapid
19 rate in North America, faster, in fact, than the rate of population growth. For example, according to U.S.
20 Census Bureau estimates, urban land in the coterminous United States increased by 20% in the 1990s
21 (Nowak *et al.*, 2005) while the population increased by 13%. Given these trends, it is important to
22 determine the carbon balance of different types of settlements and how future urban policy and planning
23 may impact the magnitude of CO₂ sources and sinks at regional, continental, and global scales. However,
24 unlike many other types of common land cover, complete carbon inventories including fossil fuel
25 emissions and biological sources and sinks of carbon have been conducted only rarely for settlements as a
26 whole. Assessing the carbon balance of settlements is challenging, as they are characterized by large CO₂
27 emissions from fuel combustion and decomposition of organic waste as well as transformations to
28 vegetation and soil that affect carbon sources and sinks.

29 Determining the extent of human settlements across North America also presents a challenge, as
30 definitions of "developed," "built-up," and "urban" land vary greatly, particularly among nations. The
31 U.S., Canadian, and Mexican census definitions are not consistent; in addition, several other classification
32 schemes for defining and mapping settlements have been developed, such as the U.S. Department of
33 Agriculture's National Resource Inventory categorization of developed land, which uses a variety of
34 methods based on satellite imagery. One method of classifying settled land cover that has been
35 consistently applied at a continental scale is the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project conducted by a

1 consortium of institutions, including Columbia University and the World Bank (CIESIN *et al.*, 2004).
2 This estimate, which is based on nighttime lights satellite imagery, is 1,039,450 km², almost 5 % of the
3 total continental land area (Fig. 14-1).

4
5 **Fig. 14-1. North America urban extents.**

6
7 Currently, there is insufficient information to determine the complete current or historical carbon
8 balance of total continental land area. Fossil fuel emissions very likely dominate carbon fluxes from
9 settlements, just as settlement-related emissions likely dominate total fossil fuel consumption in North
10 America. However, specific estimates of the proportion of total fossil fuel emissions directly attributable
11 to settlements are difficult to make given current inventory methods, which are often conducted on a state
12 or province-wide basis. In addition, the biological component of the carbon balance of settlements is
13 highly uncertain, particularly with regard to the influence of urbanization on soil carbon pools and
14 biogenic greenhouse gas emissions.

15 For the urban tree component of the settlement carbon balance, carbon stocks and sequestration have
16 been estimated for urban land cover (as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau) in the coterminous United
17 States to be on the order of 700 Mt (335–980 Mt C) with sequestration rates of 22.8 Mt C yr⁻¹ (13.7–25.9
18 Mt C yr⁻¹) (Nowak and Crane, 2002). These estimates encompass a great deal of regional variability and
19 contain some uncertainty about differences in carbon allocation between urban and natural trees, as urban
20 trees have been less studied. However, to a first approximation, these estimates can be used to infer a
21 probable range of urban tree carbon stocks and gross sequestration on a continental basis. Nowak and
22 Crane (2002) estimated that urban tree carbon storage in the Canadian border states (excluding semi-arid
23 Montana, Idaho, and North Dakota) ranged from 24 to 45 t C ha⁻¹, and carbon sequestration ranged from
24 0.8 to 1.5 t C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹. Applying these values to a range of estimates of the extent of urban land in Canada
25 (28,045 km² from the 1996 Canadian Census and 131,560 km² from CIESIN *et al.*, 2004), Canadian
26 urban forest carbon stocks are between 67 and 592 Mt while carbon sequestration rates are between 2.2
27 and 19.7 Mt C yr⁻¹. Similarly, for Mexico, Nowak and Crane (2002) estimated that urban carbon storage
28 and sequestration in the U.S. southwestern states varied from 4.4 to 10.5 t ha⁻¹ and 0.1 to 0.3 t ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹,
29 respectively, leading to estimates of 10 to 107 Mt C stored in urban trees in Mexico and 0.2 to 3.1 Mt C
30 yr⁻¹ sequestered. Estimates of historical trends are not available.

31 While complete national or continental-scale estimates of the carbon budget of settlements including
32 fossil fuels, vegetation, and soils are not available, several methods are available to assess the full carbon
33 balance of individual settlements and can be applied in the next several years toward constructing larger-
34 scale inventories. Atmospheric measurements can be used to determine the net losses of carbon from

1 settlements and urbanizing regions (Grimmond *et al.*, 2002; Grimmond *et al.*, 2004; Nemitz *et al.*, 2002;
2 Soegaard and Moller-Jensen, 2003). Specific sources of CO₂ can be determined from unique isotopic
3 signatures (Pataki *et al.*, 2003; Pataki *et al.*, 2006b) and from the relationship between CO₂ and carbon
4 monoxide (Lin *et al.*, 2004). Many of these techniques have been commonly applied to natural
5 ecosystems and may be easily adapted for settled regions. In addition, there have been several attempts to
6 quantify the “metabolism” of human settlements in terms of their inputs and outputs of energy, materials,
7 and wastes (Decker *et al.*, 2000) and the “footprint” of settlements in terms of the land area required to
8 supply their consumption of resources and to offset CO₂ emissions (Folke *et al.*, 1997). Often these
9 calculations include local flows and transformations of materials as well as upstream energy use and
10 carbon appropriation, such as remote electrical power generation and food production.

11 To conduct metabolic and footprint analyses of specific settlements, energy and fuel use statistics are
12 needed for individual municipalities, and these data are seldom made available at that scale.
13 Consequently, metabolic and footprint analyses of carbon flows and conversions associated with
14 metropolitan regions have been conducted for a relatively small number of cities. A metabolic analysis of
15 the Toronto metropolitan region showed per capita net CO₂ emissions of 14 t CO₂ yr⁻¹ (Sahely *et al.*,
16 2003), higher than analyses of other large metropolitan areas in developed countries (Newman, 1999;
17 Pataki *et al.*, 2006a; Warren-Rhodes and Koenig, 2001). In contrast, an analysis of Mexico City estimated
18 per capita CO₂ emissions of 3.4 t CO₂ yr⁻¹ (Romero Lankao *et al.*, 2004). Local emissions inventories can
19 provide useful supplements to national and global inventories in order to ensure that emissions reductions
20 policies are applied effectively and equitably (Easterling *et al.*, 2003).

21 Current projections for urban land development in North America highlight the importance of
22 improving carbon inventories of settlements and assessing patterns and impacts of future urban and rural
23 development. Projections for increases in the extent of developed land cover in the United States in the
24 next 25 years are as high as 79%, which would increase the proportion of developed land from 5.2% to
25 9.2% of total land cover (Alig *et al.*, 2004). The potential consequences of this increase for the carbon
26 cycle are significant in terms of CO₂ emissions from an expanded housing stock and transportation
27 network as well as from conversion of agricultural land, forest, rangeland, and other ecosystems to urban
28 land cover. Because the dynamics of carbon cycling in settled areas encompass a range of physical,
29 biological, social, and economic processes, studies of the potential impacts of future development on the
30 carbon cycle must be interdisciplinary. Large-scale research on what has been called the study “of cities
31 as ecosystems” (Pickett *et al.*, 2001) has begun only relatively recently, pioneered by interdisciplinary
32 studies such as the National Science Foundation’s Long-Term Ecological Research sites in the central
33 Arizona-Phoenix area and in Baltimore (Grimm *et al.*, 2000). Although there is not yet sufficient data to
34 construct a complete carbon inventory of settlements across North America, it is a feasible research goal

1 to do so in the next several years if additional studies in individual municipalities are conducted in a
2 variety of urbanizing regions.

3 4 **TRENDS AND DRIVERS**

5 Drivers of change in the carbon cycle associated with human settlements include (1) factors that
6 influence the rate of land conversion and urbanization, such as population growth and density, household
7 size, economic growth, and transportation infrastructure; (2) additional factors that influence fossil fuel
8 emissions, such as climate, residence and building characteristics, transit choices, and affluence; and
9 (3) factors that influence biological carbon gains and losses, including the type of predevelopment land
10 cover, post-development urban design and landscaping choices, soil and landscape management practices,
11 and the time since land conversion.

12 13 **Fossil Fuel Emissions**

14 The density and patterns of development of human settlements (i.e., their “form”) are drivers of the
15 magnitude of the fossil fuel emissions component of the carbon cycle. The size and number of residences
16 and households influence CO₂ emissions from the residential sector, and the spatial distribution of
17 residences, commercial districts, and transportation networks is a key influence in the vehicular and
18 transportation sectors. Many of the attributes of urban form that influence the magnitude of fossil fuel
19 emissions are linked to historical patterns of economic development, which have differed in Canada, the
20 United States, and Mexico. The future trajectory of development and associated levels of affluence and
21 technological and social change will strongly influence key aspects of urban form such as residence size,
22 vehicle miles traveled, and investment in urban infrastructure, along with associated fossil fuel emissions.
23 Whereas emissions from the transportation and residential sectors are discussed in detail in Chapters 7
24 and 9, respectively, this chapter discusses specific aspects of the form of human settlements that affect the
25 current continental carbon balance and its possible future trajectories.

26 Household size in terms of the number of occupants per household has been declining in North
27 America (Table 14-1) while the average size of new residences has been increasing. For example, the
28 average size of new, single family homes in the United States increased from 139 m² (1500 ft²) to more
29 than 214 m² (2300 ft²) between 1970 and 2004 (NAHB, 2005). These trends have contributed to increases
30 in per capita CO₂ emissions from the residential sector as well as increases in the consumption of land for
31 residential and urban development (Alig *et al.*, 2003; Ironmonger *et al.*, 1995; Liu *et al.*, 2003; MacKellar
32 *et al.*, 1995). In addition, when considering total emissions from settlements, the trajectory of the
33 transportation and residential sectors may be linked. There have been a number of qualitative discussions
34 of the role of “urban sprawl” in influencing fossil fuel and pollutant emissions from cities (CEC, 2001;

1 Gonzalez, 2005), although definitions of urban sprawl vary (Ewing *et al.*, 2003). Quantitative linkages
2 between urban form and energy use have been attempted by comparing datasets for a variety of cities, but
3 the results have been difficult to interpret due to the large number of factors that may affect transportation
4 patterns and energy consumption (Anderson *et al.*, 1996). For example, in a seminal analysis of data from
5 a variety of cities, Kenworthy and Newman (1990) found a negative correlation between population
6 density and per capita energy use in the transportation sector. However, their data have been reanalyzed
7 and reinterpreted in a number of subsequent studies that have highlighted other important driving
8 variables, such as income levels, employment density, and transit choice (Gomez-Ibanez, 1991; Gordon
9 and Richardson, 1989; Mindali *et al.*, 2004).

10
11 **Table 14-1. Increases in number of households and the total population of the United States, Canada,**
12 **and Mexico between 1985 and 2000.** (United Nations, 2002; United Nations Habitat, 2003).

13
14 Quantifying the nature and extent of the linkage between development patterns of human settlements
15 and greenhouse gas emissions is critical from the perspective of evaluating the potential impacts of land
16 use policy. One way forward is to further the application of integrated land use and transportation models
17 that have been developed to analyze future patterns of urban development in a variety of cities (Agarwal
18 *et al.*, 2000; EPA, 2000; Hunt *et al.*, 2005). Only a handful have been applied to date for generating fossil
19 fuel emissions scenarios from individual metropolitan areas (Jaccard *et al.*, 1997; Pataki *et al.*, 2006a),
20 such that larger-scale national or continental projections for human settlements are not currently available.
21 However, there is potential to add a carbon cycle component to these models that would assess the
22 linkages between land use and land cover change, residential and commercial energy use and emissions,
23 emissions from the transportation sector, and net carbon gains and losses in biological sinks following
24 land conversion. A critical feature of these models is that they may be used to evaluate future scenarios
25 and the potential impacts of policies to influence land use patterns and transportation networks in
26 individual settlements and developing regions.

27 28 **Vegetation and Soils in Human Settlements**

29 Human settlements contain vegetation and soils that are often overlooked in national inventories, as
30 they fall outside common classification schemes. Nevertheless, patterns of development affect the carbon
31 balance of biological systems, both in the replacement of natural ecosystems with rural, residential, or
32 urban land cover and in processes within settlements that affect constructed and managed land cover. In
33 the United States, satellite data and ecosystem modeling for the mid-1990s suggested that urbanization

1 occurred largely on productive agricultural land and therefore caused a net loss of carbon fixed by
2 photosynthesis of 40 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Imhoff *et al.*, 2004).

3 Urban forests and vegetation sequester carbon directly as described under carbon inventories. In
4 addition, urban trees influence the carbon balance of municipalities indirectly through their effects on
5 energy use. Depending on their placement relative to buildings, trees may cause shading and windbreak
6 effects, as well as evaporative cooling due to transpiration (Akbari, 2002; Oke, 1989; Taha, 1997). These
7 effects have been estimated in a variety of studies, mostly involving model calculations that suggest that
8 urban trees generally result in net reductions in energy use (Akbari, 2002; Akbari and Konopacki, 2005;
9 Akbari *et al.*, 1997; Akbari and Taha, 1992; Huang *et al.*, 1987). Taking into account CO₂ emissions
10 resulting from tree maintenance and decomposition of removed trees, “avoided” emissions from energy
11 savings were responsible for approximately half of the total net reduction in CO₂ emissions from seven
12 municipal urban forests, with the remainder attributable to direct sequestration of CO₂ (McPherson *et al.*,
13 2005). Direct measurements of the components of urban energy balance that quantify the contribution of
14 vegetation are needed to validate these estimates.

15 Like natural ecosystems, soils in human settlements contain carbon, although rates of sequestration
16 are much more uncertain in urban soils than in natural soils. In general, soil carbon is generally lost
17 following disturbances associated with conversion from natural to urban or suburban land cover (Pouyat
18 *et al.*, 2002). Soil carbon pools may subsequently increase at varying rates, depending on the soil and land
19 cover type, local climate, and management intensity (Golubiewski, 2006; Pouyat *et al.*, 2002; Qian and
20 Follet, 2002). In ecosystems with low rates of carbon sequestration in native soil such as arid and
21 semiarid ecosystems, conversion to highly managed, settled land cover can result in higher rates of carbon
22 sequestration and storage than pre-settlement due to large inputs of water, fertilizer, and organic matter
23 (Golubiewski, 2006). Pouyat *et al.* (2006) used urban soil organic carbon measurements to estimate the
24 total above- and below-ground carbon storage, including soil carbon, in U.S. urban land cover to be 2,640
25 Mt (1,890 to 3,300 Mt). This range does not include the uncertainty in classifying urban land cover, but
26 applies the range of uncertainty in aboveground urban carbon stocks reported in Nowak and Crane (2002)
27 and the standard deviation of urban soil carbon densities reported in Pouyat *et al.* (2006). In addition,
28 irrigated and fertilized urban soils have been associated with higher emissions of CO₂ and the potent
29 greenhouse gas N₂O relative to natural soils, offsetting some potential gains of sequestering carbon in
30 urban soils (Kaye *et al.*, 2004; Kaye *et al.*, 2005; Koerner and Klopatek, 2002). Finally, full carbon
31 accounting that incorporates fossil fuel emissions associated with soil management (e.g., irrigation and
32 fertilizer production and transport) has not yet been conducted. In general, additional data on soil carbon
33 balance in human settlements are required to assess the potential for managing urban and residential soils
34 for carbon sequestration.

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OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT

A number of municipalities in Canada, the United States, and Mexico have committed to voluntary programs of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Under the Cities for Climate Protection program (CCP) of International Governments for Local Sustainability (ICLEI, formerly the International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives) 269 towns, cities, and counties in North America have committed to conducting emissions inventories, establishing a target for reductions, and monitoring the results of reductions initiatives (the current count of the number of municipalities participating in voluntary greenhouse gas reduction programs may be found on-line at <http://www.iclei.org>). Emissions reductions targets vary by municipality, as do the scope of reductions, which may apply to the municipality as a whole or only to government operations (i.e., emissions related to operation of government-owned buildings, facilities, and vehicle fleets).

Kousky and Schneider (2003) interviewed representatives from 23 participating CCP municipalities in the United States who indicated that cost savings and other co-benefits of greenhouse gas reductions in cities and towns were the most commonly cited reasons for participating in voluntary greenhouse gas reductions programs. Potential cost savings include reductions in energy and fuel costs from energy efficiency programs in buildings, street lights, and traffic lights; energy co-generation in landfills and sewage treatment plants; mass transit programs; and replacement of municipal vehicles and buses with alternative fuel or hybrid vehicles (ICLEI, 1993; 2000). Other perceived co-benefits include reductions in emissions of particulate and oxidant pollutants, alleviation of traffic congestion, and availability of lower-income housing in efforts to curb urban sprawl. These co-benefits are often “perceived” because many municipalities have not attempted to quantify them as part of their emissions reductions programs (Kousky and Schneider, 2003); however, it has been suggested that they play a key role in efforts to promote reductions of municipal-scale greenhouse gas emissions because local constituents regard them as an issue of interest (Betsill, 2001).

Of the co-benefits of municipal programs to reduce CO₂ emissions, improvements in air quality are perhaps the most well studied. Cifuentes (2001) analyzed the benefits of reductions in atmospheric particulate matter measuring less than 10 µm in diameter (PM₁₀) and ozone concentrations in four cities in North and South America. Using a greenhouse gas reduction of 13% of 2000 levels by 2020 from energy efficiency and fuel substitution programs, Cifuentes (2001) estimated that PM₁₀ and ozone concentrations would decline by 10% of 2000 levels. Estimated health benefits from such a reduction included avoidance of 64,000 (18,000–116,000) premature deaths associated with air quality-related health problems as well as avoidance of 91,000 (28,000–153,000) hospital admissions and 787,000 (136,000–1,430,000) emergency room visits. However, using calculations for co-control of CO₂ and air pollutants

1 in Mexico City, West *et al.* (2004) found that in practice, if electrical energy is primarily generated in
2 remote locations relative to the urban area, cost-effective energy efficiency programs may have a
3 relatively small effect on air quality. In that case, options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions would
4 have to be implemented primarily in the transportation sector to appreciably affect air quality.

6 RESEARCH NEEDS

7 Additional studies of the carbon balance of settlements of varying densities, geographical location,
8 and patterns of development are needed to quantify the potential impacts of various policy and planning
9 alternatives on net greenhouse gas emissions. While it may seem intuitive that policies to curb urban
10 sprawl or enhance tree planting programs will result in emissions reductions, different aspects of urban
11 form (e.g., housing density, availability of public transportation, type and location of forest cover) may
12 have different net effects on carbon sources and sinks, depending on the location, affluence, economy,
13 and geography of various settlements. It is possible to develop quantitative tools to take many of these
14 factors into account. To facilitate development and application of integrated urban carbon cycle models
15 and to extrapolate local studies to regional, national, and continental scales, useful additional data include:

- 16 • common land cover classifications appropriate for characterizing a variety of human settlements
17 across North America,
- 18 • emissions inventories at small spatial scales such as individual neighborhoods and municipalities,
- 19 • expansion of the national carbon inventory and flux measurement networks to include land cover
20 types within human settlements,
- 21 • comparative studies of processes and drivers of development in varying regions and nations, and
- 22 • interdisciplinary studies of land use change that evaluate socioeconomic as well as biophysical drivers
23 of carbon sources and sinks.

24
25 In general, there has been a focus in carbon cycle science on measuring carbon stocks and fluxes in
26 natural ecosystems, and consequently highly managed and human-dominated systems such as settlements
27 have been underrepresented in many regional and national inventories. To assess the full carbon balance
28 of settlements ranging from rural developments to large cities, a wide range of measurement techniques
29 and scientific, economic, and social science disciplines are required to understand the dynamics of urban
30 expansion, transportation, economic development, and biological sources and sinks. An advantage to an
31 interdisciplinary focus on the study of human settlements from a carbon cycle perspective is that human
32 activities and biological impacts in and surrounding settled areas encompass many aspects of
33 perturbations to atmospheric CO₂, including a large proportion of national CO₂ emissions and changes in
34 carbon sinks resulting from land use change.

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1 **Table 14-1. Increases in number of households and the total population of the United States, Canada, and**
 2 **Mexico between 1985 and 2000.** (United Nations, 2002; United Nations Habitat, 2003).

	Total population (%)	Households (%)
Canada	19	39
Mexico	33	60
United States	15	25

3

1 Figure 14-1. North America urban extents.



2

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Chapter 15. Coastal Oceans, Lakes and Rivers

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KEY FINDINGS

- The global oceans currently take up between 1.3 and 2.3 Gt C yr⁻¹ from the atmosphere.
- The carbon budgets of ocean margins (coastal regions) are not well-characterized due to lack of observations coupled with complexity and highly localized spatial variability. Existing data are insufficient, for example, to estimate the amount of carbon stored in the coastal regions of North America.
- New observations reveal that on average, nearshore waters surrounding North America are neither a source nor a sink to the atmosphere. A small net source of CO₂ to the atmosphere of 19 Mt C yr⁻¹ is estimated mostly from waters around the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, with a variation (standard deviation) around that number of ± 22 Mt C yr⁻¹.
- With the exception of one or two time-series sites, almost nothing is known about historical trends in sea-air fluxes and the source-sink behavior of North America's coastal oceans.
- The Great Lakes and estuarine systems of North America may be net sources of CO₂ where terrestrially-derived organic material is decomposing, while reservoir systems may be storing carbon through sediment transport and burial.
- There are no existing projections of whether North America's coastal oceans will remain a source of CO₂ in the future or become a sink.
- Options and measures for sequestration of carbon in the ocean include deep-sea injection of CO₂ and iron fertilization, although it is unresolved how important, feasible or acceptable any of these options might be for the North American region.

- 1 • Highly variable sea-air CO₂ fluxes in coastal areas may introduce errors in North American CO₂ fluxes
2 calculated by atmospheric inversion methods. Reducing these errors will require ocean observatories
3 utilizing fixed and mobile platforms with instrumentation to measure critical stocks and fluxes as part
4 of coordinated national and international research programs. Ocean carbon sequestration studies
5 should also be continued.
-

9 **INVENTORIES (STOCKS AND FLUXES, QUANTIFICATION)**

10 This chapter focuses on the role that aquatic systems play in modulating atmospheric carbon dioxide
11 (CO₂). The chapter quantifies water-atmosphere CO₂ fluxes and considers how the underlying stocks and
12 rate processes affect them. Aquatic stocks of living carbon are small relative to stocks in the terrestrial
13 environments, but turnover rates are very high. In addition aquatic stocks are not well characterized
14 because of their spatial and temporal variability. The complexity of transformations in aquatic systems,
15 the limited data on the transformations, and space considerations have led to the focus on water-
16 atmosphere CO₂ fluxes. Aquatic systems, primarily the oceans, act as a huge reservoir for inorganic
17 carbon, containing about 50 times as much CO₂ as the atmosphere, and atmospheric concentration of CO₂
18 would be much higher in the absence of current ocean processes.

19 The ocean's biological pump converts inorganic carbon in the upper ocean to organic particulate
20 carbon by photosynthesis, transports the organic carbon from the surface by sinking, and therefore plays a
21 critical role in removing atmospheric CO₂ (Gruber and Sarmiento, 2002) in combination with physical
22 and chemical processes. The net sea-air CO₂ flux over the global ocean appears to be well constrained to
23 be about $1,800 \pm 500$ Mt C [1 Mt = one million (10^6) metric tons] or 1.8 ± 0.5 Gt C yr⁻¹ [1 Gt = one
24 billion (10^9) metric tons] from the atmosphere into the ocean (Figure 15-1 and Table 15-1). (See Chapter
25 2 for a description of how ocean carbon fluxes relate to the global carbon cycle.) The atmosphere is well
26 mixed and nearly homogenous. The large spatial variability in sea-air CO₂ fluxes shown in Figure 15-1 is
27 driven by a combination of physical, chemical, and biological processes in the ocean. The flux over the
28 coastal margins has neither been well characterized (Liu *et al.*, 2000) nor integrated into global
29 calculations because there are large variations over small spatial and temporal scales, and observations
30 have been limited. The need for higher spatial resolution to resolve the coastal variability has hampered
31 modeling efforts. In the following sections we review existing information on the coastal ocean carbon
32 cycle and its relationship to the global ocean, and we present the results of a new analysis of about a half
33 million observations of sea-air flux of CO₂ in coastal waters surrounding the North American continent.

1 **Table 15-1. Climatological mean distribution of the net sea-air CO₂ flux (in Gt C yr⁻¹) over the global**
2 **ocean regions (excluding coastal areas) in reference year 1995.** The fluxes are based on about 1.75
3 million partial pressure measurements for CO₂ in surface ocean waters, excluding the measurements made
4 in the equatorial Pacific (10°N- 10°S) during El Niño periods (see Takahashi *et al.*, 2002). The
5 NCAR/NCEP 42-year mean wind speeds and the (wind speed)² dependence for sea-air gas transfer rate are
6 used (Wanninkhof, 1992). Plus signs indicate that the ocean is a source for atmospheric CO₂, and negative
7 signs indicate that ocean is a sink. The ocean uptake has also been estimated on the basis of the following
8 methods: temporal changes in atmospheric oxygen and CO₂ concentrations (Keeling and Garcia, 2002;
9 Bender *et al.*, 2005), ¹³C/¹²C ratios in sea and air (Battle *et al.*, 2000; Quay *et al.*, 2003), ocean CO₂
10 inventories (Sabine *et al.*, 2004), and coupled carbon cycle and ocean general circulation models
11 (Sarmiento *et al.*, 2000; Gruber and Sarmiento, 2002). The consensus is that the oceans take up 1.3 to 2.3
12 Gt C yr⁻¹

13
14 **Figure 15-1. Global distribution of air-sea CO₂ flux.** The white line represents zero flux and separates
15 sources and sinks. The sources are primarily in the tropics (yellow and red) with a few areas of deep mixing
16 at high latitudes. Updated from Takahashi *et al.* (2002).

17 18 **Global Coastal Ocean Carbon Fluxes**

19 The carbon cycle in coastal oceans involves a series of processes, including runoff from terrestrial
20 environments, upwelling and mixing of high CO₂ water from below, photosynthesis at the sea surface,
21 sinking of organic particles, respiration, production and consumption of dissolved organic carbon, and
22 sea-air CO₂ fluxes (Figure 15-2). Although fluxes in the coastal oceans are large relative to surface area,
23 there is disagreement as to whether these regions are a net sink or a net source of CO₂ to the atmosphere
24 (Tsunogai *et al.*, 1999; Cai and Dai, 2004; Thomas *et al.*, 2004). Great uncertainties remain in coastal
25 carbon fluxes, which are complex and dynamic, varying rapidly over short distances and at high
26 frequencies. Only recently have new technologies allowed for the measurement of these rapidly changing
27 fluxes (Friederich *et al.*, 1995 and 2002; Hales and Takahashi, 2004).

28
29 **Figure 15-2. In the top panel, mean air/sea CO₂ flux is calculated from shipboard measurements on a**
30 **line perpendicular to the central California coast.** Flux within Monterey Bay (~0–20 km offshore) is
31 into the ocean, flux across the active upwelling region (~20–75 km offshore) is from the ocean, and flux in
32 the California Current (75–300 km) is on average into the ocean. These fluxes result from the processes
33 shown in the bottom panel. California Undercurrent water, which has a high CO₂ partial pressure, upwells
34 near shore, and is advected offshore into the California Current and into Monterey Bay. Phytoplankton
35 growing in the upwelled water use CO₂ as a carbon source, and CO₂ is drawn to low levels in those areas.
36 Phytoplankton carbon eventually sinks or is subducted below the euphotic zone, where it decays, elevating

1 the CO₂ levels of subsurface waters. Where the level of surface CO₂ is higher than the level of atmospheric
2 CO₂, diffusion drives CO₂ into the atmosphere. Conversely, where the level of surface CO₂ is lower than
3 that of atmospheric CO₂, diffusion drives CO₂ into the ocean. The net sea/air flux on this spatial scale is
4 near zero. DIC = dissolved inorganic carbon; POC = particulate organic carbon. Updated from Pennington
5 *et al.* (in press).

6
7 Carbon is transported from land to sea mostly by rivers in four components: CO₂ dissolved in water,
8 organic carbon dissolved in water, particulate inorganic carbon (e. g. calcium carbonate, CaCO₃), and
9 particulate organic carbon. The global rate of river input has been estimated to be 1,000 Mt C yr⁻¹, about
10 38% of it as dissolved CO₂ (or 384 Mt C yr⁻¹), 25% as dissolved organic matter, 21% as organic particles
11 and 17% as CaCO₃ particles (Gattuso *et al.*, 1998). Estimates for the riverine dissolved CO₂ flux vary
12 from 385 to 429 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Sarmiento and Sundquist, 1992). The Mississippi River, the seventh-largest in
13 freshwater discharge in the world, delivers about 13 Mt C yr⁻¹ as dissolved CO₂ (Cai, 2003). Organic
14 matter in continental shelf sediments exhibits only weak isotope and chemical signatures of terrestrial
15 origin, suggesting that riverine organic matter is reprocessed in coastal environments on a time scale of 20
16 to 130 years (Hedges *et al.*, 1997; Benner and Opsahl, 2001). Of the organic carbon, about 30% is
17 accumulating in estuaries, marshes, and deltas, and a large portion (20% to 60%) of the remaining 70% is
18 readily and rapidly oxidized in coastal waters (Smith and Hollibaugh, 1997). Only about 10% is estimated
19 to be contributed by human activities, such as agriculture and forest clearing (Gattuso *et al.*, 1998), and
20 the rest is a part of the natural carbon cycle.

21 One of the major differences between coastal and open ocean systems is the activity of the biological
22 pump. In coastal environments, the pump operates much more efficiently, leading to rapid reduction of
23 surface CO₂ and thus complicating the accurate quantification of sea-air CO₂ fluxes. For example,
24 Ducklow and McCallister (2004) constructed a carbon balance for the coastal oceans using the framework
25 of the ocean carbon cycle of Gruber and Sarmiento (2002) and estimated a net CO₂ removal by primary
26 productivity of 1,200 Mt C yr⁻¹ and a large CO₂ sink of 900 Mt C yr⁻¹ for the atmosphere. In contrast,
27 Smith and Hollibaugh (1993) estimated a biological pump of about 200 Mt C yr⁻¹ and concluded that the
28 coastal oceans are a weak CO₂ sink of 100 Mt C yr⁻¹, about one-ninth of the estimate by Ducklow and
29 McCallister (2004). Since the estimated sea-air CO₂ flux depends on quantities that are not well
30 constrained, the mass balance provides widely varying results.

31 32 **North American Coastal Carbon**

33 Two important types of North American coastal ocean environments can be identified: (1) river-
34 dominated coastal margins with large inputs of fresh water, organic matter, and nutrients from land (e.g.,

1 Mid- and South-Atlantic Bights) and (2) coastal upwelling zones (e.g., the California-Oregon-Washington
2 coasts, along the eastern boundary of the Pacific) where physical processes bring cool, high-nutrient and
3 high-CO₂ waters to the surface (Cai *et al.*, 2003). In both environments, the biological uptake of CO₂
4 plays an important role in determining whether an area becomes a sink or a source for the atmosphere.

5 High biological productivity fueled by nutrients added to coastal waters can lead to seawater
6 becoming a CO₂ sink during the summer growing season, as observed in the Bering Sea Shelf (Codispoti
7 and Friederich, 1986) and the northwest waters off Oregon and Washington (van Geen *et al.*, 2000; Hales
8 *et al.*, 2005). Similar CO₂ draw-downs may occur in the coastal waters of the Gulf of Alaska and in the
9 Gulf of Mexico near the Mississippi River outflow. Coastal upwelling results in a very high concentration
10 of CO₂ for the surface water (as high as 1,000 µatm), and hence the surface water becomes a strong CO₂
11 source. This is followed by rapid biological uptake of CO₂, which causes the water to become a strong
12 CO₂ sink (Friederich *et al.*, 2002; Hales *et al.*, 2005).

13 A review of North American coastal carbon fluxes has been carried out by Doney *et al.* (2004) (Table
14 15-2). The information reviewed was very limited in space (only 13 locations) and time, leading Doney *et*
15 *al.* to conclude that it was unrealistic to reliably estimate an annual flux for North American coastal
16 waters. Measurement programs have increased recently, and we have used the newly available data to
17 calculate annual North American coastal fluxes for the first time.

18
19 **Table 15-2. Variability of CO₂ distributions and fluxes in U.S. coastal waters from regional surveys**
20 **and moored measurements (from Doney *et al.* 2004).**
21

22 **Synthesis of Available North American Sea-Air Coastal CO₂ Fluxes**

23 A large data set consisting of 550,000 measurements of the partial pressure of CO₂ (pCO₂) in surface
24 waters has been assembled and analyzed (Figure 15-3; see Appendix 15A for details). pCO₂ is measured
25 in a carrier gas equilibrated with seawater and, as such, it is a measure of the outflux/influx tendency of
26 CO₂ from the atmosphere. pCO₂ is affected by physical and biological processes increasing with
27 temperature and decreasing with photosynthesis. The data were obtained by the authors and collaborators,
28 quality-controlled, and assembled in a uniform electronic format for analysis (available at
29 www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/CO2). Observations in each 1° × 1° pixel area were compiled into a single
30 year and were analyzed for time-space variability. Seasonal and interannual variations were not well
31 characterized except in a few locations (Friederich *et al.*, 2002). The annual mean sea-air pCO₂ difference
32 (delta pCO₂) was computed for 5°-wide zones along the North American continent and was plotted as a
33 function of latitude for four regions (Figure 15-4): North Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico/Caribbean, North
34 Pacific, and Bering/Chukchi Seas. Figure 15-4A shows the fluxes in the first nearshore band, and Figure

1 15-4B shows the fluxes for a band that is several hundred kilometers from shore. The average fluxes for
2 them and for the intermediate bands are given in Table 15-3. The flux and area data are listed in Table 15-
3 4. A full complement of seasonal observations are lacking in the Arctic Sea, including Hudson Bay, the
4 northern Labrador Sea, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence; the northern Bering Sea; the Gulf of Alaska; the
5 Gulf of California; and the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.

6
7 **Figure 15-3. (A). Distribution of coastal CO₂ partial pressure measurements made between 1979 and**
8 **2004. (B). The distribution of the net sea-air CO₂ flux over 1° × 1° pixel areas (N-S 100 km, E-W 80**
9 **km) around North America.** The flux (grams of carbon per square meter per year) represents the
10 climatological mean over the 25-year period. The magenta-blue colors indicate that the ocean water is a
11 sink for atmospheric CO₂, and the green-yellow-orange colors indicate that the sea is a CO₂ sink. The data
12 were obtained by the authors and collaborators of this chapter and are archived at the Lamont-Doherty
13 Earth Observatory (www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/CO2).

14
15 **Figure 15-4. Estimated sea-air CO₂ fluxes (grams of carbon per square meter per year) from 550,000**
16 **seawater CO₂ partial pressure (pCO₂) observations made from 1979 to 2004 in ocean waters**
17 **surrounding the North American continent.** (A) Waters within one degree (about 80 km) of the coast
18 and (B) open ocean waters between 300 and 900 km from the shore (see Figure 15-3B). The annual mean
19 sea-air pCO₂ difference (delta pCO₂) values were calculated from the weekly mean atmospheric CO₂
20 concentrations in the GLOBALVIEW-CO₂ database (2004) over the same pixel area in the same week and
21 year as the seawater pCO₂ was measured. The monthly net sea-air CO₂ flux was computed from the mean
22 monthly wind speeds in the National Centers for Environmental Prediction/National Center for
23 Atmospheric Research (NCEP/NCAR) database in the (wind speed)² formulation for the sea-air gas
24 transfer rate by Wanninkhof (1992). The ± uncertainties represent one standard deviation.

25
26 **Table 15-3. Climatological mean annual sea-air CO₂ flux (g C m⁻² yr⁻¹) over the oceans surrounding**
27 **North America.** Negative values indicate that the ocean is a CO₂ sink for the atmosphere. N is the number
28 of seawater pCO₂ measurements. The ± uncertainty is given by one standard deviation of measurements
29 used for analysis and represents primarily the seasonal variability.

30
31 The offshore patterns follow the same general trend found in the global data set shown in Figure 15-1.
32 On an annual basis the lower latitudes tend to be a source of CO₂ to the atmosphere, whereas the higher
33 latitudes tend to be sinks (Figures 15-3B and 15-4B). The major difference in the coastal waters is that the
34 latitude where CO₂ starts to enter the ocean is further north than it is in the open ocean, particularly in the
35 Atlantic. A more detailed region-by-region description follows.

1 Pacific Ocean

2 Observations made in waters along the Pacific coast of North America illustrate how widely coastal
3 waters vary in space and time, in this case driven by upwelling and relaxation (Friederich *et al.*, 2002).
4 Figure 15-5A shows a summertime quasi-synoptic distributions of temperature, salinity, and pCO₂ in
5 surface waters based on measurements made in for July through September 2005. The effects of the
6 Columbia River plume emanating from ~46°N are clearly seen (colder temperature, low salinity, and low
7 pCO₂), as are coastal upwelling effects off Cape Mendocino (~40°N) (colder, high salinity, and very high
8 pCO₂). These coastal features are confined to within 300 km from the coast. The 1997–2005 time-series
9 data for surface water pCO₂ observed off Monterey Bay (Figure 15-5B) show the large, rapidly
10 fluctuating sea-air CO₂ fluxes during the summer upwelling season in each year as well as the low-pCO₂
11 periods during the 1997–1998 and 2002–2003 El Niño events. In spite of the large seasonal variability,
12 ranging from 200 to 750 µatm, the annual mean sea-air pCO₂ difference and the net CO₂ flux over the
13 waters off Monterey Bay areas (~37°N) are close to zero (Pennington *et al.*, in press). The seasonal
14 amplitude decreases away from the shore and in the open ocean bands, where the sea-air CO₂ flux
15 changes seasonally in response to seawater temperature (out of the ocean in summer and into the ocean in
16 winter).

17
18 **Figure 15-5. Time-space variability of coastal waters off the west coast of North America.** (A) Quasi-
19 synoptic distribution of the temperature, salinity, and pCO₂ in surface waters during July–September 2005.
20 The Columbia River plume (~46°N) and the upwelling of deep waters off the Cape Mendocino (~40°N) are
21 clearly seen. (B) 1997–2005 time-series data for sea-air CO₂ flux from a mooring off Monterey Bay,
22 California. Seawater is a CO₂ source for the atmosphere during the summer upwelling events, but
23 biological uptake reduces levels very rapidly. These rapid fluctuations can affect atmospheric CO₂ levels.
24 For example, if CO₂ from the sea is mixed into a static column, a 500-m-thick planetary boundary layer
25 over the course of one day, atmospheric CO₂ concentration would change by 2.5 µatm. If the column of air
26 is mixed vertically through the troposphere to 500 mbar, a change of about 0.5 µatm would occur. The
27 effects would be diluted as the column of air mixes laterally. However, this demonstrates that the large
28 fluctuations of sea-air CO₂ flux observed over coastal waters could affect the concentration of CO₂
29 significantly enough to affect estimates of air-land flux based on the inversion of atmospheric CO₂ data.
30 Sea-air CO₂ flux was low during the 1997–1998 and 2002–2003 El Niño periods.

31
32 The open ocean Pacific waters south of 30°N are on the annual average a CO₂ source to the
33 atmosphere, whereas the area north of 40°N is a sink, and the zone between 30° and 40°N is neutral
34 (Takahashi *et al.*, 2002). Coastal waters in the 40°N through 45°N zone (northern California-Oregon
35 coasts) are even a stronger CO₂ sink, associated with nutrient input and stratification by the Columbia

1 River (Hales *et al.*, 2005). On the other hand, coastal pCO₂ values in the 15°N through 40°N zones have
2 pCO₂ values similar to open ocean values and to the atmosphere. In the zones 15°N through 40°N, the
3 annual mean values for the net sea-air CO₂ flux are nearly zero, consistent with the finding by Pennington
4 *et al.* (in press).

6 **Atlantic Ocean**

7 With the exception of the 5°N–10°N zone, the open ocean areas are an annual net sink for
8 atmospheric CO₂. The open oceans become more intense CO₂ sinks toward higher latitudes, especially
9 north of 35°N (Figure 15-3B). Between 15°N and 45°N, the open ocean waters are a CO₂ sink (Takahashi
10 *et al.*, 2002), whereas the nearshore waters are a CO₂ source. Accordingly, in contrast to the Pacific coast,
11 the latitude where Atlantic coastal waters become a CO₂ sink is located further north than that for the
12 open ocean fluxes. In the areas north of 45°N, the open ocean waters are a strong CO₂ sink due primarily
13 to the cold Labrador Sea waters.

14 In the coastal zone very high pCO₂ values (up to 2,600 μatm) are observed occasionally in areas
15 within 10 km offshore of the barrier islands. These waters have salinities around 20 and appear to
16 represent outflow of estuarine/marsh waters rich in carbon (Cai *et al.*, 2003). The large contribution of
17 fresh water that is rich in organic matter relative to the Pacific contributes to the coastal Atlantic source.
18 Offshore fluxes are in phase with the seasonal cycle of warming and cooling; fluxes are out of the ocean
19 in summer and fall and are the inverse in winter and spring.

21 **Bering and Chukchi Seas**

22 Although measurements in these high-latitude waters are limited, the relevant data for the Bering Sea
23 (south of 65°N) and Chukchi Sea (north of 65°N) are plotted as a function of the latitude in Figure 15-4.
24 The values for the areas north of 55°N are for the summer months only; CO₂ observations are not
25 available during winter seasons. Although data scatter widely, the coastal and open ocean waters are a
26 strong CO₂ sink during the summer months due to photosynthetic draw-down of CO₂. The data in the
27 70°–75°N zone are from the shallow shelf areas in the Chukchi Sea. These waters are a very strong CO₂
28 sink (sea-air pCO₂ differences ranging from –80 to –180 μatm) with little changes between the coastal
29 and open ocean areas. The sea-air CO₂ flux during winter months is not known.

31 **Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea**

32 Although observations are limited, available data suggest that these waters are a strong CO₂ source
33 (Figure 15-4 and Table 15-3). A subsurface anoxic zone has been formed in the Texas-Louisiana coast as
34 a result of the increased addition of anthropogenic nutrients and organic carbon by the Mississippi River

1 (e.g., Lohrenz *et al.*, 1999). The carbon-nutrient cycle in the northern Gulf of Mexico is also being
2 investigated (e.g., Cai, 2003), and the studies suggest that at times those waters are locally a strong CO₂
3 sink due to high biological production.

4 5 **SYNTHESIS**

6 An analysis of half a million measurements of sea-air flux of CO₂ shows that the nearshore
7 (< 100 km) coastal waters surrounding North America are a net CO₂ source for the atmosphere on an
8 annual average of about 19 ± 22 Mt C yr⁻¹ (Table 15-4). Most of the flux (14 ± 9 Mt C yr⁻¹) occurs in the
9 Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. The open oceans are a net CO₂ sink on an annual average (Table 15-
10 4; Takahashi *et al.*, 2004). The results do not include some portions of the Arctic Sea, Bering Sea, Gulf of
11 Alaska, Gulf of Mexico, or Caribbean Sea because of insufficient data. Observations in these areas will be
12 needed to improve estimates. These results are consistent with recent global estimates that suggest that
13 nearshore areas receiving terrestrial organic carbon input are sources of CO₂ to the atmosphere and that
14 marginal seas are sinks (Borges, 2005; Borges *et al.*, in press). Hence, the net contribution from North
15 American ocean margins is small and difficult to distinguish from zero. It is not clear how much of the
16 open ocean sink results from photosynthesis driven by nutrients of coastal origin.

17
18 **Table 15-4. Areas (km²) and mean annual sea-air CO₂ flux (Mt C yr⁻¹) over four ocean regions**
19 **surrounding North America.** Since the observations in the areas north of 60°N in the Chukchi Sea were
20 made only during the summer months, the fluxes from that area are not included. The ± uncertainty is given
21 by one standard deviation of measurements used for analysis and represents primarily the seasonal
22 variability.

23 24 **TRENDS AND DRIVERS**

25 The sea-to-air CO₂ flux from the coastal zone is small (about 1%) compared with the global ocean
26 uptake flux, which is about 2,000 Mt C y⁻¹ (or 2 Gt C yr⁻¹), and hence does not influence the global air-
27 sea CO₂ budget. However, coastal waters undergo large variations in sea-air CO₂ flux on daily to seasonal
28 time scales and on small spatial scales (Figure 15-5). Fluxes can change on the order of 250 g C m⁻² yr⁻¹
29 or 0.7 g C m⁻² day⁻¹ on a day to day basis (Figure 15-5). These large fluctuations can significantly
30 modulate atmospheric CO₂ concentrations over the adjacent continent and need to be considered when
31 using the distribution of CO₂ in calculations of continental fluxes.

32 Freshwater bodies have not been treated in this analysis except to note the large surface pCO₂
33 resulting from estuaries along the east coast. The Great Lakes and rivers also represent net sources of CO₂
34 as, in the same manner as the estuaries, organic material from the terrestrial environment is oxidized so

1 that respiration exceeds photosynthesis. Interestingly, the effect of fresh water is opposite along the coast
2 of the Pacific northwest, where increased stratification and iron inputs enhance photosynthetic activity
3 (Ware and Thomson, 2005), resulting in a large sink for atmospheric CO₂ (Figure 15-3). A similar
4 process may be at work at the mouth of the Amazon (Körtzinger, 2003). This emphasizes once again the
5 important role of biological processes in controlling the sea-air fluxes of CO₂.

6 The sea-air fluxes and the underlying carbon cycle processes that determine them (Figure 15-2) vary
7 seasonally, interannually, and on longer time scales. The eastern Pacific, including the U.S. west coast, is
8 subject to changes associated with large-scale climate oscillations such as El Niño (Chavez *et al.*, 1999;
9 Feely *et al.*, 2002; Feely *et al.*, in press) and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) (Chavez *et al.*, 2003;
10 Hare and Mantua, 2000; Takahashi *et al.*, 2003). These climate patterns, and others like the North
11 Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), alter the oceanic CO₂ sink/source conditions directly through seawater
12 temperature changes as well as ecosystem variations that occur via complex physical-biological
13 interactions (Hare and Mantua, 2000; Chavez *et al.*, 2003; Patra *et al.*, 2005). For example, during El
14 Niño, upwelling of high CO₂ waters is dramatically reduced along central California (Figure 15-5) but so
15 is photosynthetic uptake of CO₂ (Chavez *et al.* 2002) so the net effect of climate variability and change on
16 sea-air fluxes remains uncertain. What is certain is that the biological, chemical and physical processes
17 controlling the sea-air fluxes of CO₂ are strongly affected by natural and anthropogenic change and that
18 efforts to track them need to be considered in global carbon management plans.

19 20 **OPTIONS AND MEASURES**

21 Two options for ocean carbon sequestration have been considered: (1) deep-sea injection of CO₂
22 (Brewer, 2003) and (2) ocean iron fertilization (Martin, 1990). The first might be viable in North
23 American coastal waters, although cost and potential biological side effects are unresolved issues. The
24 largest potential for iron fertilization resides in the equatorial Pacific and the Southern Ocean, although it
25 could be considered for the open ocean waters of the Gulf of Alaska and offshore waters of coastal
26 upwelling systems. Iron fertilization would be an economical alternative, but there is still disagreement
27 over how much carbon would be sequestered (Bakker *et al.*, 2001; Boyd *et al.*, 2000; Coale *et al.*, 2004;
28 Gervais *et al.*, 2002) and what the potential side effects would be (Chisholm *et al.*, 2001).

29 30 **R&D NEEDS VIS A VIS OPTIONS**

31 Waters with highly variable sea-air CO₂ fluxes are located primarily within 100 km of the coast
32 (Figure 15-5). With the exception of a few areas, the available observations are grossly inadequate to
33 resolve the high-frequency, small-spatial-scale variations. These high intensity sea-air CO₂ flux events
34 may introduce errors in continental CO₂ fluxes calculated by atmospheric inversion methods. Achieving a

1 comprehensive understanding of the carbon cycle in waters surrounding the North American continent
2 will require development of advanced technologies and sustained research efforts. Both of these seem to
3 be on the horizon with (1) the advent of ocean observatories that include novel fixed and mobile
4 platforms together with developing instrumentation to measure critical stocks and fluxes and (2) national
5 and international research programs that include the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) and
6 Ocean Carbon and Climate Change (OC³). Given the importance of aquatic systems to atmospheric CO₂
7 concentrations, these developing efforts must be strongly encouraged. Ocean carbon sequestration studies
8 should also be continued.

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Table 15-1. Climatological mean distribution of the net sea-air CO₂ flux (in Gt C yr⁻¹) over the global ocean regions (excluding coastal areas) in reference year 1995. The fluxes are based on about 1.75 million partial pressure measurements for CO₂ in surface ocean waters, excluding the measurements made in the equatorial Pacific (10°N- 10°S) during El Niño periods (see Takahashi *et al.*, 2002). The NCAR/NCEP 42-year mean wind speeds and the (wind speed)² dependence for sea-air gas transfer rate are used (Wanninkhof, 1992). Plus signs indicate that the ocean is a source for atmospheric CO₂, and negative signs indicate that ocean is a sink. The ocean uptake has also been estimated on the basis of the following methods: temporal changes in atmospheric oxygen and CO₂ concentrations (Keeling and Garcia, 2002; Bender *et al.*, 2005), ¹³C/¹²C ratios in sea and air (Battle *et al.*, 2000; Quay *et al.*, 2003), ocean CO₂ inventories (Sabine *et al.*, 2004), and coupled carbon cycle and ocean general circulation models (Sarmiento *et al.*, 2000; Gruber and Sarmiento, 2002). The consensus is that the oceans take up 1.3 to 2.3 Gt C yr⁻¹

Latitude bands	Pacific	Atlantic	Indian	Southern Ocean	Global
N of 50°N	+0.01	-0.31			-0.30
14°N-50°N	-0.49	-0.25	+0.05		-0.69
14°N-14°S	+0.65	+0.13	+0.13		+0.91
14°S-50°S	-0.39	-0.21	-0.52		-1.12
S of 50°S				-0.30	-0.30
Total flux	-0.23	-0.64	-0.34	-0.30	-1.50
% of flux	15	42	23	20	100
Area (10⁶ km²)	152.0	74.6	53.0	41.1	320.7
% of area	47	23	17	13	100

17
18

1 **Table 15-2. Variability of CO₂ distributions and fluxes in U.S. coastal waters from regional surveys and**
 2 **moored measurements (from Doney *et al.*, 2004)**

Location	Surface seawater pCO ₂ (µatm)	Instantaneous CO ₂ flux (mol/m ² yr ⁻¹)	Annual average (mol m ⁻² yr ⁻¹)	Sampling method	Reference
New Jersey Coast	211–658	–17 to +12	–0.65	Regional survey	Boehme <i>et al.</i> (1998)
Cape Hatteras, North Carolina	ND*	–1.0 to +1.2	ND	Moored meas.	DeGrandpre <i>et al.</i> (1997)
Middle Atlantic Bight, inner shelf	150–620	ND	–0.9	Regional survey	DeGrandpre <i>et al.</i> (2002)
Middle Atlantic Bight, middle shelf	220–480	ND	–1.6	Regional survey	DeGrandpre <i>et al.</i> (2002)
Middle Atlantic Bight, outer shelf	300–430	ND	–0.7	Regional survey	DeGrandpre <i>et al.</i> (2002)
Florida Bay, Florida	325–725	ND	ND	Regional survey	Millero <i>et al.</i> (2001)
Southern California Coastal Fronts	130–580	ND	ND	Regional survey	Simpson (1985)
Coastal Calif. (M-1; Monterey Bay)	245–550	–8 to +50	1997–98: –1.0 1998–99: +1.1	Moored meas.	Friederich <i>et al.</i> (2002)
Oregon Coast	250–640	ND	ND	Regional survey	van Geen <i>et al.</i> (2000)
Bering Sea Shelf in spring (April–June)	130–400	–8 to –12	–8	Regional survey	Codispoti <i>et al.</i> (1986)
South Atlantic Bight	300–1200	ND	2.5	Regional survey	Cai <i>et al.</i> (2003)
Miss. River Plume (summer)	80–800	ND	ND	Regional survey	Cai <i>et al.</i> (2003)
Bering Sea (Aug–Sep.)	192–400	ND	ND	Regional survey	Park <i>et al.</i> (1974)

3 * ND = no data available

1
 2 **Table 15-3. Climatological mean annual sea-air CO₂ flux (g C m⁻² yr⁻¹) over the oceans surrounding North**
 3 **America.** Negative values indicate that the ocean is a CO₂ sink for the atmosphere. N is the number of seawater
 4 pCO₂ measurements. The ± uncertainty is given by one standard deviation of measurements used for analysis and
 5 represents primarily the seasonal variability.

6

Ocean regions	Coastal boxes		First offshore		Second offshore		Third offshore		Open ocean	
	Flux	N	Flux	N	Flux	N	Flux	N	Flux	N
North Atlantic	3.2± 142	80,417	-1.4± 94	65,148	-7.3± 57	35,499	-10.4± 76.4	15,771	-26± 83	37,667
North Pacific	-0.2± 105	164,838	-6.0± 81	69,856	-4.3± 66	32,045	-5.3± 60	16,174	-1.2± 56	84,376
G. Mexico Caribbean	9.4± 24	75,496	8.4± 23	61,180	11.5± 17.0	8,410	13± 20	1,646		
Bering/Chukchi	28.0± 110	892	-28± 128	868	-44± 104	3,399	-53± 110	1,465	-63± 130	1,848


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 2 **Table 15-4. Areas (km²) and mean annual sea-air CO₂ flux (Mt C yr⁻¹) over four ocean regions surrounding**
 3 **North America.** Since the observations in the areas north of 60°N in the Chukchi Sea were made only during the
 4 summer months, the fluxes from that area are not included. The ± uncertainty is given by one standard deviation of
 5 measurements used for analysis and represents primarily the seasonal variability.

Ocean areas (km ²)					Mean sea-air CO ₂ flux (10 ¹² grams or Mt C yr ⁻¹)				
Coastal boxes	First offshore	Second offshore	Third offshore	Open ocean	Coast box	First offshore	Second offshore	Third offshore	Open ocean
North Atlantic coast (8° N to 45°N)									
625,577	651,906	581,652	572,969	3,388,500	2.7±9.5	-0.5±9.3	-4.0±4.9	-6.5±6.3	-41.5±28.1
North Pacific coast (8°N to 55°N)									
1,211,555	855,626	874,766	646,396	7,007,817	2.1±17.1	-7.0±14.1	-4.8±12.5	-3.7±5.3	-53.8±60.7
Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea (8°N to 30°N)									
1,519,335	1,247,413	935,947	1,008,633		13.6±8.9	10.9±7.5	6.8±5.00	6.6±5.0	
Bering and Chukchi Seas (50°N to 70°N)									
481,872	311,243	261,974	117,704	227,609	0.8±3.1	-6.2±9.5	-5.3±7.5	-3.7±3.0	-9.8±3.7
Total ocean areas surrounding North America									
3,838,339	3,066,188	2,654,339	2,300,702	10,623,926	19.1±21.8	-2.8±20.7	-7.4±16.2	-7.3±10.1	-105.2±67.0


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- 1 **Figure 15-1. Global distribution of air-sea CO₂ flux. The white line represents zero flux and separates sources**
- 2 **and sinks.** The sources are primarily in the tropics (yellow and red) with a few areas of deep mixing at high
- 3 latitudes. Updated from Takahashi *et al.* (2002).




1 **Figure 15-2. In the top panel, mean air/sea CO₂ flux is calculated from shipboard measurements on a line**
 2 **perpendicular to the central California coast.** Flux within Monterey Bay (~0–20 km offshore) is into the ocean,
 3 flux across the active upwelling region (~20–75 km offshore) is from the ocean, and flux in the California Current
 4 (75–300 km) is on average into the ocean. These fluxes result from the processes shown in the bottom panel.
 5 California Undercurrent water, which has a high CO₂ partial pressure, upwells near shore, and is advected offshore
 6 into the California Current and into Monterey Bay. Phytoplankton growing in the upwelled water use CO₂ as a
 7 carbon source, and CO₂ is drawn to low levels in those areas. Phytoplankton carbon eventually sinks or is subducted
 8 below the euphotic zone, where it decays, elevating the CO₂ levels of subsurface waters. Where the level of surface
 9 CO₂ is higher than the level of atmospheric CO₂, diffusion drives CO₂ into the atmosphere. Conversely, where the
 10 level of surface CO₂ is lower than that of atmospheric CO₂, diffusion drives CO₂ into the ocean. The net sea/air flux
 11 on this spatial scale is near zero. DIC = dissolved inorganic carbon; POC = particulate organic carbon. Updated from
 12 Pennington *et al.* (in press).


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1 **Figure 15-3. (A).** Distribution of coastal CO₂ partial pressure measurements made between 1979 and 2004.
 2 **(B).** The distribution of the net sea-air CO₂ flux over 1° × 1° pixel areas (N-S 100 km, E-W 80 km) around
 3 **North America.** The flux (grams of carbon per square meter per year) represents the climatological mean over the
 4 25-year period. The magenta-blue colors indicate that the ocean water is a sink for atmospheric CO₂, and the green-
 5 yellow-orange colors indicate that the sea is a CO₂ sink. The data were obtained by the authors and collaborators of
 6 this chapter and are archived at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/CO2).
 7




1 **Figure 15-4. Estimated sea-air CO₂ fluxes (grams of carbon per square meter per year) from 550,000**
 2 **seawater CO₂ partial pressure (pCO₂) observations made from 1979 to 2004 in ocean waters surrounding the**
 3 **North American continent. (A) Waters within one degree (about 80 km) of the coast and (B) open ocean waters**
 4 **between 300 and 900 km from the shore (see Figure 15-3B). The annual mean sea-air pCO₂ difference (delta pCO₂)**
 5 **values were calculated from the weekly mean atmospheric CO₂ concentrations in the GLOBALVIEW-CO2 database**
 6 **(2004) over the same pixel area in the same week and year as the seawater pCO₂ was measured. The monthly net**
 7 **sea-air CO₂ flux was computed from the mean monthly wind speeds in the National Centers for Environmental**
 8 **Prediction/National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCEP/NCAR) database in the (wind speed)² formulation for**
 9 **the sea-air gas transfer rate by Wanninkhof (1992). The ± uncertainties represent one standard deviation.**



1 **Figure 15-5. Time-space variability of coastal waters off the west coast of North America.** (A) Quasi-synoptic
 2 distribution of the temperature, salinity, and pCO₂ in surface waters during July–September 2005. The Columbia
 3 River plume (~46°N) and the upwelling of deep waters off the Cape Mendocino (~40°N) are clearly seen. (B) 1997–
 4 2005 time-series data for sea-air CO₂ flux from a mooring off Monterey Bay, California. Seawater is a CO₂ source
 5 for the atmosphere during the summer upwelling events, but biological uptake reduces levels very rapidly. These
 6 rapid fluctuations can affect atmospheric CO₂ levels. For example, if CO₂ from the sea is mixed into a static column,
 7 a 500-m-thick planetary boundary layer over the course of one day, atmospheric CO₂ concentration would change
 8 by 2.5 μatm. If the column of air is mixed vertically through the troposphere to 500 mbar, a change of about 0.5
 9 μatm would occur. The effects would be diluted as the column of air mixes laterally. However, this demonstrates
 10 that the large fluctuations of sea-air CO₂ flux observed over coastal waters could affect the concentration of CO₂
 11 significantly enough to affect estimates of air-land flux based on the inversion of atmospheric CO₂ data. Sea-air CO₂
 12 flux was low during the 1997–1998 and 2002–2003 El Niño periods.

13



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Appendix 15A

Database and Methods

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2
3
4 A database for pCO₂, temperature and salinity in surface waters within about 1,000 km from the shore
5 of the North American continent has been assembled. About 550,000 seawater pCO₂ observations were
6 made from 1979 to 2004 by the authors and collaborators of Chapter 15. The pCO₂ data have been
7 obtained by a method using an infrared gas analyzer or gas-chromatograph for the determination of CO₂
8 concentrations in a carrier gas equilibrated with seawater at a known temperature and total pressure. The
9 precision of pCO₂ measurements has been estimated to be about ± 0.7% on average. The quality-
10 controlled data are archived at www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/CO2.

11 The zonal distribution of the surface water pCO₂, sea surface temperature (SST), and salinity data
12 shows that the greatest variability is confined within 300 km from the shores of both the Atlantic and
13 Pacific. Observations made in various years were combined into a single year and were averaged into 1°
14 × 1° pixels (approximately N-S 100 km by E-W 80 km) for the analysis. Accordingly, the results
15 represent a climatological mean condition over the past 25 years. Finer resolutions (10 × 10 km) may be
16 desirable for some areas close to shore because of outflow of estuarine and river waters and upwelling.
17 However, for this study, which is aimed at a broad picture of waters surrounding the continent, the fine
18 scale measurements have been incorporated into the 1° × 1° pixels. In addition, data with salinities of less
19 than 16.0 are considered to be inland waters and have been excluded from the analysis.

20 Climatological monthly and annual mean values for pCO₂ in each zone were computed first. Then
21 the sea-air pCO₂ difference, which represents the thermodynamic driving potential for sea-air CO₂ gas
22 transfer, was estimated using the atmospheric CO₂ concentration data. Finally, the net sea-air CO₂ flux
23 was computed using transfer coefficients estimated on the basis of climatological mean monthly wind
24 speeds using the (wind speed)² formulation of Wanninkhof (1992). The transfer coefficient depends on
25 the state of turbulence above and below the sea-air interface and is commonly parameterized as a function
26 of wind speeds (corrected to 10 m above the sea surface). However, selection of wind data is problematic
27 because wind speeds vary with the time scale (hourly, diurnal, or seasonal). For example, fluxes
28 calculated for the South Atlantic Bight from 6-h mean wind speeds in the NCEP/NCAR version 2 file (1°
29 × 1° mean) were lower than those estimated using the monthly mean. This discrepancy suggests that ships
30 used commonly for coastal carbon studies tend to be small and hence are rarely at sea under high wind
31 conditions, so observations are biased toward lower winds. Taking into account that the observations have
32 been made infrequently over multiple years, the gas transfer coefficients estimated from climatological
33 mean monthly wind speeds may be more representative. The Schmidt number is computed using

1 measured SST and climatological mean salinity (Da Silva *et al.* 1994). The flux values in a given month
2 are then averaged to yield a climatological mean flux (and standard deviation) for each month. This
3 procedure assumes implicitly that the seawater pCO₂ changes at much slower rates in space and time than
4 the wind speed and that the seawater pCO₂ does not correlate with the wind speed.

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